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the survivability of existing systems, deploy additional redundant systems and proliferate command, control and communications capabilities are considered to be of a higher priority.


Senaor WARNER. Last year, as you know, this committee took an initiative Wliereby in the fiscal year 1983 Defense authorization will as enacted by the Sena ate, the administration was directed to relocate the E 4 "Kueecap" aircraft from Andrews Air Force Base to a point in the interior of the United States.

While this statutory requirement w's not accepte: liy tlie blouse/Sente ('ollference, I understand that the administration is pursuing steps along these lines.

('an you give us an uj date on the situation with re. pect to relocating the E-t. Ilow urgent a priority so you believe such a relocation could le?

Mr. LATHIAM. At the request of the administration, a plan to relocate The National Emergency Airborne Command l'ost was developed and has been submitted for approval. [Deleted.)

DSP GROUND STATION CONNECTIVITY TO NORAD Senator WARNER. What are the current means of providing connectivity be. tween the DSP Ground Station and the NORAD facility at (hepeme Mountain?

Mr. LATHIAN. ('urrently, the data from [deleted]). The data is then sent directly to NORAD anıl the other users via [(eleted).

Senator WARNER. What is the likelihood that this means of connectivity will survive an EMP-type attack?

Mr. LATHAM. [Deleted. ] However, these phenomenon are so complex to pire. dict that it is entirely possible that a significant portion of the commercial system could in fact function after an EMP attack.

Senator WARNER. What initiatives are planned to provide a high-confidence connectivity capability for this critical functior ?

Mr. LATHAM. Two programs are ongoing and another is programed to provide a high-confidence connectivity among the [deleted].


Senator WARNER. Mr. Latham, do you believe that, given the inherent difficulties in providing assured EMP hardness to fixed ground-based facilities, we are better advised to pursue aggressively a hardening of airborne assets and other elements of the system rather than expanding large sums to EMP harden the land-based portion of the (network?

Mr. LATHAM. It is not difficult to provide assured EMP hardness for a limited number of selected ground-based ( facilities. It is easier and costs less to EMI’ Harden a ground-based CP capability, as has been done at HQ SAC and NORAD [deleted] as examples, than to harden an equivalent airborne asset. While this approach provides a hardened command post capability, the communications links connecting the hardeved command posts to the users have limited range. In order to have an end-to-end hardened communications capability, a Groundwave Emergency Network (GWEN) type system, hardened satellites, or hardened airborne platforms must be used for relay. EMP hardening of airborne assets with high confidence is a more complex and potentially more expensive task. This is primarily due to the weight, space and the flying environment constraints imposed on the hardening approach that has to be implemented. However, be cause of mobility and location uncertainty, airborne assets have a significant survivability advantage over fixed ground facilities to sabotage and nuclear effects.

There is an element of the land-lased C system, [deleted]. This approach may have merit depending on its cost and available assets. Under these circumstances, [deleted].

REVISIONS OF ELECTRO-MAGNETIC PULSE THREAT Senator WARNER. Are steps currently underway to revise the assessment of the threat posed to the U.S. strategic Cl network by electromagnetic pulse effects of nuclear weapons? Does it appear that the threat levels assumed previously are proving to be less than expectant?

Mr. LATHAM. Steps are underway to both review and update the EMP threat [deleted). DNA is presently conducting R&D to quantify energy content at [deleted] should not present a problem to EMP hardened facilities and its effect on unhardened ground-based facilities will probably be within the uncertainty associated with EMP effects on these facilities.

Senator WARNER. Is the resiliency of our 03 system to EMP effects proving to be greater than previously believed ? Mr. LATHAM. The resiliency of our overall C system to EMP is [deleted].

MOBILE COMMAND CENTER OPTION Senator WARNER. Have studies been performed with respect to alternatives available to us for providing survivable, mobile command and control centers? In your view, do shipborne MCC's provide greater survivability and operational flexibility than do ground-based mobile command ?

