The man who buys any other Typewriter always HOPES it will be as good as the Remington Remington Typewriter Company Vose HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED 54 YEARS S and are receiving more fav- WE CHALLENGE By our easy payment plan every family in moderate circumstances can own a vose piano. We allow a liberal price for old instruments in exchange, and deliver the piano in your house free of expense. You can deal with us at a distant point the same as in Boston. Catalogue, books, etc., giving full information mailed free. Vose & SONS PIANO CO., 160 Boylston St., Boston, Mass. PIANOS UNDIVIDED PROFITS, 7,000,000 00 The Company is a legal depositary for moneys paid Court, and is authorized to act as Executor, Administr Trustee, Guardian, Receiver, and in all other Fiduciar pacities. Acts as Trustee under Mortgages made by Railroad other Corporations, and as Transfer Agent and Regist Stocks and Bonds. Receives deposits upon Certificates of Deposit, or subje check and allows interest on daily balances. Manages Real Estate and lends money on bond and mort Acts as Agent for the transaction of any approved fin business. EDWIN S. MARSTON, President. THOS. J. BARNETT, 2d Vice-President. BOARD OF DIRECTORS: Samuel Sloan, E. R. Holden, H. Van Rensselaer K P. A. Valentine. The Treaty of Peace SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1905 Some On Tuesday morning of this week it was announced that the peace treaty would in all probability be signed that afternoon. The agreement on terms of peace, as reported last week, was one of the most profoundly significant events of our time. The drafting of a treaty was immediately intrusted to the capable hands of Professor Frederick Martens and Mr. Henry Willard Denison, the legal advisers of the Russian and Japanese Foreign Offices. additional details have come to light since the announcement that the Mikado had receded from the indemnity demand and the Czar from a refusal to cede territory. The Japanese may well feel that theirs is a great material victory, after all. They are now supreme in Korea, southern Manchuria, and Southern Saghalien. As to the last named, the Japanese bind themselves not to fortify their part of the island on a reciprocal promise from the Russians as to their part. The recognition of Japan's possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway involves a payment by Russia to China of a sum for China's interest in the road. If Japan surrenders the road to China, she may thus obtain an indirect spoil of war from Russia. In addition, China would have to reimburse Japan for the expense incurred in the railway's restoration, in changing the gauge, and in rebuilding the bridges. For the road's short distance southward from Harbin still to be retained by Russia and Japan (unless the latter sells the road to China), railway guards for the protection of the respective properties are to be allowed, and, in case of disorder, troops; but the number is in no case to exceed those required, and they are to be recalled as soon as their mission is accomplished. This provision would still seem to give to Russia the control of much the larger part of Manchuria and one of its particularly valuable sections, for the Sungari valley and the adjacent regions form the granary for that part of the world. The Russians may, therefore, well be content that the victorious Japanese did not push their successes as far as Harbin before the peace conference was called. In this region Russia may perhaps remain the great power which she has been; but it is folly to contend, as does Mr. Witte in his grandiloquent despatch to the Czar, that "Russia will remain in the Far East the great power which she hitherto has been and will be forever." It is a satisfaction to add that the peace terms are taking on a character of commercial amity and good will which may mean much for the future, indeed may lead to a possible commercial Russo-Japanese alliance, such as Mr. Witte recommended years ago. An agreement to cease hostilities has now been signed by the plenipotentiaries, to take effect after the signing of the peace treaty. Twelve articles of that treaty were last week agreed upon. Full summaries of the text, when completed, if not the actual text itself, will be cabled to Tokyo and St. Petersburg for approval. The subsequent exchange of ratifications by the two Governments will be only a formality. series of victories learned that Japan was to retire from half of an island all of which is now under her actual government, and that Russia was not to pay an exemplary money penalty for the sacrifice which she had forced. No matter what Japan had already gained, morally and materially, these seemed ignominious terms of peace. Besides, Japanese opinion was practically unanimous that in the next battle the Russian forces would be annihilated and that all eastern Siberia would shortly be overrun. Only a comparatively small number of Japanese expressed satisfaction that the that the Mikado, in view of the impossibility of collecting an indemnity from Russia, had decided not to spend two dollars in order to obtain one. Most observers believe, however, that Japanese patriotism will not long oppose any decision of the Mikado: first, because no Japanese may criticise his Emperor; and, secondly, because the Mikado's moderation must before long appeal to the native common sense. This will be strengthened by the plaudits of the neutral nations, now acclaiming Japan as truly great, not only in war-making, but in peace-making. The ultimate cause for the change in the Mikado's instructions is supposed to be the counsel of the "Elder Statesmen," Marquis Ito, Count Inouye, Count Matsugata, and Marshal