It is unfortunate that although these matters were studied in the U.S. in 1972 12 and agreed at IMCO in 1973, it is once again being suggested that segregated ballast be required for the smaller product ships where it may do little good for the environment and possibly some harm.

It should be clear from my remarks that I believe ship design measures, over and above the basic tank size regulations agreed at IMCO in 1971, can do very little to mitigate accidental pollution from groundings and collisions.

I do agree with the findings of the committee last year that if a ship must have segregated ballast capacity for operational reasons, placing such capacity at the sides and toward the bottom is obviously

correct.

I do not agree however, that the additional specifications as to amount and positioning as contained in USCG's January 8, 1976 regulations will really provide any additional protection.

What then can be recommended in the way of technical features which may improve the accident situation?

In addition to those measures already mentioned, I would add the following:

Better shipboard electronic navigational equipment is available, and reasonable requirements for such equipment to be fitted on ships of all types should be made.

In this regard many areas outside of the U.S. have been using a very successful system for years known as Decca with which many well found ships are already equipped.

In this regard, since the U.S. has elected to proceed with LORAN C rather than Decca, it may be sensible to require LORAN C for U.S. ships.

Additionally, for the future, Omega and perhaps someday synchronized satellite systems should be considered."

My own company has been evaluating equipment of these types for some years now, and has decided on Decca and Omega for its tankers and is now experimenting more broadly with satellites for communications.

Doppler sonar ground speed indicators are available and have proven extremely useful for coastal piloting and navigation, as well as for berthing of large tankers.

Consideration might be given to possible future requirements of such gear for larger ships.

Undoubtedly with innovative thinking and a reasonable amount of funding, major progress in improving shorebased navigation aids used by ships of all sizes could be made.

At the present, I have the impression that many navigation aid systems are really little changed from those developed in sailing ship days despite the availability of the technology needed to upgrade them.

In my view, priority of spending ought to be directed in this area rather than to more steel for each tanker.

One other safety feature often proposed for tankers is inert gas.

12 "Segregated Ballast Tanker"-Study I, Parts 1 and 2, a note by the United States Department of Transportation. U.S. Coast Guard for submission to the IMCO Subcommittee on Ship Design and Equipment, 1972.

Certainly, for the larger tankers using high-capacity fixed-tank washing machines, and recirculating the washing fluid, inert gas makes sense.

Following IMCO's lead, increasing numbers of countries are requiring inert gas for new ships larger than 100,000 dwt.

I think it is worth noting that as with other fundamental safety features, the basic research, and later the implementation, were broadly adopted by conscientious shipowners well in advance of final regulatory action.

In regard to recent proposals to require inert gas for smaller tankers, I think this suggestion deserves thorough technical review before any regulatory action takes place.

Certainly on the basis of accident data over the last 20 years which my company made available to USCG and IMCO in 1973, there seems strong evidence that ships of a size commonly used in U.S. waters have been far less likely to have cargo fires or explosions.

Accordingly, I believe that adding new arbitrary requirements without adequate technical review would be a mistake.

In closing, I think it should be obvious that in general I support the regulations which USCG has made under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. I would like to add that in my opinion our USCG is the premier marine safety organization in the world and I believe most around the world share this view.

I also believe that the emphasis on ship design features may have obscured the attention that should have been directed at regulations for training and licensing of personnel, and in some instances for navigation equipment.

Nevertheless, I think the way in which the regulations have been evolved is logical and supportable, and I look forward to this being the case in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you for giving us your technical views. We appreciate that.

Now, most of the ships of your company fly the Liberian flag, don't they?

Mr. GRAY. Yes; well, I wouldn't say most of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Are all these things on the ships?

Mr. GRAY. Many of them are. The standards for equipment on our ships depending on the ship-services are the same regardless of the flag it flies.

The CHAIRMAN. These things that you mentioned?

Mr. GRAY. Many of them are.

The CHAIRMAN. Many of the things you mentioned which should be on a ship you say are available.

Mr. GRAY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What I want to know is this: Does Exxon have these things on their ships?

Mr. GRAY. We have a great many of them, yes, sir. It is really a changing scene and I can tell you

The CHAIRMAN. That wouldn't be your job. I understand that. But if these things are available and you have the alternative to make it a part of the ship, it seems to me that the company ought to have them.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you will find that Panama doesn't require it and Liberia doesn't require it. They have no rules whatsoever. You have to do it in a voluntary way.

Mr. GRAY. If I may disagree, sir. In regard to Liberia, you are not correct to say they don't have requirements for things in the sense that those nations do not have requirements.

This came up this morning. Inspection requirements and some of the equipment requirements from Liberia have preceded those in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they said this morning that Liberia is doing better; and I hope so.

Mr. GRAY. The recent accident record has shown that that indeed is the case.

The CHAIRMAN. We can go into that in some detail.

Only recently we have had some problems with passenger ships, but that is a different story.

Now you come out very strongly against the concept of double bottoms. I understand there are 28 double bottom ships that have been ordered or built as of now.

Mr. GRAY. That could well be.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you disagree with those people in spending the money to build those double bottoms?

Mr. GRAY. I disagree that they will get any accident protection out of those double bottoms and I don't believe that many of the people ordering such ships have done so with the belief that they would get any accident protection.

The CHAIRMAN. They wouldn't do it if they didn't think they were going to.

