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General, in the past several years the U.S. has increased the defense budget in real terms by the following amounts, based on the NATO definition of defense spending: Fiscal year 1979—3.4 percent; fiscal year 1980—4.9 percent; fiscal year 1981—5.4 percent, Updated figures for fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983 of U.S. Defense spending based on the NATO definition are not available yet, but in terms of outlays, our own defense budget, according to CBO calculations grew by 7.7 percent in fiscal year 1983. Our defense budget has thus been growing sig. nificantly in real terms each year.

On the other hand, the weighted average real growth rate in defense spending of all our allies was projected to be the lowest it has ever been in 1982 (latest available)-between 1.0 percent and 2.1 percent, according to DOD. We have set the example you called for.

Why do you think the Europeans have failed to follow?

General ROGERS. Economic and political conditions in nations have certainly made it difficult for some of the Allies to follow the U.S. example. Beyond that, however, I continue to believe that the people of the Alliance must be accurately informed about the nature and the magnitude of the threat that the Warsaw Pact poses to their free and democratic societies. If this can be done, public opinion will demand that governments take the necessary actions to shore up defenses. In this context, then, it is a matter of education. In my opinion, some European leaders could be doing more in that regard.

Senator LEVIN. General, you have called for 4 percent annual real growth by each NATO nation. Why do you think they will be willing to spend that much if they don't even meet the three percent commitment?

General ROGERS. It is my view that, for NATO as a whole, an annual real increase of about four percent is needed if the Alliance is to fulfill its 1983-88 Force Goals. That is an average for all NATO nations if the Force Goals are fully met; being an average, the percentage real increase per nation varies. If the people of our nations realize that for 1983 that real increase amounts to an average additional sacrifice of only $23 for every citizen in the Alliance (only $11 for each citizen in W. European allied nations) I believe they would consider such a sum reasonable and affordable, and a small added premium on an insurance policy for peace with freedom. Our challenge is getting the message across to the people on both sides of the Atlantic.

OPEN SESSION

The subcommittee proceeded in open session at 10:20 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Warner, Jackson, Exon, and Levin.

Staff present: Frank J. Gaffney, professional staff member; James G. Roche, minority staff director; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel, and Willis D. Smith, deputy staff director and chief scientist for the minority, David S. Lyles, Patrick L. Renehan, and James C. Smith, professional staff members; and Karen A. Love, staff assistant.

Also present: John Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon, and Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin.

Senator WARNER. The committee will resume in open session.

Mr. Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Dr. Richard L. Wagner, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, and representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, will provide their views on matters of nuclear warfare from their perspective as it relates to the authorization of defense spending before this subcommittee.

Secretary Perle and Dr. Wagner will concern themselves with policies and programs complemented by input from the representative of the three Services General Watson, U.S. Army, Director, Nuclear and Chemical Directorate; Admiral Holland, U.S. Navy, Director, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Callaghan, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Director, Regional Plans and Policy DCS/Plans and Operations.

We will now hear from Secretary Perle. STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD PERLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY) Mr. PERLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator WARNER. First, I would like to apologize for any inconvenience that the subcommittee may have caused the witnesses today, but obviously we were in session with General Rogers and more time was consumed than anticipated.

Mr. PERLE. I expect he had some interesting things to say,

With your permission, I would like to make available for the record a prepared statement and focus my comments this morning on three things. One is our intermediate nuclear forces, both the administration

program and the negotiations presently underway in Geneva; second, on shorter range nuclear forces; and finally on the question of the nuclear freeze.

The nuclear freeze would entail a freeze affecting intermediate range forces and indeed others. I have brought some charts with me this morning that provide some detailed information on the effect of a freeze on the United States and Soviet strategic inventories.

With your permission, I would like to take a moment of the subcommittee's time to address that issue.

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MODERNIZATION OF NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES First, with respect to the administration's program for the modernization of nonstrategic nuclear forces, let me say that it does not en

ntitative increase in the number of these weapons. Indeed the trend of recent years has been a quantitative decrease.

I would remind the subcommittee that in December 1979 in connection with the decision to deploy the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, the United States unilaterally withdrew the thousand short-range nuclear warheads from the European theater.

Also in December 1979 the alliance as a whole pledged that the introduction of the 572 Pershing and ground-launched cruise missiles would not result in a net increase in the number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. We therefore planned to remove weapons on a one-for-one basis as those modernized nuclear forces are deployed in Europe.

Therefore, it is easy to summarize the thrust of the administration's request this year with respect to nuclear weapons of less than strategie range. We ask to be permitted to proceed with the normal sort

of modernization that inevitably becomes necessary as aging weapons become increasingly less effective.

That is the situation we now face with respect to Lance, the 8-inch shell, and the 155mm projectile, and we therefore propose to modernize with respect to each of these systems in order to provide improved operating characteristics and indeed improved safety.

I believe these programs should be relatively noncontroversial. Unless there are specific questions, I won't say more than that the thrust of this program represents a normal sort of technological modernization.

If I may say a word about the negotiations presently underway in Geneva.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, in October 1981 President Reagan proposed to the Soviet Union—and it has been our position since that time that we eliminate the entire category of weapons that is the subject of negotiation in Geneva—that is, the longer range land-based intermediate nuclear forces on both sides.

Those forces consist on the Soviet side of the SS-20 missiles which they have been deploying at the rate of one a week during the whole of the period we have been negotiating, and indeed before that, and all SS-4 and SS-5 missiles which the Soviets have repeatedly said would be withdrawn as their newer SS-20's were deployed.

