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If you look at the proliferation that has occurred in the Soviet conventional systems with their rather substantial increase in the number of tanks, their 64 percent increase in artillery, 51 percent increase in armored personnel carriers and mechanized systems, it also becomes very apparent that the Soviets are aware of their vulnerability to short-range systems.

It is this vulnerability that they are trying to overcome by hardening their force and by making them more mobile and thus able to deploy them to their breakthrough attacks from a much greater distance.

So, from where we stand in the Army system we very much believe that the short-range theater systems serve as a very significant deterrent to the Soviet use of their rather massive conventional forces.


The second point that I would make is one that has already been made and that is our systems are getting very old. They are approaching the end of their shelf life and thus are not as effective as we need.

The third point that I would make with regard to the short-range systems is that we see a rather large proliferation on the part of the Soviets in the development of their short-range systems. Within the last 10 or 12 years we have seen them deploy several new nuclear capable cannons. They are replacing their Frogs and Scuds with second and even third generation missile systems that can deliver warheads to ranges significantly greater than our own.

The proliferation that we see within those short-range systems in the Soviet Union are sufficient to cause us great concern and thus it is necessary that we continue to modernize in order to gain any deterrent leverage against those kinds of systems.

I would also point out two programs that are now in very serious trouble and we need support.



We need to continue with the Pershing program. We have had significant successes in the last four launches and we believe it is now time to go ahead and make those resources available so that that program can continue.

The second is the 155 nuclear round, the W82. Last year we were unsuccessful within the Department of Energy in being able to facilitize that system sufficiently so that we could continue into production. That 155 nuclear system is very critical to our ability to deter. Two-thirds of our certified systems are in the 155mm caliber. Therefore, we present to the Soviets a rather difficult task in trying to target all the systems and thus our ability to survive is greatly enhanced if we have the 155 system in our inventory. The result is that the 155 system is perceived by our adversaries as being a very significant deterrent to their ability to succeed.

That concludes my remarks, sir.
Senator WARNER. Admiral Holland?



Admiral HOLLAND. The Navy program consists basically of four elements, Mr. Chairman.


We will be stressing survivability and improving our capability to operate in the nuclear environment: Most of that work involves testing to determine what we really have to do and then develop the improvements that we must make to our ships and aircraft.

We need to modernize our ASW and AAW weapons. The weapons we presently have are older and less effective against modernized Soviet threats.


We will within the next 2 years, put the cruise missile strike forces at sea. This proliferation of survivable fire power will cause significant problems for Soviet planners and should enhance raising the nuclear threshold.

Finally, the Navy has a good deal of work to do this year and next in the training and tactical awareness required to operate the ships and weapon systems that we are developing in the nuclear environment.

Senator WARNER. Admiral, will you defer for a moment? Senator Jackson has to depart and wants me to ask two questions of Mr. Perle while hle is here.


Secretary Perle, press accounts have described the Zablocki freeze resolution, as approved by the Foreign Affairs Committee, as differing from the original freeze resolution in the House, one example being the resolution calls for a negotiated freeze and would therefore permit some modernization of certain systems to go forward.

Would you describe the basic differences between the present Zablocki resolution and the original freeze resolution in the House and whether or not the present one in any way marks a step toward being more acceptable?

Mr. PERLE. It certainly is not more acceptable. It is confusing in a number of respects. I don't have the language in front of me, but it would require the administration to do things that are in contradiction with one another. I don't know what it means to say

that we should have a negotiated freeze.

Does that mean that the freeze should be only a partial freeze and not a total freeze?

In other words, it is impossible to tell from looking at that resolution what it is that will be frozen unless everything is frozen and I believe the only way one can read the language as recommended is requiring indeed that we go to the Soviets and propose a total freeze.

I tras up before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Congressman Varkey, the author of the original freeze on the House side, said that the freeze would not preclude the deployment of Trident submarines.

As I read the language, and I asked him where in the language he could find reference to the permissibility of Trident submarines, it became clear there is no such language. Congressman Markey was interpreting language that was saying something quite other than that.

I don't see any way we can read that resolution as requiring other than a total freeze. If it means something other than that, it should be amended on the floor to make sure what it does precisely mean.

Senator WARNER. The New York Times remarked that such a negotiated freeze would not preclude some new weapon deployment on either side so long as overall freeze limits are observed.

Mr. PERLE. If they mean quantitative, but not qualitative freeze, then they ought to say so.

I would urge my colleagues in the administration to take a long, hard look at whether we cannot find a way to live with the concept of a quantitative freeze. It is entirely possible that we could, but we can't live with a qualitative freeze that halts all our modernization program.

That I believe is the effect of the Zablocki resolution. I must say it is an extraordinary situation where you have a resolution that is described as meaning different things by even its own sponsor.

I would strongly urge the House to amend the Zablocki freeze resolution so that it applies only to the number of weapons and not the modernization within those numbers. As I say, then we would certainly take a fresh look at it.

Senator WARNER. Wouldn't your first recommendation be not to adopt the resolution as opposed to amending it?

