Page images

Mr. PERLE. As we have said previously, this administration shares the goals and endorses the spirit of your proposal, to seek, within the context of negotiated arms control agreements, a build-down of nuclear weapons, while allowing the modernization and replacement of nuclear forces necessary to correct the strategic balance, and maintain a stable deterrent. We seek a stable balance at the lowest level of military forces. Whenever modernization permits us to maintain the balance at lower levels, we can reduce forces and have done so in the past. Likewise, whenever the threat is reduced, whether by arms control or by unilateral actions on the other side, we can make reductions.

In the START and INF negotiations, we are seeking agreement on deep, verifiable reductions to equal and stabilize force levels. Because Soviet and American nuclear force structures differ significantly, it is not easy to apply a single mechanism for reductions in the forces of both sides and still maintain stability.

As with all arins control proposals based on fairly rigid mechanisms for technical implementation, the Cohen-Nunn proposal would contribute to stability and deterrence only if some flexininity were permitted in the application. In our case, the reason for this is obvious—U.S. weapons systems are, on average, older than comparable Soviet systems. For example, about three-fourths of U.S. warheads are on launchers or delivery systems which are 15 years old or older. In sharp contrast, three-fourths of Soviet warheads are on systems 5 years old or less. The Soviet Union has just completed a major modernization of its forces and, while it continues a dynamic military program, it does not face the survivability and aging problems that confront our strategic forces. We absolutely must modernize; the Soviet Union need not. Our land based missiles are old and vulnerable; theirs are new and secure. With the exception of two Trident submarines, all of our submarines were built in a few years in the early to mid-1960s. Since then the Soviet Union has deployed over 60 new ballistic missile submarines of five new types. Since we are heavily dependent upon our strategic bomber force for our deterrent, we also must modernize this leg of our strategic Triad. For example, we must bring the B-1 bomber into the forte aud extend the life of our quarter-century old B-52s by adding air launched cruise missiles. The Soviet Union, less dependent on its bombers and possessing a large, new Backfire bomber force, has no comparable requirement for modernization. Furthermore, our bombers face formidable air defenses that would not be limited by the mutual build-down. In short, given the fact that our modernization requirements are different, and also given the difficulties in verifying the actual numbers of weapons which are really added to delivery systems (as opposed to counting rules), a rigid application of the build-down principle could be destabilizing because it would be one-sided.

The key to enhancing stability via any arms reduction proposal is in providing the flexibility to address the very real problems resulting from differences in the forces on both sides. Senator Percy's approach to a mutual builddown illustrates how one could approach some of the problems of the builddown. However one were to approach a mutual build-down, stability would best be promoted by having provisions which prevent the emergence of destabilizing inequalities. And finally, effective verification would be absolutely essential.

DOD AUTHORIZATION/TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER Senator Nunn. Secretary Perle, what legislative initiative could be taken in the fiscal year 1984 DOD authorization bill to deal with the problems of technology transfer that you have testified about and done so much meaningful work?

Is there a set of both short-term and long-term measures we could initiate in this area?

Mr. PERLE. We have made progress in the technology transfer area and we will soon be able to close the gap betweru desires and performance, provided of course we retain the excellent help of the Armed Services Committee. As I am sure you are aware, the Defense Authorization Act-fiscal year 1983, reflected the concern of Congress that, “. . . DOD's technology transfer programs lack adequate resources, permanently assigned personnel, and sustained, highlevel policy supervision” (SASC Report on DOD Authorization Act, fiscal year 1983, No. 97-330, Pg. 151). Additionally, it provided $2 million for operating funds and required the Secretary of Defense to submit a written report each fiscal year recommending resources necessary for this program (DOD Authorization Act, fiscal year 1983, Conference Report No. 97-749, Pg 170). In response, Defense

added 34 permanent personnel to the Policy area and 10 to Research and Engineering. Incidentally, we are in the process of filling these positions now. Also, vre established a Program Element for technology transfer control with the $2 milıion as a new start program. The other DOD components (USDR&E, Army, Navy, Air Force, Dia, and NSA) are establishing technology transfer l’rogram E.ements for fiscal year 1984.

