FURTHER TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. J. T. BOONE, INSPECTOR, MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES, PACIFIC COAST, HEADQUARTERS, WESTERN SEA FRONTIER, TREASURE ISLAND, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

Admiral BOONE. I wish to clarify one or two things, Mr. Chairman, in the testimony of this morning for the record.

The question came up about the number of patients at Oak Knoll, and the statement was made by Admiral Owen, district medical officer of the Twelfth Naval District, that the allocation of patient load there is 2,000. That figure has been reduced to approximately 1,700, and the patient load at the present time is about 1,400. That lower figure may be accounted for by the fact that there have been no evacuees from the Pacific recently.

Mr. ANDERSON. Do I understand that at the present time 1,700 is the present capacity?

Admiral BOONE. Yes, but that change-over took place this fiscal year. Congress had appropriated for a permanent hospital at Oak Knoll $13,200,000. That has been held up by the request of the Surgeon General. Due to the high labor costs, the present facilities will be utilized for the time being.

The representative for Alameda County, who testified the other day, made the statement that the hospitals in San Leandro and Oak Knoll had been closed up and were under caretaker's status. I think that should be corrected. There are about 2,800 people there daily, and it may be stated that the pay roll represents about half a million dollars a month, which should be of interest to the community. I should like to say also in connection with the Veterans' Bureau patients—I don't think I made that very clear-the Navy is very desirous and very willing to have as many Veterans' Bureau patients as possible. The Surgeon General, who was then Admiral Stittwhose aide I was-proposed after World War I that the Navy take Veterans' Bureau patients in the naval hospitals, not only as a service to its sister service, but also due to the fact that we had facilities which must be maintained in the interval between wars, which we call "peace." We could take these men without large additions to our administrative or professional staff, which must be maintained anyway, and provide for them. We still make available more beds to the Veterans' Administration than it utilizes.

Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you very much, Admiral. That clears up a couple of misunderstandings that occurred this morning.

Admiral BOONE. We have to maintain a certain overhead anyway for our Navy. requirements, and it doesn't cost any more to take a few more thousands at the same ratio. We can take the patient load of the Veterans without taxing us too much. We did have to cut down the bed capacity of Oak Knoll due to the attrition of the Navy and due to the shortage of medical personnel, doctors, nurses, and corpsmen. So we reduced the bed capacity relatively to the naval strength.

Mr. ANDERSON. I hope the Nurse Corps bill will be helpful to you in obtaining more nurses.

Admiral BOONE. That was very helpful; it was the first of the personnel bills passed, so the women always take the lead.

Mr. ANDERSON. No wise man will ever say otherwise.
Admiral BOONE. In other words, we follow the ladies.

I would like to say a word about my comment regarding location of hospitals and the inference that might be drawn about the Army hospital at the Presidio. I meant to convey the idea that it would be unwise for the Navy to add another facility there, to build a separate or large, oversized hospital in such a threatened strategic area, in addition to the ones that the Army already have there. I can well understand that the Army, with a great investment there, would want to build on that and hold what they have. It is like Oak Knoll; we have about a million dollars invested in basic facilities, such as the sewer system, water, light, roads, et cetera, and that has been one of the reasons why a decision has been made to replace the temporary hospital with buildings of a permanent construction. It might not be an ideal site, but there is an investment which we feel should not be disregarded and that for reasons of economy we should captalize on that.

Mr. ANDERSON. We are glad to know you are considering' the taxpayers.

Admiral BOONE. I am, sir; I am one of them.

Mr. ANDERSON. I wish to announce that Mr. Francis V. Keesling, who was the first witness before the committee, has taken exception to some of the statements that have been made with reference to the Islais Creek property, and has requested an opportunity to file with the committee a statement which he thinks will clarify several points. He has received that permission. His statement will be made a part of the record and it will be printed and available to all interested parties. (Note Supplemental data.)

Mr. ANDERSON. As far as these two subcommittees are concerned, this terminates our hearings for the present. We are going to spend the next 2 days in inspecting the many installations discussed the past few days. I appreciate the interest that has been taken by the Federal agencies, including the Armed Services, and the citizens of San Francisco, and the very fine treatment we have been accorded while we were here.

The meeting stands adjourned.

(Thereupon, at 3:45 p. m. on Wednesday, September 17, 1947, the hearing was closed.)

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

OCTOBER 25, 1947.

