created by deed, will not be forfeited by a simple refusal to pay rent,
or by any mere words, where there is no open act of hostility to the
lessor's title.

Id.

120. The relation of landlord and tenant as to a covenant for pay-
ment of rent can be dissolved only by an agreement between them-
selves, which equity would enforce. Fisher v. Milliken,

8, 395

121. Measure of damages.-The value of the coal raised by the les-
sees after the expiration of the twenty-one years' lease, was to be
paid for by them at its fair market value as if they were purchasers,
all expenses of hewing and raising being allowed. Jegon v. Vivian,
8, 628

122. A mining lease provided for payment of taxes by the lessee;
though the mine proved a loss, he was held bound for the taxes.
Gibben v. Atkinson,

15, 428

123. Coal rent as liquidated damages.-The rent per ton agreed for
was stipulated damages to the extent of the non-performance. The
uncertainty as to the extent of the injury is a criterion to determine
whether it is a penalty or liquidated damages. Powell v. Burroughs,
8, 531

124. The taking by lessee of his share of the oil found is not waste,
but a rightful act, unless the lease be forfeited by its own terms. Chi-
cago Co. v. U. S. Co.,

12, 570
125. Compulsory production of books to ascertain rental value.
Stuart v. White,

F. Assignment.

5, 454

126. Relation of lessor to tenant's assignee.-There is a privity of
estate between the lessor and the assignee of the lessee which makes
such assignee liable for rents or royalties. Watson Coal Co. v. Casteel,

9, 130

127. What will release assignor.-Nothing but a surrender, a release
or an eviction can, in whole or in part, absolve the tenant from the ob-
ligation of his covenant with his landlord. Fisher v. Milliken, 8, 395
128. Assignor of lease bound, notwithstanding subsequent modifi-
cations. Fisher v. Milliken,
8, 395
129. Covenant against assignment not broken by subletting. Har-
grave v. King,
8, 408

130. Assignee of recorded lease against parol tenant.-The owner in
fee let a tract of land for a term of years by lease duly executed and
recorded. Afterward with the assent of the tenant he resumed pos-
session of a part of the demised premises and let the same by parol to
S. While S. remained in possession of such part, the tenant for years
for a valuable consideration, conveyed all his interest to B., who had no
knowledge of the lease to S. Held, that the parol lease to S. could not
avail against ejectment brought by B. Burr v. Spencer, 8, 450

131. Relation of lessor to equitable assignee.-An agreement to take
an assignment of a lease followed by possession on the part of the equi-
table assignee, is not sufficient to give the lessor any right to sue such
equitable assignee in equity on the covenants of the lease. Cox v.
Bishop,

8, 455

LEASE-Assignment. Continued.

132. Assignment of lease after covenant broken.—The assignee of a
lease containing covenant to commence a well within a time stated, is
not liable for the breach when he took his assignment after such time
had elapsed. Washington Co. v. Johnson,

16, 165

133. Non-assignable lease.-An indenture between land owner and
certain skilled niners giving them the right to prospect and dig for
gold at a fixed royalty, to have and to hold as long as the lessees might
deem it worthy of search, creates no permanent estate in the land and
is a lease which is not assignable. Hodgson v. Perkins,

G. Forfeiture-Abandonment-Eviction.

16, 116

134. Right of re-entry, on breach, must be reserved, to create a
good condition upon which the term granted by a lease shall end before
lapse by expiration of time. Vanatta v. Brewer,

6, 358

135. Entry for non-payment.—Where the tenant fails to comply
with such covenant and the landlord has made demand at the time
and place and in the manner prescribed by common law, and such de
mand is not complied with, the landlord may, at his option, enter upon
the leased premises, or such part thereof as can be entered upon by
him. Bowyer v. Seymour,
9, 67
136. Election to bring ejectment.-But if he does not re-enter, in
fact, he may bring ejectment under § 16, Chap. 93 of the Code. Id.
137. Forfeiture for default in payments by holder of lease and op-
tion. Christie's Appeal,
9, 42
138. Rights of tenant working quarry beyond the bounds of his
lease. Sheldon v. Davey,

8, 581

139. Eviction of lessee-Rent-Recoupment.-An eviction such as
will suspend rent is an actual expulsion of the lessee out of all or
some part of the demised premises; the rent already accrued and over-
due is not forfeited by the eviction, but in an action for such rent, the
tenant may defalk the damages caused by it. Tiley v. Moyers,
4, 320

140. Recoupment by lessees for ejectment and estrepement.-Where
ejectment had been brought by the lessors to try the question of for-
feiture, under a provision of the lease which forbade the tenant to let
the mine stand idle for a year, in which they failed-damages therefor
could not be allowed by the jury in action for the rent-but for the
estrepement brought by them, which interrupted mining operations,
damages were properly allowed and assessed by the jury under the
charge of the court. Id.

