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rently allocated to the European theater lack the logistics support structure needed to conduct sustained wartime operations. Without WHNS from Germany the U.S. would have to forward deploy additional active CS/CSS units and equipment to achieve comparably responsive support for the deploying combat divisions and associated Air Force units. In order to sustain the planned U.S. 10-Division D-Day forces the FRG has agreed to provide 93,000 Reservists plus an estimated equivalent of 100,000 civilian labor spaces. Use of U.S. reserve or active duty support troops would be at 10 to 40 times the cost of the German WHXS alternative. WHNS from Germany is a classic example of a U.S. ally assuming greater share of the common defense burden. Traditionally within XATO this logistical support has been considered a national responsibility. The C.S.-GE WHNS agreement represents a major breakthrough because, for the first time, a NATO ally has agreed to pay a portion of support costs for C.S. combat units. In summary, WHNS is critically needed and cost effective for sustainment of U.S. combat forces, while enhancing the credibility of the forward conventional defense of NATO.




Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, you have said a new rationale has been developed for determining the needs for short-range nuclear systems—the modernization of which you support.

You also have said that the short-range balance now also has shifted against us with their 152-millimeter artillery becoming nuclear capable. You said that you do not yet know how the new rationale will be translated into specific war. head requirements in your annual requirements study.

How has this rationale for need/use of short-range systems changed? Is it just for short-range or all systems?

General ROGERS. In the past, requirements were developed to attack each Forward Division, plus those of the follow-on Armies. Currently we are not developing requirements against each and every WP Division facing ACE. Rather we now allocate capabilities to various ACE command levels to hold elements of the WP at risk. Through assessment of the threat and the expected deployment against the three regions, force requirements are developed for [deleted]. The purpose of allocating ACE resources within sectors and regions is to give flexibility at these levels to react to major threats which exceed the capability of a particular corps and/or sector. This approach provides requirements against [deleted] targets at both short and medium ranges, to include artillery weapon systems, surface-to-surface missiles and aircraft. Another major category, [deleted] includes targets for attack with medium and long range weapon systems.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN EUROPE Senator LEVIN. Do you expect this changed rationale to increase or decrease our requirements for short-range nuclear warheads in Europe?

General ROGERS. The requirements study is not complete. Until the study is completed and has been thoroughly reviewed, I consider it premature to provide an answer. Further, I do not want to interfere nor preempt the ongoing work of NATO's High Level Group which is developing a study to determine essential requirements for those NATO nuclear forces with range capabilities less than Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces. The results of the High Level Group study will be presented to NATO Ministers of Defense this fall.


MODERNIZATION OF THE 155MM SHELL Senator LEVIN. Why should we approve modernization of the 155-millimeter shell, which Congress rejected last year, until you translate your new rationale into requirements in your anual needs statement? Shouldn't Congress know the overall scope in numbers and total program cost before we begin this program? General ROGERS. Modernization with the 155mm shell is a significant part of the theater's nuclear modernization program. At present, 155 howitzers comprise the majority of nuclear artillery units in theater. (Deleted). The new 155mm warhead is being designed with required state-of-art safety and security features and will provide increased accuracy, range, and effectiveness. As I indicated earlier, the results of our requirements study and the HLG effort should provide numbers of 155mm nuclear weapons needed to determine final production funding. However, funding support is required now to continue development of the new warhead.


Senator LEVIN. Even though you support modernization of our short-range systems, it sounds like NATO parliamentarians will be ambivalent about it; according to the Washington Post on March 15, 1983. They want large reductions of present short-range systems. Has the North Atlantic Assembly, the NATO Parliamentary group, endorsed modernization of our short-range nuclear weapons ?

