amount of money they spend each year for military growth. In fact, all the projections right through this week would show a Soviet intent to stay on that upward glide path of military growth she started in the backwash of the Cuban missile crisis.

Wishful thinking that "nothing is going to happen and if it does, somebody else will come along and pull our chestnuts out of the fire.” I am speaking about some persons thinking this way in Western Europe and that "somebody else" being this country. I maintain to those people that this country cannot do it alone. It is necessary for them to help.

Then there are those very thoughtful people, young and old, who are worried about a future conflict and in searching for a preventative think pacifism or unilateral disarmament may be the answer. They again forget that history will confirm you can have your peace under those conditions, but you will surely lose your freedom. As I have said so often, the ultimate fate of a pacifist is peace at any price, to include freedom, and under unilateralism you disrobe in the presence of one who is covered with armor. History shows the other side does not disrobe and you throw yourself on its good graces and good will.

That is a long way of saying to you, Senator, that the freeze will encourage those kinds of attitudes and beliefs on the other side. They are counterproductive to what we are trying to do to reach a truly balanced reduction of all categories of forces and arms.

The short answer is that I think that kind of resolution is a mistake. Senator WARNER. General, as you are aware, much interest is being expressed on the possibility of tabling interim arms control agreement talks on the intermediate-range forces which would preclude the deployment by the United States of Pershing II missiles while permitting a scaled back deployment of the ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and a reduced number of SS-20 missiles.

What would your view be of such a proposal?

PERSHING II MISSILES

General ROGERS. If we have to cut back because we have been unable to achieve that which I think should be our objective, the zero-zero option, then the reduction should be in the ground-launched cruise missiles and not in the Pershing II.

Senator WARNER. Not in the Pershing II?

General ROGERS. Absolutely not. It is the Pershing II that causes the greatest amount of concern to the other side and it is the SS-20 that ought to be causing us the greatest amount of concern because 70 percent of those 351 SS-20's are aimed at us in Western Europe. They ought to have the same source of concern that we do.

It is only the Pershing II missiles, in my opinion, with their penetrability and survivability that provide the greater deterrent to the Soviets against using their SS-20 missiles with their short flight time, their great accuracy and their three warheads to our one.

Senator WARNER. As you know, much is made of the fact that the Pershing II missiles could theoretically be utilized in an attack that would provide no more than 6 minutes of warning to the Soviets. Could you comment on this contention?

General ROGERS. That it would not give them time to react?

Senator WARNER. Correct.

General ROGERS. I can't feel sorry for them. Senator, because of the number of years since 1977 when they put those SS-20's aimed against us which gives us very little time to react. I can't feel sorry that they have a short time to react as well. This country has faced a very short reaction time for years as a result of the Soviet SLBM's on their submarines just off our east coast.

The fact is the purpose of our putting those weapon systems on our soil is to deter the use of theirs. There are ambiguities and paradoxes in the nuclear era which sometimes some of us forget.

For example, you can defend against a tank with an antitank weapon. How can you defend against a nuclear ballistic missile? You have to build yourself an antiballistic missile system, and this Nation made the decision after it started to build one, when we almost had it ready, we made the decision to tear it down.

So, the way you defend against a nuclear weapon is with a counteroffensive nuclear weapon of your own in order to deter their use by the other side. That is why I think the Pershing II is so important as the counteroffensive, defensive, deterrent weapon system against those SS-20 missiles.

Senator WARNER. In a sense, the fact that it is anti-ballistic, not ballistic, but an anti-intermediate system, is your deterrent at the present.

General ROGERS. The whole purpose of the nuclear weapons is to deter their use or we have failed in our mission. We have failed in our mission if our deterrence collapses and we have to fight.

Senator WARNER. Yesterday an article in the Washington Post referred to the issue of going ahead with developing a nuclear warhead for a proposed new battlefield missile in Europe. It is ironic that the quote intending to substitute this point was taken, I think, somewhat out of context, from your appearance in testimony before this subcommittee last year.

Would you continue on the need as you see it for a balanced modernization program including replacement of aging tactical nuclear artillery shells?

[The newspaper article follows:]

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 14, 1983]

PENTAGON QUESTIONS COMBAT NUCLEAR ARMS

(By Walter Pincus)

The Pentagon, in a reassessment that would reverse 20 years of Army policy, is questioning the need for thousands of short-range, battlefield nuclear weapons that it has deployed or plans to build, according to top Defense Department officials.

The review reflects a realization that the older weapons would be difficult to use in wartime and that deploying the newer ones would create severe political problems.

