Therefore I propose to this Committee that the time has come, indeed is long past, to begin dealing with all the issues of oil and LNG traffic in U.S. waters as a single system in urgent need of system-wide planning and development. It begins today with this review of tanker design and operations, for both U.S. and foreign vessels, but continues directly through the issues of new ports and pipelines, spill cleanup and liability, and the relative status of the states and federal agencies in a working partnership.

We in the states cannot do it alone, and indeed it is this relatively powerless and fragmented situation which has led to creation of the uncoordinated, dangerous situation we now face. Thus as the long-awaited national energy policies begin to emerge, we turn to you for effective relief through recognition of the serious system deficiencies which still exist.

This leads me to a final observation concerning federal-state relationships. Over the past decade, Congress and the national Administrations have, as a matter of national policy, encouraged the states to lead in protecting our waters against degradation. I refer specifically to the Federal Water Pollution Control Acts, particularly those of 1965 and 1972, the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, and the Deep Water Ports Act of 1974 as examples. The State of Washington has accepted the challenges of federal policy and legislation and has enacted numerous environmental protection statutes designed to protect our waters from pollution by oil and other pollutants.

I have always viewed the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 as a solid piece of environmental protection legislation which allows the best efforts of the federal government and the states to operate in the subject area of the act. Unfortunately, and I believe contrary to the intent of Congress, the Act is being relied upon to undermine a 1975 state statute (Chapter 125, Laws of 1975, first Extraordinary Session) on the basis of "federal premeption".

This state statute prohibits very large oil tankers (over 125,000 dwt) from entering the most vulnerable part of our inland waters and requires tankers from 40,000 to 125,000 dwt to be equipped with certain safety equipment or to have a tug escort while in these local waters. This statute is sound legislation which takes a reasonable approach to achieve a needed objective. The act operates in a field which has historically been viewed as a proper area for state activity. The statute was supported by a wide range of interest groups and individuals.

I urge the Committee to examine the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 carefully as it pertains to federal-state relations. In so doing I recommend to the Committee that it reaffirm federal policy of recent times that the Act does not preempt the states in the field of water protection. The Committee should further confirm that the Act allows for the states, working in harmony with the federal government, to develop and operate natural resource protection programs in the inland marine waters of our country. The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead, Mr. Daddario.

STATEMENT OF EMILIO Q. DADDARIO, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would like to first of all introduce the members of the Office of Technology Assessment, who are with me today. On my right I would like to introduce Mr. Robert Niblock, who is the program manager for all oceans projects in OTA.

On my left, is Mr. Peter Johnson, who is in direct charge of this particular activity. It's a privilege to be here today, Mr. Chairman, here today, Mr. Chairman, to discuss with you briefly a report preto discuss with you briefly a report prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment on tankers and marine pollution. The study is entitled: "Oil Transportation by Tankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollution and Safety Measures." It was prepared, as you have said, Mr. Chairman, at your request for the use of this committee and was

transmitted to you with the approval of the Congressional Technolcgy Assessment Board of the Office of Technology Assessment last

year.

This study was prepared by the OTA Oceans Program staff in cooperation with a panel including specialists in tanker operations, insurance underwriting, ship design, crew training and environmental issues. Although it makes no recommendations, it does touch on the consequences of proceeding with existing technologies, training programs and government regulation of tankers, and examines alternative actions and options, and the likely consequences of their use. By way of background, the report emphasizes several factors which may be of importance to your Committee.

One is that 94 percent of all oil imported to the United States is carried in foreign ships. As a result, Federal regulatory agencies find it difficult to deal with the operations of those ships.

The CHAIRMAN. I might interrupt and say we tried to change that, but failed. We wanted to change the percentage a little bit, so that there would be more American tankers hauling this product. Go ahead.

