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But I can almost hear the answer—"we don't have enought money, --but that is the case, then we ought to have some responsibility, we in Congress, to see that they have the wherewithal to move ahead with these technologies all over the country.

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Chairman, there is no question the point you raise is extremely important. I would like to note that worldwide tanker losses from accidents rose to record heights in 1975, with over twice as much spillage as in 1974 as reported by the Tanker Advisory Center of New York.

In addition, tankers constructed during 1951–1955 had a much higher ratio of losses than any other building year. That touches on the importance of knowing where they are, and to be in proper communications with them.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would like to call attention to the important contribution made by this committee and its staff during the development of the report. That has been of help to Mr. Robert Niblock, OTA's Ocean Program Manager, and it is gratefully acknowledged. This report also benefitted from information and assistance from other agencies, particularly the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration.

We appreciate the help we have received.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate the good job you have done on this report and I must say you have done it expeditiously, because you didn't have much time to start to work on it. I mean, we told you and you went right ahead and got it done. And that is very important in this field.

Now, I have no further questions now. But when the committee members again go over this report we might want to have you back, to ask some specific questions which I think we could submit to you in writing ahead of time, so you would be prepared to go into that particular subject matter of the questions.

Mr. Daddario. We would like that opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Because a lot of this is technical and things move so fast in this area it's hard to keep up, isn't it?

Mr. DADDARIO. It certainly is, Nr. Chairman, and the questions raised in our report setting out various options and alternatives need to be examined in order for the Congress then to come to the determination as to what course of action is followed.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't recall, did you go into cost? Are cost figures in here? Mr. DADDARIO. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been some confusion about the costs of double bottom's which is kind of a misnomer since there are a lot of places to put protective space on a ship other than the keel.

Have you gone into the cost figures, as best you could get them ? Mr. JOHNSON. That's right.

Mr. DADDARIO. We recognize that is a controversial point raised as one of several options, so an anlysis can be made as to the effectiveness of taking one course or others and the costs attendent to it. Those do allow for policy options which the Congress could come to determination about.

The CHAIRMAN. I think your figures are somewhat amazing, on the amount of intentional spills out in the ocean.

Mr. DADDARIO. Well, you touched on those in your original remarks, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We are in the state of having a discussion in our State about whether we should build a superport and require big tankers to dock only at this superport and not come inside Puget Sound.

Have you given any thought to that?
Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Chairman, we are presently-
The CHAIRMAN. Existing law allows one to be built now.

Mr. DADDARIO. Yes. We are presently completing an assessment on extractions of oil and gas from the Outer Continental Shelf off of New Jersey, and Delaware. A part of that goes into the technologies and impacts of the building of a superport.

Superports in that particular area, we think, will have a direct bearing on the question that you have raised, because the same situation applies in various places throughout the country.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Deciding to build a superport would of course, keep the big ships out. There is no question about that. But the question of cost always arises, and whether or not the cost would be greater to the consumer or whether or not we could make ships safe enough to let them come in.

Making them safer may be the best answer.
Mr. DADDARIO. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And then we wouldn't have to worry about these things.

Mr. DADDARIO. We will have that other report which includes a look at the superports completed within 2 months, and that report will be available, of course, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you very much.
May I inquire of this? Are these reports readily available ?

Mr. DADDARIO. We printed 3,000, Mr. Chairman, and made them available to various committees of Congress. We have about 200 left, I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Only 200 left? I am thinking with the average public that is so concerned about that matter. I guess they would have to buy them?

Mr. DADDARIO. They would be available through GPO for purchase, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. For a dollar and a quarter! Mr. DADDARIO. I don't recall the price. We would have to get that for the record, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Well, I will recommend a dollar.

There are so many interested people who are not involved in government, either Federal and State and environmentalists, and nearly everybody, but who would like to get copies of this report on the supertankers.

Mr. DADDARIO. Yes. Mr. Niblock advises me that the price for the GPO copy of this report is $2.80, Mr. Chairman. The price has gone up.

The CHAIRMAN. The price has gone up. That ought to be for the hard cover. This is paperback.

We should try to lower it.
All right.
Thank you very much.

Now, the commissioner of highways from the State of Alaska is here.

Mr. Parker? All right.
Mr. Parker, we would be glad to hear from you.


Mr. PARKER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Governor Hammond wanted to express his regrets that he could not be here and he asked me to read his testimony.

I brought with me Mr. Charles Champion, who is the State pipeline coordinator for Alaska, and has responsibility for enforcing the stipulations of the lease on the trans-Alaska pipeline in the areas of State control. The CHAIRMAN. I want to say that Senator Stevens is tied up

with an Appropriations Committee meeting which he must chair. He said he would be here as soon as possible. But you go ahead. You will probably see him anyhow.

Mr. PARKER. Mr. Chairman, reading the Governor's testimony, when the Nation observed the signing of the 1972 Ports and Waterways Safety Act on July 10, 1972, many of us were assured as the President cited :

Under this act, the USCG gains much needed new authority to protect against oil spills, by controlling vessel traffic in our inland waters and territorial seas, by regulating the handling and storage of dangerous cargoes on the waterfront, by establishing safety requirements for waterfront equipment and facilities, and by setting standards for design, construction, maintenance, and operation of tank vessels.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the intent of the legislation, but we are trying to find out whether it is being carried out.

Go ahead.

