trollable and proved to the other side the unity and cohesiveness of the alliance by a number of allies sharing the burden and risks of nuclear weapons on their soil.

There was another reason that that decision was important in December 1979 and that was it gave us the opportunity to go to the negotiatng table-the second track of the agreement-with some resolve and Some strength represented, by the intent to put these weapon systems on our soil by December 1983 if there was no breakthrough in the negotiation.

First, I believe it was that decision of December 1979 that brought the Soviets to the negotiating table.

Second, we have been very firm in pursuing that decision within the alliance. Construction is underway in Sicily and in the United Kingdom. The Federal Republic of Germany has remained firm in its resolve to put the Pershing II's and eventually ground-launched cruise missiles on its soil.

I believe it is because the Soviet Union has seen that we are serious about this matter that they have abandoned the intractable position hey first took of never reducing to less than 300 SS-20's, and now have offered to reduce to 162.

Now, I think that through this year if, as I believe we will, we remain staunch in that decision and continue to move down that path of putting them on our soil, that barring a breakthrough in Geneva, the Soviets find that we are serious, they in turn will negotiate seriously. We need to give her that incentive for serious negotiation. A failure to put those weapons systems on our soil in December would be very infortunate. One might say disastrous for the alliance, because we do ave a gap in our spectrum of deterrence which we have to fill.

Second, it would show to the world that here was a decision condered vital to the alliance and yet the alliance could not follow rough and implement it, mainly because it was opposed by the Soviet Laion.

It would reduce any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in the INF talks. It would throw away that one opportunity that we Low have for the first time to eliminate an entire category of nuclear eapons, the land-based, longer range INF weapons from the face of Earth. Of course, I am talking about the zero level option. Finally, for all intents and purposes, failing to put those weapon ystems on our soil would be giving the Soviet Union a veto on the And of weapon systems which NATO deploys in order to deter the of those weapon systems which the Soviet Union has already loved.

I maintain that this is a precedent that we don't want to set. So, it 1 crucial year and it is a crucial decision that must be made. There are those who speak of postponing deploying the INF missile, * us keep talking and postponing. Well, we would gratuitously give Soviets an advantage. She continues to maintain this massive force ich she has and continues to build additional sites. We now have ntified 39 completed sites, with 351 missiles and know that others under construction.

Also, we have seen the tactics that she has been able to use at the INF talks in Vienna, where she continues to delay and delay any

progress there. That is what we could expect if there were a postponement in this instance.

Senator WARNER. In other words, the INF negotiations would fall in the same sort of pattern as the MBFR talks, which have been inconclusive for a number of years.

General ROGERS. Yes. What incentive does she have? She has everything she wants. We have not yet deployed and we have that major gap in our spectrum of deterrence which I don't think we wish to delay closing.

PUTTING WEAPON SYSTEMS ON NATO SOIL

Now, with respect to the prospects of putting the weapon systems on our NATO soil, I mentioned the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy are not waivering on that subject. I am optimistic with respect to the Belgians.

I can only say that I am hopeful with respect to the Netherlands that they may eventually make the decision to also put them on their soil. I would add a footnote to what I have said. This is a priority for 1983, this decision to deploy the missiles on NATO soil. That is the priority of NATO for this year. We will continue to get the carrot and stick treatment from the Soviet Union. We have to look carefully at those carrots to see if any of them make any sense and we must be impervious to those threats which we see almost every day against one country or another.

To that footnote I would say of equal priority, but it should not have that same equality this year, is the need to improve our conventional forces in Western Europe.

As you have heard me say before, Mr. Chairman, we have mortgaged our defense of Western Europe and the alliance to the nuclear response. I don't like that. We are trying by the end of this decade to get a conventional capacity which has a reasonable prospect of frustrating a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact.

A number of things need to be done in order to achieve our goal by the end of the decade, but we just must reduce our dependence on the nuclear response for our defense.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to open it up to questions. Senator WARNER. General, let us turn to the subject of the nuclear freeze. Have you had an opportunity to review the proposal before the House of Representatives today and tomorrow? I will submit two articles from the New York Times.

[The newspaper articles follow:]

[From the New York Times, Mar. 11, 1983]

AN EVOLVING "FREEZE"

(By Tom Wicker)

On the day the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved, 27 to 9, a compromise nuclear freeze resolution, President Reagan in a warlike speech to a religious group denounced the freeze idea as a "very dangerous fraud" that "at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously."