Mr. DADDARIO. The most recent figures available to OTA at the time the report was prepared showed that 5.4 million barrels of petroleum arrived by tanker in U.S. ports each day during 1974, and that about two-thirds of that petroleum was offloaded in eastern ports. It also noted that by 1980, and you already touched on this, the Alaska oil fields would be transporting about 2 million barrels of oil a day by ship to U.S. ports.

I would like to refer for the moment to the fact that the report already projected that these imports probably would rise to 5.7 million barrels per day in 1975. In fact, early figures from the Bureau of Mines indicates that this projection was conservative and in fact our present imports by tankers are closer to 6 million barrels per day.

In a global perspective, between 30 and 35 million barrels of oil are being carried by tankers somewhere in the world each day, the bulk of that being in supertankers.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you will answer this later on, I have read the whole report, but did you discuss any conclusion that approximately 2 billion barrels of oil would come from Alaska? Mr. DADDARIO. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. By 1980.

Mr. DADDARIO. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will this relieve the upsurge of importation of foreign oil?

Mr. DADDARIO. Well, we didn't do that, but I have brought out the additional figures which indicate that despite the objective of reducing our reliance on foreign oil, that in 1975, the projection is upward rather than downward and if that were to continue, the 2 million barrels of oil per day would be of importance, of course, but it would not greatly reduce the reliance of that upswing.

The CHAIRMAN. A lot of people think that when the Alaska oil comes, we will immediately be relieved of reliance on foreign oil. But by the time it shows up, I would suppose that the demand for

oil would also have gone up. And therefore, percentage of foreign imports would be about the same, even with Alaska oil.

Mr. DADDARIO. The issue you raise, Mr. Chairman, is a very complicated one, and obviously involves the development of alternative energy sources, strong conservation measures, and policy steps which take into consideration your concerns.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course we must consider new exploration and if domestic sources become greater, that would also be taken into consideration. But all of these are the "ifs' of future oil demand.

But anyway, we will have to rely a great deal on the importation of oil.

Mr. DADDARIO. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. In a global perspective, between 30-35 million barrels of oil are being carried by tankers somewhere in the world each day, the bulk of that being in supertankers, and you have already referred to the importance of that, Mr. Chairman. Another finding is that about one gallon of every seven spilled, is spilled because of an accident or a collision. The other 6 gallons are spilled during routine operations, such as tank cleaning, discharge of ballast, and drydocking operations. All total, some 1.45 million tons of oil are spilled into the oceans each year as a result of tanker operations.

The substantial swing in recent years away from smaller tankers toward supertankers and the economic pressures that are causing that swing are emphasized. At the time the report was prepared transporting oil from the Arabian Gulf to the United States in tankers of 50 thousand deadweight tons cost between $2 and $3 a barrel. Costs in a supertanker of 250 thousand deadweight tons was just half.

The report also notes that:

Fitting double bottoms or double hulls on tankers offers a significant degree of protection from oil pollution in the event of a grounding collision or accidents, casualties, and that the risk of tanker explosions can be reduced substantially by systems which involve the use of carbon dioxide from the engines or the use of nitrogen as an inert gas to fill the empty tanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you will cover this later on, but do liquified natural gas tankers pose a problem?

Mr. NIBLOCK. As a safety problem?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Safety problem.

Mr. JOHNSON. Liquified natural gas? The LNG ships you are speaking of?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. No. This report would not cover that.

The CHAIRMAN. I see pictures in the paper of a new type of LNG tanker. They are very huge, aren't they?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How many tons do they run?

Mr. JOHNSON. Their size is comparable to some of the very large tankers.

The CHAIRMAN. They are tankers, aren't they? What if something happened to one of those in mid-ocean, or coming in? What would

happen? Would it be an explosive situation, rather than pollution? Would that be the case?

Mr. JOHNSON. That would probably be the case. It's not a very well know subject right now.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it's something we are just experimenting with right now. All the facts aren't in on it yet. Okay.

Go ahead.

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Chairman, also continuing with notes in the report, improved maintenance, inspection and survey procedures can help alleviate tanker structural failure problems.

