Page images

I remind them that that 420 Belgian francs is less than one-fourth of what they pay as the annual tax for their colored television.

The additional sacrifice varies by nation. It is $38 per citizen in this country in 1983 to meet the force goals established by NATO for the United States. But the average additional sacrifice is only $11 for the citizens in our West European nations. I maintain that added sacrifice is affordable and reasonable. We have to be seen by the Soviets as committing ourselves to that kind of conventional enhancement if we are going to be successful in what I think is the only route to our long-term goal-success at the arms reduction talks.

Senator Exon. My time is up. I want to thank you for the good work
and I generally agree with everything you say. I was delighted with
the outcome of the German elections, I think many of us were, but I
must say to you that I am more worried about the perception that
Americans have of this situation right now, even more so than I was
before the German elections, on the problems in Europe.
We have problems.
General ROGERS. Yes, sir.
Senator Exon. Thank you.
Senator WARNER. Senator Levin, do you have any further questions?
Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am not sure why the Appropriations Committees are always
knocking out those pre-position sets five and six. I presume it is some-
what out of pique with our allies for not carrying out their commit-
ments to have 3 percent real growth.

Is that correct?
General Rogers. I should not speak for the committees, but I believe
that is one reason.

The second is not wishing to move equipment from this country to
store in Europe when we need it in our Active Army and our Reserves.

When this administration first came into office the only thing I raised with Secretary Weinberger during my initial call on him as SACEUR, was the need for six divisions of equipment pre-positioned in Europe. But I pointed out that all we could stand to pulī from the Army Reserves and Active Army were four division sets of equipment. I knew that later as the former Chief of Staff.

If we are to meet our commitment to our allies for a 10 division force in Europe by M plus 10 days, I suggested an additional buy of those two sets of equipment, the sets for divisions five and six. The Secretary of Defense agreed to that additional buy. Now that the equipment is available and being issued to Conus units it appears that it would have to be pulled from the Reserves and Active Forces again if it were to be stored in Europe.

Senator LEVIN. We bought equipment. The question now is where is it going to be located ?

General Rogers. That is right. I figure I am still owed two sets of equipment which were to be bought over and above the authorized acquisition objective of the U.S. Army. Senator LEVIN. It is probably a lot more than that, at least that. General Rogers. I am sympathetic with the Army, too. I know their problems. Senator LEVIN. (Deleted.]

[ocr errors][ocr errors]


Could you comment on the coordination of conventional forces with the French? Can we count on them?

General ROGERS. Yes, I can. The coordination is extremely good. both multilateral within the NATO context and bilateral. Not only United States and French, but Germans and French and so on; a very close working relationship between the Commander of the U.S. 6th Fleet and Commander of the French fleet in the Mediterannean; a very close relationship between U.S. Army, Europe, and the First French Army. The same is true between the First French Army, most of which is located in Germany, and the NATO CINC, Central Region, General von Senger. The U.S. Air Force has an extremely close association with the French tactical air force.

I am most encouraged by how close that coordination is.
Senator LEVIN. Is that coordination public?
General ROGERS. It is made public to a certain extent. [Deleted.]

Senator Levin. I mean in the conventional area, is that generally known publicly? Is that classified ?

General ROGERS. It is not classified. Whenever I am asked the question about it, or there is an opportunity to raise this matter, I point out what close cooperation exists. I point out that the common objective between their Chief of Deferise and myself—and say so publiclyis to move as far down the road as we possibly can toward having done as much as possible in peacetime so that, when the French political decision is made for their forces to join ours, we lose the least amount of time in utilizing their forces.

Senator LEVIN. In your 2.6 million estimate of uniform personnel did you include the French!

General ROGERS. I did not. I have to go back and look at those figures. Senator Levin. Maybe you can supply those for the record.

[See questions submitted by Senator Levin for the hearing record.] Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I will end there and I thank the Chair.

I do have a number of questions for General Rogers, both in open session and in the executive session.

Senator WARNER. Senator Quayle, we are happy to have you.

Senator QUAYLE. You started very early, Mr. Chairman. I have to compliment you on starting at 8 o'clock in the morning.

Senator LEVIN. Don't encourage him.

Senator QUAYLE. I know this is not the first time. It shows the durability of the Chair and the workload on this committee.


General Rogers, there has been a great deal of discussion over a number of years about troops in Western Europe. There has been discussion among Senators about our ratio of Reserves to active duty and how we have 1 to 1.4 active duty, something like that whereas Europe and the other countries have 0.4, 0.3, the obvious reverse.

[ocr errors]

There seems to be some discussion that we ought to rely more on our Reserves. I brought up the question that if you look at NATO, given the political concerns, and I think a closed session is much better to talk about it than in open session, I hope you can give me as much direction or tell us what kind of communication we really are doing with some of our allies. Serious discussion of this issue is taking place in the political system here, I am not one of those saying that we should withdraw, I am concerned about the amount of sentiment.

[ocr errors]


[ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors][ocr errors]

I am also concerned about our contribution to NATO. Are we concerned about this? You talk to other people at your level, do they express the political problem they have? If so, what is the reaction and what direction can we quietly take to perhaps get a reallocation or a change in the mix and attitudes and assumption of responsibility of our NATO allies compared to what we have today?

General Rogers. The fertile field is mobilization of war reserves and particularly as it relates to the deployment of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF] and the void that deployment creates in NATO when those same units that are committed to NATO will not be coming to Europe but will go with the RDF.

We are just at the point right now in NATO where we have gotten the information from the United States as to what forces she would expect to deploy with the RDF, and we are now asking our allies how are they going to fill the void ?

One approach is through their mobilizable Reserves. Even though they can't create mechanized division or armored divisions, still an infantry division consisting of reserve forces located in the urban sprawl in the Northern Plain of Europe or in the rear area still can be an effective unit.