Mr. Reagan may not have read the text of what the House committee actually pproved. When and if he does (the issue may reach the full House next week) he will find that the resolution does not call for an immediate, unconditional, stop-in-your-tracks freeze of American and Soviet nuclear forces, achieved by sme magical stroke from on high.

Rather the resolution establishes several objectives that Congress calls upon Mr. Reagan to seek in transformed Soviet-American nuclear arms negotiations. The most significant of these objectives is as follows: "Deciding when and how * achieve a mutual, verifiable freeze on testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Mr. Reagan, however he may have misstated or misconstrued the text, obrously did not underestimate the importance of the committee's action. It approved a "joint resolution"-not a mere nonbinding statement of the "sense of Congress." If passed by House and Senate, the President would be required either to sign or veto it; if he signs, the resolution would have the force of law, and if he vetoes, he probably would face strong political reaction in this country and among the European allies.

No doubt some of those who voted for a nuclear freeze, in numerous state and al referendums last year, will also be surprised to learn that the CongresNotal resolution calls for it to be negotiated by the superpowers, not merely proclaimed. One of the political attractions of the freeze movement was its apparent simplicity; overnight, so it seemed, there would be no more testing, proaction or deployment of additional nuclear weapons on either side. Actually putting a freeze into effect could hardly be that simple—particularly a freeze that was always designed, despite the slurs of opponents, as "mutual and verifiable." Achieving such a freeze will be further complicated by the strong pposition of the Reagan Administration; Mr. Reagan himself continues to impagn the patriotism of freeze supporters, terming them "those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority."

The joint resolution approved by the House committee attempts to deal with the complexities of putting a freeze into effect. What, for example, would be done ader a freeze about replacing worn-out weapons or delivery systems? What verification agreements might be necessary? Would such potentially vital matters as research and development in antisubmarine warfare be ruled out?

A freeze to be negotiated exposes as hollow Mr. Reagan's contention that it ld remove Soviet incentives to negotiate. Some months ago, in the so-called Start talks, Moscow indirectly raised the possibility of a reduction in strategic issiles and bombers to about 1,800 on each side-a 25 percent cut for the Ruslans, a 10 percent cut for the U.S. Why would Moscow be less interested in achieving such a reduction as part of a mutual and verifiable freeze?

As for the European theater, an immediate freeze at "current levels" would eave the Russians an advantage in numbers of intermediate-range missiles. But negotiating for a freeze, the President still could seek a reduction in the er of these IRMB's, under threat of deploying American Pershing II's as a "anter; Congressional and other sources say the terms of the joint resolution wald not preclude" deployment of Pershing II's as part of an overall freeze agreement.

Alternatively, in negotiating such a freeze, Mr. Reagan could rely-as the U.S. and NATO did in the 60's and 70's-on land- and sea-based intercontinental assiles to deter a Soviet missile attack on Europe. One of the objectives set by freeze resolution is to confine the two current sets of nuclear arms negotiation— on theater missiles, the other on strategic weapons-so that an overall Stiet-American nuclear balance could be struck.

Such a negotiated freeze would not even preclude some new weapons deployDet on either side, its proponents say, as long as the overall limits of the freeze Tere observed. A new single-warhead missile might be substituted, for example, Crone or two multiple-warhead missiles.

Eren after he studies its text, Mr. Reagan is not likely to come around to "Tport of the freeze resolution. It unquestionably represents a Congressional ort, backed by strong public opinion, to force a new direction on his arms atrol policy, and it may yet confront him with one of the most difficult and mportant decisions of his Administration.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 15, 1983]

A FREEZE BENEFITS US BOTH

(By Alan Neidle)

ALEXANDRIA, VA.-Would passage of the House resolution calling for a verifiable United States-Soviet freeze on nuclear weapons undercut President Reagan's ability to negotiate sound treaties limiting and reducing strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems?

The answer is no. On the contrary, the greater the Congressional support for the resolution, the more likely it is that serious and productive negotiations can take place with Moscow-whether they concern reductions of nuclear arms, freezing various elements of nuclear development or some combination.

Unfortunately, the United States and Soviet Union have not yet begun genuine negotiations on either strategic or intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Proposals have been issued; views have been exchanged. The positions of the two sides, however, remain far apart on a great many major issues. Some observers believe that they can discern the broad outlines of possible deals. But the two Governments have not begun to hammer out specific solutions to numerous points of difference.