141. Effect of surrendering lease.-Where a lessee of a mine makes a
written surrender of his lease in view of a contemplated sale of his
improvements and machinery to enable the lessor to make a new lease
to the purchaser, the original lease, in law if not in equity, is canceled.
Stewart v. Munford,
5, 555
142. Coal lease construed with reference to forfeiture clauses.-
Moyers v. Tiley,
8,474
143. Surface lessee can not open new mines. Griffin v. Fellows,
8, 657

144. Eviction a good plea against lessor.—Where the lessee under a
lease allowing him both to farm and to mine, is prevented from exer-
cising the right to farm, it is an eviction, and such eviction is a good
plea to an action for breach of the covenants of the lease.

Walker v.

Tucker,

8, 673

145. Lessee after virtual surrender estopped to deny forfeiture.—
Wilmington Co. v. Allen, 9, 106; Sheldon v. Davey,

8, 581

146. A tenancy at will may be determined by one month's notice.
Desloge v. Pearce,
9, 247

147. Penalty not enforced in equity.-A court of equity will not
entertain a bill filed against lessee of stone quarries to enforce the pen-
alty under the statute (4 Geo. II, Ch. 28), nor compel a discovery in aid
of an action to enforce the penalty against a tenant holding over.
Cross v. McClenahan,

12, 669

148. Idem.-Equity will sometimes relieve against, but will never
enforce a penalty. Id.

149. Lease distinguished from sale-Lessor entitled to rescission of
abandoned lease. Cowan v. Radford Co.,

15, 453
150. Facts of the case-No breach possible after forfeiture. Colum-
bia Coal Co. v. Miller,

9, 21

151. Idem.--Miller had confessed judgment to other persons, and
after the breach by plaintiff of its covenants, and notice from Miller of
the assuming of the agreement, the leasehold was sold under the judg-
ment. Held, that this was not a breach by Miller; the agreement
being at an end by reason of the precedent breaches of the plaintiff.
Id.

H. Fixtures.

152. Right to use tramways.-Where the coal, upon severance, has
become the property of the lessee, he has the right to enter and remove
it, and to use the tramways for such purpose. Lykens Valley Co. v.
Dock,

8, 571

153. Construction of lease as to what is covered by "machinery.”
Foley v. Addenbrooke,

8, 349

LEDGE.

1. Meaning of "ledge" as used in charter, construed with con-
text deeds and collateral evidence. Dexter Lime Rock Co. v. Dexter,
4. 291

2. Signification of "ledge."-The term "ledge" discussed with
reference to "hill or elevation," "layer or stratum," and "rock in
place.” Id.

See LODE.

LEVEL.

1. Evidence of local meaning of "level." Clayton v. Gregson,
9, 141

2. The word "level" when used as a mining term, in the coal
district of Lancashire refers to the inclination of the strata, and not
to a horizontal plane. The expression “below the level of the bottom
of the mine" explained accordingly. Id.

LIBEL.

1. Slanderer of mine, liable in damages. Paul v. Halferty, 9, 149
2. Sale prevented by officious libel.—Where one has been prevented
from selling his land or other property by the malicious interference
of another, he may maintain his action for the damage suffered. Id.
3. Describing mine as "pockety." Held, that the defendant was
liable in damages. Id.

4. Remedy in tort for the libel—Against vendee, on contract.—If
there had been a contract for the purchase of the land, binding upon
the vendee, and he had refused to comply, being biased by such false
representations, the remedy of the plaintiff would have been against
the intending purchaser on his contract. Id.

5. Article libelous on its face.-When an article in a newspaper
imputes to a person grave offenses and dishonest practices, which, if
established, would bring him into general contempt and disgrace, it is
actionable on its face. Wilson v. Fitch,

9, 155
6. Proof of colloquium.-When an alleged libel is actionable per
se, and still a colloquium is inserted in the complaint, it is unnecessary
to prove the colloquium. Id.