Mr. PARKER. The trans-Alaska pipeline was authorized by the U.S. Congress only after strong reassurances by the Federal administration that the most rigid requirements would be imposed on tankers transporting Alaskan crude to the “lower 48.” It was only through these most adamant reassurances that the tanker design would be of the highest quality to maximize the protection of our environment that the Alaska pipeline bill was ever allowed to pass Congress. In specific, Hon. Rogers C. B. Morton, then Secretary of the Interior, clearly outlined the administration's position before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on June 22, 1972. The Secretary stated, and the rest of this is quoting from the Secretary:

I am convinced that we must seize this opportunity to set new and exacting standards to govern the marine transport of American oil. This goal is worth accomplishing by itself; but if our standards can set an example for solving the broader problems of international oil movements, we will have accomp

lished a task of long range significance for mankind. I have discussed this matter with Secretary Volpe, and we are now studying the implementation of the following steps:

All tankers, foreign and domestic, operating in the TAPS trade will be prohibited from discharging oil into the ocean, including oil contaminated ballast, tank cleaning waste, or bilge effluent. Newly constructed American flag vessels carrying oil from Port Valdez to the United States ports will be required to have segregated ballast systems, incorporating a double bottom, which will avoid the necessity for discharging oily ballast to the onshore treatment facility. All other tankers will be required to discharge oily wastes into the treatment facility at Port Valdez.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, this may have been done a long time ago, but, is there a treatment center being constructed, or has it already been constructed, at Valdez!

Mr. CHAMPION. There is one being constructed now.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I understand.
Mr. CHAMPION. It handles 800 barrels a day.

The CHAIRMA&. By the time any tanker comes up there, it will be an established fact.

Mr. CHAMPION. It is in the proposed construction schedule.

Mr. PARKER. Vessel traffic systems will be required for Port Valdez and the west coast ports.

New United States flag vessel designs will be evaluated, looking toward improving their maneuverability with regard to stopping distance and turning characteristics.

All accidental discharges during loading and unloading will be eliminated to the fullest extent possible and, if they occur, will be subject to substantial penalties.

Contingency plans for cleaning up oil spills must be continually reviewed and proven to minimize the damage in the event any accidents occur.

A continuing environmental monitoring system will be required during the lifetime of oil movement in American coastal waters.

I have attached a copy of the full statement to my written testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Go right ahead.

Mr. PARKER. You may well imagine my dismay when it came to my attention shortly after I became Governor, that the USCG was in the process of promulgating less stringent construction standards than those just noted for oil tankers carrying Alaskan crude. In March 1975 I corresponded with Secretary of Transportation William T. Coleman and expressed my concerns regarding tanker safety standards and associated port development. I also requested the assistance of Secretary Coleman in arranging a meeting of affected west coast Governors to examine the problems associated with the distribution of Alaskan oil by maritime interests to west coast markets.

Among other concerns, the Secretary of Transportation was apprised that although Alaska's stake in the development of fossil fuels is immense, the protection and development of our other resources would not be overlooked or taken for granted. In particular, Alaska was not prepared to risk a large, rich coastal zone and its fisheries to an economic tradeoff in vessel construction for the benefit of the contiguous States with Alaska bearing the brunt of the attendant risks of catastrophe to other resources.

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I have attached a copy of that letter to my written testimony for your information.

The CHAIRMAN. He uses a term I haven't heard before—but we must have some good facts to back it up-“an economic tradeoff.”

Mr. PARKER. I think we could make that, Mr. Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about an economic tradeoff in vessel construction.

Mr. PARKER. I think the tradeoff should be considerably less than the values mentioned.

In the Secretary's reply he stated that he did not feel it necessary to convene a specific Governors' meeting as I suggested. Indeed, he further stated that he endorsed the USCG's policy as reflected in “The Coast Guard's Approach to Tanker Pollution Abatement.” This approach, gentlemen. is biased in that the optimum value assigned to conflicting variables in the design of a vessel is reduced to wholly satisfy the parochial interests of the marine operator.

Since I considered the Secretary's response to be inadequate, I instructed the Alaska commissioner of highways, Walter B. Parker, to commence review of the petroleum distribution system on the west coast to alert my office of any potential problems that may affect the orderly development of Alaska's resources.

To digress for a moment, in implementing that, I sent my special assistant, Mr. Dooley, to the west coast to confer with other staffs. Mr. Champion put Mr. Keun on his staff and between the offices, we have spent the last year in developing this particular position.

During an initial review by the commissioner, conducted in early June, of west coast States ports, refineries, and policies regarding the transportation, handling, and conversion of petroleum products, sufficient concern was shown to be of mutual interest by the West Coast States. I then requested a meeting of Governors' representatives from the West Coast States to review policy alternatives for those areas of mutual interest. To some degree this was self-serving in an attempt to prevent a host of individual State policies and regulations which would only serve to hamper the proper development and utilization of Alaska's fossil fuel resources. These fears were not unfounded. It was determined that most of the States, Alaska included, were reviewing legislation which would have presented a quagmire of regulations for industry to operate within.

The first meeting was held in Seattle on September 17, 1975. All participants were enthusiastic about the progress made at this meeting and a second meeting was subsequently called in October to deal specifically with the topic of tanker construction standards. As a result of the information gathered and the concerns expressed at that meeting, the Governors from Alaska, Washington, and Oregon expressed jointly the position that the USCG must be more stringent in their proposed construction standards. The State of California also presented testimony endorsing this group's stance regarding double bottoms. At the outset, the group recognized that safety and pollution controls within a tanker transportation system are inseparable; anti-pollution measures are only an extension of what is to be kept "safe."

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