When, and if, that process begins, one basic principle may be taken as axiomatic. Neither Government will accept proposals from the other that it considers heavily weighted to its disadvantage. The application of this principle— which is akin to the instinct for survival-will not be affected one iota by whether the freeze resolution is passed or defeated. For example, if the resolution were adopted, even by both houses of Congress, there would still be no chance that the Reagan Administration would accept the present unbalanced proposals put forward by the Soviet Union. Moscow certainly knows this. Conversely, if the freeze resolution were defeated, there would still be no chance that the Soviet Union would accept Administration proposals that it feels are one-sided. The United States Government ought to understand this. What will be essential for any progress toward arms control that serves the interests of both sides is genuine compromise. But this will be extremely difficult to achieve.

On the Soviet Union's side, there will have to be greater readiness to accept limitations on, and reductions of, its most modern nuclear weapons-the ones that it considers most effective. Within the Soviet Government, the process of deciding how many of its best weapons to give up in exchange for which concessions from the American side probably will be nothing less than excruciating. Soviet military leaders, who take great pride in their new technological achievements, doubtless will struggle hard to retain as many of their best weapons as possible.

The Soviet Government surely will ask itself hard questions before it decides to go through the tough process of knocking heads together in its bureaucracy. It will want to know whether going through the agony of offering, or accepting, genuine compromises is likely to bring a concrete payoff at the end of the road. It will ask itself whether the United States Government really is capable of carrying a treaty project through to completion-and bringing it into force through ratification.

The United States' recent performance in this regard is, of course, less than reassuring. Three treaties negotiated by Republican and Democratic Presidents in the last decade-SALT II, the threshold test ban and a treaty regulating peaceful nuclear explosions-have not been ratified by the United States.

Senior Soviet officials, and those whose duty it is to give them unsentimental advice, will at the very least have serious doubts whether compromise by the Soviet Union is likely to lead, in the end, to concrete benefits.

No single move by the Reagan Administration can erase the impediments resulting from America's accumulated reputation for inconstancy. But broad support by the public for a freeze and reductions, especially endorsed by the Congress, can help to establish a stronger national constituency for arms control. And that in turn enlarges the long-range prospect that any genuinely worthwhile arms-control treaty will be ratified.

Adoption of the freeze resolution, accordingly, does not undermine prospects for effective negotiation with the Soviet Union. Instead, it increases the chances

that the Soviet Union may at some point judge that it is potentially profitable to engage in genuine negotiations with the United States. But for that day to come, the United States must also be prepared to seek not perfect solutions but those based on mutual compromise. Only when both powers are prepared to proceed on this basis will there be any prospect of significant progress.

General ROGERS. There have been a number and I am not sure I know this one. It has to do with freezing and verifying and then working toward a reduction. I think those are the key principles associated therewith, are they not?

Senator WARNER. That is correct. The essential difference between this freeze and the one Mr. Jackson and I put in a year ago is we had suggested, following the President's guidance, negotiating substantial reductions and then exploring a freeze at these reduced levels.

The question is: Would the implementation of such a resolution apart from any of the legalities, would the implications of it being adopted by one or both Houses, although I don't think in my judgment the Senate would follow the House on this, should the House vote in favor of it, what would be the implication on your responsibilities?

General ROGERS. It would adversely affect the efforts of those of us who are working toward what we feel is the long-term goal that all of us want in all the nations of the alliance and that is peace with freedom.

I underscore with freedom in a world with lower tensions and reduced levels of balanced forces, equitable, verifiable. I think the kind of freeze that has been suggested would be a mistake and it certainly would be counterproductive to what we are trying to do in Western Europe.

What we need in my opinion is to provide as many incentives as we can to the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously. But when you freeze an imbalance why should she have any incentive then to negotiate seriously because she has and can keep what she wants?

It is my judgment that we should provide as many incentives as possible for serious negotiation.

The first is the one I mentioned about putting the INF weapon system on our soil, "arm in order to parley," as Winston Churchill put it. What we have to do is to put a cap on the military growth on both sides and then reduce and balance the forces.

We are not achieving the objectives that we ought to be striving for in my opinion by these kinds of movements. It encourages the attitudes and beliefs of many of the people within our Western European nations which are counterproductive to our efforts to accentuate those positive things that impact favorably upon incentives for serious negotiation.

But it is not only the freeze proponents that degrade our efforts. Well-meaning people with a feeling of complacency, feeling that we have for 34 years been successful in deterring an attack with NATO believe we should be able to do so for another three decades. They forget that in the intervening time the balance in all categories of forces we need to implement our strategy has shifted against us.

A lot of wishful thinking is going on in two areas.

One, that the Soviets with their major problems internal to their borders-and they are serious-will find it necessary to reduce the