General ROGERS. We need new, modern nuclear weapons; [deleted]. Due to [deleted] production rates, we need funding now in order to have [deleted]. Regarding my earlier comments on chemical weapons, the primary purpose of nuclear and chemical retaliatory capabilities is, respectively, to deter enemy nuclear and chemical attack and, failing that, to provide an effective response. Our present short-range tactical nuclear capability addresses this; however, we lack a credible chemical retaliatory capability, which has the potential for [deleted] military consequences.

NEUTRON ARTILLERY SHELLS

Senator LEVIN. Even though neutron artillery shells will have longer ranges than current shells, they still will be of extremely short range. And although blast and thermal effects are reduced, they are not eliminated, so there still will be collateral damage from their use, albeit less. Won't these neutron shells have some similar deficiencies to those which NATO politicians are arguing are reasons we should reduce our nuclear stockpile in Europe?

General ROGERS. The Reduced Blast/Enhanced Radiation (RB/ER) weapon, has as its central purpose the deterrence of Soviet-Warsaw Pact aggression. For deterrence to be credible, NATO needs a full spectrum of military capabilities. Should deterrence fail the RB/ER would significantly improve our ability to support the forward conventional defense. The RB/ER warhead is an efficient, qualitative improvement that helps offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in tanks and other armored vehicles through emphasis of radiation over blast as the damage mechanism. Another important advantage of radiation versus blast is use of lower yield weapons, thereby limiting collateral damage. Our fighting forces as well as neutral or friendly population could be protected by more precise and confined damage effects resulting from these improved warheads. In my view, the RB/ER warhead can make a significant contribution to help offset increasing Soviet military strength.

Senator LEVIN. Of what real utility is it to build neutron warheads and stockpile them in this nation-does that really add anything to our nuclear deterrent in Europe?

Isn't that the worst of both worlds: They cannot contribute to our deterrent over in Europe and their potential deployment causes us political problems in NATO?

General ROGERS. [Deleted.] The fact that ER/RB weapons exist is a factor the Soviets must consider, regardless of location. Therefore, these weapons must be considered additive to NATO's deterrent equation.

Senator LEVIN. Wouldn't it make more sense not to build any of these artillery shells until NATO gets the INF deployments out of the way and sorts out its policy toward all battlefield weapons?

General ROGERS. All studies of theater nuclear requirements continue to reaffirm the Alliance's need for short-range systems. However, currently deployed short-range artillery fired atomic projectiles are old, [deleted] and therefore [deleted] degrade NATO deterrent posture. In the SNF area I do not want the Alliance put in a position similar to our LRINF situation (i.e., Soviet/WP88-20's; Alliance-nothing). I am particularly concerned in view of recent Soviet developments in their SNF.

NEUTRON WARHEAD PROTECTION

Senator LEVIN. Wouldn't neutron warhead production hand another propaganda victory to the Soviets when we can least afford it among the populations of Europe?

General ROGERS. I believe the enhanced radiation warhead, with its increased effectiveness serves as a greater deterrent to war. However, as I have stated, we are taking a hard look at nuclear requirements and how these requirements can best be met, just as we are looking seriously for ways to improve NATO's Conventional capabilities. Both types of forces-modernized and ready-are essential to the maintenance of NATO's deterrent posture. When the neutron weapon is produced, undoubtedly the Soviets will maximize their propaganda efforts, as they have attempted to do with INF. We cannot, however, have Soviet propaganda determine our NATO defense needs.

INF

Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, there is a general impression in the United States that none of our European allies really are willing to accept the GLCM and Pershing II deployments, but that we are somehow forcing these deployments on them. How would you respond to this contention?

General ROGERS. Although a segment of the European public is speaking out against deployment, Alliance governments are holding firm to their 1979 decision. The decision was unanimous to deploy GLCM and Pershing II to counter Soviet weapons programs and strengthen stability and Western security. NATO's agreement to a two part strategy of deployment and arms control talks was a reflection of Alliance resolve to restore a European nuclear balance at lower levels of armaments. This resolve has been reconfirmed repeatedly, with most recent reconfirmation occurring in March at the NATO Ministers' Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Portugal.

NEED FOR M-1 TANK

Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, last year, you said the following about the capabilities of the M-1 tank and its production rates:

"In the field of equipment I am pleased with actions which will hasten the delivery of modern weapons, such as the M-1 tank, to Europe.

"A delay in production and fielding of the M-1 tank would unquestionably reduce our capability to defend NATO Europe against Soviet aggression.

"The M-1 is currently the best tank on the battlefield, and product improvement programs will continue. The M-1 incorporates major improvements in: Crew protection, speed, battlefield agility, lethality, and fire control reliability. These improvements provide for greater survivability which allows us to defend more effectively for a longer period of time. To delay this capability, while the forces opposite NATO continue to be modernized, is not in our best interests and would adversely impact on our ability to defend NATO Europe."