Yamagata, the men who brought their ruler safely through the revolution which put an end to the Shogunate, reinstated him in the power which for long ages had been denied to his immediate ancestors, and have wisely counseled him since then in every important crisis. They seem the real rulers of Japan. such widely separated places as Libau, Nijni-Novgorod, Kiev, Kharkov, Smolensk, Saratov, Odessa, and Baku. Russian newspaper opinion is also instructive. The "Russ" says: All we could have expected was avoidance of diplomatic defeat. This seems to have been accomplished. The "Novoe Vremya" says: Japan is dissatisfied with the peace. So are we. President Roosevelt was in favor of Russia ceding the island of Saghalien and paying an indemnity. This does not please us. This peace is only one phase in our relations with Japan, which are only beginning. We shall rest and then doubtless go on. The "Sviet" says: General Linevich's army is not destroyed. The present treaty puts off but does not exclude war; only a bucket of cold water has been poured over it out of the Fountain of Humanity with which President Roosevelt is now irrigating all the world. The St. Petersburg" Gazette " remarks: We have been overcome, not by Japan, but by our dishonesty, happy-go-luckiness, and laziness. The dreadful lessons of this war will not be fruitless and will force us toward better forms of life. America and her noble and brave President have rendered us great service. Among the unparalleled numInternational ber of congratulatory des Opinion patches received by President Roosevelt from crowned heads, distinguished statesmen and churchmen, municipal governments, and many social, philanthropic, and religious societies, the Czar's and Mikado's messages are of course of prime note. The Czar says: Accept my congratulations and warmest thanks for having brought the peace negotiations to a successful conclusion owing to your personal energetic efforts. My country will gratefully recognize the great part you have played in the Portsmouth Peace Conference. The Mikado's message has especial significance in its last sentence. In all it reads: I have received with gratification your message of congratulation conveyed through our plenipotentiaries and thank you warmly for it. To your disinterested and unremitting efforts in the interest of peace and humanity I attach the high value which is their due and assure you of my grateful appreciation of the distinguished part you have taken in the establishment of peace based upon principles essential to the permanent welfare and tranquillity of the Far East. The German Emperor telegraphed as follows: Just received cable from America announcing agreement of peace conference on preliminaries of peace. I am overjoyed; express most sincere congratulations at the great success due to your untiring efforts. The whole of mankind must unite, and will do so, in thanking you for the great boon you have given it. In acknowledging this latter despatch Mr. Roosevelt expressed his appreciation of the Kaiser's co-operation at every stage in the effort to bring about peace. This should set at rest any contrary suppositions. King Edward telegraphed : Let me be one of the first to congratulate you on the successful issue of the peace conference, to which you have so greatly contributed. As to Mr. Witte's "diplomatic victory," the consensus of English opinion seems to be expressed by the London "Outlook," which says: In the matter of indemnity, Japan yielded to inexorable conditions; in the matter of Saghalien, she allowed herself to be outgeneraled. Mr. Roosevelt's part in the negotiations was also abundantly recognized. The London "Speaker's " comment has special point: Those who, like ourselves, always mistrusted President Roosevelt's policy and blamed him for certain definite acts, yield to Done in recognizing the great service he has rendered the world, to the gratitude of which he is entitled. It is to his initiative, untiring energy, and refusal to despair of the successful outcome of the conference that peace is argely due. The negotiations which The History of the have now reached so Peace Treaty satisfactory a conclusion had their inception almost exactly three months ago with informal conferences at the White House, on June 1, beteen President Roosevelt and the Japatese Minister, Mr. Takahira, and on the following day between the President and the Russian Ambassador, Count Cassini. The President had several months before this sounded the St. Petersburg Government as to its willingness to con sider the terms of peace known to be then in the minds of the Japanese statesmen, but without result. At the interviews of June 1 and 2, however (the battle of Mukden and the battle of the Sea of Japan having occurred in the interim), the prospect of peace seemed more encouraging. The American Ambassador to Russia, Mr. Meyer, under explicit and minute instructions from Washington, secured an audience with the Czar at Tsarkoe-Selo, and the result, together with the already existing knowledge of Japan's attitude, was such that the time was deemed ripe for formal proposals. An identical note was therefore sent on June 7 to Tokyo and St. Petersburg. We give it here entire : The President feels that the time has come when, in the interest of all mankind, he must endeavor to see if it is not possible to bring to an end the terrible and lamentable conflict now being waged. With both Russia and of friendship and good will. It hopes for Japan the United States has inherited ties the prosperity and welfare of each, and it feels that the progress of the world is set back by the war between those two great nations. The President accordingly urges the Russian and