On the American side, the western side, we envisage deployment of a limited number of Pershing II missiles-108—replacing Pershing I's that are presently deployed and the deployment of some 464 groundlaunched cruise missiles. The deployment of both of these systems is to be spread over five allied countries.

This deployment arises out of a decision reached after very considerable debate in December 1979. It is a program to which the alliance remains committed.

In December 1979, the alliance agreed that while proceeding to deploy these systems we would also seek to negotiate with the Soviets with a view toward achieving a balance of these forces in Europe that would enhance the security of the West.

The President's proposal to eliminate this entire category of weapons we believed and continue to believe, would be the best possible outcome of these negotiations.

Having tabled the proposal to eliminate the entire category of weapons when the talks began on November 30, 1981, we waited for some considerable time before we received anything other than a negative response from the Soviets.

As you know, some months ago the new Soviet General Secretary, Mr. Andropov, publicly made what was widely described as a counterproposal according to which the Soviets would retain a SS-20 force even larger than the SS-20 force they had when the negotiations got underway on November 30, 1981.

The Andropov proposal was hardly what we would call a constructive step forward, but the arithmetic of that proposal was not immediately self-evident. As a result, it was described in a number of places in terms that suggested that it did indeed constitute a step forward.

Regarding the arithmetic, I think it is important that the record show how the Soviets have contrived the position that, as I say, would

actually leave them with more weapons than they had when the talks got underway.

They have proposed that they would retain in Europe-by which they mean west of 80° east and a dividing line that the Soviets have selected roughly paralleling the eastern slope of the Ural Mountains, 162 launchers for SS-20's.

East of 80° east they would retain another significant number of launchers, but they have not specified exactly what that number would be. They have indicated that among the weapons that are presently west of 80° in excess of the number 162, they would dismantle a few dozen and the remainder would be moved east of 80°.

They presently have about a hundred SS-20's east of 80°. We don't know how many more they propose to move eastward under their proposal.

Even if they didn't move any eastward, even if they dismantled all the SS-20 launchers presently deployed in Europe, they would still be left with something on the order of 270 SS–20's, compared with the 250 they had on the day the negotiations began.

It is an indication I believe of the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda and an unhappy commentary on the ineffectiveness of our own ability to clear the air that a proposal which would leave them even in a better position than when the talks began received the widespread favorable publicity that it did in fact receive in Europe.

On recent days there has been a great deal of speculation about an interim proposal from the United States. Let me say that while sight of this was lost in the conduct of the negotiations following the President's speech in October 1981, in which he announced the proposal to eliminate the entire category of weapons, he said at the time, and has repeated on a number of occasions since, that that proposal is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, that we will respond seriously to any serious Soviet proposal, but that we have yet to see a serious Soviet proposal. I don't believe and I would doubt that this committee would believe that the Andropov proposal constitutes a serious proposal.

In the past we have made a mistake in arms negotiations in offering the Soviets successively more generous proposals without intervening counterproposals from their side.

I very much hope and believe that this administration will not repeat that mistake. We continue to hope that the Soviets will make 3 counterproposal that moves in the direction that we all desire, which is total elimination of these systems. And we would be quite happy to respond to such a proposal from the Soviet Union.

I couldn't help noting in the earlier testimony this morning, Senator Warner, a question predicated on the assumption that our allies luave been asking us to make new proposals before the current round of Geneva negotiations terminates on the 29th of this month.

I am unaware that any such proposal has been made by our European allies. They have said, in some cases publicly, that we ought to be examining interim solutions, as indeed we are quite happy to do.

To my knowledge, no one has suggested that we should in a hasty and therefore potentially shortsighted way rush a new proposal to the negotiating table between now and the end of the month when the talks recess.

We are looking for solutions for interim proposals that would strengthen the position of the West and lead to the outcome we all

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prefer, which is a settlement and negotiated agreement that improves the military situation. Too often in the past we have settled on an agreement for its own sake. We intend firmly to resist the pressures to do that.

NUCLEAR FREEZE

Finally, I would like to say a little bit about the nuclear freeze, not only because the issue will be before the House this week, possibly tomorrow, but because in all of the discussions of the freeze insufficient attention has been paid to two things.

One is the history of the growth of nuclear forces over the last decade or so—it has been a very uneven history—and the implications of that.

And second, the technical impact of the freeze on the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Soviet Union.

The impact is far from equal, indeed far from similar. Yet because the freeze contains the words that it shall be mutual, there is a tendency for people to believe it would have the same effect on the forces of both sides. That simply is not the case.

So, I would like to share with you some information that we have developed which is presently in a series of charts. I will run through them very quickly.

Just to make it clear that the balance we now see is the product of differental levels of investment in recent years, this first chart shows the United States and Soviet spending on the acquisition of strategic forces in the period 1965 projected forward to 1987.

U.S. AND SOVIET SPENDING ON
ACQUISITION OF STRATEGIC FORCES

(1965 - 1987)

40

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35

30

CONSTANT FY 83 DOLLARS (BILLIONS)

20

15

10

U.S. SPENDING

PROCUREMENT

0 1965

1970

1980

1987

FISCAL YEAR

FROM THE SIGNING OF SALT I IN 1972 THROUGH 1982, THE TOTAL DIFFERENCE IN
SPENDING ON ACQUISITION OF STRATEGIC FORCES IS APPROXIMATELY 140 BILLION
SOVIET SPENDING ESTIMATED IN EQUIVALENT DOLLARS

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