« PreviousContinue »
We let the contract to upgrade our experimental OTH-B radar system to a fully operational configuration and to ultimately deploy it as the first sector of the East Coast operational radar system (3 sectors točal). This radar will provide a long range surveillance capability, out to 1800nmi., not possible with currently deployed air-defense radars.
The Air Force accepted the first Regional Operations Control Center (ROCC) at Tyndall AFB, Florida. This ROCC is part of our overall new Joint Surveillance System which provides the surveillance and Command and Control functions required for peacetime air sovereignty and air defense in crisis or wartime for as long as it survives. It will reduce manpower requirements by 5000 slots and more importantly reduce O&M costs by $100M annually.
We awarded a contract for the Initial Connectivity Capability (ICC) which is simply a proof of concept program for the Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN). The GWEN program will provide a high confidence communication link between our sensors, NORAD, the CONUS based SIOP forces and the National Command Authority. GWEN gives us a system protected in a nuclear environment unlike today's systems.
We bezan the Divercity Reception Equipment (DRE) program which provides improved VLF receiving equipment for all Air Force ground and airborne systems. We were very pleased to let a large contract on this program to a small disadvantaged business.
We continue working on providing the necessary vital command, control and communications to effectively integrate, coordinate and manage all space defense resources. The Space Defense Command and Control System (SPADOC) is a phased approach to support the integration of our sensors (monitor and inform), the defensive posture of our own space systems (protect), and our antisatellite system (negate).
The current atmospheric defense system of North America, a United StatesCanadian, co-operative venture, is composed of ground-based radars in the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, the Continental Air Defense Integration North (CADIN)/Pinetree system in southern Canada, and the Joint Surveillance System. However, these radars have limited range, significant gaps in low altitude coverage and high O&M costs (mostly because of age and obsolesence of the equipment), We have a comprehensive upgrade program which includes replacing the existing DEW line with a series or minimally attended long range radars and unattended short range radars which will reduce the O&M costs nearly 50 percent. Further, the initial investment for this replacement program will be amortized in little over three years. The Congress will soon have before it a reprogramming action in fiscal year 1983 for $8M dollars to begin this program and keep it on schedule, in accordance with congressional directions as part of its fiscal year 1983 appropriations bill.
I have provided, here in my formal testimony, detailed information on the Air Force C programs which, with your permission Mr. Chairman, I will insert for the record along with my spoken testimony. Thank you for your time and we look forward to your continued support in helping to make the U.S. O program stronger than ever.
II. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (0) Ci systems link together all of our national defense assets. C systems are essential to implement strategy, control forces, and employ weapons in modern warfare. These systems support day-to-day operations, provide time-critical warning information to decision makers, facilitate accurate situation monitoring and allocation of resources in crisis situations, and permit the appropriate and effective employment of military power in wartime.
Recognizing the importance of C in directing military operations, the Soviets are placing heavy emphasis in their doctrine on the disruption of our C3. The threats to our systems include both physical and electronic attacks.
In response to this growing threat, our primary objective is to increase the survivability, security, and jam resistance of our Co links. Another objective is to improve both the relia hility and interoperability of our systems. Finally, we want to exploit new technologies to more effectively meet future C3 requirements and overcome future threats to our system. The discussion in this chapter will focus on our strategic, tactical and defense-wide C modernization programs.
Our Strategic C programs include warning and assessment systems, command centers, and supporting communications systems. Since the warning and assessment systems were discussed in the Strategic Defene section, this section will concentrate on command centers and communications.
One or the key features of the President's strategic program is the modernization of strategic C". For deterrence to be a successful policy, we need effective strategic systems which will be able to support the wartime planning and employment of our nuclear forces. In the past, we have not modernized our C systems fast enough. As a result, these systems have insufficient survivability and reliability to operate dependably during a nuclear conflict. Consequently, we are increasing the survivability and endurance of our strategic C systems. Our objective is to make these systems as strong as the forces they support. One of the primary
programs for enhancing command and control of our strategic forces is the Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) System. The AFSATCOM system consists of aircraft terminals, ground terminals, and communications packages on several satellites, including the Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) System, and the Satellite Data System (SDS) satellites, along with classified host spacecraft. In our AFSATCOM RDT&E program, we are developing improvements to our existing ultra high frequency (UHF) AFSATCOM terminals which will allow us to better withstand enemy ja ning efforts and provide a smoother transition to MILSTAR—the next generation satellite system.
We are currently installing AFSATCOM terminals in strategic bombers, reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, ground and airborne command centers, and missile launch control facilities. The installation of these terminals will be virtually completed by December 1983. In addition, the Army and Navy are also acquiring terminals for their own systems. Our fiscal year 1984 request includes procurement funds for an AFSATCOM communications package to be integrated on a host spacecraft to ensure continuity of communications in critical geographic areas.
In fiscal year 1984, we will continue to develop the new satellite communications system called MILSTAR to replace AFSATCOM. MILSTAR will fulfill the urgent need for highly jam-resistant and survivable satellite communications, and will feature increased jam resistance by using extremely high frequency (EHF) communications and increased survivability through a variety of techniques. It is a joint Army/Navy/Air Force program which will support both strategic and tactical users.
