LEGAL

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Topic

Applicability as regards carriage of oil..

Dispute settlement..

Amendment procedure....

Survey and certification.

Definition of oll..

Discharge criteria in prohibited zones (this term does not appear in the 1973 Convention which uses a distance from and criterion).

1954 Convention (as amended in 1962)

1. Bengoing tankers over 180 gross tons.

2. Other seagoing ships over 500 gross tons.

1. Referred to International Court of Justice unless all parties agree to arbitration.

1. Effective only upon specific acceptance via IMCO assembly and contracting States.

1. No comparable provision...

1973 Convention

1. All tankers over 150 gross tons.

2. All other ships over 400 gross tons including novel craft and rod and floating platforms.

1. Compulsory arbitration by specially formed tribunals upon application of any party to dispute.

1. Speedier method for annexes and appendices via IMCO Committee and tacit acceptance procedures.

1. Survey at &-year intervals and at intermediate (mid period) intervals.

2. Equipment must be approved by Administration (mondtors, filters, separators, interface detectors).

3. Administration issues certificate altesting to compliance by its ships, which certificate shall be accepted except when there are clear grounds to believe the ship is not in compliance.

2. Does not include bilge slope and fuel and lube oil purification residuos.

1. Prohibits discharges by all ships in concentrations in excess of 100 parts per million within the prohibited

zones.

are regulated by annex 11).

1. Prohibits discharges which leave visible traces unless it can be established by installed instruments that the concentration discharged was less than 15 parts per

million.

2. For tanker cargo slops, discharge is prohibited within 80 miles from nearost land. For other ships slops, and other tanker slops, discharge is prohibited within 12 miles from the nearest land.

1. Tankers must meet all the following conditions: a. Ship is proceeding enroute.

b. Discharge is limited to 60 liters per mile instantaneous rate.

c. Total quantity discharged is limited to 1/15,000 of cargo last carried for existing tankers and 1/30,000 of cargo last carried for new tankers.

d. Tanker bilges, except pump rooms, shall be treated same as other ships.

2. Other ships must meet all of the following conditions: a. Ship is proceeding enroute.

b. Oil content of the emuent must not exceed 100 parts per million.

1. Requires that the monitoring and control system. be in operation and a permanent record made anytime olly effluent is being discharged, except for clean or segregated ballast.

1. Segrogated ballast is mandatory for new tankers of 70,000 deadweight tons and greater, and is optional for tankers of less than 70,000 deadweight tons. Note that "new" tankers are defined by calendar dates and are therefore not dependent upon entry Into force of this Convention.

2. Retention of oil on board (LOT) is mandatory for all tankers.

3. Mandatory installation of effluent monitor and control system, provision of slop tanks, and provision of oil/ water interface detectors. Effluent must comply with discharge criteria or be transferred to reception facility. 4. Other ships require sludge tank installations, all water separator and/or filters dependent upon ship sise.

1. Expande provision to undertake to insure availability and adequacy at oil loading ports, repair ports and at other ports according to the needs of ships.

1. Expands requirements to provide entries for more specific operations and in greater detail to aid in enforcement.

1. Establishes damage assumptions and methods of calculation of the amount of hypothetical oil outflow for tankers.

2. Establishes tank arrangement and size limitations for the cargo tanks of tankers.

3 Establishes subdivision and damage stability criteria to be applied to tankers to Increase survivability in the event of accident.

(3) In the conduct of LOT, there are numerous opportunities for oil and water to comingle and, through human failing, large quantities of oil can inadvertantly go over the side undetected. Recognizing these shortcomings, several companies conducted carefully controlled tests of the LOT operation with the dual objective of determining its ultimate potential for oil recovery and developing specific shipboard procedures for assuring that the operation is properly done. These tests resulted in the publication in 1973 by the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) and the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) of the "Clean Seas Guide for Oil Tankers-the Operation of LOT." This manual is referenced in the 1973 convention in the section requiring approved operating instructions for LOT, and since publication, nearly 10,000 copies of this manual have been purchased by tanker operators.