our initial manpower studies first concentrated on OSD agencies then on all DOD Components that deal with technology transfer. Our first report to Congress on the DOD Technology Transfer Program outlined our fiscal year 1984 budget submission. As I am sure you can appreciate, the fiscal year 1984 budget was simply a best guess regarding technology transfer and our first attempt to estawlish a base line for the program. Since that budget submission rre hare gained experience and understanding of what more accurately reflects the true minimum needs of our program. On the attached resource summary I believe I have described the minimum resources required to make our DOD program whole. l'lease notice that the “add on" is in addition to the fiscal year 1981 budget submission. The authorization of the fiscal year 1981 budget request plus the “add on" would be the kind of legislative support which we need to get the job done. We need the SASC to identify this request as a "minimum base line" for our program. This will serve to protect the program for the long term and prevent others in the future from selectively weakening the effort. DOD TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTROL PROGRAM RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

[Dollar amounts in millions]

[blocks in formation]

General defense intelligence program:

Air Force.



1 These figures constitute the AF technology transfer control program established as directed under 2 new program eleme ts (P:s). These! were viousiy sulfilling the same functions under different PE's. The program will be ungraded beginning in fiscal year 1985. Other activities within AF in fiscal year 1983 include 32 persons who are engaged at least 50 percent of the time in technology transfer. Their total funding is estimated to cost $1,900,000.

NUCLEAR WEAPON CONSTRUCTION Senator Nunn. Dr. Wagner, what are the changes in nuclear weapon construction in recent years that makes these systems safer than old warheads?

Dr. WAGNER. Senator Nunn, as you know, there has been a growing concern in some segments of the public, for safety issues, almost demanding a risk-free world. While some of us believe these demands are excessive, the concerns are real and must be taken into account when we consider the public views of the trust put in us in our stewardship of nuclear weapons. Our nuclear weapons have always been designed with a high level of safety built in, and the record of the last 38 years has been excellent. There has never, in response to the heightened sensitivity, today's nuclear weapons are designed and built to even more stringent safety standards than was the case even a few years ago.

One area of recent improvement is in the generation of unique firing signals. The electrical systems and strong link/weak link pairs in our modern warheads provide nuclear detonation fail-safe protection beyond that thought achievable in the 1960s. This accomplishment was the product of a vigorous effort to develop

system concepts and components that would respond in a predictably safe manner even in severe accident environments such as fire or crashes.

Another area of recent improvement is the type of high explosive used in our modern weapons. The possibility of scattering radioactive material in potential accidents involving nuclear weapons has been greatly decreased by use of insensitive high explosive (IHE) rather than conventional explosives used in older weapons. Developing an IHE suitable for use in nuclear weapons required more than ten years of dedicated research and development. IHE is now generally used in all warheads and being produced or in engineering development, unless clear operational penalties preclude it.



Senator THURMOND. Mr. Perle, if the United States and the Soviet Union were to enter into a nuclear freeze, what would be the impact on the stability of NATO:

Mr. PERLE. The impact on the cohesion of NATO, American leadership, and spirit of bipartisan diplomacy would be extremely serious. First, an American negotiation of an immediate freeze would unilaterally repudiate the NATO Alliance-wide 1979 dual-track decision to deploy Pershing II and GLCMs to counterbalance Soviet SS-20s and to seek U.S.-Soviet arms reductions providing equal ceilings and equal rights. NATO leaders oppose a freeze for precisely these reasons. Second, a freeze today would increase fear in Europe that NATO would be “decoupled" from the American nuclear umbrella, a fear which led European leaders to press for the dual-track decision in the first place.


Senator THURMOND. Mr. Perle, last year you read the committee a quote from Sir Samuel Hoare about the disastrous way negotiators are pressured into reaching an agreement just for agreement's sake. I agree with Sir Samuel except that only negotiators from democratic countries are subject to such pressures. Negotiators from totalitarian regimes are independent from public opinion.

Do movements such as the nuclear freeze campaign have such an impact on our negotiators today?