But it may be due to the climate involved around here that we should do everything to prevent pollution, the things you mentioned and the concept of the double bottom. And more and more we are going to have that concept- the concept of making them safe.

Now, many of these things you are suggesting would require Government appropriation; wouldn't they?

Mr. GRAY. I am sure they would in regard to navigation systems. The CHAIRMAN. So the company wouldn't have to pay a nickel. Mr. GRAY. The company is a taxpayer and I am a taxpayer also, so yes sir, I would be contributing.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just saying that the taxpayers will pay for it. Mr. GRAY. In the suggestions I have made for the equipment to be put aboard ship

The CHAIRMAN. But some of the other things the taxpayers don't pay for and that may be perfectly all right. I would rather pay some taxes for these things than have an oil spill in Puget Sound because it affects the whole taxpaying public.

The hour is getting late. So we thank you very much.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I just want to say to you that you have been very patient and courteous in hearing the industry views and I appreciate that very much.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

When we get around to it, we might have some amendments. We will have you testify, of course, and see where we go from there.

All right. Now we have Mr. Greenberg from the Center for Law and Social Policy, and Mr. Robert Lynette from the Coalition Against Oil Pollution.

We welcome your testimony today.

All right, Mr. Lynette.

STATEMENTS OF ROBERT LYNETTE, COALITION AGAINST OIL POLLUTION; AND ELDON GREENBERG, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

Mr. LYNETTE. My name is Robert Lynette, and I am speaking for the Coalition Against Oil Pollution, a Washington State organization comprised of shoreline tourist businesses, commercial and sports fishermen, conservation groups, aquaculture interests and concerned citizens. Our brochure with a partial listing of our supporters is attached. All told, our member groups represent over 35,000 Washington citizens. I, personally, am a reliability and system safety engineer with 15 years' experience predicting the reliability and safety of everything from aircraft to ships.

For the past 4 years we have been at the forefront of a growing concern in our State over the increasing dangers of tanker oil spills in our enclosed waters. Historically, more than 90 percent of our four refiners' crude oil needs have been supplied by pipeline from Canada. Now, with the Canadian crude oil cutoff, all of our crude oil needs will have to come in by tanker. Thus, we will go from an average of 20,000 barrels per day of waterborne transport in 1971-1972 to 350,000 barrels per day by next year.

Further, the Northern Tier Pipeline Co. will shortly apply for permits to build an oil transfer facility on the Straits of Juan de Fuca to bring in an additional 800,000 barrels per day of crude oil headed for the Midwest. It is apparent, then, that our State has a very real concern that tanker construction standards and operational standards be established with safety as a paramount concern.

On the positive side, the recent established vessel traffic system [VTS], implemented in parts of Puget Sound, is to be applauded. This system should be expanded to cover the complete route followed by both crude oil and refined product tankers. Highest on our priorities is the need for a radar-controlled VTS at the entrance of the Straits of Juan de Fuca.

But no amount of sophistication in a VTS can prevent groundings, explosions and collisions where human error or mechanical failures are involved. Puget Sound is the most beautiful, biologically productive inland waterway in the United States. Its potential for aquaculture and other fish farming is just beginning to be realized. Over 14,000 people in our State depend upon the clean waters of Puget Sound for their livelihood, and more than 2 million people live within several hours' drive of the Sound, which is a recreational asset unmatched in the rest of the country.

The estimated total 1973 contribution of the Puget Sound fish and shellfish fishery to Washington State's economy is $149,820,000. There are 13 wildlife preserves operated by the Federal Government. Puget Sound tourism accounted for $169,990,000 in 1973. We have spent over $300 million in Federal, State, local and private funds to enhance and preserve the water quality in Puget Sound since 1956.

It is with this in mind that we have depended upon the USCG to protect our waters. That protection has not materialized. During the past 6 years we have had at least 10 tanker casualties-the oil tanker, Bunker Hill, lies at the bottom of Rosario Straits, the victim of an explosion that killed five crew members. Three years ago the oil tanker Hyllier Brown came within feet of grounding and only the chance appearance of a tug saved her.

Yet, despite all of these events, the USCG has done little to protect our waters. In 1957 our State legislature passed SHB 527 requiring tug support for all tankers over 40,000 deadweight tons and prohibiting any oil tankers over 125,000 deadweight tons from proceeding into northern Puget Sound. That law has been challenged by ARCO and is scheduled to go to court in June of this year. Our coalition is an intervenor in that suit.

When the Alaska pipeline bill was being debated in Congress, we were assured that oil tankers carrying North Slope crude to west coast ports would have double bottoms and be the safest ships afloat. This has not come to pass, and we feel like we were deceived into a false sense of security. Now the oil will flow and be delivered to us in ships with single skins, single bottoms, single screws and rudders, no bow thrusters and with single, failure-prone powerplants.

Others more qualified than we can speak to the specific tanker standards that are necessary. We are not experts in these matters, but we are observant enough to note that the safety record of U.S. ships falls far short of many other countries' safety records. This tells us that we have not done even that which is well within the state of the art, much less pressed for new innovative safety features. To make matters worse, the USCG has appeared at numerous hearings before our State legislature essentially telling us to avoid setting local standards, that they will handle these matters.

In summary, we believe that the intent of Congress in the Ports and Waterways Safety Act has not been carried out by the USCG.