The 1973 convention has adopted the LOT system as its primary means for pollution prevention for all older tankers; that is, tankers both ordered before December 31, 1975, and delivered before December 31, 1979. To assure proper operation of LOT, it includes a requirement for specific instructions as given in the OCIMF/ICS guide just mentioned. It contains provisions as well for adequate slop tanks and for an oil monitoring and control system to measure quantity and rate of oil discharge at sea.

The slop-tank provisions of the convention should pose little problem for either present or new tankers, and in fact, improved design of slop tanks has been under continual review by many in industry. A companion paper at this conference will report on slop-tank research by our company.

The oil-discharge monitoring and control provisions of the convention will undoubtedly pose considerably more difficult problems. In our own case, research to develop an effective oil-inwater monitor commenced in the mid-60s, and although we have spent over two million dollars in the intervening years on this subject alone, we have not developed a monitor which we consider fully capable of meeting the convention provisions. More recently OCIMF has reported to IMCO on several occasions the status of oil-in-water monitor development progress worldwide and will continue to do so, as very active developments proceed in this field.

Though seemingly a simple problem, it has proven very difficult to reliably obtain accurate real-time measurements of small quantities of oil-in-water. The problem is compounded by differences in oil makeup, weathering, and the differences between dissolved and free oil in emulsion. Despite these drawbacks, we feel that with the additional importance given to monitoring by the new convention, these problems should be capable of solution within a few years, at least for heavy or persistent oils.

In the case of nonpersistent (or light) oils, the monitoring problem is further compounded; so much so in fact that the 1973 convention contains a waiver if no monitoring instrument is available.

Additionally, the convention requirements for an automatic control and shutdown system in new tankers will require engineering development to produce workable arrangements meeting the convention requirement. While this requirement can no doubt be met

without recourse to fundamentally new technology, it should be recognized that it does involve very rapid and accurate control and diversion of fluid flows often reaching several thousands of tons per hour. Accordingly, simple check valves, automatic pump shutdowns, and such will not solve these problems without fundamental changes in tankers' cargo- and ballast-handling systems and associated control hardware.

Returning to the question of slops generated from tank washing and ballast shifting in product-tanker trades, it has already been mentioned that these slops cannot be comingled with new cargoes, since product contamination would ensue. Accordingly, to prevent discharge of these slops at sea, it will be necessary to have shorereception and oily-water processing facilities at nearly all ports loading product tankers. In addition, it must be recognized that in product-tanker services, it is common for a product tanker to carry different cargo grades on subsequent voyages so that on intervening ballast voyages it is usually necessary to wash a very high percentage, if not all, of a ship's cargo tanks before being ready to receive a new cargo.

It is clear that reception and processing facilities are required at product loading terminals and these are called for in the new convention. In addition, however, there are a number of other circumstances under which the new convention specifies reception facility requirements for tankers. These include the following:

(1) Crude-tanker loading-terminal reception facilities will be required where ballasted tankers will have arrived without sufficient time to have completed the LOT operation. This is specified as a ballast voyage of less than 1,000 miles or 72 hours.

(2) The new convention will make the Baltic, Mediterranean, and Black Seas "special areas" under one set of circumstances, and under a slightly different set of circumstances, the Red Sea and "Gulfs"* area will also become special areas. For the first three areas, reception facilities sufficient to receive the slops from ballasted tankers without causing them undue delay will have to be provided by (or before) January 1, 1977, at all tanker-loading ports. In the Red Sea and Gulfs area a similar provision exists, but without a specific date. This distinction was specifically made since, particularly in the Gulfs area, it was hoped that at major crude-exporting terminals, arriving tankers will have been able to have successfully completed LOT before arriving in the Gulfs special area, thereby minimizing the need for reception facilities in this area. Considering the exceedingly large volumes of crude loaded in the Gulfs area for Japan, Europe, and North America and the difficulty in providing transfer arrangements to reception facilities from offshore loading installations now commonly being used, we believe this is a crucial point in the convention. Neither the oil-producing nations nor industry want this convention requirement to result in a massive and costly installation of inflexible reception facilities in oil-producing

areas.

The term "Gulfs" area was adopted as a compromise to describe the area known to some as the Persian Gulf and to others as the Arabian Gulf.