The review comes as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is seeking to reduce the approximately 6.000 U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe by at least 572 warheads in conjunction with deployment, planned to start in December, of that number of longer-range Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles.

There also is growing public criticism within the United States and in western Europe of short-range nuclear systems.

A report to be released soon by NATO's interparliamentary arm, the North Atlantic Assembly, calls for such reductions, saying "many of the systems lack

accuracy .. the warhead yields are too large for battlefield use . . . most have extremely short ranges which would mean use on or near 'own territory'. . . and the warhead storage sites are vulnerable to preemptive attack."

The report said there is "growing realization that the present tactical nuclear systems are effectively unusable and therefore NATO has little to lose and much to gain, particularly in a political sense, by reducing if not eliminating them." In one section, the report disclosed that after 20 years, the western alliance "has not yet managed to agree on guidelines for the follow-on use of nuclear weapons if a first attempt to communicate NATO's intentions through a controlled demonstrative use did not succeed in persuading the adversary to halt hostilities."

Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), chairman of the NATO group that did the study, is circulating a letter to President Reagan for signatures by his Senate colleagues. The letter supports reduction of battlefield warheads.

The immediate issues for Pentagon officials are whether the Army will go ahead with more than 1,000 new 155-mm neutron artillery shells or develop a nuclear warhead for a proposed new battlefield missile, air- and ground-launched, with a range of 150 to 250 miles.

The latter is a joint undertaking with the Air Force.

Also involved in the Pentagon review is how many of about 2,000 older U.S. nuclear artillery shells and more than 1,000 nuclear antiaircraft and atomic demolition munitions with troops in western Europe will be returned to the United States and dismantled.

An Army spokesman said the service would not discuss battlefield weapons. Last year, Congress turned down initial production money for the 155-mm shells, but $63 million has been included in the fiscal 1984 Pentagon budget now on Capitol Hill.

According to government sources, some Pentagon officials are prepared to drop the request for the shell because of its multibillion-dollar cost, doubts that it can be deployed in Europe in the face of political opposition and unavailability until at least 1986.

The change in attitude toward short-range nuclear weapons is illustrated in proviously classified testimony by Gen. Bernard Rogers, NATO commander and former Army chief of staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee last year.

Rogers noted that NATO, far behind the Soviets in long-range nuclear missiles, already has "about a 3-to-1 advantage for theater nuclear weapons with a range less than 150 kilometers." That advantage is composed primarily of several thousand nuclear artillery shells, a type the Soviets have not built in any numbers.

During the hearing, another Army general described these older 8-inch and 155-mm shells, many of which are 20 years old, as having "inadequate ranges and inaccurate fuzes." The 8-inch shell, he said "requires time-consuming field assembly" and requires firing of a spotter shell before the nuclear round can be fired.

As to the newer, eight-inch neutron shell being built, Rogers said, "I can get the same effects from the weapons we have now as I can get with the neutron warhead. The only trouble is that it can't be used in as close proximity to our own troops because of the blast and thermal damage of those that we have."

Asked to choose between new neutron shells or new chemical weapons, Rogers responded. "It is more important to me to have the modern adequate chemical capability to retaliate than the neutron weapon.

The administration has asked Congress to approve production funds for a new generation of chemical shells and bombs.

That is a sharply different approach to neutron battlefield weapons, which fewer than six years ago were seen as the major weapon system to defend NATO troops against Soviet tanks.

Rogers and the Army now are stressing a new approach against a Soviet invasion, with emphasis on hitting second-echelon enemy forces well behind the forward lines with conventional rather than nuclear weapons.

The NATO review is being conducted by a subcommittee called the "high-level group" and chaired by assistant defense secretary Richard N. Perle.

The group reportedly has produced interim recommendations for nuclear warhead reductions to accompany deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles.

Those findings will be presented to the upcoming meeting in Lisbon of NATO's nuclear planning group. No public disclosure of those findings is expected, but Pentagon sources said that any nuclear warhead reductions would be widely publicized.

Of U.S. warheads currently deployed in Europe, more than 2,000 are old 8-inch and 155-mm artillery shells, and another 600 are warheads for the Lance missile. At least 500 are atomic demolition munitions, nuclear devices to be planted as mines on main invasion routes from eastern Europe into West Germany. About 600 are nuclear warheads for the Nike Hercules, an antiaircraft weapon no longer deployed in the United States.