This administration now proposes to reduce the production rate of M-1s from 855 in fiscal year 1983 to 720 per year in fiscal year 1984 and thereafter. This cuts some 360 tanks from past projections for fiscal year 1984 and fiscal year 1985 and beyond. It also delays by several years the Army's achievement of its 7,058 M-1 inventory objectives.

Would you still say such reductions "are not in our best interests and would adversely impact on our ability to defend NATO Europe?"

General ROGERS. Fielding the M-1 tank is an integral step in our overall Army modernization program for all the reasons enunciated in last year's testimony and restated in the preamble to your question. A delay in production and fielding of the M-1 will delay our achieving our planned capability to defend NATO Europe.

Senator LEVIN. Of all the U.S. services, would you agree the Army needs the most modernization and has lagged behind the Air Force and Navy in modernizing against the Soviet threat? The delays in the M-1 annual production are even doubly unwise, are they not?

General ROGERS. Soviet modernization efforts show no sign of abating and reach across the spectrum of modern weapons for all services. U.S. and allied efforts are required on all fronts if this unrelenting Soviet effort is to be countered successfully. Essential modernization to respond to Soviet advances is a major USEUCOM priority. Pressing modernization needs for USEUCOM include better capability to target and destroy enemy forces; improved capability for engaging Warsaw Pact follow-on forces; survivable, secure voice/data and interoperable theatre and tactical command, control and communications systems; improved air defense coverage, and improved anti-armor capability. HQ/USEUCOM FY82 input for the FY84-88 Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM), highlighted delays in M-1 tank production, Copperhead procurement, AH-64 R&D, and AH-1 COBRA TOW sight as inconsistent with the priority anti-armor capability requires. While the continued Soviet build-up dictates we can not afford to be complacent and I consider our tank modernization effort vital, this effort must be viewed in the context of a balanced program designed to counter the total Warsaw Pact effort.

DEFENDING EUROPE WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

enator LEVIN. General Rogers, you have said you share the optimism of ral Frederick Kroesen, U.S. Army Comander in Europe, that he could

successfully defend Central Europe with conventional weapons. However, you say your pessimism about the need to go nuclear "fairly early" because of a weakness in our conventional NATO defenses is based, in part, on the lack of sustainability of our allies. You implied that General Kroesen's optimism was based on the fact he was considering only the capabilities of U.S. troops, not the allies, also.

According to the interview which quoted General Kroesen, he also was considering the capabilities of the West Germans and Canadians who share with the United States the responsibilities for defending Central Europe. Please explain this apparent contradiction with your statement.

General ROGERS. General Kroesen and I are in complete agreement regarding NATO defense capabilities in Central Europe. I believe you will find his optimism always expressed in terms of initiating the defense and coupled with concerns about sustaining the defense if we do not build up our conventional capability. In his NATO role as Commander, Central Army Group (CENTAG), General Kroesen commands NATO's land forces in Southern Germany. CENTAG includes United States, German and Canadian units. Additionally, if the French were to join in wartime defense, their forward ground forces, The First French Army, would likely operate with CENTAG. CENTAG units have a higher proportion of regular soldiers than those of Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) in Northern Germany. Importantly, CENTAG has stores of pre-positioned supplies which would probably enable CENTAG units to sustain the defense using conventional weapons for longer than NORTHAG. NORTHAG is composed of German, British, Dutch, Belgian and some U.S. units. Many NORTHAG units are malpositioned, making initial movement to fighting positions more difficult, and a high percentage of NORTHAG's troops are reserves. NORTHAG has serious shortages of pre-positioned supplies. It is the lack of sustainment which will cause me, under current conditions, to request the release of nuclear weapons fairly early. General Kroesen is properly proud of CENTAG's capabilities; but as SACEUR I am charged with the defense of all of Allied Command Europe.

FRANCE AND NATO

Senator LEVIN. [Deleted.]

General ROGERS. France is committed to the Atlantic Alliance; however, French policy precludes the prior commitment of French Forces to the NATO integrated military command. [Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. [Deleted.]

General ROGERS. The French have displayed a keen interest in furthering peacetime coordination between their forces and other NATO conventional forces. [Deleted.] They maintain formal liaison missions to major NATO military headquarters, such as SHAPE, AFCENT and AFSOUTH. Despite this fairly high degree of peacetime defense interrelationship and cooperation, [deleted]. This French policy, I should add, does not preclude the strong positive military dialogue which continues to exist between France and the military establishments of the United States and other NATO countries.

Senator LEVIN. [Deleted.]

General ROGERS. [Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. [Deleted.]

General ROGERS. As I mentioned, I personally believe that the French will support NATO in event of war and very likely will join her forces with those of NATO to defend Western Europe. [Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. [Deleted.]

General ROGERS. [Deleted.] However, as stated, I personally believe that the French will support NATO in event of war; [deleted].

WESTERN EUROPEAN SACRIFICES LAGGING

Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, last year you told this subcommittee that it was necessary for the United States to continue to support increased defense budgets so as to set an example our European allies would follow in increasing their own defense contributions: You said this about the pending congressional consideration of the fiscal year 1983 defense budget?

