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tion support and for POMCUS sets 5 and 6 would be significant. POMCUS sets 5 and 6 are essential and integral part of long-standing United States and NATO plans to reinforce Europe in order to provide a credible deterrence, or if necessary, adequate combat power in NATO's northern part of the central region to contain a Warsaw Pact attack. Critical to achievement of these goals is the 10 division-D-Day force. The 10 division force is contingent upon six full sets of POMCUS on the ground to complement the four divisions forward deployed. Therefore, lack of POMCUS sets 5 and 6 forward deployed places achievement of those essential goals at risk. How early I must ask for release of nuclear weapons may well be determined by the early availability of the divisions whose equipment would comprise sets 5 and 6. The impact of canceling funding for wartime host nation support is severe, and falls primarily in the area of sustainability. As a result of previous congressional mandates, there is inadequate combat service support force structure forward deployed to sustain U.S. Army Europe's forward deployed, in-place forces. (Deleted.]
The 93,000 German reservists earmarked under full implementation of the wartime host nation support agreement will provide such essential service supoprt as transportation and material handling, airfield damage repair, resupply, medical evacuation, and decontamination. Without this support, the six reinforcing divi. sions cannot be properly received and appropriately deployed in theater and conventional combat operations cannot be sustained. Taken together, cancellation of funding for POMCUS sets 5 and 6 as well as wartime host nation support would jeopardize successful conventional defense of central Europe, and force early escalation to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
SAFETY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE SITES
Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, I am concerned about the safety of our nuclear weapons storage sites and about the various delivery systems. My specific concern deals with the capabilities of Soviet special purpose forces.
Would you detail for us the threat that these highly trained Soviet troops pose?
General ROGERS. The main intelligence directorate of the Soviet General Staff maintains a large, standing force of elite special purpose (Spetsnaz) forces. [Deleted). These forces are subordinate to, and tasked directly by, the front intelligence directorate. [Deleted).
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY
GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS
RELIABILITY OF SOVIET ALLIES Senator Jackson. General Rogers, don't you believe that the Soviets increasingly must distrust or doubt the military reliability of their allies—that is, Polish forces and military infrastructure?
General ROGERS. Reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces is a special problem for the U.S.S.R., [deleted]. The main problems contributing to this uncertainty are historical antagonisms, latent nationalism and the adverse impact of the continuing recession on Warsaw Pact economies. (Deleted]. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armed forces would almost certainly cooperate and prove reliable in the defense of their own territory. [Deleted.]
Senator Jackson. Doesn't this doubt increase the deterrence we provide the Soviets?
General ROGERS. [Deleted.] Even though the Soviets have sought to insure unity within the Warsaw Pact through political indoctrination and security programs, traces of doubt obviously remain. These factors probably detract from Soviet leaders' confidence in their allies. In a military sense, the political and economic dissatisfaction and discontent among the U.S.S.R.'s East European allies ultimately could have the effect of weakening loyalty to Soviet military objectives and [deleted].
SOVIET PROBLEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE
Senator JACKSON. Don't we too often ignore the very real military problems Hs Soviets face in Eastern Europe?
General ROGERS. [Deleted.] Over the past decade the Soviets have concen'rated their efforts on correcting military deficiencies in Eastern Europe, and all indications point toward a continuation of this effort.
[Deleted.] The Soviets have also made great strides in quantitative and qualitative improvements in their ground forces in the forward area. Army units are being equipped with the newest models of tanks, the latest artillery Teapon systems and multiple rocket launchers. Older missile systems are in the process of being replaced by more sophisticated models. The Soviets are also gradually modernizing East European forces selectively with emphasis on artillery and attack helicopters. [Deleted.)
While the Soviets may harbor some doubts about the genuine enthusiasm some of its East European allies have for membership in the Warsaw Pact deleted].
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY
GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS
PROBLEMS FACING ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE
Senator Nunn. What is your view of the progress that is occurring in NATO in moving to the deep strike/second echelon attack capability that you have endorsed? What doctrinal problems still exist, if any?