Japanese Governments, not only for their own sakes but in the interest of the whole civilized world, to open direct nego tiations for peace with each other. The President suggests that those peace negotiations be conducted directly and exclusively between the belligerents; in other words, that there may be a meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries or delegates without any intermediary, in order to see if it is not possible for those representatives of the two Powers to agree to terms of peace. President earnestly asks that the Russian Government do now agree to such a meeting, and is asking the Japanese Government likewise to agree. The While the President does not feel that any intermediary should be called in in respect to the peace negotiations themselves, he is entirely willing to do what he properly can, if the two Powers concerned feel that his services will be of aid, in arranging the preliminaries as to the time and place of meetarranged directly between the two Powers, ing. But if even these preliminaries can be or in any other way, the President will be glad, as his sole purpose is to bring about a meeting which the whole civilized world will pray may result in peace. This note, both in substance and expression, received the approval of the statesmen and the press of the entire world. Japan accepted the proposal within two days, Russia within the week. Discussion as to the place of meeting followed: Paris, The Hague, Chefoo, and Geneva were mentioned, but each for pretty obvious reasons was unacceptable to one or the other of the parties involved. Washington was suitable in all ways but for its summer heat, and this disadvantage was obviated by the choice of Portsmouth, where the United States Government was able to furnish a suitable building for the use of the plenipotentiaries in conference and to guard the secrecy of their proceedings. The choice of envoys was naturally a most important matter: Japan, with little hesitation, named Baron Komura, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Takahira. Russia showed some hesitation; the appointment of Mr. Muraviev was actually made, but was withdrawn and the name of Sergius Witte substituted at the last minute, while Baron Rosen, the present Russian Ambassador at Washington, was made his associate. The Outlook has published personal articles about all of these men and need not here describe their qualifications and experience. On Saturday, August 5, Mr. Roosevelt introduced the plenipotentiaries of the two nations on board the Mayflower, and on that occasion offered the following toast and wish: Gentlemen, I propose a toast to which there will be no answer, and which I ask you to drink in silence, standing. I drink to the welfare and prosperity of the sovereigns and the peoples of the two great nations whose representatives have met one another on this ship. It is my most earnest hope and prayer, in the interest not only of these two great powers, but of all civilized mankind, that a just and lasting peace may speedily be concluded between them. The actual sessions of the conference began at Portsmouth on August 9, and the Japanese terms were presented. The history of the ensuing demands and counter-demands, concessions and refusals, and of the final recession on August 29 by Japan from certain of its earlier positions and the immediate acceptance of the reduced conditions by Mr. Witte, has already been told in full from week to week in The Outlook, in so far as these facts were allowed to become known publicly. The War in Retrospect In the terrible conflict ended at Portsmouth last week after twenty months of warfare, the Japanese lost no engagement of any consequence either at sea or on land, while Russia retires from the war with her navy all but annihilated and without a single land victory worthy of the name to her credit. Rough estimates of the money cost of the war to Russia and Japan are a thousand million dollars for the first and half that amount for the second. In all, Russia is supposed to have had about 800,000 men in the field, Japan perhaps 700,000; while the number of men killed or disabled by wounds or illness has been roughly estimated at 375,000 for Russia and 250,000 for Japan. The Japanese total was, on the one hand, increased to larger proportions than one would expect by the terrible slaughter in the early stages of the attack on Port Arthur (probably their most serious error in the whole war was the belief that they could capture that all but impregnable fortress by frontal attack), and, on the other hand, was kept down by Japan's superb medical and sanitary organization, in which the best attainments of Western nations were far surpassed. Looking for the most salient events of the war, one finds on the naval side three critical episodes: the sudden attack on the Russian war-ships at Chemulpo and the night attack at Port Arthur on February 8 and 9, 1904; the naval battle off Port Arthur on August 10, with the following fight with the Vladivostok squadron four days later; and, finally, the tremendous battle of the Sea of Japan on May 27 and 28. By the first Japan crippled the sea power of her enemy seriously at the outset; by the second it was made clear that if Russia was to contest Japan's supremacy at sea, naval reinforcements must be had; by the third, those reinforcements, after a voyage of seven thousand miles from the Baltic, were at one blow destroyed, captured, or driven helpless and crippled into foreign ports. In the war Russia lost about fifty battle-ships, cruisers, and destroyers, Japan about nine; while Japan's navy, through captures and the raising of sunken Russian ships, is stronger at the end of the war than at 1 |