SDS provides one of the major host satellites supporting the AFSATCOM system. It provides critical two-way transpolar command and control communications for our nuclear capable forces. SDS also supports a data communications network among remote tracking stations and the STC for command and control of our satellites. Our fiscal year 1984 RDT&E program will complete the development of a Shuttle-compatible SDS spacecraft, and our procurement program is designed to sustain our capability to launch satellites to replenish the SDS orbital constellation.
The E 4 and EC-135 aircraft are survivable extensions of the fixed command centers which provide higher confidence in our ability to manage our strategic forces during a nuclear war. In fiscal year 1984 we are continuing development of several major improvements in our Airborne Command Post equipment. These include increased capabilities for the E-4B super high frequency (SHF) and EC-135 UHF satellite communications terminals, as well as continuing our work on improving the Minimum Essential Emergency Communication Network (MEECN) low frequency and very low frequency (LF/VLF) system. Development also continues on the improved communications processing, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) testing, and terminals for the Integrated Operational NUDET Detection System (IONDS). These systems are being developed so that we will be able to maintain connectivity and communications in the high threat environment of the future. We are designing these systems to have, among other features, antijam capabilities so that they will be able to support operations in a nuclear environment over extended ranges for prolonged periods of time. Our fiscal year 1984 aircraft modernization portion of the Cs improvement program includes procurement funds for installing upgraded automatic data processing equipment
which will improve the E 4B battle staff's ability to provide critical and time sensitive information to the XCA. Procurement funds have also been requested to harden selected systems on the EC-135 against nuclear effects, to provide a satellite secure voice conferencing capability, and to add new Communications Security (COMSEC) units on the E-AB to support the NCA connectivity.
Another major program to improve the reliability and endurance or our strategic communications is the Groundwave Emergency Network (GWEN). The GWEN system will be a grid of unmanned, EMP hardened relay nodes operating in the LF band. This effort is a part of the JEECN program to improve its LF/VLF capabilities. Network terminals will be located at major command centers, warning sensor sites, and force element command posts. These terminals will have the capability to support two-way data communications in a nuclear environment. In fiscal year 1985 we will complete GWEN development activities and planning will begin for the final operational capability.
Under the SAC Communications program, we are developing the SAC Digital Network (SACDIN) and Aircraft Alerting Communications EMP (AACE) upgrades. SACDIN modernizes SAC's existing CẢ data system, which is aging and has insufficient capacity. SACDIN objectires are to provide responsive, twoway, secure command and control information between SAC Headquarters and subordinate commanders. The system, in addition to providing greater survivability, will also feature increased flexibility and growth capacity. In fiscal year 1984, we will continue the SACDIN field test and 10T&E and begin production, installation and transition.
In order to provide EMP protection for emergency action communications equipments, the AACE upgrade program will provide shielded enclosures for selected equipment at SAC main operating bases in the CONUS. The screen rooms and associated interface consoles will also protect the communications equipment used to relay critical action messages from the command post to bomber crews in the alert facility or in the cockpit. AACE development will continue in fiscal year 1984 and initial site surveys and installation will begin.
Our MEECN VLF/LF Improvements project provide for improved dissemination of war orders via the secure VLF/LF system. In fiscal year 1994 we will continue the development of a VLF/LF miniature receive terminal (JRT) for bomi)er aircraft. The bomber receiver will provide a high confidence strategic communication link for the B-1B, B-52G, B-52H and FB-111 aircraft. In addition to these VLF/LF improvements, the MEFCX adaptive high frequency (HF) communications program will provide a modular family of radios which will improve the reliability of two-way communications in a ruclear or jamming environment. In fiscal year 1984, full scale development of the near term modifications and the modular radio family will continue.
III. STRATEGIC DEFENSE Strategic defense is an integral part of our deterrence nosture. Our strategic defense forces insure that our strategic retaliatory capability survives a Soriet first strike by providing timely, reliable, and unambiguous warning, assessment and defense. Our atmospheric warning and defense systems are required to defend against bomber and cruise missile strikes, our missile surreillance and warning systems are required to provide warning and limited assessment of missile attacks, and our space surveillance and defense systems are required to provide warning and defense against attacks on our systems in space. Atmospheric warning and defense
Over the past 20 years, the United States has significantly redured forces assigned to atmospheric defense. At the same time, the Soviet threat has increased in numbers and capability with the introduction and continued production of Backfire bombers and improved air-to-surface missiles. A new strategic bomber similar to but larger than our B-LB, called the Blackjack, is expected to become operational during the 1980s. Given this growing threat, atmospheric surveillance and warning are required to surport intercept operations and to insure that retaliatory responses can be made. Capable atmospheric surveillance and defense are necessary to preclude U.S. vulnerability to a no-warning bomber attack and to limit the damage that would be inflicted in follow-on bomber strikes. Our current atmospheric warning and defense systems have serious deficiencies which must be corrected.
