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So, it would put the President in the position of having to choose between ignoring the views of the alliance or repudiating an agreement reached after considerable consultation in December 1979 which we reaffirmed on every occasion since.
It would be terribly damaging to the NATO alliance.
Senator Jackson. Really it exposes NATO to a most dangerous situation in which we could agree to a freeze with the adversary having the local theater nuclear forces capable for reaching, in ballistic missile terms, the land of all the NATO countries and, of course. beyond that if they so chose. This would leave the NATO countries with nothing on which to bargain.
Mr. PERLE. Exactly. We have a chart that shows the range of the SS-20's.
“BUILD DOWN" APPROACH Senator WARNER Before we go to that, I wonder if you could also address a resolution that was introduced by Mr. Nunn and Mr. Cohen calling for a “build down” type of approach to this situation. What are your views on that?
Mr PERLE. It has some features that are entirely consistent with our own view, in particular the stress that it lays on modernization, As we indicated, without modernization our strategic deterrence and our theater forces will decline to a point where we will no longer
Senator WARNER. I am sorry, we have had a slight commotion up here. Would you go back on that?
Mr. PERLE The resolution lays great stress on the importance of modernizing our forces. We share that view entirely. In the absence of modernization—a freeze being an extreme form of nonmoderniza
our strategic and theater forces will become progressively less able to provide for our security
We think modernization is very important. The "build down" pro posal also lays emphasis on reductions and the President has proposed significant reductions in both the INF negotiations and START negotiations.
From a technical point of view it requires two weapons to be re tired for every new one that is produced. Given the massive moder nization requirement we have and the relatively modern Soviet forces it would mean an increasing gap in the comparative effectiveness o the two forces. But those technical impacts I think are in principl distinguishable from the general thrust of that legislation.
Senator WARNER. But there needs to be in your judgment som corrective features to the resolution as it has now been presented!
Mr. PERLE. Yes; if we had to in plement it literally, it would caus some serious programatic difficulties.
Senator WARNER. As I understand it, it would place us in a position of dangerous inferiority in about 4 or 5 years time?
Mr. PERLE. It would create real problems as we were forced t link our forces in relation to the Soviet forces simply in order to carry out necessary modernization. But we would be quite receptive t changes in that proposal that would avoid that difficulty
I might mention in passing there was a piece in the New Yor Times on the op ed page that has a striking statement. It says:
If the resolutionReferring to the resolution now in the House calling for a freezeWere adopted even by both Houses of Congress, there would still be no chance that the Reagan administration would accept the present unbalanced proposals put forward by the Soviet Union. Moscow surely knows this.
The irony of that statement is that the Soviets have indeed put forward precisely the proposition that is contained in the freeze resolution. The Soviets have proposed a freeze and they have proposed a freeze precisely because it produces the sort of result that We were showing a moment ago.
Senator WARNER. That freeze embraces the Soviets' position ? Mr. PERLE. It is quite similar to the Soviet position in both INF and START.
FRENCH AND BRITISH CAPABILITIES
Senator JACKSON. What is the administration's response to the Soviet contention that of course the French had a capability of hitting the Soviet Union as well as the British with their sea-launched ballistic missiles ?
Mr. PERLE, The French, Senator Jackson, have only 18 land-based missiles. The British have none. With the exception of 18 French missiles, the whole of the British and French force consists of submarine-launched ballistic missiles which the British and French regard as strategic forces to be used in the last resort, the last resort being to respond to a Soviet attack on the cities of Britain and France. None of these systems are under the control of the United States.
They therefore don't figure, in our judgment, in any intelligible way in the balance in the theater. Moreover, we are bound by the December 1979 decision and by the normal propriety of relations among allies not to bargain away forces that are not our own, not to agree on limitations on forces that are under the sovereign control of the countries. We have pledged not to do so.
Finally, alongside the 25,000 or so nuclear weapons that the Soviets possess, 162 British and French weapons are hardly a significant factor in the balance. We believe, and I believe there is substantial evidence to bear this out, that the Soviet focus on the 162 British and French forces is intended both to stalemate the negotiations, because they know we will not accept counting those, and to divide the United States from its allies.
It is not a serious factor in the military equation. It may give the British and French—they surely believe it does—some ability to deter that final attack on their territory. It does not figure in the theater balance.
Senator JACKSON. How would you handle a Russian response to the effect that “We, the Russians, do not allow any proliferation within our alliance, that none of our allies in the Warsaw Pact have tny nuclear devices, that we are the true antiproliferators"?
Mr. PERLE, I think if we had allies that stood in the same relationship to us as the Soviet allies stand with the Soviet Union, we would make sure they didn't have any, too.