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF FRANCIS V. KEESLING, JR., OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., SUBMITTED TO ANDERSON-RIZLEY JOINT COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING PROPERTY HOLDINGS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA

It is respectfully submitted:

(1) That the Unification Act of 1947 contemplates the elimination of unnecessary federal property holdings and expenditures by the consolidation, relocation, or elimination of various functions of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Corps, both at the national level and in areas throughout the country, such as the San Francisco Bay area;

(2) That the data set forth in this statement will conclusively prove that the Marine Corps Depot of Supplies at Islais Creek, San Francisco, should be moved

to Alameda or some other location on available property already owned by the armed services and be consolidated with comparable functions of the Army and Navy from the standpoint of (a) strategic location, (b) maximum efficiency of operation, (c) vulnerability from bombing, (d) reduction of federal expenditures and local taxes, (e) the best interest of private enterprise and San Francisco Bay Area citizens;

(3) That the relocation and consolidation of the functions of the Marine Corps Depot at Islais Creek is a prime example of what should be expected to be accomplished under the Unification Act of 1947, and that if the functions of the Marine Corps Islais Creek Depot are not consolidated with comparable functions of the Army and Navy under the circumstances herein set forth, then it is difficult to visualize that any appreciable consolidations and benefits will accrue from the Unification Act, and therefore the Congress and the people of the United States should be so informed.

SUMMARY

This statement will show the following:

(1) That the Marine Corps Islais Creek supply facilities in the process of condemnation were intended to be temporary under yearly renewable leases which provided that in no event would the leases be extended beyond 1947 (in some cases 1948).

(2) Not until condemnation proceedings were instituted after the war in October, 1945 were the lessors or their successors in interest informed of the government's intention to condemn.

(3) In reliance upon the temporary leases, some property owners retained their property for postwar private industrial development, and others purchased the property between 1942 and 1945 for such purposes. The negotiations with the landowners and with the City, together with a comparison of the type of construction with the construction at Rough and Ready Island and other depots which were intended to be permanent from the outset, are further indications that the Government intended to hold the property only on a temporary basis. (4) The Marine Corps representatives themselves have admitted the functions could be moved across the Bay to property already owned by the government at Alameda.

(5) The supplies from Islais Creek Depot are handled inefficiently and uneconomically by being loaded in trucks, trucked to San Francisco docks, loaded in barges, towed all the way across San Francisco Bay to the Oakland-Alameda Naval Supply Depot, and then loaded into Navy transports for shipment to the Pacific. The entire operation would be handled at less cost and more efficiently at the Alameda location or at other locations, with considerable long term savings. (6) The only practical objection by the Marine Corps to moving the Islais Creek operations to government owned property at Alameda is the cost of moving. Payment for the Islais Creek property in the present condemnation proceedings will exceed the actual cost of moving. Payment for property will be in excess of $2,500,000. The cost of moving will be less than that estimated by the Marine Corps if, in fact, as stated by the Marines, there is rapid turnover of the supplies; for, as present supplies are being depleted, future supplies could be routed directly to Alameda, thereby eliminating the necessity for transferring existing supplies from San Francisco to Alameda. Long-term savings from more efficient operation at Alameda is also a large factor. In addition, the tax saving must also be considered.

(7) Instead of recovering taxes of $10,000, as stated by G. L. Fox of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, San Francisco would recover at least $146,000 from the Islais Creek property and improvements alone, and if the Harrison Street property were also given up, an additional $111,000, or a combined total of at least $257,000, on a conservative estimate by the San Francisco Assessor. (8) Important private industrial concerns cannot find adequate space in San Francisco.

(9) Present San Francisco locations of the Marine Corps Depot are more vulnerable from effects of bombing than Alameda location.

(10) Alameda location is more readily accessible by rail, by road, by air, and by water than San Francisco with its peninsula bottleneck and railroad tunnels which could more easily be cut off in time of war than_Alameda.

(11) The Alameda location is better than the San Francisco location from the standpoint of traffic congestion. Acute traffic problems have developed during and since World War II. The Islais Creek Depot increases the traffic congestion. It is cut out of the center of an industrial district and is not a terminal fronting on water, so traffic must go all the way around it. The second bay bridge crossing

recommended by the Army and Navy to enter at Army Street almost alongside of the depot will aggravate the traffic situation.

(12) Considerable benefits will accrue to the entire Bay Area if Marine Corps activities are moved to land already owned by the federal government at Alameda and private industry is permitted to locate at the Islais Creek property.

(13) Prior to acquisition of the Islais Creek property by the Marine Corps, the Islais Creek Reclamation District had placed over five million cubic yards of fill in the property bringing it up to street level. Comparatively little filling was thereafter done by the Marine Corps, most of it being within building lines. Reclamation District officers and officials of the City and County of San Francisco can furnish the facts in that regard.

