which will improve the E-4B battle staff's ability to provide critical and time sensitive information to the NCA. Procurement funds have also been requested to harden selected systems on the EC-135 against nuclear effects, to provide a satellite secure voice conferencing capability, and to add new Communications Security (COMSEC) units on the E-4B to support the NCA connectivity.

Another major program to improve the reliability and endurance or our strategic communications is the Groundwave Emergency Network (GWEN). The GWEN system will be a grid of unmanned, EMP hardened relay nodes operating in the LF band. This effort is a part of the MEECN program to improve its LF/VLF capabilities. Network terminals will be located at major command centers, warning sensor sites, and force element command posts. These terminals will have the capability to support two-way data communications in a nuclear environment. In fiscal year 1985 we will complete GWEN development activities and planning will begin for the final operational capability.

Under the SAC Communications program, we are developing the SAC Digital Network (SACDIN) and Aircraft Alerting Communications EMP (AACE) upgrades. SACDIN modernizes SAC's existing C3 data system, which is aging and has insufficient capacity. SACDIN objectives are to provide responsive, twoway, secure command and control information between SAC Headquarters and subordinate commanders. The system, in addition to providing greater survivability, will also feature increased flexibility and growth capacity. In fiscal year 1984, we will continue the SACDIN field test and IOT&E and begin production, installation and transition.

In order to provide EMP protection for emergency action communications equipments, the AACE upgrade program will provide shielded enclosures for selected equipment at SAC main operating bases in the CONUS. The screen rooms and associated interface consoles will also protect the communications equipment used to relay critical action messages from the command post to bomber crews in the alert facility or in the cockpit. AACE development will continue in fiscal year 1984 and initial site surveys and installation will begin. Our MEECN VLF/LF Improvements project provide for improved dissemination of war orders via the secure VLF/LF system. In fiscal year 1984 we will continue the development of a VLF/LF miniature receive terminal (MRT) for bomber aircraft. The bomber receiver will provide a high confidence strategic communication link for the B-1B, B-52G, B-52H and FB-111 aircraft. In addition to these VIF/LF improvements. the MEFCN adaptive high frequency (HF) communications program will provide a modular family of radios which will improve the reliability of two-way communications in a ruclear or jamming environment. In fiscal year 1984, full scale development of the near term modifications and the modular radio family will continue.

III. STRATEGIC DEFENSE

Strategic defense is an integral part of our deterrence nosture. Our strategic defense forces insure that our strategic retaliatory capability survives a Soviet first strike by providing timely, reliable, and unambiguous warning, assessment and defense. Our atmospheric warning and defense systems are required to defend against bomber and cruise missile strikes, our missile surveillance and warning systems are required to provide warning and limited assessment of missile attacks, and our space surveillance and defense systems are required to provide warning and defense against attacks on our systems in space. Atmospheric warning and defense

Over the past 20 years, the United States has significantly reduced forces assigned to atmospheric defense. At the same time, the Soviet threat has increased in numbers and capability with the introduction and continued production of Backfire bombers and improved air-to-surface missiles. A new strategic bomber similar to but larger than our B-LB. called the Blackjack, is expected to become operational during the 1980s. Given this growing threat, atmospheric surveillance and warning are required to support intercept operations and to insure that retaliatory responses can be made. Capable atmospheric surveillance and defense are necessary to preclude U.S. vulnerability to a no-warning bomber attack and to limit the damage that would be inflicted in follow-on bomber strikes. Our current atmospheric warning and defense systems have serious deficiencies which must be corrected.

Atmospheric defense of North America is a cooperative U.S.-Canadian effort. The atmospheric surveillance and warning system is configured to control access to North American airspace during peacetime, provide tactical warning of an air attack and provide command and control for air defense. The current system is composed of ground-based radars in the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, the Continental Air Defense Integration North (CADIN)/Pinetree system in Southern Canada, and the Joint Surveillance System. However, these radars Lare limited range and significant gaps in low altitude coverage. Surveillance and command and control of interceptor aircraft will transition from groundbased Regional Operational Control Centers to the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft during periods of crisis. Interceptors currently assigned for atmospheric defense include F-106s, F-4s and F-15s. Within the Department of Defense (DOD), we have developed an Air Defense Master Plan. The first major initiative is to improve our surveillance and warning system through development and deployment of Over-the-Horizon-Backscatter (OTH-B) radars and through improvements to the DEW Line. The OTH-B radar will correct coverage deficiencies by providing wide-area, long-range, and all-altitude warning of atmospheric attack from the East, West and South. Because of performance degradations from auroral effects, the OTH-B radar is not suitable as a north-looking surveillance and warning system. Therefore, we will improve the existing DEW Line radars with a mix of minimally attended long-range radars and short-range gap-filler radars.