Mr. PERLE. I would think it better to reject the resolution, not least of all, Mr. Chairman, because we presently have on the table in Geneva a proposal that we should have thought would meet with wide approval in the country, and in the Congress: and to put the President in a position of coming under an injunction by the Congress to propose something to the Soviet different from what he has in fact proposed and closer to the Soviet position than what he in fact is proposing can have only one effect and that is to undermine the President's ability to negotiate.

I believe this action is almost unprecedented. If I may say so, to propose a resolution that would have the effect of undermining the President's negotiators in Geneva when in the case of START we have only had two rounds of those negotiations, without giving the administration a decent chance to try to produce an agreement that would involve significant reductions, is I believe without precedent.

Senator WARNER. In the history of this country and our negotiations.

Mr. PERLE. I can't think of another occasion in which the Congress asked the President to accept a position closer to the position of our adversary and do so after a few months of negotiation.

Senator JACKSON. Isn't the real problem here, of course, that it does substantially impair the negotiating process?


The resolution as a matter of law does not have any impact. It is merely an expression of intent, but to our adversaries at the confer: ence table it gives them an enormous edge because there is no way in which we can have that degree of credibility which will result in an agreement that protects our vital national security interests.

It is a direct interference with the ability of the President, I should say an American President, to carry out his constitutional responsibilities.

It adds confusion. No one really knows what is meant by it. I have talked with a number of these people and I have pointed out what it does to our allies. “Well, we don't mean that."

All you can look at is the resolution itself and the idea of stopping the arms race as they put it and the idea of saying, “Isn't enough enough ?” has a lot of appeal.

The real tragedy of it is that I think the overwhelming majority of people in this country want to do something and see something accomplished in the way of arms reduction.

The real question is how do you get the process going? How do you provide the incentive to get the other side to join?

A number of us who have been concerned about it, most of them are dead now, I regret, joined over 30 years ago to eliminate by resolution all nuclear weapons. The late Brian McMahon and I introduced that in 1951 and again in 1953 after I watched the hydrogen device go off at Eniwetok.

Anyone who has watched it and been there close up knows the perils that are involved. But the interesting thing is that the Soviets turn all those things down and clearly the challenge that we face is how do you provide the incentive, Mr. Chairman, and the encouragement on the other side to get this reduction process going so that one day you will be able to eliminate at least in the Soviet Union and on the American side these enormous weapons of destruction.

Senator WARNER. While Senator Jackson is here, Senator Jackson and I introduced a resolution in the Senate during this debate last year and at the present time we are looking at the option of introducing a revised resolution here in the next few days. We hope to give our President the necessary degree of flexibility that we spoke of this morning, and we hope to prevent the commencement of the unraveling of the NATO alliance that you warned us about should this thing be adopted in the conference.

As soon as we have completed it, we will very much want to have your views.

Mr. PERLE. We appreciate your efforts to find a statement that expresses the broad public concern which we feel is entirely justified, but does so in a responsible manner that will not undermine the efforts of this or any other administration to try to achieve the reductions to which Senator Jackson referred.

I would hope that no President would ever be put in a situation where, while he is in the midst of negotiations, the Congress passes a resolution that calls on him to abandon a negotiating position and accept one which comes much closer to that of the adversary, or as I said earlier, with respect to the intermediate range nuclear forces a position

identical with the position of the adversary except it may be slightly worse.

Senator WARNER. General, would you like to present the Department of the Air Force program?


General CALLAGHAX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My remarks this morning will be brief in view of what has been said previously.

Based on the NATO decision to modernize intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Air Force is modernizing principally in two areas.

First of all, with regard to our manned aircraft, about 60 percent of our aircraft in Europe are dual-capable; that is to say, they are capable of both conventional and nuclear missions. With the introduction of the F-16, this force continues to be modernized.

Second, and perhaps of more interest to the committee this morning, the Air Force will begin deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles this year.

I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that past committee support for Air Force intermediate-range nuclear forces is appreciated and continued support for these imoprtant programs in the future is essential. Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER. In order to expedite this hearing, I am going to ask one question in the open and defer to any of my colleagues who might wish to ask questions and then we will go into closed session.

WEAKNESS OF U.S. FORCES VERSUS SOVIET UNION Throughout these debates on the freeze the question is often askedin an attempt to refute the contention of the weaknesses of the United States forces versus the Soviet Union—whether or not those in senior positions, uniformed and civilian, would be willing to trade our military and strategic capabilities for the corresponding Soviet military apabilities.

Mr. PERLE. I would, Mr. Chairman, in a flash, if what I desired to achieve was a strategic force optimized for the purpose of coercion and intimidation.

There is no question that the Soviet ability to carry out an intimidating first strike vastly exceeds that of the United States and has done so for some years now.

So, I would not hesitate in exchanging forces with them. The previous Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff used to answer this question in the negative. He can speak for himself as to why he came to that conclusion.

I think this is the sort of question that puts any commander-in-chief or service commander in an awkward position because he not only is an analyst of strategic battles, but a leader of troops in the field, a commander of forces.

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