Mr. PERLE. They have observed that a weapon that is pointing west at one moment can be pointed east the next. In fact, the Soviets have been massive proliferators over the last decade. They have simply kept the proliferating weapons under their strict control.

I have one last chart which is particularly interesting. Indeed it is responsive, Senator Jackson, to the point about the British and French forces.

LONGER RANGE INF WEAPONS*

*INCLUDES SOVIET SS-20, SS-4 AND SS-5 WEAPONS

**THIS DECISION CALLED FOR LRINF DEPLOYMENTS AT END OF 1983 UNLESS AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WERE REACHED WHICH MADE THEM UNNECESSARY

You are too far away to read the print, but let me tell you what this chart shows. Beginning in 1977 and running through to the present, indeed projecting a little bit forward, it shows the number of United States and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Of course, that number is zero on the U.S. side, although we are making preparations now for the deployment of those 572.

The red line shows the growth of Soviet SS-20's. At various points along that line we have noted significant dates. December 1977 is the first point. That is when the Soviet SS-20 deployment began. In October 1979 Mr. Brezhnev said a balance now exists.

You will see that was the point at which they had roughly 750 intermediate range nuclear missile warheads in October 1979; a year later, the Soviet negotiators said a balance now exists. By that time the number had risen to 950. It was still zero on our side.

By February 1981 the number had risen to just under 1,000. Mr. Brezhnev said there is an approximate equality now. Most recently in August 1982 Defense Minister Ustinov referred to the approximate parity of forces which continue to exist today.

In other words, at every point along that steeply sloping curve. each point reflecting more weapons on the Soviet side, the Soviets have repeated the statement that a balance exists.

Either a balance existed in October 1979 and therefore no longer exists today or it didn't exist in October 1979, but you can't have it

both ways.

The fact is that the Soviets throw the term "balance" around for their own convenience. There is not a balance now, there was not a balance in October 1979. There will not be a balance until we proceed with deployment on our side.

I might say that even if we were to carry out the full anticipated program of 572 launchers, we would still be well below the levels the Soviets have already attained, so under no circumstances will a numerical balance be achieved, although we believe that it is critical that we end the situation in which there is a monopoly of these forces on the Soviet side.

That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my opening remarks.

Senator WARNER. Had you finished with the SS-20 chart? We interrupted you at the time that was put up.

Mr. PERLE. Yes.

Senator WARNER. Would you like to put it up one more time and stress that point?

TARGET COVERAGE OF SOVIET
SS-20 AND NATO PERSHING II
AND GROUND-LAUNCHED
CRUISE MISSILES (GLCM)

SOVIET MISSILES

10 70 140 200 270

300

351

WARHEADS 30

210

420 600 810

900

1083

Mr. PERLE. This relates back to the question of coverage the Soviets an achieve with SS-20's. The red ring indicates the area that can be targeted by the SS-20's. Shown in black, and I am sorry to say more difficult to see, is the area that can be covered by Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles.

You will note the Pershing II falls far short of Moscow and the ground-launched missiles cover only a small fraction of Soviet territory.

The notion which I have heard expressed that the Soviets are justified in having a particular concern with respect to the Pershing II because it has a flight time of 5 minutes, which happens, by the way,

to be wrong, it is something on the order of 211⁄2 times that, and because of the short flight time, it could destroy the Soviet command and control apparatus, is simply wrong.

Much of the Soviet command and control apparatus is well beyond the reach of the Pershing II missile. In any event, we only propose to deploy 108. There is no target in the Soviet Union of which I am aware that could be effectively attacked by 108 Pershing II missiles that could not be as equally effectively attacked by some other set of

weapons.

So the Pershing II has no unique military capability that would give rise to the Soviet claim that it would fundamentally alter the theater balance.

One unique characteristic is that it is deployed under the NATO plan in the Federal Republic of Germany. I believe it has been the Soviet purpose in these negotiations from the very beginning to attempt to pry Germany loose from the Western alliance and to attempt to exploit the indications of a growing neutralist sentiment that they thought they detected in the last several years in the Federal Republic, although I would hope after the election results that returned the Kohl Government to power they would need to assess whether there is a rift in the Federal Republic.

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wagner, why don't you provide us with some comment.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. WAGNER, ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY)

Dr. WAGNER. I have no prepared comment, Mr. Chairman. Senator WARNER. Do any of the service representatives care to make opening comments before we proceed to some questions?

If you would like to give a short overview of the programs, it would be helpful.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. GERALD G. WATSON, U.S. ARMY, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL DIRECTORATE

General WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to briefly give you an overview of the Army's program and as you know, this basically deals with the shorter range systems.

SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS

If we were to take those comments and those charts that Mr. Perle showed, it would very definitely parallel the situation we see in shortrange systems with respect to the aging force and the programed antiquity that we are going to incur if the modernization program that we have set forth does not continue.

In looking at the short-range systems, it is very apparent that those, systems deter the Soviet conventional forces at the divisional and second echelon level. Without those short-range systems, our ability to deter the Soviet Union I think is in jeopardy or certainly at high risk, sir.

If you look at the proliferation that has occurred in the Soviet conventional systems with their rather substantial increase in the number of tanks, their 64 percent increase in artillery, 51 percent increase in armored personnel carriers and mechanized systems, it also becomes very apparent that the Soviets are aware of their vulnerability to short-range systems.

It is this vulnerability that they are trying to overcome by hardening their force and by making them more mobile and thus able to deploy them to their breakthrough attacks from a much greater distance. So, from where we stand in the Army system we very much believe that the short-range theater systems serve as a very significant deterrent to the Soviet use of their rather massive conventional forces.

U.S. SYSTEMS OUTDATED

The second point that I would make is one that has already been made and that is our systems are getting very old. They are approaching the end of their shelf life and thus are not as effective as we need.

The third point that I would make with regard to the short-range systems is that we see a rather large proliferation on the part of the Soviets in the development of their short-range systems. Within the last 10 or 12 years we have seen them deploy several new nuclear capable cannons. They are replacing their Frogs and Scuds with second and even third generation missile systems that can deliver warheads to ranges significantly greater than our own.

The proliferation that we see within those short-range systems in the Soviet Union are sufficient to cause us great concern and thus it is necessary that we continue to modernize in order to gain any deterrent leverage against those kinds of systems.

I would also point out two programs that are now in very serious trouble and we need support.

PERSHING PROGRAM

We need to continue with the Pershing program. We have had significant successes in the last four launches and we believe it is now time to go ahead and make those resources available so that that program can continue.

The second is the 155 nuclear round, the W82. Last year we were unsuccessful within the Department of Energy in being able to facilitize that system sufficiently so that we could continue into production. That 155 nuclear system is very critical to our ability to deter. Two-thirds of our certified systems are in the 155mm caliber. Therefore, we present to the Soviets a rather difficult task in trying to target all the systems and thus our ability to survive is greatly enhanced if we have the 155 system in our inventory. The result is that the 155 system is perceived by our adversaries as being a very significant deterrent to their ability to succeed.

That concludes my remarks, sir.
Senator WARNER. Admiral Holland?

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. W. J HOLLAND, JR., U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral HOLLAND. The Navy program consists basically of four elements, Mr. Chairman.

SURVIVABILITY

We will be stressing survivability and improving our capability to operate in the nuclear environment: Most of that work involves testing to determine what we really have to do and then develop the improvements that we must make to our ships and aircraft.

We need to modernize our ASW and AAW weapons. The weapons we presently have are older and less effective against modernized Soviet threats.

CRUISE MISSILE STRIKE FORCES AT SEA

We will within the next 2 years, put the cruise missile strike forces at sea. This proliferation of survivable fire power will cause significant problems for Soviet planners and should enhance raising the nuclear threshold.

Finally, the Navy has a good deal of work to do this year and next. in the training and tactical awareness required to operate the ships and weapon systems that we are developing in the nuclear environ

ment.

Senator WARNER. Admiral, will you defer for a moment? Senator Jackson has to depart and wants me to ask two questions of Mr. Perle while he is here.

ZABLOCKI FREEZE RESOLUTION

Secretary Perle, press accounts have described the Zablocki freeze resolution, as approved by the Foreign Affairs Committee, as differing from the original freeze resolution in the House, one example being the resolution calls for a negotiated freeze and would therefore permit some modernization of certain systems to go forward.

Would you describe the basic differences between the present Zablocki resolution and the original freeze resolution in the House and whether or not the present one in any way marks a step toward being more acceptable?

Mr. PERLE. It certainly is not more acceptable. It is confusing in a number of respects. I don't have the language in front of me, but it would require the administration to do things that are in contradiction with one another. I don't know what it means to say that we should have a negotiated freeze.

Does that mean that the freeze should be only a partial freeze and not a total freeze?

In other words, it is impossible to tell from looking at that resolution what it is that will be frozen unless everything is frozen and I believe the only way one can read the language as recommended is requiring indeed that we go to the Soviets and propose a total freeze.