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The gap in strategic spending has been substantial in favor of the Soviet Union. We have drawn a vertical dotted line at 1972.

Senator WARNER. Could that be pointed out? Mr. PERLE. 1972 was, of course, the year in which we reached the first arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. As you can see, the gap widened following those agreements. It did not, as many hoped, narrow.

The next chart portrays what is often referred to as the arms race. Each of the triangular shaped symbols reflects the introduction of a new strategic weapon system by the United States, in the case of the blue triangles at the top of the chart; the Soviet Union in the case of the red triangles at the bottom of the chart.

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The Soviets have introduced 42 nuclear strategic systems in the period covered by that chart, 20 years. We have during the same time introduced 13. That is what is referred to as the arms race.

I would call attention to the dividing line of 1972. You will see that there are a very large number of triangles to the right of that dividing line, the introduction of new Soviet systems following the SALT agreement exceeded anything prior to the SALT I agreement.

You will also see we have introduced very little since that time. In fact, of the four systems that are shown since 1972, one of them, the Trident, so far has only one boat operational. The ALCM's are just entering the inventory now. So, this arms race has been a very uneven race.

Now I would like to get to the specifics of the freeze and what the freeze would mean.

This chart simply shows the relative antiquity of the United States and Soviet strategic forces. In the absence of the modernization program that the administration has recomended or something very much

like it, we have, Mr. Chairman, a strategic force that is on its way to the Smithsonian Institution while the Soviets have a strategic force that is for the most part of very recent manufacture.

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This chart illustrates that rather well. If you look at the left-hand side of the chart, that first tall red column and the much shorter blue column next to it represents the weapons in the strategic inventory that are 5 years old or less.

As you will see, the Soviet SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 missiles, the Typhoon submarine and the Backfire are all 5 years old or less. There are important elements of the Soviets' strategic force, as you know.

The oniy thing we are able to put in this category of 5 years old or less is the Trident submarine and that little blue box represents one

boat.

Moving over to the category of weapons that are between 5 and 10 years old, you find the Minuteman III on the U.S. side and the SS-11 ICBM's on the Yankee and Delta class submarines on the Soviet side.

So, in the 5 years to 10 years category you see a lot of red, but not very much blue. There is blue on the chart that occurs on the righthand side when you talk about categories of weapons that are 15 to 25 years old.

Ås you can see, most of our submarine force, the Poseidon, the Minuteman II's, and the Titans and the B-52's, are in the 15-to 20

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year old category, and our most modern B-52, the B-52H, was built 20 years ago.

The remainder of our strategic bombing force, the B-52D's and B-52G's are in the 20- to 25-year old category. The only thing that the Soviets have in that category of old age is Bears and Bisons.

What does this mean? It means simply that under the circumstances of the freeze even if it were mutual, even if it were verifiable and even if it could be implemented at once, immediately, today, we would face a situation in which our aging strategic force would become progressively less operable.

It would slide into obsolescence and the point would be reached when We would no longer have a strategic defense while the Soviets with their relatively modern forces would gain week by week, month by month, year by year increasing strategic superiority.

The next chart illustrates what the inventory would look like under the circumstances of the freeze. We have taken the year 1992.

As you can see, and I won't belabor the point, virtually everything n the Soviet inventory, everything that matters, would be in the 5- to 11-year old category whereas virtually everything that matters on our side wonld be in the 20- to 25-year-old category, or beyond what we anticipated would be the operational life of our systems.

What that chart illustrates is that under the circumstances of the freeze, by 1992 the typical Soviet warhead would be on a launcher 14 years old, well within the operational life.