(3) Reception facilities are required in all repair-port areas. This also is an exceedingly important requirement in that tankers preparing for repair and dry dock must be thoroughly clean and gas free prior to arrival. This requires not only the usual LOT and slop retention but also removal and disposal of unpumpable sediments and sludge which accumulate at the bottoms of cargo tanks on crude tankers. These sediments, made up of rust, sand, water, and oil, must be received and safely processed at repair ports if the provisions of the convention are to be met.

At this stage it would be well to recap some of the more important industry programs aimed at meeting these various requirements. Much work has been done to determine the amount and nature of unpumpable sediments in crude tankers and environmentally sound means for disposal. Most promising at the moment is a new technique of washing cargo tanks with crude oil during each discharge of cargo. This technique seems to greatly reduce the buildup of unpumpable sediments as well as providing somewhat cleaner cargo tanks than is possible with traditional water washing. As this is being written, crude-oil washing is still in the developmental stage and, for safety reasons, in our company is only being developed for use on inerted tankers. In the coming years, however, we look forward to crude washing becoming the next important step, as was LOT, in the effective control of operational pollution from tankers.

Going back to work done in 1972 preparatory to the IMCO Conference, OCIMF has recently started a comprehensive study of guidelines for the installation of reception facilities. The receptionfacility provisions now in the convention basically follow OCIMF proposals, but this still requires a great deal of study to determine appropriate, yet not excessive, amounts of reception facilities on a port-by-port basis. While eventually these decisions and the effluent standards to be met will have to be decided by responsible parties in each region, it is hoped that industry/OCIMF guidance will assist these decisions.

In addition to its activities aimed at furthering development of oil-and-water monitors, OCIMF, together with ICS, published in late 1973 a guideline entitled "Monitoring of LOT." By mid-1974, some 4,000 copies of it had been ordered by terminal operators. "Monitoring of LOT" describes the procedures for measuring retained slops aboard ballasted tankers arriving at loading ports so as to determine whether or not the LOT operation has been successfully practiced. This in-port inspection technique, while far from perfect, is the only technique now known for assessing a ship's LOT performance on a routine basis. While it cannot prove compliance with convention provisions, it can definitely identify gross or flagrant violators who have retained insufficient slops to have done a proper LOT operation. In a paper which was presented to IMCO's Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) in the fall of 1974, OCIMF has again stressed the value of this technique together with the need for it to be endorsed and practiced by governments as a key step in effective enforcement. As already noted, it is unfortunate that the 1973 convention does not accord postinspection prosecution rights to port states, but it is the industry's hope that suitable arrangements of this type can eventually be reached so as to put real teeth into the fundamental concept of in-port measuring of retained slops.

All of the above provisions will apply to both new and existing tankers and to tankers in both crude and product trades. Additionally, the 1973 convention requires that new tankers (those ordered after December 31, 1975, and/or delivered after December 31, 1979) if over 70,000 d.w.t., be so-called segregated-ballast tankers. This concept, which was supported in advance of the conference by OCIMF for new crude tankers, should greatly simplify the operation of these ships in that no tank washing for change of ballast will be required, thus clearly reducing the mixing of oil and water during most ballast voyages. It is important to recognize that although there were pressures from some governments to extend the segregated ballast requirement down to a range of ship sizes covering new product tankers as well as crude tankers, very little would probably have been achieved in terms of reducing pollution by such a step. As already noted, the need to have a clean ship for change of cargo grades in product service means that the amount of tank washing in a segregated-ballast product tanker would be very little different from that required for a conventional product tanker.