Mr. LATHAM. The question of the optimum platform mix that will provide a survivable and enduring node of the NMCS is currently under study by a DOD strategic command center panel. This panel has been given the responsibility to define the concept and generic structure for coherent, interoperable and endurable strategic command center capability for use by senior decision makers such as the JCS and the nuclear-capable CINCs. The panel has also been tasked for the integration of existing and near-term planned command centers and will design a mid- and long-term strategic and theater nuc ear command center architecture for the DOD. The results of their effort shculd be available in late summer.

The use of land-mobile assets to exploit mobility as a basis for reducing O'I vulnerability [deleted]. On the other hand, small coastal merchant type ships can operate autonomously in off-shore areas re atively free from collateral damage effects and can support larger staffs, facilities and communications antennas than can be accommodated in practical land-mobile configurations. The shipborne MCC could provide an alternative means of achieving continuity of force management, intelligence collection and processing, and decision-making support throughout a protracted strategic conflict. The survivability of the shipborne MCC would be a function of [deleted].

There are advantages and disadvantages between land-mobile assets and shipborte MCC's with regard to survivability and endurability. Cost, connectivity and vulnerabiilty are major factors to be considered. The best chance of surviving and enduring the NMCS lies in a combination of surface, sea and air command center facilities.

THREAT ASSESSMENT CONFERENCING Senator WARNER. Is it true that our current threat assessment conferencing capability requires the use of leased, non-secure, and vulnerable landlines? Is there no backup to this capability ?

Mr. LATHAM. The current threat assessment conferencing capability uses a [deleted]. In addition, we are in the process of transferring critical circuits and networks from commercial microwave and satellite facilities to governmentned, hardened facilities. Senator WARNER. What would be the effects for the National Command Authority decisionmaking process if the capability should be denied? Mr. LATHAM. The denial of threat assessment conferencing could possibly delay or interrupt critical conferencing timeliness. However, the likelihood of this occurring is slim. If the United States has strategic warning and reacts to this warning, then the NCA, connected through NEACP or a Mobile Command Center, can conduct the critical conferencing required via DSCS and in the late 1980's, via MILSTAR or GWEN. 9

Senator WARNER. What steps are planned in the present 0 modernization program to rectify the deficiencies of this system?

Mr. LATHAM. The requirement to rectify the deficiencies of the system has been validated, and preparatory steps have been taken regarding a concept for develnping, fielding and funding for equipment to satisfy the requirement. A secure conferencing project (SCP) has been established that will provide for the development of enhanced strategic command and control, and general purpose conferencing capabilities using Jam Resistant Secure Communications terminals,


satellite comectivity and cryptographic equipment that is liardened against EMP. An early operational capability is planned for fiscal year [deleted] and will include many users [deleted). A [deleted] conferencing capability that will include [deleted] locations is planned by the fiscal year [deleted] timeframe.


Senator WARNER. Secretary Latham: Would you describe the status of the review being performed pursuant to congressional action last year concerning embedded computer systems standardization? Please provide in detail the optious under review and their relative merits and deficiencies.

Jr. LATHAM. The study directed by Congress as a part of the fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorization Act has been underway since November 1982. It is being conducted by a team from the three Military Departments and the OSD staff. A rough draft report has been prepared and the target for completion is April 15, 1983.

The study is addressing the six issues posed in the ('onference Report, namely:

(a) A full assessment of the applicability of commercial computer technology including, but not limited to computer hardware, semiconductors and associated ISA's to Defense Department missions,

(b) The desirability of standardization at ISA level in light of alternative approaches, including those taking advantage of the technology mentioned in paragraph (a).

(c) The degree of software transportability (transferring computer programs from one computer to another) that the various approaches permit and how each approach would affect Department of Defense hardware/software logistics support requirements and the cost of computer system ownership.

(d) An assessment of the relative merits and liabilities inrolved in the incorporation of each approach into Department of Defense weapons systems.

