Senator LEVIN. Cruise missile technology?

Mr. PERLE. They are very rapidly closing on us.

Senator LEVIN. Would you swap right now if you were a Soviet planner?

Mr. PERLE. I would not swap.

Senator LEVIN. If you were a Soviet leader, would you swap theirs for ours?

Mr. PERLE. Theirs is very similar to ours since they got it from us. Senator LEVIN. So they are not ahead on nuclear cruise missile technology?

Mr. PERLE. I think for the purpose I can say in this open hearing they are rapidly approaching our technology because they got it from

us.

Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Nitze and his counterpart in Geneva supposedly outlined an interim solution in the INF talks which had a number of features which have been described publicly. Reportedly the Pentagon played a role in having the United States reject that proposal. I am wondering whether or not that is true?

Mr. PERLE. I will be glad to make a general statement in this open session and a detailed statement if you would like in closed session.

The ideas that were discussed between Ambassador Nitze and Ambassador Kvitzinskiy were reviewed in Washington and I believe in Moscow as well. They were largely Ambassador Nitze's ideas. When Ambassador Nitze returned to Geneva it was with the authority to keep open the private channel in which those ideas had been discussed.

He was, upon arrival in Geneva, confronted by a Soviet denunciation of the ideas that had passed between them and by an impassioned Soviet attack on the United States position and I believe that began with Kvitzinskiy's arrival at the Geneva airport.

The answer is that the review that was conducted of those ideas resulted in Ambassador Nitze having the authority to continue to discuss it in that private channel and the Soviets flatly and coldly turned

it down.

Senator LEVIN. In other words, the United States did not reject that proposal?

Mr. PERLE. That is correct.

Senator LEVIN. Nitze was not given any instruction not to accept or pursue that particular proposal?

Mr. PERLE. I would like to get into the details in closed session, but I will say he had all the authority he needed to respond to the Soviets had the Soviets been responsive to the ideas that had been discussed. Senator LEVIN. Are you able to say in public whether or not he was directed not to pursue that particular proposal?

Mr. PERLE. I don't mean to be evasive

Senator LEVIN. You are succeeding anyway.

Mr. PERLE. Not every detail in that proposal.

Senator LEVIN. I am talking about the proposal as a whole. Was he directed not to pursue that proposal as a whole?

Mr. PERLE. No

Senator LEVIN. Were you involved

Mr. PERLE. To the best of my knowledge, he was not.

Senator LEVIN. Were you involved in the discussions that were held relative to that proposal?

Mr. PERLE. I was.

NEUTRON WEAPONS IN EUROPE POSE POLITICAL PROBLEM

Senator LEVIN. Is it your understanding that the placement of neutron weapons in Europe would not be a political problem for some of our European allies?

Mr. PERLE. I should think in the main the deployment now of neutron weapons would be a political problem, but I haven't discussed this recently with the allies.

Senator LEVIN. It would be?

Mr. PERLE. It would be.

Senator LEVIN. Finally, on this question of this intermediate proposal which we hear our allies want us to offer by the 28th, you have indicated that you don't know of any allies who are pushing us to make such an offer by the 28th.

Do you agree, however, with the apparent alleged reported desire of many of our allies that the administration propose some sort of interim alternative to the zero option at some point?

Mr. PERLE. I think there is a desire among some of our allies for us to demonstrate that we are flexible in these negotiations.

Senator LEVIN. Are we going to at some point offer an interim. proposal?

Senator WARNER. Isn't that the subject that we want to cover here in executive session?

Mr. PERLE. Certainly the details in closed session.

The question does give me an opportunity to say that it has been our position in the very beginning that we would be responsive to negotiate in good faith to any Soviet proposal. They have thus far not made a serious proposal that would justify our making response to them. So, the door has been open from the first day of the negotiation to discuss alternatives to zero.

Senator LEVIN. I don't want to push you for any details except in an executive session.

Are you able to say publicly that based on what is on the table now from their side we are not prepared to offer an interim proposal? Mr. PERLE. That would entail making two proposals in a row in the absence of a serious proposal from them.