Perhaps the most controversial aspects of the segregated-ballasttanker requirements were the amount of ballast to be specified and the determination of the dates upon which these requirements would become applicable. In regard to both of these questions, the final provisions of the convention followed very closely the consensus recommendations of the world's leading technical experts. It is hoped that they will provide as equitable a transition to this new type of crude tanker as is possible. The segregated-ballast capability is specified by a very simple formula giving ballast draft as a function of ship length. It has already, however, come in for considerable criticism. We would be the first to concede that many factors influence the proper level of ballast draft, but it is clearly beyond the state of the art at this time to write a more complex formula giving proper weight to each possibly relevant factor. We therefore have continued to express a preference for a simple and unambiguous formula which would have to be uniformly applied by all as experience is gathered. Although some believe that somewhat lighter drafts could or should have been permitted, based solely on model or theoretical studies, in our view the amount to be saved through a more liberal formula is certainly not commensurate with the risks that might have to be run through building ships too lightly ballasted. For those who believe the formula is already too liberal, there is the option to simply build their ships with a slightly heavier ballast capability. The actual level chosen reflects not experimental but actual operating experience in our company, fairly closely confirmed by others over a period of several years, and we believe it provides a sound basis for further and equitable design development.

In regard to the dates of application, the principal question centered around the choice of calendar dates rather than a specified time period after the convention has been brought into force. Most in industry were of the firm opinion that for major new design requirements it would be chaotic to leave the transition dates completely uncertain, since lead time for shifting to such new designs could involve decisions as far as four or five years in the future which must be reached mutually by both owners and yards. Accordingly, the use of calendar dates in this convention for the segregatedballast and other ship-construction type features is the right approach, whereas equipment provisions are better left specified at some date following bringing the convention into force, such as for the oil-and-water monitors.

While the main thrust of the 1973 convention is the prevention of pollution from normal operations, it includes as well regulations which are intended to minimize oil outflow in tanker accidents for new vessels. These regulations attempt to achieve their objective through specifying the size and arrangements of a tanker's compartments, 30 as both to minimize oil outflow immediately following an accident and also to assure necessary flotation and stability (survivability) of the tanker.

The first part of these regulations, the so-called tank-size rules, are essentially identical to the 1971 amendment to the 1954 convention which was adopted by the IMCO Assembly in October 1971. The tank size limitations are fundamentally a three-part formula controlling (1) maximum tank length, (2) maximum tank volume, and (3) "hypothetical oil outflow" calculated according to assumed bottom- or side-damage criteria. For larger tankers in the VLCC class, the hypothetical oil outflow criterion will nearly always govern. This criterion with its maximum upper limitation of 40,000 cubic meters may cause rather unusual tank configurations and possibly double bottom construction to be adopted in the forward one-third of length in tankers over 500,000 to 600,000 d.w.t. This in turn may prove to be an unfortunate result, since void spaces created by partial double bottoms near the bow, in order to meet this regulation, could represent a very detrimental feature for grounded tankers from a salvage point of view. The basic drawbacks with this type of construction have been thoroughly covered by many. For aude tankers of the sizes now being constructed (100,000 to 500,000 d.w.t.), the major impact of the tank-size limitation is greater initial cost due to the higher degree of compartmentalization which it involves. It is pertinent to recognize as well, however, that directionally, it is a detrimental feature for the prevention of operational pollution due to the far greater surface area of cargo tanks which it creates. This point is mentioned simply to show that, as with most features of ship design, some type of trade-off is

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involved, and it is seldom that emphasis on one design advantage is not at the expense of another.

The survivability regulations are fundamentally an extension of those already found in Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Conventions, also adopted under IMCO auspices. Fundamentally, the survivability provisions of the new convention are believed sound and a step in the right direction, in that they will require a twocompartment damage-survival standard for the larger tankers (length greater than 225 meters) and ability to survive engine room flooding in new tankers as small as a length of 150 meters. The development of these survivability regulations provides another example in which enthusiasm for a seemingly very rigorous new standard would have produced a clearly counterproductive result, had not careful technical studies shown the falacy of certain proposals debated during the preparatory sessions. Specifically, one of the early draft requirements specitying limiting the heel of partially loaded tankers in damaged condition, having survived bottom damage forward equal to 1/10 of the ship's length, would have provided a near impossible condition to be met consistent with the previously noted tank-size regulations. Our studies showed that the only possible way to meet this proposed criterion would be to preferentially require partially loaded tankers to retain cargo in side tanks rather than center tanks. The result would have been inevitable spillage of oil from side tanks in any collision, whereas with the more flexible set of regulations finally adopted, there may be an inducement to preferentially empty side tanks first, thereby avoiding oil outflow when such partially loaded tankers have been struck in collision. Again, this example has been cited in some detail to emphasize the need for careful study of the trade-off aspects of new regulations, so as to assure effective rather than counterproductive results.