Missile surveillance and warning

The credibility of our national defense policy of nuclear deterrence and escalation control are critically dependent on our ability to provide unambiguous, timely, reliable, and survivable, warning and assessment of an enemy missile attack.

Our ballistic missile attack warning and assessment are currently accomlished by space surveillance systems, three Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) sites, the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System radar, two PAVE PAWS SLBM detection and warning sites and the FPS-85 and FSS-7 SLBM radars.

One of our objectives for improving the capabilities of our current systems is improve the BMEWS radar resolution to provide information beyond simple attack warning. We want to be able to determine the accurate magnitude and probable effect of the attack in progress so that our selected response is appropriate. To achieve better attack assessment, we are developing the capability for more precise tracking and improved data processing to provide better preimpact assessment in support of critical, time-sensitive National Command Authority (NCA) decisions. The BMEWS modernization program supports this objective, as well as providing improved reliability and supportability.

In response to the growing Soviet SLBM threat. we are working to expand ar SLBM warning system by deploying two additional PAVE PAWS radars in the southeastern and southwestern United States. These deployments will expand our coverage and enable us to phase out the older, less capable FPS-85 and FSS-7 SLBM radars in Florida. We are also developing upgrades for all four PAVE PAWS radars which will provide improved warning and some attack assessment.

We are continuing to pursue technology to support development of an adranced missile surveillance system for improved long-term survivability and attack assessment. Infrared data on earth background and ballistic missile sigLatures are being collected and analyzed in the Missile Surveillance Technology program. This effort supports development of the required technologies and designs being conducted in the Advanced Warning System program.

In our Ballistic Missile Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment Support program, we develop and maintain the overall architecture for current and prozramed systems to insure that individual warning and attack assessment eletents operate coherently as an integrated system and that modifications to the system are certified as operational prior to IOC declaration.

Senator WARNER. That is a good progress report, General.
General RANDOLPH. Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER. Admiral?

21-250 O 83 8

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. GORDON R. NAGLER, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, COMMAND AND CONTROL OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral NAGLER. Mr. Chairman, I request permission to put in the record a classified statement and give you a very short unclassified overview.

Senator WARNER. When we go into classified session, at that time put your statement in the record.

Admiral NAGLER. A short unclassified statement. We think the Navy has the finest peacetime crisis management command and control in the world today, but we are lacking a good enduring C2 capability for wartime.

As you mentioned earlier, due primarily to the initiative of this committee, we are now on track to develop an enduring capability and the last Congress approved that initiative of this committee.

We are moving out on EMP hardening in our TACAMO aircraft which this committee suggested. We are in a source selection on ECX aircraft which is a replacement for TACAMO. We expect to go to contract at the end of April, next month.

The MILSTAR, with the Air Force as the lead service, the MILSTAR satellite is also critical to the Navy and the Navy is fully participating with the Air Force out in Los Angeles. We have dovetailed the program we have on EHF with MILSTAR. The Navy is the lead service for the development of terminals for the ground, sea, and air.

As you know, the extremely low frequency communications program, commonly known as ELF, was approved by Congress, and we are moving out in that area right now, and in closed session I can go into more detail on that subject.

Finally, the concept that this committee suggested we undertake, we are now moving out in those areas and know where we are actually going.

That completes my unclassified summary.

Senator WARNER. Admiral Tomb, as I understand it, most of your testimony will be in closed session. Is that correct?

Admiral TOMB. That is true.

Senator WARNER. Do you have any statement you wish to make in open session?

Admiral ToмB. No. sir, except to tender General Davis' regrets for not being here at this time. I have tendered his classified statement to you for the record.

Senator WARNER. We had General Davis for 4 hours this morning. We were able to cover much of his area of responsibility this morning. Let me go first to just a general question.

Mr. Latham, following all of the material that comes before us with respect to cutting the defense budget, I have seen reference to the thought that perhaps we are trying to move too far too fast with consequently heavy expenditures in this field of C.

As you well know, since I was the one that started the initiative 3 years ago, I disagree. I would want for the record your generalized response to that recommendation.