General ROGERS. Allied Command Europe (ACE) is developing procedures for attacking follow-on forces. The Major Subordinate Commanders in ACE are playing a key role in this process. As for the NATO countries, some such as Germany, are vigorously working toward developing and fielding the capability to strike follow-on forces. Others have been more cautious in their approach to the issue and are still examining the problem, in large part because of budgetary reasons. As for the doctrinal issues involved, Allied Command Europe is addressing these as it develops procedures for attacking follow-on forces. In the process the views of the various nations will be taken into account. The result of efforts to date indicate that no major doctrinal issues need emerge, since what is being done is fully supportive of the flexible response strategy and the forward defense concept. Any major future impediments to implementation of attack of follow-on forces are not likely to be doctrinal, but rather hardware problems. Developing adequate target acquisition means and weapons with requisite range/accuracy/ responsiveness are the real challenges, both for the United States and its allies.
Senator Nunn. How do you answer the critics of this concept? What problems are in the U.S. budget to fulfill this requirement and what programmatic initiatires are needed? What opportunities exist for NATO cooperative programs in this area?
General ROGERS. As for the first question, it makes little sense to allow Warsaw Paet follow-on formations to supply and close rapidly on NATO defenses without being disrupted and attritted enroute. By directing some of our force against these deeper targets, we can slow the rate of advance and reduce the volume and rate of presentation at the forward edge of the battlefield. Moving Warsaw Pact formations present lucrative targets against which weapon effectiveness can be merimized. Attacking follow-on forces also introduces a confusion factor that will disrupt the orderly battle plan that the Warsaw Pact would like to execute. As for the second and third quesiton, there are four elements, all of which must function successfully to attack the follow-on forces. The first element is target Location.
[Deleted.] The second element required is secure, survivable communication systems to transmit the information detected by sensor systems to intelligence processing centers. [Deleted.] The third element required is a fusion system which can rapidly process the sensor data and transmit, in real time, targeting information to the appropriate attack systems. [Deleted.] To send aircraft deep into enemy territory to attack a moving target based on information that is more than several hours old is a less than optimal proposition. The final element required is an accurate, survivable attack means. Today, attack of a deep target requires an aircraft in most cases. In the future, we need a standoff capability that will allow these targets to be attacked without necessarily having a manned sireraft overfly the target area. As for cooperative programs within NATO, we have had some success with both the F-16 and AWACS. The number of opportunities available in the future will to a great extent depend on the willingness of the countries involved to share their technological developments since many of the systems needed will be based on new technology.
AIRLAND BATTLE CONCEPT
Senator Nunn. What is your view of the AirLand Battle concept, and how do you plan to implement this in NATO?
General ROGERS. It must be kept in mind that the AirLand Battle doctrine is a U.S. Army doctrine based on a global perspective. The AirLand Battle doctrine should not be confused with the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle 2000 concept that deals with potential developments and capabilities in the year 2000.
When we developed the ACE concept for the attack of Warsaw Pact follow-on forces, the SHAPE staff analyzed the efforts of nations in this field, including the U.S. Army's AirLand battle doctrine. The ACE concept, approved by me in June 1981, incorporated those elements from all the nations' (and subordinaate commands') thinking which were most applicable for ACE. There are some aspects of the U.S. Army's doctrine, developed for global applicationing which are not appropriate for the defensive posture of ACE.
Senator Nunn. What is the current capability in the intelligence area needed to implement the AirLand Battle concept, what are the problem areas, and what programmatic initiatives are needed? What problems, if any, exist in the intelligence fusion area?
General ROGERS. From an intelligence perspective, the ACE concept for attack. ing Pact follow-on forces, requires the integration of intelligence collection, communications, data processing, and dissemination to a degree that was not even conceivable a few years ago. Because we can expect to face a numerically superior force in Europe, we must have the capability to track, identify and target our adversary over an extended battlefield. To accomplish these goals, continued programmatic support for collection systems capable of monitoring the extended battlefield is essential. In this area we have made substantial progress. The TR-1, with its [deleted] imaging radar systems, will provide a significant capability for day-night, all-weather monitoring of first and second echelon forces. JSTARS, with its moving target tracking capability, will provide the timely and accurate positional data needed to employ effectively our present and planned extendedrange weapons systems. Continued improvement and developmemnt of satellite based collection systems with the capability to disseminate information rapidly to operational commanders will support critically needed monitoring of follow-on forces. With all of these systems, programmatic support for development of day-night, all-weather collection capabilities is mandatory. Collection, however, is only part of the equation. The amount of data that current and future collections systems will provide to operational commanders can be a detriment without the ability to fuse this data rapidly into a coherent stream of usable information. Intelligence fusion presents our greatest challenge and we are making progress in this area. [Deleted.]
