Soviet Union as of March 1983 LRINF missiles on launchers: SS-20 (351) –. SS-4 (232) SS-5 (16) Total (599)‒‒‒‒‒‒ Warheads 1, 053 232 16 1,301 United States LRINF missiles on launchers:1 GLCM Total Soviet Union as of December 1981 INF aircraft in Europe: 2 1 Under NATO's 1979 decision in the absence of a concrete arms control agreement the U.S. will deploy 108 PERSHING II and 464 ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) to Europe beginning in December 1983. 2 Nuclear capable aircraft including aircraft not assigned to combat units. 3 A small number of F-16s have replaced F-4s since December 1981. Total numbers remain essentially the same. [Deleted.] [Deleted.] With respect to qualitative comparisons, the new SS-20 missile is far superior to the older SS-4s and SS-5s. The accuracy and reaction time are greatly improved and the SS-20 has three warheads versus one for the older systems. In addition, the mobility of the SS-20 along with its increased range increases greatly its survivability. The SS-20 has twice the range of the US GLCM and almost three times the range of the PERSHING II. While it is very difficult to compare US and Soviet aircraft because of the geographical advantages which favor the Soviet Union, it is safe to say that the Soviet Union's Frontal Aviation has been the focus of comprehensive modernization and reorganization programs. The upgrades to the FENCER, FLOGGER and FITTER aircraft have had a particularly profound impact on Soviet offensive capabilities. The FENCER with its all-weather, low-attitude penetration capability increases greatly the Soviet's ability to carry out deep strikes into NATO territory with little warning. By contrast the US and Allied upgrading of NATO aircraft has been limited numerically (F-16s, Tornado) and while comparable in quailty, NATO aircraft are greatly outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact. Overall, the Soviet modernization program has been much more vigorous than that of the US and NATO, and the former qualitative advantage which we once enjoyed is eroding rapidly. SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS Senator WARNER. Secretary Perle, can you provide us with the number of SS-20 ballistic missiles deployed in the Soviet Union and targeted against Western Europe at the time of the December 1979 NATO agreement on LRINF? What is the equivalent number today? In addition, how many systems have been fielded whose targets lie outside Western Europe? Mr. PERLE. At the time of the December 1979 NATO decision, there were [deleted] SS-20s deployed, of which [deleted] were targeted on Europe. Today, there are 351 SS-20s deployed, of which [deleted] are targeted on Europe and [deleted] are in the Soviet Far East. However, it must be noted that because of their mobility and transportability, SS-20s are a threat to Europe or Asia wherever located. SS-20 RELOCATABILITY Senator WARNER. Secretary Perle, how far east of the Ural Mountains can Soviet SS-20s be deployed and still be in range of critical NATO targets? Do you have an estimate of how long it would take SS-20s based for attack upon targets in East Asia to be relocated so as to be within range of principal European high-value targets? Mr. PERLE. SS-20s as far east as Mongolia can still hit NATO territory. [A Secret/NOFORN insert is being provided under separate cover to answer the second part of the question.] NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY REPORT Senator WARNER. What is the relationship between the North Atlantic Assembly and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? Does the forthcoming report, which it is said will call for unilateral reductions of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe going, in any way, to represent a formal decision on the part of the alliance? Mr. PERLE. (a) The North Atlantic Assembly is the interparliamentary organization of member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, founded in 1955. Its aims are to strengthen cooperation and understanding among Alliance countries, to encourage governments to take the Alliance viewpoint into account when framing legislation, and to encourage a common feeling of Atlantic solidarity in national parliaments. It provides a forum for North American and European parliamentarians to discuss problems of common concern, and it constitutes a link between parliamentarians and the Alliance. The North Atlantic Assembly is, however, completely independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (b) Reports of the North Atlantic Assembly do not, in any way, represent formal decisions on the part of the Alliance. UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT Senator WARNER. You gained some notoriety in your recent appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in which you asserted that supporters of the nuclear freeze had formally embraced a program calling for unilateral disarmament. What evidence do you have to support that contention? Mr. PERLE. As you may recall, what I characterized specifically as "unilateral” were the decisions taken in early February in St. Louis by the leaders of the U.S. nuclear freeze movement. As reported in the New York Times, the freeze leaders stated that the freeze movement will henceforth oppose additional spending on nuclear forces by the United States. That is, they will attempt to impose a freeze on U.S. modernization while merely calling for, but not making U.S. actions contingent upon, similar Soviets restraint. This I believe is fair to characterize as "unilateral". While the House freeze resolutions use the words "mutual and verifiable", I should point out that the practical effects of an immediate freeze would be close to unilateral disarmament. A freeze now would ccdify existing Soviet military advantages while preventing the United States from undertaking long overdue modernization to replace our aging and increasing vulnerab`e deterrent forces. At the present time, Soviet nuclear forces are substantially newer, more powerful and more survivable than are ours. For example, 75 percent of Soviet nuclear warheads are on launchers the average age of which is five years or younger, while the same percentage of U.S. warheads are on launchers the average age of which is fifteen years or older. Thus, even without cheating, the Soviets can easily maintain their sizable military advantage under a freeze. In contract, without modernization, elements of The U.S. strategic Triad will, over time, become obsolete—that is, our deterrent ability will slowly wither away. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN NUCLEAR WAR AT SEA Senator NUNN. Secretary Perle, last year, during this hearing, you and I had a discussion about your statements about nuclear war at sea. What is your view on this matter now? Do you still believe we have disadvantages in the strategie nuclear balance? Do you still believe we have distinct disadvantages in the theater nuclear balance? Do you still believe that a nuclear war at sea should not be confined there, but escalated to land in areas where we have disadvantages? Mr. PERLE. With regard to the strategic nuclear balance. Senator Nunn, I believe it is clear that the Soviet Union has distinct advantages in most significant measures of strategic forces. One area in which we still retain some advantage in total numbers of deliverable weapons, but that advantage rests chiefly on an aging bomber fleet whose ability to penetrate Soviet air defense is increasingly in question. In any event the continuing growth in the number of Soviet warheads means that even that small U.S. advantage may soon disappear. At the time of the SALT I Agreement some 10 years ago it was generally accepted that rough parity existed between the two sides. When one examines what the Soviets have done since that period and compares it with actions the United States has taken, there can be little question that the strategic nuclear balance has been adversely affected. Similarly, during a decade in which our nuclear force posture in Europe has not undergone significant changes, the Soviets have undertaken large forward deployments of new and highly capable nuclear delivery means. In addition to the deployment of SS-20 missiles, the Soviets have fielded modern replacements for their shorter-range missiles (SS-21 and SS-23 missiles are replacing FROG and SCUD, the SS-22 is rep'acing Scaleboard). Large numbers of Fencer, Flogger and Fitter aircraft have been forward deployed and the Soviets now have nuclear warheads for cannon artillery. These increases give the Soviets a capability for flexible nuclear strike options they never had before. We are definitely at a disadvantage in theater nuclear capability. With regard to a nuclear war at sea, Senator, last year I told you that it was U.S. policy that we would not permit the Soviet Union to confine a nuclear war to the sea. That policy stands—for three important reasons. First, the essence of deterrence is that our retaliatory capability must raise incalculable risks to any potential aggressor; in this regard, we have never-confine our retaliation within the boundaries of any particular theater. Rather, to support our deterrent policy, we will continue to make clear that we have the capability to escalate a conflict. and that we will take whatever steps are necessary to halt aggression against us or our allies. Secondly, it is a fact that we and our allies are far more dependent on using the sea than are our potential adversaries. If we agree to confine a nuclear war to the sea-by, for example, tacitly agreeing to a series of tit-for-tat exchanges-we would soon lose the surface naval capabilities we depend on to defeat the naval air, surface and submarine forces attempting to sever our SLOCs. Thus a nuclear war confined to the sea, even if it resulted in the essential elimination of both the U.S. and Soviet surface fleets would threaten our ability to reinforce our allies. Finally, land-based air, especially the SNA Backfire, is an important element of the Soviet naval nuclear threat to our Navy. Agreeing to confine a nuclear war to the sea would in essence allow the Soviets to operate nuclear strikes against our naval forces from a sanctuary of landbased airfields, and this would undercut both deterrence and defense. Based on all of this, we remain convinced that our policy is a prudent one which decreases the risk of war by increasing our ability to affect the Soviet risk calculus, and thus reinforce our capability to deter. "TWO FOR ONE" BUILD DOWN Senator NUNN. Secretary Perle, Senator Cohen and I have proposed a guaranteed nuclear build-down concept or "two for one" reduction proposal. Could you provide for the record your office's views of this proposal as it relates to both strategic and theater systems and to the current U.S. arms control positions in START and INF? Would such a concent provide a vehicle for reducing to the levels outlined in the U.S. proposals? What problems, if any, do you have with this proposal in terms of U.S. force modernization goals? Could you comment on Senator Percy's description of how this proposal and concept could be implemented? Mr. PERLE. As we have said previously, this administration shares the goals and endorses the spirit of your proposal, to seek, within the context of negotiated arms control agreements, a build-down of nuclear weapons, while allowing the modernization and replacement of nuclear forces necessary to correct the strategic balance, and maintain a stable deterrent. We seek a stable balance at the lowest level of military forces. Whenever modernization permits us to maintain the balance at lower levels, we can reduce forces and have done so in the past. Likewise, whenever the threat is reduced, whether by arms control or by unilateral actions on the other side, we can make reductions. In the START and INF negotiations, we are seeking agreement on deep, verifiable reductions to equal and stabilize force levels. Because Soviet and American nuclear force structures differ significantly, it is not easy to apply a single mechanism for reductions in the forces of both sides and still maintain stability. As with all arms control proposals based on fairly rigid mechanisms for technical implementation, the Cohen-Nunn proposal would contribute to stability and deterrence only if some flexibility were permitted in the application. In our case, the reason for this is obvious-U.S. weapons systems are, on average, older than comparable Soviet systems. For example, about three-fourths of U.S. warheads are on launchers or delivery systems which are 15 years old or older. In sharp contrast, three-fourths of Soviet warheads are on systems 5 years old or less. The Soviet Union has just completed a major modernization of its forces and, while it continues a