Finally, it should be noted that the 1973 conference very carefully considered the advantages as well as the drawbacks of a mandatory requirement for full double-bottom construction in new tankers before defeating two such United States sponsored proposals by overwhelming margins. This subject is mentioned, although it forms no part of the final 1973 convention requirements, because of the continuing popular pressure, particularly from some in our Senate, for this ship construction feature. Numerous technical reports and Coast Guard and House of Representatives hearings have covered the issues involved in the double-bottom debate, so they will not be further explored here.

In addition to the specific convention provisions described above, reference should be made to Resolution 5, adopted by the conference to encourage further specific study and action on means to prevent accidental pollution. A careful reading of this resolution indicates a sense of the IMCO Conference, with which industry firmly concurs, that the principal means for preventing accidental pollution will be found in operational and possibly equipment steps aimed at preventing accidents generally. It is quite clear that further progress in this field will predominately result from better standards of training, watchkeeping, and general operation of vessels of all types rather than through design features.

Progress toward ratification

At this writing, one year after the conference which adopted the 1973 pollution prevention convention, no ratifications have yet been received. Considering the complexity of the convention, portions of which have been described herein, this is not surprising. It is still difficult to make an adequate guess as to when the convention may be brought into force or as to the attitudes of various key governments whose actions might give an indication of the eventual date of bringing the convention into force. It is possible, however, to comment on some activities which may have a direct bearing on eventual ratification of the convention.

IMCO itself, or more properly those governments most active in IMCO, has already taken several steps of a positive nature. At its first meeting, the new Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) adopted a 22-point work program together with priorities of items thereon, the main thrust of which is toward completion of any technical studies considered prerequisite to effective implemen

tation of the 1973 convention. Not surprisingly, a review of this work program will show many of the same studies described above as being key elements to the success of the 1973 convention. MEPC also decided at its first meeting that priority for the prevention of accidental pollution should remain principally with the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), which through its existing subcommittee structure already has considerable work underway which is directly complementary with the convention objectives.

The IMCO Secretariat has taken active and positive steps to acquaint other U.N. organizations and governments around the world not only with the 1973 convention provisions, but also with all other parts of IMCO's work program and treaties under its cognizance of which these groups should be aware. The IMCO Secretariat paper prepared in May 1974 for presentation to the U.N.'s Third Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas during summer 1974 is an excellent and comprehensive document covering the entire scope of international activities related to pollution prevention and vessel safety generally. It may be wondered why such a step is considered worthy of mention. We think it important because all too often the same governments who participate actively at IMCO adopt positions at other U.N. conferences which appear to show almost total ignorance of important IMCO activities.

Many of the contributions which industry can make toward furthering ratification have already been covered above as various technical and operational studies specific to oil tankers were described. Most important of industry's activities at the moment seem to be OCIMF's studies of reception-facilities guidelines, greater use of in-port inspection techniques, following progress on the development of oil-in-water monitors, and extension of the basic LOT technique in a safe way to nonpersistent-oil tankers. Additonally, several industry bodies will, by the time this paper is published, have come out with strong positive statements urging nations to ratify the 1973 convention at the earliest practicable time, pledging continued industry support with technical studies at IMCO. Additionally, industry (principally OCIMF as a representative industry group) have made their views known to the U.N.'s Law of the Sea Conference as well, and stressed that this new conference in no way need conflict with the positive work already undertaken by IMCO for the 1973 convention.

One further factor about industry activities and their limitations must be stressed. We have often heard calls, sometimes from the public, sometimes from people in government, for industry to police itself. There seems to be little understanding that many companies are individually policing themselves already and following self-imposed programs to avoid oil spills and pollution damage. But we emphasize that this is, and probably must remain, a company-by-company practice. Certainly for companies with U.S. operations, the antitrust laws lay down certain limitations upon the degree of cooperation which is permissible among companies on such matters as any sort of industry-wide enforcement program, even if directed at environmental protection. For example, affiliates of my own company have for years made it a practice carefully to inspect vessels which they are considering for charter and also have typically monitored the performance of chartered vessels when carrying oil Experience has shown that this practice tends to make available high quality vessels and to minimize oil pollution. However, if our affiliates were to pass this kind of information on to other companies chartering vessels or arrange with other companies to exchange such information, this might be misconstrued as an attempt to create some sort of blacklist or boycott of undesirable vessels or owners. The laws of other countries relating to trade regulation probably impose similar restrictions. Environmentalists should be aware of such restrictions on industry activity and should recognize that effective enforcement of uniform standards requires governmental action.

