and handle them. Hopefully we can get what we are trying to do into a more systematic order.

I say that without criticism of anyone. But it just seems to me that when we first started putting those weapons in Europe we had the philosophy that if one is good, two are better and three then must be outstanding. That comment may be unfair. I do know we had at one time the rationale that we should have "X" number of nuclear warheads for every 155 tube and "Y" for every Lance and "Z" for every 8-inch tube. For me, that is not a proper rationale.

You see, I have asked for the 155 rounds to be modernized; I have asked for the 8-inch rounds to be modernized. And still I haven't yet got my arms around the numbers by types that we need, based on this new rationale in which I have confidence.

I come to you and say this, not knowing but what 3 years from now-2 years from now in my tenure-I will have been asking for things that I don't need on down the road.

On the other hand, if we have to go to war, we don't want to go to war [deleted].

That is my quandry. It is my problem and I have to solve it. I just hope I am not pouring a lot of money down a rathole by requests that I make because we have not yet reached the final decision in confidence on all items which stem from warhead requirements.

You must also understand I must deal with my political authorities with my recommendations to them concerning numbers of weapons, and so forth.

Senator WARNER. Would you suggest some amendment to our procurement process to dovetail with your analysis to save that money?

General ROGERS. That is what we need to work toward. I am not there yet, Mr. Chairman. And yet we don't know how much time we have. Do I in fact have 2 years? Do we have until the end of this decade? I don't know.

One of these days I will have brought all of this together. What I would say to you is I need the 155 round and I would ask that we start producing and procuring the 155 round. [Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. In that sense we wouldn't be putting money down the rathole, to use your words?

General ROGERS. No, not until I get it sorted out. Insofar as the civil engineering and the intrusion and detection system and so on for our sites where we have these warheads stored, I pay for that out of infrastructure funding, common funding from every NATO nation. We went from having very few storage sites to dispersing them up to a [deleted].

I am going to be a smarter man in this area next year than I am now and hopefully have all of this resolved 2 years from now. Senator WARNER. [Deleted.]

General ROGERS. [Deleted.]

[Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. Bear in mind, gentlemen, we have so many people waiting for the next session.

Senator Exon?

Senator Exox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rogers, thank you for coming again. Speaking for myself. there is nobody in the military in whom I have more confidence and

respect, and I have listened very intently to your recommendations this morning.

With regard to the 155 round, do your superiors-you must have told them about this-share your view or is it still up for grabs?

General ROGERS. I believe they finally share my view with respect to need of the 155. [Deleted.] I don't know.

Senator EXON. When I read that article in the paper that you referred to I was looking forward to this this morning so that we could get a firsthand report from you on it. It seemed to me that we should do everything that we can to begin development of what you call a modernized round here to get you up to speed in case you need it.

I, as one member of this committee, will do everything I can to be of assistance to you. There is only so far that we can go here until— may I ask you bluntly, what do the Joint Chiefs think of your proposal?

General ROGERS. I believe the Joint Chiefs are on record as being supportive of modernization of the 155.

Senator ExoN. I don't see any basic objection to the outline you have made here. We have to take a risk on a lot of these things and I am ready to take a risk.

If I could digress for just a moment to get your ideas on something else because we count on you to make the decisions over there for the defense of the free world and I think you do an excellent job. I hope that you people in the military recognize the political difficulties we are having right here at home, not just in Europe.

[Deleted.]

ATTACK BY SOVIET FORCES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

Let me pose this question to you. How likely do you think an attack by the Soviet forces in the European theater is from what information you have, 1 out of 10, with 1 being low and 10 being high, in the next 2 years? Is that a fair question?

General ROGERS. That is a fair question. I would put my answer this way if I might. I am not concerned about an attack out of the blue from the East, not today.

In the first place, the Soviets are too smart for that. They are watching the same trends that I am watching in Western Europe, such trends that although our forces in Allied Command Europe get stronger every year, the gap between our force capabilities and those of the Warsaw Pact is widening every year.

For example, we field 500 modern tanks one year, they will field 2000. We will field 400 modern aircraft, they will field 1,000. That gap continues to get wider and wider.

However, the military situation is not unmanageable yet. That is the message I try to give to anybody who will listen to me. The situation is not yet beyond restoration. We are a defensive alliance and we don't have to match them one for one in any category of force comparison. But that trend of the widening gap continues.

There is another trend represented by the attitudes and beliefs of many people on both sides of the Atlantic, but I am particularly concerned with the European side. Their attitudes and beliefs: and I mentioned complacency, wishful thinking, enamored with the freezes, and attracted to neutralism, pacifism, and unilateral disarmament.

These are thoughtful people, well-meaning people. They are casting about for a solution which might prevent war. But what they are doing is counterproductive to the efforts of those of us who are trying to achieve successful arms negotiations and reach arms reduction accords. I happen to believe, Senator, that the path that leads to the future that all of us want-peace with freedom, lowered tensions, and reduced and balanced forces-that path runs through Geneva and Vienna.

The question is-and this is the major menace I see-how long can these two trends continue to converge until we wake up some morning and we find that the Soviets have achieved the objective she has set for herself, which is domination of Western Europe without ever calling her troops out of the barracks. And then we find ourselves politically and economically blackmailed and coerced in Western Europe with the obvious impact in this country. That is the major worry that I have right now, the kind of intimidation that can result from the massive military might of the Soviets from their perceiving us in the alliance as failing to do those things necessary to be politically cohesive, politically unified and militarily strong and resolute, capable of implementing our strategy.

That is why I think these are the two actions that are so important to the alliance.

ESTABLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS ON ALLIED SOIL

First in this year our priority must go to putting the new nuclear weapon systems on allied soil by the end of December-barring a breakthrough at Geneva-to show that in fact we can follow through on that very vital decision of December 1979, that our alliance is cohesive and unified, thus providing incentives to the Soviets to negotiate seriously. Second, in the longer term, to be perceived as improving our conventional deterrence which we have been buying on the cheap, doing those things that we need to strengthen ourselves conventionally. Being so perceived will have a favorable impact, I contend, at the MBFR talks in Vienna.

Doing as I suggest it is going to take sacrifice. I have pointed to this Nation with great pride in the past 2 years as setting a model in times of economic constraint of a nation that can and is increasing its security arrangements at the expense of other programs.

I point that out to our European allies because it is a magnificent example our Nation is setting. I point out to our allies that for every dollar we spend on defense in the United States, we spend only $2.50 on social programs. But over there for every dollar our allies spend on defense they spend $7 on social programs.

When allies wring their hands about the possible use of nuclear weapons, one needs to ask them the question: Are you prepared to pay a little more to prevent it? Are you, say, the Belgians, prepared to sacrifice an additional 420 Belgian francs in 1983 for every citizen in order to meet your agreed force goals? Are you each prepared to spend 420 more francs, in 1983 as an additional premium on an insurance policy for peace and freedom?

I remind them that that 420 Belgian francs is less than one-fourth of what they pay as the annual tax for their colored television.

The additional sacrifice varies by nation. It is $38 per citizen in this country in 1983 to meet the force goals established by NATO for the United States. But the average additional sacrifice is only $11 for the citizens in our West European nations. I maintain that added sacrifice is affordable and reasonable. We have to be seen by the Soviets as committing ourselves to that kind of conventional enhancement if we are going to be successful in what I think is the only route to our long-term goal-success at the arms reduction talks.

Senator ExON. My time is up. I want to thank you for the good work and I generally agree with everything you say. I was delighted with the outcome of the German elections, I think many of us were, but I must say to you that I am more worried about the perception that Americans have of this situation right now, even more so than I was before the German elections, on the problems in Europe.

We have problems.

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Senator Levin, do you have any further questions? Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am not sure why the Appropriations Committees are always knocking out those pre-position sets five and six. I presume it is somewhat out of pique with our allies for not carrying out their commitments to have 3 percent real growth.

Is that correct?

General ROGERS. I should not speak for the committees, but I believe

that is one reason.

The second is not wishing to move equipment from this country to store in Europe when we need it in our Active Army and our Reserves. When this administration first came into office the only thing I raised with Secretary Weinberger during my initial call on him as SACEUR, was the need for six divisions of equipment pre-positioned in Europe. But I pointed out that all we could stand to pull from the Army Reserves and Active Army were four division sets of equipment. I knew that later as the former Chief of Staff.

If we are to meet our commitment to our allies for a 10 division force in Europe by M plus 10 days, I suggested an additional buy of those two sets of equipment, the sets for divisions five and six.

The Secretary of Defense agreed to that additional buy. Now that the equipment is available and being issued to Conus units it appears that it would have to be pulled from the Reserves and Active Forces again if it were to be stored in Europe.

Senator LEVIN. We bought equipment. The question now is where is it going to be located?

General ROGERS. That is right. I figure I am still owed two sets of equipment which were to be bought over and above the authorized acquisition objective of the U.S. Army.

Senator LEVIN. It is probably a lot more than that, at least that. General ROGERS. I am sympathetic with the Army, too. I know their problems.

Senator LEVIN. [Deleted.]

FRENCH CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Could you comment on the coordination of conventional forces with the French? Can we count on them?

General ROGERS. Yes, I can. The coordination is extremely good. both multilateral within the NATO context and bilateral. Not only United States and French, but Germans and French and so on; a very close working relationship between the Commander of the U.S. 6th Fleet and Commander of the French fleet in the Mediterannean; a very close relationship between U.S. Army, Europe, and the First French Army. The same is true between the First French Army, most of which is located in Germany, and the NATO CINC, Central Region, General von Senger. The U.S. Air Force has an extremely close association with the French tactical air force.

I am most encouraged by how close that coordination is.
Senator LEVIN. Is that coordination public?

General ROGERS. It is made public to a certain extent. [Deleted.] Senator LEVIN. I mean in the conventional area, is that generally known publicly? Is that classified?

General ROGERS. It is not classified. Whenever I am asked the question about it, or there is an opportunity to raise this matter, I point out what close cooperation exists. I point out that the common objective between their Chief of Defense and myself-and say so publiclyis to move as far down the road as we possibly can toward having done as much as possible in peacetime so that, when the French political decision is made for their forces to join ours, we lose the least amount of time in utilizing their forces.

Senator LEVIN. In your 2.6 million estimate of uniform personnel did you include the French?

General ROGERS. I did not. I have to go back and look at those figures.

Senator LEVIN. Maybe you can supply those for the record.

[See questions submitted by Senator Levin for the hearing record.] Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I will end there and I thank the Chair.

I do have a number of questions for General Rogers, both in open session and in the executive session.

Senator WARNER. Senator Quayle, we are happy to have you. Senator QUAYLE. You started very early, Mr. Chairman. I have to compliment you on starting at 8 o'clock in the morning. Senator LEVIN. Don't encourage him.

Senator QUAYLE. I know this is not the first time. It shows the durability of the Chair and the workload on this committee.

TROOPS IN WESTERN EUROPE

General Rogers, there has been a great deal of discussion over a number of years about troops in Western Europe. There has been discussion among Senators about our ratio of Reserves to active duty and how we have 1 to 1.4 active duty, something like that whereas Europe and the other countries have 0.4, 0.3, the obvious reverse.