So, you are pointing toward an area of which I think we must take greater cognizance. The long-term defense program of 1978 called for the creation of 10 additional brigades by our allies. The only ones that have been forthcoming to date are two home defense brigades now committed to NATO by Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany has four more which I expect will be committed sometime in the future. There are many reservists in West Europe because most nations have conscription. So, our country is using the instrument of the possible deployment of the Rapid Deployment Force to push our allies into doing more than just giving the RDF overflight and base rights and to have allies Create forces that will be available to fill the void. To create such forces for that purpose is going to take some sacrifice on the part of the West Europeans, and they will be reluctant to make it.

That is the approach I would take, and it would be under the um-
brella of the Rapid Deployment Force.

Senator QCAYLE. What could we do to sort of push that along and
to also increase the degree of efficiency of mobilizable Reserves, that is
pally a key factor. It seems we as a country overlook that or at least
not place proper emphasis on it.
Do you think that is true?

[ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors]

General ROGERS. The allies have more Reserves that can be mobilized than we do. I think our country is doing extremely well in the past 3 or 4 years in meeting the levels of Reserve component strength mandated by the Congress, both the Reserves and the National Guard and doing so with good people.

As a nation if you wish to use more Reserves than active troops, the place to use them is in the combat service support [CSS] area. That is what we have done; for example, 67 percent of the combat service support units necessary to support our Active Army Forces are in the Army Reserves.

Now, if you deploy the Rapid Deployment Force, you must send along with the RDF nearly all the CSS units that are earmarked to support not only our forward-deployed forces in Europe-already short 28 percent of CSS—but all the other forces that might come to Europe. The bulk of the Army's CSS units will have to go to Southwest Asia with the RDF.

So there is the place for this Nation to concentrate more on reserv. ists in combat service support units; give them the proper training and get them up to a high level of readiness.

I would not create additional divisions in our Army Reserve; perhaps in the National Guard.

That is the way I would go, both with respect to NATO and here at home.


Senator QUAYLE. Can you give us any update on what is happening in Greece, particularly with the base there? I just happened to stop off there on the way from Lebanon and talked to the base commander there. It is a very tenuous situation.

I have read more statements from Papandreous to the people. I know it is for domestic consumption. Do you think we will get forced out of there?

General ROGERS. [Deleted.] Senator QUAYLE. [Deleted.] General ROGERS. [Deleted.] Senator QUAYLE. There is to them. General ROGERS. [Deleted.] We depend on Turkey too much to hold that very strategic part of the world and she needs the modern weapon systems with which to do it.

Senator WARNER. I think that is going to be done. [Deleted.] That ratio of $1 U.S. defense-$21/2 social programs vice $1 to $7, I was not certain whether that was a reference to certain NATO nations or overall.

General ROGERS. If you take all the Western European nations in NATO, for every dollar for defense they spend $7 for social programs.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, General.

[Whereupon at 10:20 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in open session.]

[The questions submitted by Senate Armed Services Strategic and Theater Nuclear Force Subcommittee to be answered by General Rogers follow:]




Senator WARNER. How is the overall capability of Soviet shorter-range nuclearrapable systems being affected by the introduction of SS-21's, SS-22's and SS-23's?

General ROGERS. The overall nuclear capabilities of Soviet forces are increasing with the deployment of greater range and more accurate third-generation short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM's)—SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23.

(Deleted.] The SS-21 has a range of 120 kilometers (km) versus a 70-km range for the FROG-7 and the [deleted].

The SS-22 SRBM is believed to be replacing the SS-12 Scaleboard [deleted). It is projected, however, to replace front and Army level Scud SRBM's. The 88-23 has both improved range and accuracy over the Scud [deleted).




Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, we here on the Armed Services Committee rely very heavily on your judgment and wisdom in regards to our defense posture in Europe. Would you give us your assessment of the strength of the NATO alliance? General ROGERS. I believe the alliance is fundamentally sound. As has been pointed out many times before, NATO is a defensive alliance whose first mission is to deter war. In the 34 years since NATO came into existence, not a square meter of allied territory has been lost. So I believe the alliance has been one of history's most significant successes. I do not subscribe to the view that the alliance is in disarray.

At the same time, I am deeply disturbed about the unabated growth of military power of the Soviet Union. This growth has created a serious threat to the alliance. I am concerned that many in the West have not responded to the Soviet threat with the appropriate sense of urgency, as evidenced by, in some cases, reduced defense expenditures and a lack of rapid progress toward improring our defense posture. I am particularly concerned about the widening capabilities gap in conventional forces that exists between NATO and the Waraw Pact. We need to improve our conventional forces quickly and dramatically, nt we face the prospect of political intimidation stemming from overwhelming Russian military power. If enough is not done to beef up NATO conventional forces, the West would have no recourse in war except the early use of nuclear Teapons.

PERSHING II FUNDS CANCELLATION Senator THURMOND. How have our allied military leaders reacted to congressional actions such as cancellation of funds for l’ershing II ?

General ROGERS. NATO military leaders take great interest in what our Conzrere does and says, especially regarding issues that bear on the defense of Europe. They find it difficult to understand when the United States makes what ute perceived to be abrupt changes in defense policy. Such actions cause confusion and uncertainty, and play into the hands of those who profess to see a weakening of the U.S. commitment to NATO.


Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, I believe you made reference to our inTeased reliance on nuclear weapons resulting from failures to meet conventional oumitments during your testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. Pop the record, would you assess the impact of canceling funds for host nation support and POMCUS sets 5 and 6 on our increased reliance on nuclear weapons? General ROGERS. The impact of canceling funds for German wartime host na

[ocr errors]
« PreviousContinue »