General ROGERS. In 1978 SACEUR developed proposals to improve theater nuclear forces. Included in this was a proposal to develop, produce, and deploy new technology warheads for short-range nuclear systems. These proposals were supported and endorsed by NATO Defense Ministers of the Nuclear Planning Group. The proposal to modernize short-range nuclear weapons has subsequently been included in NATO's Force Goals which are a product of NATO's Defense Planning Committee (DPC). Future short-range nuclear weapons are under review by the High Level Group and results will be presented to the Defense Ministers of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group this fall. This effort is providing the basis for full alliance participation in developing short-range nuclear requirements at the government level. As far as is known, the inter-parliamentary group of the North Atlantic Assembly has not addressed the modernization of our short-range nuclear weapons. They have however, endorsed the ongoing review of shorter range nuclear weapons aimed at rationalization of essential requirements of short-range nuclear forces.

Senator LEVIN. You say the short-range launcher balance has shifted from about three to one for us to against us with conversion of the many 152-millimeter artillery tubes to dual mission and conversion capability. Do we know whether they have the nuclear shells-enough of them-to use this edge effectively? Do they have the trained crews for this yet? How meaningful is this edge then ?

General ROGERS. The 152-mm howitzer equipped with dual mission artillery tubes is organic to Soviet armies [deleted].


Senator LEVIN. General, there are reports the Pentagon is reassessing the need for the thousands of short-range nuclear weapons we currently have deployed in Europe, supposedly because their yields are too large, their ranges are too short, their accuracies too poor and their storage sites too vulnerable. All this degrades their deterrent utility.

Do you agree that we should reduce the numbers of these warheads?

General ROGERS. NATO is continously reviewing its requirement for nuclear weapons. Although current short-range artillery fired atomic projectiles are aging, they still serve as a viable deterrent. We may be able to reduce the numbers of short-range weapons as advanced technology weapons are introduced. However, requirements must be based on the threat, which is continuously changing, as well as weapon capabilities. That is why the subject remains under continuous review,

Senator Levin. Reportedly, some people in the Pentagon also are considering that we should not produce new nuclear artillery shells, [deleted]. You yourself said that modernizing our chemical warfare capabilities was more important to you than deploying neutron warheads.

Considering the political problems facing the alliance with the GLCM/PII deployments this year, why should Congress approve any neutron warhead fund. ing and thereby add to the burden on the political and military cohesion of NATO?

General ROGERS. We need new, modern nuclear weapons ; [deleted). Due to [deleted] production rates, we need funding now in order to have [deleted].

Regarding my earlier comments on chemical weapons, the primary purpose of nuclear and chemical retaliatory capabilities is, respectively, to deter enemy nuclear and chemical attack and, failing that, to provide an effective response. Our present short-range tactical nuclear capability addresses this; however, we lack a credible chemical retaliatory capability, which has the potential for [deleted] military consequences.


Senator LEVIN. Even though neutron artillery shells will have longer ranges than current shells, they still will be of extremely short range. And although blast and thermal effects are reduced, they are not eliminated, so there still will be collateral damage from their use, albeit less. Won't these neutron shells have some similar deficiencies to those which NATO politicians are arguing are reaSons we should reduce our nuclear stockpile in Europe?

General ROGERS. The Reduced Blast/Enhanced Radiation (RB/ER) weapon, bas as its central purpose the deterrence of Soviet-Warsaw Pact aggression. For deterrence to be credible, NATO needs a full spectrum of military capabilities. Should deterrence fail the RB/ER would significantly improve our ability to support the forward conventional defense. The RB/ER warhead is an efficient, qualitative improvement that helps offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in tanks and other armored vehicles through emphasis of radiation over blast as the damage mechanism. Another important advantage of radiation versus blast is use of lower yield weapons, thereby limiting collateral damage. Our fighting forces as well as neutral or friendly population could be protected by more precise and confined damage effects resulting from these improved warheads. In my view, the RB/ER warhead can make a significant contribution to help offset increasing Soviet military strength.

Senator LEVIN. Of what real utility is it to build neutron warheads and stockpile them in this nation-does that really add anything to our nuclear deterrent in Europe?

Isn't that the worst of both worlds: They cannot contribute to our deterrent over in Europe and their potential deployment causes us political problems in NATO?

General ROGERS. (Deleted.) The fact that ER/RB weapons exist is a factor the Soviets must consider, regardless of location. Therefore, these weapons must be considered additive to NATO's deterrent equation.