LONG-TERM DEFENSE PLAN
Senator Nunn. How well is NATO doing implementing the long-term defense plan and what is your view on how United States can, if needed, revitalize this effort?
General ROGERS. I believe the LTDP has led to considerable improvement in NATO's defense posture. (Deleted.) So there has been progress.
As you may know, the LTDP as a separate program has been phased out. Many of its principles have been incorporated in other planning processes, such as Force Goals. It is important that NATO build on the progress that we made under LTDP. We need to ensure that the analytical advantages the LTDP brought to the planning process are not lost in the transition. We also must continue to point out, as Secretary Weinberger and others have been doing, that many of the actions begun under LTDP have not been completed. (Deleted.]
CONVENTIONAL PREPARATIONS Senator Nunn. What is the current capability of the United States and our allies to support the type of conventional conflict envisioned for NATO center? What are our objectives in terms of ammunition and war reserves and what do we currently have? What is in the 5-year plan and what are the major deficieneies? What is the current objective of our NATO allies and what is the current level on hand ?
What is your view of the recent proposal of former Secretary of Defense McNamara and others that the United States cut our procurement of ammunition and war stores for NATO since we are so far in front of our allies?
General ROGERS. The NATO minimum stockage objective for war reserves is 30 days with the exception of the U.S. The NATO recognized U.S. stockage objective is [deleted) as our forces must be sustained until the transAtlantic LOC is established. DOD resource planning guidance has supported the [deleted). The services have attempted to comply with the Defense Guidance. With the exception of Army class VII and some high technology missiles, the service POMs for FT SŁ88 would satisfy [deleted] of U.S. European Forces war reserve requirements if fully funded/implemented. As you are aware, there is a tendency to place the bulk of funds needed to correct a given problem in the program outyears. Thus, while we have gradually improved our theater war reserve status, full realization of the [deleted] level has remained perpetually five years in the future. USCINCEUR has no access to specific status of Allied efforts to achieve war reserve objectives; however, imclassified sources reveal varying degrees of success depending on the commodity and nation concerned. All freeworld western nations are currently experiencing some degree of economic stagnation or depression making real growth in defense spending a difficult and often politically unpopular choice. It is especially important during these economically troubled times, that the United States maintain the goals we are encouraging our allies to achieve. To cut back on our procurement of war reserve materiel DOW, particularly ammunition and critical items for U.S. European Forces, would be self-deluding, dictate early resort to nuclear weapons in any major conflict and send the wrong signal to both our allies and potential adversaries.
FORWARD DEFENSE CONCEPT Senator Nunn. In the recent issue of Army magazine, First Lieutenant Peters wrote a very thoughtful and provocative article on the forward defense concept. Would you have your staff comment on this article both from a political perspective but primarily from a military capability standpoint?
General ROGERS. Lieutenant Peters' article is a well-written exposition of current discussions concerning implementation of the NATO Forward Defense concept, and he makes several valid points. However, he incorrectly suggests that Forward Defense is directed toward defending a small strip of NATO territory, whereas, in fact, NATO is seeking the flexibility to carry the war to the enemy's rear by attacking reinforcing units before they trespass NATO territory. Forrard Defense thus remains a valid principle and I support it. Our commitment to Forward Defense can best be implemented, in my view, once NATO is attacked, by carrying the battle forward—to the enemy's own territory. We continue, as you know to evaluate improved methods for stopping and punishing an aggressor as deeply in his territory as possible in order to preserve the credibility of Forward Defense.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROBLEMS Senator Nunn. Are there any short-term legislative initiatives that can be taken to address technology transfer problems that we are all concerned about?