Atmospheric defense of North America is a cooperative U.S.-Canadian effort. The atmospheric surveillance and warning system is configured to control access to North American airspace during peacetime, provide tactical warning of an air attack and provide command and control for air defense. The current system is composed of ground-based radars in the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, the Continental Air Defense Integration North (CADIN)/Pinetree system in southern Canada, and the Joint Surveillance System. However, these radars bare limited range and significant gaps in low altitude coverage. Surveillance and command and control of interceptor aircraft will transition from groundbased Regional Operational Control Centers to the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft during periods of crisis. Interceptors currently assigned for atmospheric defense include F-1065, F-4s and F-15s.
Within the Department of Defense (DOD), we have developed an Air Defense Master Plan. The first major initiative is to improve our surveillance and warning system through development and deployment of Over-the-Horizon-Backscatter (OTH-B) radars and through improvements to the DEW Line.
The OTH-B radar will correct coverage deficiencies by providing wide-area, long-range, and all-altitude warning of atmospheric attack from the East, West and South. Because of performance degradations from auroral effects, the OTH-B radar is not suitable as a north-looking surveillance and warning system. Therefore, we will improve the existing DEW Line radars with a mix of minimally attended long-range radars and short-range gap-filler radars. Hissile surrcillance and warning
The credibility of our national defense policy of nuclear deterrence and escalation control are critically dependent on our ability to provide unambiguous, timely, reliable, and survivable, warning and assessment of an enemy missile attack.
Our ballistic missile attack warning and assessment are currently accomplishe:1 by space surveillance systems, three Ballistic Missile Early Warning Nystem (BUEWS) sites, the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System radar, two PAVE PAWS SLBN detection and warning sites and the FPS-85 and FSS-7 SLBM radars.
One of our objectives for improving the capabilities of our current systems is to improre the BJEWS radar resolution to provide information beyond simple attack warning. We want to be able to determine the accurate magnitude and probable effect of the attack in progress so that our selected response is appropriate. To achiere better attack assessment, we are developing the capability for more precise tracking and improved data processing to provide better preimpact assessment in support of critical, time-sensitive National Command Authority (NCA) decisions. The BMEWS modernization program supports this objective, as well as providing improved reliability and supportability.
In response to the growing Soviet SLBM threat, we are working to expand onr SLBM warning system by deploying two additional PAVE PAWS radars in the southeastern and southwestern United States. These deployments will expand our corerage and enable us to phase out the older, less capable FPS-85 and FSS-7 SLBJI radars in Florida. We are also developing upgrades for all four PAVE PAWS radars which will provide improved warning and some attack assessment.
We are continuing to pursue technology to support development of an adTaneed missile surveillance system for improved long-term survivability and attack assessment. Infrared data on earth background and ballistic missile signatures are being collected and analyzed in the Missile Surveillance Technology program. This effort supports development of the required technologies and designs being conducted in the Advanced Warning System program.
In our Ballistic Missile Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment Support proFram, we develop and maintain the overall architecture for current and proFramed systems to insure that individual warning and attack assessment elements operate coherently as an integrated system and that modifications to the system are certified as operational prior to IOC declaration.
Senator WARNER. That is a good progress report, General.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. GORDON R. NAGLER, U.S. NAVY, DIREC
TOR, COMMAND AND CONTROL OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Admiral NAGLER. Mr. Chairman, I request permission to put in the record a classified statement and give you a very short unclassified overview.
Senator WARNER. When we go into classified session, at that time put your statement in the record.
Admiral NAGLER. A short unclassified statement. We think the Navy has the finest peacetime crisis management command and control in the world today, but we are lacking a good enduring C2 capability for wartime.
As you mentioned earlier, due primarily to the initiative of this committee, we are now on track to develop an enduring capability and the last Congress approved that initiative of this committee.
We are moving out on EMP hardening in our TACAMO aircraft which this committee suggested. We are in a source selection on ECX aircraft which is a replacement for TACAMO. We expect to go to contract at the end of April, next month.
The MILSTAR, with the Air Force as the lead service, the MILSTAR satellite is also critical to the Navy and the Navy is fully participating with the Air Force out in Los Angeles. We have dovetailed the program we have on EHF with MILSTAR. The Navy is the lead service for the development of terminals for the ground, sea, and air.
As you know, the extremely low frequency communications program, commonly known as ELF, was approved by Congress, and we are moving out in that area right now, and in closed session I can go into more detail on that subject.
Finally, the concept that this committee suggested we undertake, we are now moving out in those areas and know where we are actually going.
That completes my unclassified summary.
Senator WARNER. Admiral Tomb, as I understand it, most of your testimony will be in closed session. Is that correct?
Admiral Tomb. That is true.
Senator WARNER. Do you have any statement you wish to make in open session ?
Admiral Tomb. No, sir, except to tender General Davis' regrets for not being here at this time. I have tendered his classified statement to you for the record.
Senator WARNER. We had General Davis for 4 hours this morning. We were able to cover much of his area of responsibility this morning.
Let me go first to just a general question.
Mr. Latham, following all of the material that comes before us with respect to cutting the defense budget, I have seen reference to the thought that perhaps we are trying to move too far too fast with consequently heavy expenditures in this field of C'.
As you well know, since I was the one that started the initiative 3 years ago, I disagree. I would want for the record your generalized response to that recommendation.