The remaining nuclear weapons are air-delivered bombs and assorted devices such as anti-submarine bombs and warheads for the Honest John missile, the launcher no longer maintained by the U.S. Army but still in the inventory of Italian and Dutch troops.

The controversial neutron replacements for the old 8-inch artillery shells are being produced, at more than $1 million per shell, but are being stockpiled in the United States. Meanwhile, the old 8-inch nuclear shells, described as unusable during the debate about the neutron weapons, remain in Europe.

About 300 neutron Lance missile warheads also are being produced, at almost $3 million per warhead, according to one industry source. They, too, are being stockpiled here.

Over the last year, the Army has withdrawn some old atomic munitions and warheads for the Nike Hercules, but without public notice.

Perle's NATO group is expected to recommend that remaining Nike Hercules warheads be withdrawn, in part because the antiaircraft system is to be replaced by the Patriot, a new electronic system.

Some older artillery shells also are candidates for removed, according to

sources.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

General ROGERS. I saw that article and its comments attributable to me result from one of two things:

One, and I think we were in closed session, could be that the classified material was cut out in such a manner that there wasn't a complete picture presented. Or it could have been selective reporting. But my position has not changed since I appeared before this committee last

year.

Senator WARNER. Excuse me. I have before me the record of our hearings last year and you are correct. The quote was on page 4347 which was in fact in closed session.

General ROGERS. I thought that was the case because I am quoted as having said that the balance is in our favor in short-range nuclear weapons. I think you will remember I said last year that if the Soviets made their 152 millimeter gun nuclear capable, then the balance would shift against us in that area as well. In fact, since my appearance last year, they have made the 152 millimeter weapon nuclear capable. We know that, it is in the public domain. As a consequence, the one advantage we had, the one balance which was in our favor, has now been lost.

What I was represented as having said in the article yesterday was put in the context that we didn't need to modernize our shorter range nuclear weapons.

I have not changed on that subject as I told you last year. I should really talk about most of it in closed session.

Senator WARNER. We want to give you the opportunity to clarify that public report.

General ROGERS. Publicly I can say this, that we do need to modernize the 8-inch warhead, which we are doing. And, in my opinion,

we do need to modernize the 155 millimeter nuclear round for reasons which I can give in closed session. One which I can give in public is that the majority of the artillery tubes that we have in Western Europe within the alliance are 155 millimeter weapons.

Senator, would you give me a chance to talk just a little bit about the question you haven't asked on the numbers of short-range nuclear weapons and other ranges?

Senator WARNER. I was about to ask that question, but I wanted to allow my colleague, Mr. Cohen, to participate in this question. Perhaps if you could touch on that one point, then I will defer to Mr. Cohen. That was to be my next question.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE

General ROGERS. I want to disabuse anyone present who believes that years go by without our ever taking a look at nuclear weapons requirements in Western Europe. As SACEUR, every year I am charged with that responsibility to provide a projection of the nuclear weapons that we need in a certain time span by type and number of weapons and where they would be located within the theater.

Now, I say that because I don't want people to believe that we never look at this subject. Every year I have to put my signature to a piece of paper for the political authorities that says what I believe we need.

Second, I must also put my signature to a piece of paper which is called the nuclear weapons deployment request for those weapons that must be deployed by the nuclear powers to certain nations, according to the programs of cooperation that we have with those nations.

If I am going to put my signature to a paper that says these are the requirements, I want to insure myself that the rationale from which we develop those requirements is grounded in logic.

Senator, we have spent 2 years in trying to get our arms around that very complex subject—and it is complex-but we now have it. We have developed a different rationale. At one time, one could have thought that if you have 16 8-inch tubes of artillery, then you ought to have one warhead or one nuclear round for each tube. That is not based on logic.

We do not yet know what the results will be in the next nuclear warhead requirement study based upon this new rationale.

What I am saying to you is that I now have confidence in that rationale and I, therefore, will have confidence that in the memoranda I send forward in the future, I can look at my political authorities and say that I am convinced that I am not asking for one more warhead in Western Europe than I think we absolutely must have.

We may well find the results will be a reduction in the numbers. Nike-Hercules, the warhead on Nike-Hercules, no one would rather get rid of that more than I, or sooner than I. Every time the Congress, or a parliament, or the Bundestag or other nations that have agreed to put the Patriot system in our air defense zone in Western Europe, every time they delay deploying it by a year means another year longer that I have to keep those Nike-Hercules nuclear warheads. They are the only threat that drives the Soviet aircraft down to where we can attack them with the improved Hawk weapon.