Lastly, there is the question of what actions governments can take to assure bringing the 1973 convention into force rapidly. Considering that only 15 nations need ratify, and that 71 nations participated in the drafting of the convention, this would seemingly be a fairly simple process. Recognizing, however, that these 15 nations must between them control 50% of the world's gross registered tonnage, it is interesting to look at the tonnage of the 10 largest nations in the world at the moment:

69-088 - 7627

From this list, it appears that it will be necessary to get at least three of the first four or five nations listed above to ratify the convention before it can come into force. Or put another way, failure of two or more of the nations at the top of this list to ratify would almost certainly prevent the convention from ever coming into force. Accordingly, it is hoped that very serious priority consideration will be given to the convention by these and other major maritime powers.

Although not so prominent as shipowning nations, the actions of various nations who were among the prime movers for and at the 1973 conference will undoubtedly be watched very closely. Principal among these in our view would be the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union. While it may surprise some, it is our view that the attitude displayed at the conference by the U.S.S.R. was in some respects more flexible and more international than that displayed by several of the free world nations. We hope this bodes well for future positive action on the convention.

There was lengthy and considered debate at the conference over a so-called sovereignty article under which nations ratifying the 1973 convention would have agreed to limit their own national regulatory powers over the design, construction, and equipment of foreign vessels entering their ports. Regrettably this sovereignty provision failed to be adopted by the needed two-thirds majority, although it did achieve a simple majority approval of the nations present. In our view, failure of the United States to support the final compromise proposal on this issue represents a fence-straddling attitude which is unacceptable in regulating the fundamental design of vessels in an international business such as shipping. If each nation which professes a desire for strong international regulation is to continually reserve its own right to set differing regulations of its own, there will be little future for the international regulation-making process generally.

A further disturbing factor in regard to the prospects of bringing the 1973 convention into force is the amount of time taken by nations to set their ratification machinery into motion. There are innumerable examples of well-conceived international treaties which once drafted lay on the shelf for many years before being considered for eventual ratification. In the case of the United States, we need only look at several recent pollution-related measures including the 1969 and 1971 amendments to the 1954 convention, the 1969 Civil Liability Convention, and the 1971 International Compensation Fund Convention. The U.S. was a prime mover in the drafting of each of these agreements, but it has only been within the last year that our Senate has finally considered them, and then all too frequently the record shows their inclination to criticize the work of IMCO and to start drafting new legislation of their own. Actually, a careful reading of the reports of the Senate Commerce Committee in regard both to the U.S. Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 and the report of the U.S. delegation to the IMCO 1973 conference, shows a discouraging lack of faith in IMCO and the international legislative process generally. Various comments in these committee hearings indicated an unwillingness to listen to the productive and constructive steps being taken around the world, often with a better basis technically than that available in the United States. Accordingly, it is our earnest hope that when the 1973 convention is considered in the Senate, it will be viewed objectively and realistically for the positive step forward that it represents. In this respect, the testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee in November 1973, immediately following the IMCO conference, set the proper note for consideration of this potentially historic convention. The delegation's leader, Judge Russell Train, now head of EPA, testified that the conference had achieved more than the U.S. delegation had had any right to expect and that he viewed it as an historical step forward for the world. In supporting testimony, Admiral Chester Bender, then Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, who was vice chairman of the delegation, reinforced these remarks and noted as well that the new convention contains all the necessary machinery for rapid further amendment or change as future events may dictate advisable. He stressed the hope that the U.S. government would put its faith in this convention and give it its wholehearted backing. We believe many in industry share this hope and do not think it will be misplaced.