"If that message continues to come through from the leader of the alliance, then we have an opportunity to have the citizens of Western Europe understand the threat and be prepared to follow our example to make sacrifices and send that message to their elected representatives."

General, in the past several years the U.S. has increased the defense budget in real terms by the following amounts, based on the NATO definition of defense spending Fiscal year 1979-3.4 percent; fiscal year 1980 4.9 percent; fiscal year 1981-5.4 percent, Updated figures for fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983 of U.S. Defense spending based on the NATO definition are not available yet, but in terms of outlays, our own defense budget, according to CBO calculations grew by 7.7 percent in fiscal year 1983. Our defense budget has thus been growing significantly in real terms each year.

On the other hand, the weighted average real growth rate in defense spending of all our allies was projected to be the lowest it has ever been in 1982 (latest available)-between 1.0 percent and 2.1 percent, according to DOD. We have set the example you called for.

Why do you think the Europeans have failed to follow?

General ROGERS. Economic and political conditions in nations have certainly made it difficult for some of the Allies to follow the U.S. example. Beyond that, however, I continue to believe that the people of the Alliance must be accurately informed about the nature and the magnitude of the threat that the Warsaw Pact poses to their free and democratic societies. If this can be done, public opinion will demand that governments take the necessary actions to shore up defenses. In this context, then, it is a matter of education. In my opinion, some European leaders could be doing more in that regard.

Senator LEVIN. General, you have called for 4 percent annual real growth by each NATO nation. Why do you think they will be willing to spend that much if they don't even meet the three percent commitment?

General ROGERS. It is my view that, for NATO as a whole, an annual real increase of about four percent is needed if the Alliance is to fulfill its 1983-88 Force Goals. That is an average for all NATO nations if the Force Goals are fully met; being an average, the percentage real increase per nation varies. If the people of our nations realize that for 1983 that real increase amounts to an average additional sacrifice of only $23 for every citizen in the Alliance (only $11 for each citizen in W. European allied nations) I believe they would consider such a sum reasonable and affordable, and a small added premium on an insurance policy for peace with freedom. Our challenge is getting the message across to the people on both sides of the Atlantic.

OPEN SESSION

The subcommittee proceeded in open session at 10:20 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Warner, Jackson, Exon, and Levin.

Staff present: Frank J. Gaffney, professional staff member; James G. Roche, minority staff director; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel, and Willis D. Smith, deputy staff director and chief scientist for the minority, David S. Lyles, Patrick L. Renehan, and James C. Smith, professional staff members; and Karen A. Love, staff assistant.

Also present: John Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon, and Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin.

Senator WARNER. The committee will resume in open session.

Mr. Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Dr. Richard L. Wagner, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, and representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, will provide their views on matters of nuclear warfare from their perspective as it relates to the authorization of defense spending before this subcommittee.

Secretary Perle and Dr. Wagner will concern themselves with policies and programs complemented by input from the representative of the three Services-General Watson, U.S. Army, Director, Nuclear and Chemical Directorate; Admiral Holland, U.S. Navy, Director, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Callaghan, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Director, Regional Plans and Policy DCS/Plans and Operations. We will now hear from Secretary Perle.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD PERLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY)

Mr. PERLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. First, I would like to apologize for any inconvenlence that the subcommittee may have caused the witnesses today, but obviously we were in session with General Rogers and more time was consumed than anticipated.

Mr. PERLE. I expect he had some interesting things to say.

With

your permission, I would like to make available for the record a prepared statement and focus my comments this morning on three things.

One is our intermediate nuclear forces, both the administration program and the negotiations presently underway in Geneva; second, on shorter range nuclear forces; and finally on the question of the nuclear

freeze.

The nuclear freeze would entail a freeze affecting intermediate range forces and indeed others. I have brought some charts with me this morning that provide some detailed information on the effect of a freeze on the United States and Soviet strategic inventories. With your permission, I would like to take a moment of the subcommittee's time to address that issue.

MODERNIZATION OF NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

First, with respect to the administration's program for the modernzation of nonstrategic nuclear forces, let me say that it does not entail a quantitative increase in the number of these weapons. Indeed The trend of recent years has been a quantitative decrease.

I would remind the subcommittee that in December 1979 in connection with the decision to deploy the Pershing II and ground-launched ruise missiles in Europe, the United States unilaterally withdrew the housand short-range nuclear warheads from the European theater. Also in December 1979 the alliance as a whole pledged that the inProduction of the 572 Pershing and ground-launched cruise missiles Tould not result in a net increase in the number of nuclear weapons ployed in Europe. We therefore planned to remove weapons on a e-for-one basis as those modernized nuclear forces are deployed in Europe.

Therefore, it is easy to summarize the thrust of the administration's quest this year with respect to nuclear weapons of less than straterange. We ask to be permitted to proceed with the normal sort