Senator JACKSON. In other words, you think the Russians might not be sure which way they would march in the event of attack?
Mr. PERLE. They have observed that a weapon that is pointing west at one moment can be pointed east the next. In fact, the Soviets have been massive proliferators over the last decade. They have simply kept the proliferating weapons under their strict control.
I have one last chart which is particularly interesting. Indeed it is responsive, Senator Jackson, to the point about the British and French forces.
LONGER RANGE INF WEAPONS*
NUCLEAR WARHEADS 1400
AUG. 82 BREZHNEV: 1100
USTINOV: "THERE IS
EXIST TODAY ..."
OCT. 80 "A BALANCE
USSR NEGOTIATORS: NOW EXISTS ..." 800
"A BALANCE NOW EXISTS"
INF NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN 600
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
* INCLUDES SOVIET SS-20, SS-4 AND SS-5 WEAPONS
AGREEMENT WERE REACHED WHICH MADE THEM UNNECESSARY
You are too far away to read the print, but let me tell you what this chart shows. Beginning in 1977 and running through to the present, indeed projecting a little bit forward, it shows the number of United States and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe.
Of course, that number is zero on the U.S. side, although we are making preparations now for the deployment of those 572.
The red line shows the growth of Soviet SS-20's. At various points along that line we have noted significant dates. December 1977 is the first point. That is when the Soviet SS-20 deployment began. In October 1979 Mr. Brezhnev said a balance now exists.
You will see that was the point at which they had roughly 750 intermediate range nuclear missile warheads in October 1979; a year later, the Soviet negotiators said a balance now exists. By that time the number had risen to 950. It was still zero on our side.
By February 1981 the number had risen to just under 1,000. Mr. Brezhnev said there is an approximate equality now. Most recently in August 1982 Defense Minister Ustinov referred to the approximate parity of forces which continue to exist today.
In other words, at every point along that steeply sloping curve, each point reflecting more weapons on the Soviet side, the Soviets have repeated the statement that a balance exists.
Either a balance existed in October 1979 and therefore no longer exists today or it didn't exist in October 1979, but you can't have it
The fact is that the Soviets throw the term "balance" around for their own convenience. There is not a balance now, there was not a balance in October 1979. There will not be a balance until we proceed with deployment on our side.
I might say that even if we were to carry out the full anticipated program of 572 launchers, we would still be well below the levels the Soviets have already attained, so under no circumstances will a numerical balance be achieved, although we believe that it is critical that we end the situation in which there is a monopoly of these forces on the Soviet side. That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my opening remarks. Senator WARNER. Had you finished with the SS-20 chart! We interrupted you at the time that was put up. Mr. PERLE. Yes.
Senator WARNER. Would you like to put it up one more time and stress that point ?
to be wrong, it is something on the order of 21/2 times that, and because of the short flight time, it could destroy the Soviet command and control apparatus, is simply wrong.
Much of the Soviet command and control apparatus is well beyond the reach of the Pershing II missile. In any event, we only propose to deploy 108. There is no target in the Soviet Union of which I am aware that could be effectively attacked by 108 Pershing II missiles that could not be as equally effectively attacked by some other set of weapons.
So the Pershing II has no unique military capability that would give rise to the Soviet claim that it would fundamentally alter the theater balance.
One unique characteristic is that it is deployed under the NATO plan in the Federal Republic of Germany. I believe it has been the Soviet purpose in these negotiations from the very beginning to attempt to pry Germany loose from the Western alliance and to attempt to exploit the indications of a growing neutralist sentiment that they thought they detected in the last several years in the Federal Republic, although I would hope after the election results that returned the Kohl Government to power they would need to assess whether there is a rift in the Federal Republic.
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wagner, why don't you provide us with some comment.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. WAGNER, ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY)
Dr. WAGNER. I have no prepared comment, Mr. Chairman.
Senator WARNER. Do any of the service representatives care to make opening comments before we proceed to some questions?
If you would like to give a short overview of the programs, it would be helpful.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. GERALD G. WATSON, U.S. ARMY,
DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL DIRECTORATE General Watson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to briefly give you an overview of the Army's program and as you know, this basically deals with the shorter range systems.
If we were to take those comments and those charts that Mr. Perle showed, it would very definitely parallel the situation we see in shortrange systems with respect to the aging force and the programed antiq. uity that we are going to incur if the modernization program that we have set forth does not continue.
In looking at the short-range systems, it is very apparent that those systems deter the Soviet conventional forces at the divisional and second echelon level. Without those short-range systems, our ability to deter the Soviet Union I think is in jeopardy or certainly at high riski sir.