General ROGERS. I would be pleased to see you take any legislative or other measures that would make it more difficult for the Warsaw Pact to acquire critical Western military-relevant technologies. Protection of our technological lead for national security should continue to be a matter of real concern to the Consress as it is to the U.S. military. I do not have specific legislative initiatives in mind. I certainly do not underestimate the difficulty involved in legislating control measures over technology transfer, but I do endorse efforts to deal with this Important matter. Senator Nunn. [Deleted.] General ROGERS. [Deleted.]
SOVIET-WARSAW PACT WEAKNESSES Senator Nunn. What is your view of a principle of military strategy that would envision exploiting inherent Soviet-Warsaw Pact weaknesses? I have in mind the tenuous land lines of communication, the "unreliability" of the Pact Allies, and the lack of ready ocean access. What is your view on whether or not the Soviets should enjoy a sanctuary in Eastern Europe?
General ROGERS. Any sound military strategy must be aimed at exploiting an adversary's weak points. Interrupting Warsaw Pact lines of communication and taking the war to the Warsaw Pact are part of the rationale for attacking the follow-on forces. As for an Eastern European sanctuary, I do not feel NATO can afford such a luxury. If the Warsaw Pact should attack, NATO must disrupt the flow of supplies and reinforcements while they are still in the Eastern bloc territory.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Senator Nunn. What is your view on the need to improve the special operations forces that would have the capability to disrupt Soviet military activity?
General ROGERS. Improvement of Special Operations Forces is important to the successful containment of Soviet/Warsaw Pact aggression. Three major areas need attention. First the forces. We presently have [deleted] allocated to USEUCOM for planning. [Deleted) and may not be available. We require a [deleted] to fulfill adequately mission requirements. There are [deleted] wbich limits them to replacement and follow-on requirements. Secondly, [deleted] USEUCOM requirements were established in July 1979, and have been revalidated annually. [Deleted] Currently there are [deleted] and [deleted] for planning purposes. These [deleted] Third, to exploit fully the potential of Special Operation Forces requires dependable communications. Communication systems currently fielded do not include state-of-the-art technology required in the high threat Soviet environment. Increased funding and support of Special Operations Communications/Electronics research and development and procurement efforts are urgently required.
1975 NUNN AMENDMENT
Senator Nunn. What has happened with U.S. forces in NATO since the implementation of the Nunn "tooth-to-tail” amendment in 1975? (This amendment required the reduction of 30,000 support troops with a permissive add-back of 20,000 combat troops.) What is the current U.S. combat to support ratio and how has this changed in the last 5 years? What are the projections for the next 5 years?
General ROGERS. At the time of the Nunn amendment of 1975, you stated that the combat to support ratio was 49/51, according to your figures. Similarly, your figures showed that this ratio remained fairly constant at about 52/48 during the period 1976–1980. The Department of the Army, however, computed the ratio as 62/38 during 1976–1980, with the difference being the method of computation. You counted combat support (CS) forces such as artillery, signal, engineers and military police as "providers of combat support" rather than "consumers of logistic support” as viewed by DA and USAREUR. (Deleted.]
By 1982, the ratio was 62/38 (source; your report on this matter). The current ratio as reported to Department of the Army in the USAREUR Essential Force Package Report is 67/33. By Army doctrine, the optimal ratio is 53/47. The USAREUR goal is leaner than that, with the objective in the next five years being 58/42. It is difficult to predict how closely this goal will be met as we are still working with the European troop strength ceiling problem, and this ceiling will have an impact on the final ratio. I remain concerned, however, that we may have reduced too much "tail." In addition to known Css shortfalls in the Central Region, we currently lack the ability to support U.S. divisions committed to the NATO flanks. USCINCCENT shares similar concerns, as we double-count many of the same CONUS-based active and reserve component forces for support of our respective theaters. This issue demands a reevaluation.
WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT Senator Nunn. How important is the Wartime Host Nation Support with the Federal Republic of Germany and what would U.S. requirements be without this? Is this type of agreement compatible with the views of some that our allies should shoulder a greater portion of the burden of common defense?
General ROGERS. Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) from the Federal Republic of Germany is essential for the United States to reinforce NATO rapidly and effectively with sustainable combat forces. U.S. combat forces cur