A substantial share of tanker accidents are caused by human error and improvements in the training and licensing of shipboard personnel are needed.

Vessel traffic systems and other navigational aids are in need of continual upgrading and improvement.

The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, our report indicates. gives permissive authority to the USCG for certain regulatory action independent of international treaty.

The report calls attention to the importance of traffic control systems and notes that the ultimate effectiveness of a communicaions system is related to communications discipline.

Communications is particularly important in harbor areas. Some supertankers are so large that a ship can be well into a turn before any one aboard could feel that it is in fact turning, and take corrective action.

With large tankers, touching a dock even at very low speeds can exert tremendous pressures on the dock and the ship's hull. In smaller ships, the situation is made easier for there is often visual contact between the personnel on the bridge and the tug that is working with them in the harbor.

With a supertanker, the personnel on the bridge usually cannot see the tug.

The CHAIRMAN. By this you mean that, if you are on the bridge of a supertanker, the tug is so far below the bow, you can't see it; is that correct?

Mr. DADDARIO. The visual relationship between the people on the bridge of the supertanker and the tug is usually broken, because of the tremendous size.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it wasn't until the last few years that we have had mandatory bridge-to-bridge communication between ships -I see the USCG nodding their head. That is in operation now, isn't it?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We learned in the San Francisco Bay accident that 2 ships of the same company hit and they had no bridge-to-bridge communication whatsoever. But is that required now?

Well, we will find that out. Admiral, is that required now?
Admiral SILER. Yes.

Mr. DADDARIO. It's also indicated that communications procedures aboard many ships are pushing radio operators to the limits of their ability to handle instructions with the speed and assurance that heavy harbor traffic requires.

Some studies conclude it's not possible to keep up with more than two or three radio channels at the same time. Monitoring three channels is now fairly common for ships in harbors-one frequency over which they communicate with a harbormaster; one over which they communicate with other ships; and a third for use in discussions. with company representatives. Question is raised as to the ability of doing that efficiently and safely.

This is an area where there is a good possibility, Mr. Chairman, of improving the margin of safety for tankers operating in U.S. ports.

Traffic control systems could be improved-with relatively small investments-by using existing technologies.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, right there I feel kind of a real personal interest in this, because we did establish the first control system, with the cooperation of the USCG out in Puget Sound, and then we found it from the USCG, which spread it to other areas. It came about not by law, but as a matter of appropriations, in the beginning. If they aren't using it to their, say not using existing technologies, I would like to find out about it, because that would make it stronger. Mr. DADDARIO. One of the places which you refer to as doing a good job in that area, is the USCG operation in Puget Sound, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder why we never thought of that a long time ago.

Mr. DADDARIO. One of the options listed in the report, Mr. Chairman, for example, is the use of 2 radar screens, one to sweep the area around a ship while it is at sea approaching the harbor, and a second to provide much finer resolution and control for use in harbors.

There are systems for controlling vessels in a harbor or waterway. One of these, for example, involves transferring control of a ship in a harbor to a vessel traffic center which would then monitor ship movements much the way that air traffic controllers monitor planes landing and taking off at airports. Ships under this system would be tracked by radar and would respond to directions from the vessel traffic center which would be in a position to coordinate all their movements.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't that done now?

Mr. DADDARIO. I am going to touch on that in a moment. There are examples where we are doing quite well and we will touch on it. The USCG, as you already said, has put together sophisticated control systems for Puget Sound and San Francisco. It is working on similar systems for Houston, New Orleans and New York City.

It may well be that the USCG could expand such improvements to all ports where tankers comprise a large share of total traffic, and -while this is not in the report itself-one important area could be Delaware Bay, which handles many of the tankers that provide crude oil for refineries that service the Mid-Atlantic section of the country.

The CHAIRMAN. In that case, we will ask the USCG about this, and we want to find out why they haven't done that in Delaware Bay.