A typical warhead would be on an American launcher 26 years old, which is really beyond a safe and effective operational life. In short, in 1992 under a freeze, we would no longer have a strategic capabilty. It seems to us this is the principal reason why the freeze, with all

INVENTORY WARHEADS
BY AVERAGE AGE OF LAUNCHER

UNDER START - 1992

AGE AND NUMBER OF WARHEADS WOULD BE MORE
EQUITABLE AND LOWER UNDER START THAN A FREEZE

LEGEND

BOMBER
SLBM
ICBM

<5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 AVERAGE AGE OF LAUNCHER (YEARS)

SOVIET

<5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 AVERAGE AGE OF LAUNCHER (YEARS)

U.S.

of the best of intentions, is misguided and would have a consequence precisely opposite to what its proponents hope it would achieve, that is, stabilization.

The issue has arisen as to whether we should reduce first and then freeze or freeze first and then reduce.

A number of people, in the House in particular, cling to the view that first we should freeze and then we can set about the process of negotiating a reduction. They argue, and this has a certain plausibil ity on the surface, that it is like an elevator which is ascending, it ha to stop before it can descend and therefore we should have a freeze first.

But as that chart indicates, if there were a freeze, we would never move the Soviets off that freeze into reduction because they would be in the best of all positions. They would have no incentive to depar from the terms and circumstances of that freeze.

On the contrary, day by day the freeze would serve them better and better and therefore it is obvious that if we freeze first, we will never get reductions because reductions would not be in the Soviet interest.

Senator WARNER. On that point, as you well know, Senator Jack son and I have clearly stated our position on it, but I must say th record should contain the response of the freeze proponents and tha is let us give it a try for 1 year or 2 years.

After that if the Soviets fail to live up to the obligations under th freeze proposal, then we can go back to the Reagan modernization proposal

Mr. PERLE. I think they would be quite content to live up to the obli gations. The obligations would entail the retention by the Soviet Un ion of the force that is already a formidable force and in relation t ours would become more formidable with the passage of time.

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I would expect them to abide strictly by the terms of the freeze if one were agreed to. Senator WARNER. And just wait for antiquity to take its toll? Mr. PERLE. Sure. They would be in the position of the errant relative waiting for the rich uncle to pass away.

Senator Jackson. What would be the impact of an immediate freeze now on the negotiations that Mr. Nitze has undertaken for the theater forces ?

Mr. PERLE. With respect to the theater forces, there is no discernible difference between the freeze proposal and the Soviet position. Therefore, I would think Ambassador Nitze would have two choices. He could either pack up and come home or he could sign the Soviet proposal.

As a matter of fact, the freeze is slightly worse than the Soviet proposal since the Soviets have proposed to reduce by a few dozen the number of SS-20 launchers. The freeze would permit them to keep all those launchers and would leave us zero.

Senator Jackson. There is absolutely no incentive for the Soviets to negotiate with us on a reduction in the SS-20's because we don't have anything Mr. PERLE. No incentive at all. Senator JACKSON [continuing]. That is deployed, capable of countering the Soviets.

Am I not correct in understanding that despite all of the propaganda and the exhaustive news coverage of the issue, that all of the defense ministers of the NATO countries have opposed the freeze? I have seen something on that, but what is the fact ? Mr. PERLE. On every occasion in which the defense foreign ministers have addressed the issue of freezing the NATO deployment to zero while the Soviets retained their forces, they have opposed it.

Recently the Greek Government abstained from making any statement on these issues. But with that one exception every one of the NATO governments is opposed.

Senator JACKSON. The French have been particularly outspoken. Mr. PERLE. The French have been particularly outspoken. In fact, Senator Jackson, I have a chart that I want to show you that deals with the SS-20 deployment that was provided to us by a French official.

Dr. WAGNER. Before you go to the SS-20 I would like to point out that the age disparity for the theater nuclear weapons would be even vorse under a freeze condition than what is shown here for strategic weapons.

Senator WARNER. Senator Jackson has very wisely brought up the SATO point.

Would you go so far as to say if we were to adopt in both Houses of Congress some type of freeze proposal of the nature of the one sow pending before the House that this would be indeed the first step toward unraveling of the NATO alliance?

Mr. PERLE. I think it would have catastrophic consequences. It Tould require us to depart from an agreed alliance-wide understanding that we would proceed with the deployment of these modernized systems.

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