Mr. PERLE. As Ambassador Rowny wrote in a letter to Congressman Broomfield last June 25, passage of a nuclear freeze resolution "would make my job as a negotiator much more difficult”. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, a U.S. nuclear freeze vote would signal to the Soviets that Americans were neither serious, nor united, on the vital issues of American strength and American determination to negotiate far-reaching, equitable and verifiable reductions in nuclear forces such as we have proposed at the START and INF talks. Second, by permanently codifying existing Soviet advantages and preventing the U.S. from carrying out our long overdue modernization program, a freeze would undercut any Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously on reductions. In short, a freeze would replace reductions, and virtually eliminate the likelihood that they would ever occur.

[Whereupon, at 1:33 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)



FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 1983



Washington, D.C.



The subcommittee met in open session pursuant to recess at 2:08 p.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Warner, Wilson, and Exon. Staff present: Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., and Patrick L. Renehan, professional staff members; Karen A. Love, staff assistant. Also present: John Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon, and Ed McGaffigan, assistant to Senator Bingaman. OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Senator WARNER. The subcommittee will now commence our afternoon session. We had a very extensive and profitable closed session this morning with the commander of the strategic Air Command, General Davis.

This afternoon we will begin consideration of what has become, in recent years, one of the most important and broadly supported aspects of the President's strategic force modernization program. As our witnesses well know, this committee 2 years ago, took steps at its own initiative, to provide for important improvements to the Nation's C3 network.

Since that time, we have followed with interest developments in the administration's thinking about and funding for enhancements of this vital central nervous system of our strategic deterrent. We look forward to receiving an update on this subject from the distinguished individuals appearing before us today.

Mr. Don Latham, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence, has been a driving force behind these long overdue system upgrades.



Similarly, the Joint Strategic Connectivity Staff, today represented by Rear Adm. Paul Tomb, has provided much of the supporting analysis and program options.

We look forward to hearing from these gentlemen on how the initiatives funded thus far have improved our strategic connectivity posture and what remains to be done.

In addition, we are pleased to have Vice Adm. Gordon Nagler, Director, Command and Control and Maj. Gen. Bernard Randolph, Director, Space Systems and Command, Control, Communications, representing the two services directly involved in the strategic mission.

We will proceed briefly here in open session. A vote is anticipated in about 20 minutes or so and that may well be the appropriate time to go into closed session.

Does the gentleman from California have any opening observations?

Senator WILSON. No, sir, Mr. Chairman.



Mr. LATHAM. Thank you very much for having us here this afternoon. Indeed we will attempt to summarize for you the progress we have made during this last fiscal year and what we intend to do with the fiscal 1984 funds that we have requested.

Specifically for fiscal year 1984 the total communications, command and control budget to the President is $16.7 billion which is up approximately 18 percent from the fiscal 1983 request, and of that $16-odd billion, about $4.6 billion is the strategic Cs area, up approximately $1 billion from the fiscal 1983 request in this area.

We will summarize for you in the closed session in more detail the specific progress we have made and the details of what the 1984 moneys will bring in the areas of communications, command, and decision initiatives and tactical warning and in the attack assessment area.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Latham follows:]


DEFENSE (COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND, CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE) Mr. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE : It is my privilege to appear before you today to discuss the Strategic Communications, Command and Control (C3) elements of the President's program for revitalizing our strategic deterrent posture. It is our firm belief that a credible, reliable and survivable Cå system offers the greatest deterrent to any possible future war. Accordingly, our present budget request emphasizes improved reliability and survivability of existing systems and the initiation of programs that will improve surveillance and warning capabilities for both the air-breathing and ballistic missile threats. In addition, we will be initiating the acquisition of systems that will help sustain essential CS functions during all phases of conflict. It is vital that we proceed with our major strategic 03 program to assure that the National Command Authority (NCA) is continually linked to our surveillance and warning systems, our command centers and our nuclear capable forces. It will be because of this assured NCA-to-Forces Connectivity that any adversary must consider an attack on the United States as a very high risk option. Our budget request for strategic

« PreviousContinue »