Mr. LATHAM. Yes, sir, I share your judgment on that. I do not think Tre are moving too far or too fast or asking for too many expenditures. Senator WARNER. Go over the growth pattern of the last 3 years. Mr. LATHAM. The dollars have increased from approximately $12 Million in 1982 to $14 billion in fiscal year 1983 and the request is almost $17 billion in 1984. So, we have actually experienced a percentage growth in the command and control area that has been substantially higher than the other parts of the defense budget; however, the priority has been recognized, as you noted earlier, by the President and Secretary of Defense, and others on down.

I might add a perspective I would like to share with you, that is, if in fact there have to be cuts in the defense budget to impact on weapons programs, then your ability to execute with the strategic forces becomes even more important, with more emphasis on C3 to be better able to control your forces.

In contrast, if somebody asked, should we take a fair-share cut in Cif the rest of the defense budget is cut, I would say absolutely not. Senator WARNER. I share your view. It does provide the insurance we need against any possible accident with respect to communications, the whole network which is apparently the central nervous system of Our strategic capability. You would come down on that strongly? Mr. LATHAM. Very much so.

Senator WARNER. Admiral, I presume you share that?

Admiral NAGLER. There is no question in my mind, Mr. Chairman, without C3 you cannot run any forces effectively. It is not a very exiting area, it is not aircraft, ships, et cetera. So, some people do not have the tendency to look at it as I probably look at it, as critical to the entire leadership of the Navy. I know that the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Watkins, strongly supports what you are trying to do in this area.

BLUE-GREEN LASER SYSTEM

Senator WARNER. Now some more specific questions.

Take, for example, this blue-green laser system. Do you believe the vel of funding sought in the Navy and DARPA accounts for bluegreen laser communications is the maximum amount that can be utiIzed efficiently?

Admiral NAGLER. Yes, sir. I believe in 1984 the Navy has about $1.3 illion in blue-green laser and DARPA has about $30 million. The Navy's money is in advance development, the 6.2 account. I think that is more than sufficient for blue-green, personally.

I do not look for blue-green to be operational until the midnineties, 1993 to 1995 is the timeframe I am saying for the operation of the lue-green.

Senator WARNER. Have there been any substantial technical breakthroughs since we convened a year ago?

Admiral NAGLER. No, sir, I think we increased power ability around percent. We need 20 percent before it is effective. I don't believe that is a breakthrough. I am also looking at it from an affordability tandpoint.

In later years will that replace anything and do a better job? At the present time I am not convinced it will, but, of course, I hesitate to figare out what is best in 1995. I think from our standpoint, knowing how

we have to watch the money, I would put the money on today's problems and solve today's problems.

To answer your question directly, I think we have more than sufficient money in blue-green today.

Senator WARNER. Secretary Latham, would you care to amplify? Mr. LATHAM. Yes, sir, I agree with that. We will not know if it is a technically feasible solution to the satellite approach until 1985. There are some technical milestones that have to be reached before we can be sure that we can build the system.

Second, at that time, even if we can build the system and the technology is proven, is it a cost-effective thing to do with respect to other alternative means that we have for communicating with the submarines that are coming on line, including reconstitution concepts for both VLF and ELF and MILSTAR terminals on the submarines?

So, we will need to take a very thorough look at that before we make a large investment in such a program.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Latham, on another point-as the Congress moved in one direction to achieve deregulation-it may have impacted on national defense. Let us look at Ma Bell.

Would you describe the Department of Defense position with respect to the dismantling of the AT&T network aside from the philosophical standpoint, what effect does this diversification of industry and introduction of competition have upon the problems that you are facing with the C3 system?

Mr. LATHAM. That is a good question, sir. On any given day here in the United States, some 90-plus percent of our communications are carried by some form of commercial carrier, primarily AT&T, so this divestiture is of significant interest to the Department from the standpoint of how this is going to impact our ability to assure that we have the communications that we need.

The other aspect that impacts this is the Computer II regulatory policy of the FCC. Those two together can potentially impact us in several different ways.

In the Computer II decision, they have decided that what they call augmented service, which is not very well defined, primarily computers in telecommuniaction networks, will not be regulated.

Further, customer premise equipment, equipment on a customer's premises, such as your home telephone, will not be an item that will be part of the telephone company any more. In fact, as you know, they are trying to sell these to their various customers today.

The third thing is the issue of how are we going to assure in DOD under national emergencies, that we have an ability to call a single point of contact and assure ourselves of getting end-to-end connectivity including the customer premises equipment that might be required when we do have a national emergency.

As a result of these kinds of challenges, we are taking several steps to try to get our arms around it.

First, there is a Senate bill being put forward by Senator Packwood that will take one major step for us and that is it will allow the carriers to do planning in support of national emergencies and get around any of the antitrust issues.