7. When colloquium not necessary.—A colloquium is not necessary,
except when the libel is not actionable on its face, but has a covert
libelous meaning. Id.

8. Evidence of belief in action for libel, excluded both as to
justification and mitigation of damages. Id.

9. Idem.-If the libel assert the defamatory matter, not as a fact,
but only as the belief of the author, or as a rumor, or general suspicion,
the libel can not be justified by proof that the author believed it to
be true, or that there was such a rumor, or general suspicion. Id.

10. Proving the truth.-In order to justify such publications of the
belief of the author or of others, the defendant must prove the truth
of the matter published. Id.

11. Privileged communication-Proof of malice.-The trustee of a
private corporation is not a public officer in such a sense as to enable
the publishers of a newspaper to claim an article published concern-
ing him and criticising his conduct as trustee, as a privileged commu-
nication. and therefore compel such trustee, in an action for libel, to
prove express malice. Id.

12. Defamatory publication not privileged. Id.

13. Previous publication by others on same subject. Id.

14. Common rumor of guilt. Id.

LICENSE.

1. License defined.-A license is an authority to go upon the land
of the licensor, and do an act or series of acts there, but passes no
estate or interest in the land. East Jersey Co. v. Wright, 9, 332

2. Distinction between lease and license-Proper words to create
each, stated. Doe v. Wood, 9, 182; Boone v. Stover, 9, 326; Glon-
inger v. Franklin Co.,
9, 273
3. A license is not exclusive unless the contrary be expressed or
necessarily implied. Manning v. Frazier, 8, 307; Gloninger v.
Franklin Co., 9, 273; Dark v. Johnston,

9, 283

4. Revocability-A license may be terminated by notice. Dark v.
Johnston,

9, 283

5. But not without compensation. Dark v. Johnston, 9, 283;
Fuhr v. Dean, 6, 216; Harkness v. Burton 9, 318; Beatty v. Gregory,

9, 234
6. Oil contract construed as license, irrevocable unless compensa-
tion paid, but forfeited on account of assignment by licensee. Dark
v. Johnston,
9, 283

7. License distinguished from grant.
East Jersey Co. v. Wright,

Grubb v. Bayard, 9, 199;

9, 332

8. The right is without stint, but is not exclusive of the owner of
the soil. Grubb v. Bayard,
9.

9, 199
"All" construed.-The use of the word "all," referring to the
ore, is not necessarily exclusive of the owner's right; it describes the
extent of the grant-not its exclusiveness. Id.

10. Indivisibility.-Such license is indivisible, and an assignee of
an undivided interest (though the holder of all but a small fraction)
has nothing and can not maintain action against the owner of the soil,
excluding him from exercising the license. Id.

11. Legislative charter, allowing mining from river beds. Bradley
v. South Carolina M. Co.,
9,

323

12. Incidents of grant or license to take ore. Lord Mountjoy's Case,
9, 175; Silsby v. Trotter,

3, 137

13. License to work mines can only be granted by deed. Kamphouse
v. Gaffner,

2, 258

14. License by parol good until revoked-Not transferable. Id.
15. License distinguished from easement.—An easement can only
be created by deed, but a license may exist in parol; a license creates
no estate in the land. Fuhr v. Dean,
6, 216
16. Right to mine reserved, is not an exclusive liberty. Chetham v.
Williamson,
9, 176

17. An oral contract allowing a party "to mine and dig for lead
and zinc ore according to mining usage,” held, to amount to an exclu-
sive lease. Sobey v. Thomas,
4,360

18. One who constructs a tunnel for the purpose of mining ore under
a license from another with an understanding that he is to be reim-
bursed for his outlay from the licensor's share of the ore mined, has
the right to the exclusive use of the tunnel, by implication, if in the
exercise of reasonable diligence such exclusive use is necessary to en-
able him to mine the quantity of ore named in the license within the
time limited. Silsby v. Trotter,
3, 137

19. Parol license-How proven.—A parol license which when given
and executed should be upheld and enforced in equity, may be proven
by parol; e. g., a license to use a ditch for conveying water across
another's land. Gooch v. Sullivan,
5, 14
20. Oral license to use water, valid but not assignable. Fabian v.
Collins,
5, 20
21. Licensees are estopped from disputing the prior rights of the
licensors, and if third parties purchase such license, and enter into pos-
session, their appropriation will only date from such possession. Id.