Just as a matter of negotiating style, that has its problems.

Senator LEVIN. I don't understand your answer. Are you saying, and again I don't want to push you for any detail, can you say publicly, based on what therefore is on the table, we are not able to make a counteroffer without a new offer from them?

Mr. PERLE. We have made no decision to make a counteroffer. Senator LEVIN. We have not decided whether or not to do that? Mr. PERLE. That is right.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Wagner, one chart put up in open session relates to documentary evidence that the United States has been engaged in unilateral "Build Down" of the nuclear weapon stockpile since 1960.

Do you have that chart with you?

Dr. WAGNER. I do not have that in chart form.

Senator WARNER. We just happened to have it in the back room. I keep it handy.

Dr. WAGNER. That is a chart produced by our office. That is exactly right. As you can see, it is without numbers on the left-hand side because those numbers are and should remain classified.

However, it does show the buildup during the fifties and early sixties and then the reduction in the numbers. The fact of the matter is that during the early sixties we had a large number of bomber-carried weapons and we modernized the forces in the late sixties and early seventies.

We reduced the bomber component and increased the missile component, the net effect being the reduction you see there.

Senator WARNER. There is a comparable yield chart here that I happen to have.

Dr. WAGNER. That reduction in numbers was accompanied also by an even more striking reduction in total yield in the weapon stockpile. Those kinds of reductions are true for the tactical weapons as well, the details change somewhat, but it is generally true for tactical weapons. Senator WARNER. Gentleman, we will now go into executive session. Let us take a 3-minute break. I will ask the clerk to clear the room. [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in executive session.]

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The subcommittee proceeded in executive session at 12:10 p.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator John W. Warner.

Staff present: James G. Roche, minority staff director; Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Patrick L. Renehan and James C. Smith, professional staff members; Karen A. Love, staff assistant.

Also present: Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle, and Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin.

Senator WARNER. Secretary Perle, we would like to go into questions in executive session, but prior thereto I think you and Dr. Wagner should have an opportunity to make your own observations before we go on with the questions.

Mr. PERLE. Mr. Chairman, I really have nothing to add to the discussion we had this morning.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Wagner.

THEATER SYSTEMS AND CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS

Dr. WAGNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to amplify just a bit on the point that both Admiral Holland and General Watson made this morning which relates to a key characteristic of our theater systems which is their survivability. We know a fair amount about how the Soviets view the military relationship between their systems and conventional systems as well as our theater systems.

That view is that their No. 1 doctrinal intent is that they must destroy our nuclear systems before our nuclear systems can hurt them in return.

They devote a great deal of effort to that-both conventionally in terms of agents, special force units, and conventional deep maneuver units, as well as nuclear.

I suspect that they would prefer not to use the nuclear systems because I think the battlefield would freeze in effect if nuclear weapons were used, so they would prefer to destroy our systems conventionally if possible and they would devote resources to do that.

On the nuclear side of the survivability question I should say there is a class of systems that is not much talked about in the discussions that we hear, which the Soviets have a major advantage in, and that is mid-range missiles, missiles with ranges between 50 and a few hundred kilometers.

The SS-21's, 22's, and 23's are very effective and, in fact [deleted]. So, the survivability of our theater forces is [deleted] deficiency across the board, and it is not just in terms of weapon systems. It is in terms of command and control, surveillance systems, the entire array of things that one really has to have to pursue a war when threatened by the Soviet forces.

That concern for survivability is one of the things that conditions our view quite strongly about the utility of nuclear artillery. Nuclear artillery tubes are present in such numbers that it is impossible to distinguish a tube which can fire a conventional round from one which can fire a nuclear round. So in order to achieve their end, in effect destroying all our nuclear capability, conventionally if they can, the Soviets would need to target literally thousands of systems if we have an effective nuclear artillery capability.

Today, however, we have a rather [deleted] nuclear artillery capability. As you know, both rounds are old. We know that the Soviets in fact, because its yield is so [deleted].