(e) A justification for all on-going service computer development projects including but not liimted to the Army's Military ('omputer Family and other Army computers, the Navy's AX/UYK-43/4, the AV/VYK-7, the AV/UTK-20 and all Air Force computers including the family military-standard 1750 IS.A computers.

(f) A plan to reduce the proliferation of these computers.

Among the options under review are: No standardization; Standardization only at the High Order Language (HOL) level; standardization at the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) level ; standardization on a limited number of external attributes; form, fit and function (F-cubed) standardization; box-level hardware standardization; module-level standardization ; and total product standardization.

The relative merits and deficiencies of these approaches and various combinations of them will be included in the report which will be delivered to the Congress. It is not possible to provide the detail you request in advance of completion of the study.


Senator WARNER. Secretary Latham: Would you describe for the record prog. ress which has been made in the aftermath of the committee's initiative concern. ing the streamlining of critical mission related computer procurements? What steps have been taken to implement this initiative:

Mr. LATILAM. In February 1987, the Department issued preliminary guidelines which informed the acquiring activities in the Department of the change in our authority relative to computer acquisition. l'articular note was made that the ('ssential test as to whether such acquisitions were to be under 10 C.S.C. 2315 or 40 U.S.C. 759 is the fumetional usage of the equipnient and services, and not their commercial marketplace availawility. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering was named the senior official in the context of Section 2315.

Language in the committee's report on the fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorization Act clarified the intent of Congress with respect to this exemption. Wit!: that clarification and in coordination with the Office of Management and Budg t, the guidelines were revised and reissued on March - 1983. A copy of the revised suidelines has been provided to the Committee. At that time, the l'nder Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering delegated the responsibilities of Senior

Official for Mission Critical Computer Resources (MCCR) to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology. He further directed that a Defense Computer Resources Board be established under the MCCR Sen3: Official. Board will serve in policy oversight role for determinations of erempt status under 10 USC 2315. This latter action will be implemented as part of a current update to DOD Directive 5000.29, “Management of Computer Redurces in Major Defense Systems."

ECX/TACAMO Senator WARNER. Would you comment at this time briefly, and in greater detail for the record, on the reasons for which the Navy found unacceptable the msolicited proposal submitted by the Lockheed Corporation which called for the cancellation of the ECX program and the procurement instead of modified EC-130 aircraft.

Admiral NAGLER. On March 11, 1982, the Naval Air Systems Command issued 1 Request for Quotation (RFQ), No. N00019-82-2-0014, expressly to obtain an ECX Weapon System. The ECX Weapon System, as defined by the RFQ, is an lectromagnetic pulse hardened aircraft serving as a platform for the AN/USC3 mission Airborne Very Low Frequency Communication System. Both the aircraft and the communications system comprise the ECX Weapon System. The RFQ permitted an offerer to submit deviations from the type specifications is long as reasons for the deviations were included in the quote. Lockheed did not respond to the RFQ. On 30 June 1982, Lockheed submitted an uncolicited proposal to CNO for a preplanned product improvement to the EC-130. On 9 August 1982, the Lockheed proposal, with a covering letter from the Chief of the Naval Material Command, was returned to the President of the GeorgiaLockheed Company, explaining that it did not meet the criteria of an unsolicited * Toposal as delineated in the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) and other applicable Naval instructions. The Lockheed proposal was submitted as “unsolieited," but section 4-904 of the DAR defines an unsolicited proposal as a written offer to perform a proposed task or effort, initiated and submitted to Se Government by a prospective contractor (offerer) without a solicitation by 'he Government, with the objective of obtaining a contract." In addition, Naval Air Systems Command Instruction 4200.8B provides that a proposal shall not be deemed "unsolicited” when it (1) is merely a normal development or extension

an existing Department of Defense Program, or (2) the designation "unsolaited proposal” is applied for the apparent purpose of avoiding competition. The proposal submitted by Lockheed addressed the Government's requirement de-neated in the RFQ and, thus, the Department of the Navy cannot treat the proposal as “unsolicited.” The Government cannot consider a proposal for a requirement separately, when that requirement is the subject of an ongoing competition. Consideration of the proposal would be unfair to the companies who responded to the solicitation and would greatly jeopardize the integrity of the competitive process. Additionally, an operational assessment of this proposal by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations revealed numerous discrepancies, errors and unsupported assumptions thus avoiding the unsolicited proposals conclusions.