Senator LEVIN. Wouldn't it make more sense not to build any of these artillery shells until NATO gets the INF deployments out of the way and sorts out its policy toward all battlefield weapons?

General ROGERS. All studies of theater nuclear requirements continue to reaffirm the Alliance's need for short-range systems. However, currently deployed short-range artillery fired atomic projectiles are old, [deleted] and therefore [deleted] degrade NATO deterrent posture. In the SNF area I do not want the Alliance put in a position similar to our LRINF situation (i.e., Soviet/WPSS-20's; Alliance-nothing). I am particularly concerned in view of recent Soviet developments in their SNF.

NEUTRON WARHEAD PROTECTION Senator LEVIX. Wouldn't neutron warhead production hand another propazanda victory to the Soviets when we can least afford it among the populations of Europe?

General ROGERS. I believe the enhanced radiation warhead, with its increased efertiveness serves as a greater deterrent to war. However, as I have stated, we are taking a hard look at nuclear requirements and how these requirements can hest be met, just as we are looking seriously for ways to improve NATO's ceventional capabilities. Both types of forces—modernized and ready—are exsential to the maintenance of NATO's deterrent posture. When the neutron seapon is produced, undoubtedly the Soviets will maximize their propaganda efforts, as they have attempted to do with INF. We cannot, however, have Soviet propaganda determine our NATO defense needs.



Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, there is a general impression in the United States that none of our European allies really are willing to accept the GLCM and Pershing II deployments, but that we are somehow forcing these deployments on them. How would you respond to this contention?

General ROGERS. Although a segment of the European public is speaking out against deployment, Alliance governments are holding firm to their 1979 decision. The decision was unanimous to deploy GLCM and Pershing II to counter Soviet weapons programs and strengthen stability and Western security. NATO's agreement to a two part strategy of deployment and arms control talks was a reflection of Alliance resolve to restore a European nuclear balance at lower levels of armaments. This resolve has been reconfirmed repeatedly, with most recent reconfirmation occurring in March at the NATO Ministers' Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Portugal.


Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, last year, you said the following about the capabilities of the M-1 tank and its production rates :

"In the field of equipment I am pleased with actions which will hasten the delivery of modern weapons, such as the M-1 tank, to Europe.

“A delay in production and fielding of the M-1 tank would unquestionably reduce our capability to defend NATO Europe against Soviet aggression.

"The M-1 is currently the best tank on the battlefield, and product improvement programs will continue. The M-1 incorporates major improvements in: Crew protection, speed, battlefield agility, lethality, and fire control reliability. These improvements provide for greater survivability which allows us to defend more effectively for a longer period of time. To delay this capability, while the forces opposite NATO continue to be modernized, is not in our best interests and would adversely impact on our ability to defend NATO Europe."

This administration now proposes to reduce the production rate of M-1s from 855 in fiscal year 1983 to 720 per year in fiscal year 1984 and thereafter. This cuts some 360 tanks from past projections for fiscal year 1984 and fiscal year 1985 and beyond. It also delays by several years the Army's achievement of its 7,058 M-1 inventory objectives.

Would you still say such reductions "are not in our best interests and would adversely impact on our ability to defend NATO Europe?"

General ROGERS. Fielding the M-1 tank is an integral step in our overall Army modernization program for all the reasons enunciated in last year's testimony and restated in the preamble to your question. A delay in production and fielding of the M-1 will delay our achieving our planned capability to defend NATO Europe.

Senator LEVIN. Of all the U.S. services, would you agree the Army needs the most modernization and has lagged behind the Air Force and Navy in modernizing against the Soviet threat? The delays in the M-1 annual production are even doubly unwise, are they not?