dynamic military program, it does not face the survivability and aging problems that confront our strategic forces. We absolutely must modernize; the Soviet Union need not. Our land based missiles are old and vulnerable; theirs are new and secure. With the exception of two Trident submarines, all of our submarines were built in a few years in the early to mid-1960s. Since then the Soviet Union has deployed over 60 new ballistic missile submarines of five new types. Since we are heavily dependent upon our strategic bomber force for our deterrent, we also must modernize this leg of our strategic Triad. For example, we must bring the B-1 bomber into the force and extend the life of our quarter-century old B-52s by adding air launched cruise missiles. The Soviet Union, less dependent on its bombers and possessing a large, new Backfire bomber force, has no comparable requirement for modernization. Furthermore, our bombers face formidable air defenses that would not be limited by the mutual build-down. In short, given the fact that our modernization requirements are different, and also given the difficulties in verifying the actual numbers of weapons which are really added to delivery systems (as opposed to counting rules), a rigid application of the build-down principle could be destabilizing because it would be one-sided. The key to enhancing stability via any arms reduction proposal is in providing the flexibility to address the very real problems resulting from differences in the forces on both sides. Senator Percy's approach to a mutual builddown illustrates how one could approach some of the problems of the builddown. However one were to approach a mutual build-down, stability would best be promoted by having provisions which prevent the emergence of destabilizing inequalities. And finally, effective verification would be absolutely essential. DOD AUTHORIZATION/TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER Senator NUNN. Secretary Perle, what legislative initiative could be taken in the fiscal year 1984 DOD authorization bill to deal with the problems of technology transfer that you have testified about and done so much meaningful work? Is there a set of both short-term and long-term measures we could initiate in this area? Mr. PERLE. We have made progress in the technology transfer area and we will soon be able to close the gap between desires and performance, provided of course we retain the excellent help of the Armed Services Committee. As I am sure you are aware, the Defense Authorization Act-fiscal year 1983, reflected the concern of Congress that, “. . . DOD's technology transfer programs lack adequate resources, permanently assigned personnel, and sustained, highlevel policy supervision" (SASC Report on DOD Authorization Act, fiscal year 1983, No. 97-330, Pg. 151). Additionally, it provided $2 million for operating funds and required the Secretary of Defense to submit a written report each fiscal year recommending resources necessary for this program (DOD Authərization Act, fiscal year 1983, Conference Report No. 97-749, Pg 170). In response, Defense added 34 permanent personnel to the Policy area and 10 to Research and Engineering. Incidentally, we are in the process of filling these positions now. Also, we established a Program Element for technology transfer control with the $2 million as a new start program. The other DOD components (USDR&E, Army, Navy, Air Force, DIA, and NSA) are establishing technology transfer l'rogram Elements for fiscal year 1984. Our initial manpower studies first concentrated on OSD agencies then on all DOD Components that deal with technology transfer. Our first report to Congress on the DOD Technology Transfer Program outlined our fiscal year 1984 budget submission. As I am sure you can appreciate, the fiscal year 1984 budget was simply a best guess regarding technology transfer and our first attempt to establish a base line for the program. Since that budget submission we have gained experience and understanding of what more accurately reflects the true minimum needs of our program. On the attached resource summary I believe I have described the minimum resources required to make our DOD program whole. I'lease notice that the "add on" is in addition to the fiscal year 1984 budget submission. The authorization of the fiscal year 1984 budget request plus the "add on" would be the kind of legislative support which we need to get the job done. We need the SASC to identify this request as a "minimum base line" for our program. This will serve to protect the program for the long term and prevent others in the future from selectively weakening the effort. DOD TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTROL PROGRAM RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 1 These figures constitute the AF technology transfer control program established as directed under 2 new program eleme.ts (Ps). These person.ie! were previously fulfilling the same functions under different PE's. The program will be ungraded beginning in fiscal year 1985. Other activities within AF in fiscal year 1983 include 32 persons who are engaged at least 50 percent of the time in technology transfer. Their total funding is estimated to cost $1,900,000. NUCLEAR WEAPON CONSTRUCTION Senator NUNN. Dr. Wagner, what are the changes in nuclear weapon construction in recent years that makes these systems safer than old warheads? Dr. WAGNER. Senator Nunn, as you know, there has been a growing concern in some segments of the public, for safety issues, almost demanding a risk-free world. While some of us believe these demands are excessive, the concerns are real and must be taken into account when we consider the public views of the trust put in us in our stewardship of nuclear weapons. Our nuclear weapons have always been designed with a high level of safety built in, and the record of the last 38 years has been excellent. There has never, in response to the heightened sensitivity, today's nuclear weapons are designed and built to even more stringent safety standards than was the case even a few years ago. One area of recent improvement is in the generation of unique firing signals. The electrical systems and strong link/weak link pairs in our modern warheads provide nuclear detonation fail-safe protection beyond that thought achievable in the 1960s. This accomplishment was the product of a vigorous effort to develop |