Senator WARNER. Are you concerned that it may prove to be impossible to support the [deleted] airborne alert posture in the Atlantic until such time as the new ECX aircraft is introduced into the inventory?

Admiral NAGLER. I fully expect TACAMO to continue its outstanding performthee in the Atlantic throughout the transition to ECX. The Atlantic TACAMO squadron began supporting the JCS 100 percent airborne mission in September 1973. Since 1973 there has been [deleted] continuous Atlantic coverage. There will Le no more severe conditions during the upcoming transition period than there Lave been in the past. Benator WARNER. Operational commanders have indicated concerns along these Iles. What steps are planned by the Navy to alleviate this problem? Admiral NAGLER. The OPNAV staff along with the Naval Air Systems Command Lave arranged a schedule for depot level maintenance [deleted]. This is an acceptable level that can be supported by each squadron without jeopardizing the mistion, The Fleet CINCS have personally agreed to this plan. Senator WARNER. Would a further buy of EC-130 aircraft to insure an ability

support uninterrupted coverage in the Atlantic over the next few years be advisable?


Admiral NAGLER. Purchase of additional performance, weight, speed and range limited EC-130s and companion communication suites would not see delivery until 1987 and would be too late to be of any assistance in the transition from EC-130 to ECX.

EXTREMELY LOW FREQUENCY (ELF) Senator WARNER. You testified that the ELF system was performing according to mathematical predictions of its capability. Isn't it the case that the deployment sites selected have actually been shown to be capable of projecting an ELF transmitted message over a substantially greater area than had previously been thought possible with a system this size?

Admiral NAGLER. Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) system performance has been predicted on a worst case basis for [deleted] time availability throughout the required submarine operating areas. This performance is based on a submarine at a keel depth [deleted) and a speed [deleted]. Changes in depth. speed. range, and atmospheric noise which create excess signal strength provide added oprational flexibility to extend heading capabilities or expand receiving envelope factors. In such cases, ELF messages have indeed been received in areas outside the mathematically predicted, “worst case" area of reception contours. U.S.S. Ohio (SSBN 726) had an experimental ELF receiver installed for her first Trident patrol in 1982. ELF reception occurred [deleted] percent of the time irrespective of the ship's leading. (Deleted) ELF messages were received [deleted] and this with only a partial ELF transmitting capability in operation.


Senator WARNER. How long has there been a jammer based on Cuban soll? What do we know about its capabilities? Is it currently interfering with any of our C activities?

Admiral TOMB. (Deleted.)


Senator WARNER. What percentage of the Alternate National Military Command Center's Antennas would we expect to lose as a result of EMP effects? Are steps planned to rectify this deficiency?

Admiral Tomb. [Deleted.]


Senator WARNER. What can you tell the committee about Soviet capabilities with respect to space mines as a means of threatening our critical space-based C assets ?

Admiral Tomb. The deployment of a space mine is certainly within Soviet technological capabilities. [Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. Is it believed that the Soviet Union possesses today the necessary technology? Do you personally feel that such a space mine anti-satellite capability exists in the Soviet inventory/is deployed in orbit?

Admiral Tomb. The Soviets have the necessary technology to employ a space mine. [Deleted.]

OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS Senator Warner. What steps are planned to try to make the eracuation of the President (deleted] system in the event of an attack more efficient, and consequently, more likely to succeed in its mission of insuring the survivability of the National Command Authority?

Admiral TOMB. [Deleted.)


Senator WARNER. What would lie involved in the Soviet Union acquiring a ca. pability ? Are they believed to have such a capability today? Would we expect to have any high-confidence indicators that such a capability has, in fact, been deployed in the Soviet arsenal ?

Admiral Tomb. (Deleted.]

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