General ROGERS. Soviet modernization efforts show no sign of abating and reach across the spectrum of modern weapons for all services. U.S. and allied efforts are required on all fronts if this unrelenting Soviet effort is to be countered successfully. Essential modernization to respond to Soviet advances is a major USEUCOM priority. Pressing modernization needs for USEUCOM include better capability to target and destroy enemy forces; improved capability for engaging Warsaw Pact follow-on forces ; survivable, secure voice/data and interoperable theatre and tactical command, control and communications systems; improved air defense coverage, and improved anti-armor capability, HQ/USEUCOM FY82 input for the FY81-88 Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM), highlighted delays in M-1 tank production, Copperhead procurement, AH-64 R&D, and AH-1 COBRA TOW sight as inconsistent with the priority anti-armor capability requires. While the continued Soviet build-up dictates we can not afford to be complacent and I consider our tank modernization effort vital, this effort must be viewed in the context of a balanced program designed to counter the total Warsaw Pact effort.

DEFENDING EUROPE WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS nator LEVIN. General Rogers, you have said you share the optimism of ral Frederick Kroesen, U.S. Army Comander in Europe, that he could successfully defend Central Europe with conventional weapons. However, you say your pessimism about the need to go nuclear “fairly early" because of a weakness in our conventional NATO defenses is based, in part, on the lack of sustainability of our allies. You implied that General Kroesen's optimism was based on the fact he was considering only the capabilities of U.S. troops, not the allies, also.

According to the interview which quoted General Kroesen, he also was considering the capabilities of the West Germans and Canadians who share with the United States the responsibilities for defending Central Europe. Please explain this apparent contradiction with your statement.

General ROGERS. General Kroesen and I are in complete agreement regarding NATO defense capabilities in Central Europe. I believe you will find his optimism always expressed in terms of initiating the defense and coupled with concerns about sustaining the defense if we do not build up our conventional capability. In his NATO role as Commander, Central Army Group (CENTAG), General Kroesen commands NATO's land forces in Southern Germany. CENTAG includes United States, German and Canadian units. Additionally, if the French were to join in wartime defense, their forward ground forces, The First French Army, would likely operate with CENTAG. CENTAG units have a higher proportion of regular soldiers than those of Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) in Northern Germany. Importantly, CENTAG has stores of pre-positioned supplies which would probably enable CENTAG units to sustain the defense using conventional weapons for longer than NORTHAG. NORTHAG is composed of German, British, Dutch, Belgian and some U.S. units. Many NORTHAG units are malpositioned, making initial movement to fighting positions more difficult, and a high percentage of NORTHAG's troops are reserves. NORTHAG has serious shortages of pre-positioned supplies. It is the lack of sustainment which will cause me, under current conditions, to request the release of nuclear weapons fairly early.

General Kroesen is properly proud of CENTAG's capabilities; but as SACEUR I am charged with the defense of all of Allied Command Europe.


Senator LEVIN. (Deleted.]

General ROGERS. France is committed to the Atlantic Alliance; however, French policy precludes the prior commitment of French Forces to the NATO integrated military command. [Deleted.] Senator LEVIN. (Deleted.] General ROGERS. The French have displayed a keen interest in furthering peacetime coordination between their forces and other NATO conventional forces. (Deleted.] They maintain formal liaison missions to major NATO military headquarters, such as SHAPE, AFCENT and AFSOUTH. Despite this fairly high degree of peacetime defense interrelationship and cooperation, [deleted]. This French policy, I should add, does not preclude the strong positive military dialogue which continues to exist between France and the military establishments of the United States and other NATO countries.

Senator LEVIN. (Deleted.]
General ROGERS. (Deleted.]
Senator LEVIN. (Deleted.]

General ROGERS. As I mentioned, I personally believe that the French will support NATO in event of war and very likely will join her forces with those of NATO to defend Western Europe. (Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. (Deleted.] General ROGERS. (Deleted.] However, as stated, I personally believe that the French will support NATO in event of war; [deleted).


Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, last year you told this subcommittee that it was necessary for the United States to continue to support increased defense budgets so as to set an example our European allies would follow in increasing their own defense contributions: You said this about the pending congressional consideration of the fiscal year 1983 defense budget?

"If that message continues to come through from the leader of the alliance, then we have an opportunity to have the citizens of Western Europe understand the threat and be prepared to follow our example to make sacrifices and send that message to their elected representatives."

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