(14) Although some of the property owners in October 1946, in meetings with three supervisors and some representatives of the Marine Corps, for the time being abandoned some of their plans for getting back their property, when they learned of potential effects of unification legislation, property owners of 2,500,000 square feet out of a total of 3,000,000 square feet covered by the depot retained Francis V. Keesling, Jr., in February 1947, to ascertain whether the Marine Corps supply functions would be released by consolidation or relocation. Upon returning from Washington, D. C., Francis V. Keesling, Jr., reported to the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor, and thereafter official action was taken by resolution of the Board of Supervisors, approved by the Mayor. That resolution, which is being attached as an exhibit, called upon Congress to investigate and to move unnecessary federal holdings out of San Francisco by consolidation, relocation, etc. That official action taken by the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor in 1947 superseded any action of October 1946, which was referred to by General Creesy.

(15) In addition to the tax benefits and the savings of purchase price of the Islais Creek property, and in addition to the savings from more economical and efficient operations on the Alameda property, the government would recover additional funds from the sale of the warehouses at Islais Creek to the present landowners. The property owners, represented by Francis V. Keesling, Jr., have offered to discuss the purchase of those buildings. If the Harrison Street facilities were also moved, large funds would be obtained from sale of that property. (16) The location of the western approaches of the proposed bay crossing as recommended by the joint Army and Navy Commission will be practically on top of the Islais Creek Depot, thereby rendering its location there impracticable and untenable from a security standpoint.

Reference is made to the map attached as Exhibit 1 (maps in committee files) which shows the location of the Islais Creek Depot and other facilities herein mentioned. The Islais Creek Depot is close to the major Naval Dry Docks and base at Hunters Point, the main line Southern Pacific Railroad trestle runs almost alongside the Depot and the Southern Pacific Terminal is only a short distance away from the Depot. The Western Pacific lines are also nearby. Measured in terms of atomic bombs, guided missiles and area bombing, as illustrated by Army strategic bombing surveys and target analyses, the proximity of the San Francisco docks and the western terminus and approaches of the present San Francisco Bay Bridge, together with the fact that San Francisco is a compact, densely populated and industrial area comprising only 44 square miles, makes the entire area, particularly the vicinity of the Depot, a prime target. The Army and Navy have recommended that the western end of the new bay bridge come in at Army Street, which, as will be seen from the attached map, runs directly north of the Marine Depot. San Francisco is a peninsula and inasmuch as neither the present bay bridge nor the contemplated bay crossing provide for railroads, San Francisco can be reached directly by rail only from the south. The railroads and roads coming into San Francisco from the south form a bottleneck and the main line railroad presently passes through a series of tunnels before reaching San Francisco.

Representatives of the Marine Corps stated that the functions now performed at the Islais Creek Depot could be moved to Alameda on property already owned by the federal government. The Alameda location is more accessible from all directions by water, road, railroad, and air than the San Francisco location. The Alameda location is no more vulnerable to attack than the San Francisco location, and in view of the peninsula bottleneck situation in San Francisco and the railroad tunnels and location of other vital facilities the Alameda location is, in fact, less vulnerable than the San Francisco location, and it also could recover much more rapidly from the effects of bombing.

Although the Marine Corps witnesses indicated by pictures and statements that apparently there were no paved streets through the 94 acres comprising the

Marine Corps Depot at the time the Marine Corps took over the Depot early in the war, that certainly is no indication of the present traffic situation. It is common knowledge that during and since the war and at the present time San Francisco traffic has greatly increased with the increased Bay Area population and commercial activities. The San Francisco Bay Bridge was more than adequate to handle the prewar traffic, but it is now completely inadequate and consequently a second bay crossing must be built as soon as possible. Every person who is familiar with the prewar situation in San Francisco as compared with the postwar situation, is familiar with the facts.

At the present time the traffic must go entirely around the Marine Corps Depot which causes considerable congestion for the reason that the Depot is carved out of the middle of an industrial area instead of being a terminal bounded by water on one or more sides, as is true in the case of other terminal and transshipping facilities of the armed services at Oakland and Alameda.

In time of war, with the increased activity in the area, including the considerably increased activity at the Depot, not only would the trucking from the Depot to the San Francisco docks be impeded, but the general traffic situation in that area would be unnecessarily increased. If the Depot were relocated, streets would be opened which would relieve the traffic congestion in San Francisco while at the same time the Marine Corps traffic problem would be completely eliminated at the Alameda terminal.

Even without any consolidation with the Navy this would certainly result in a better coordination of the Navy and Marine Corps supply and shipping functions. Also, it must be recognized that certainly the Navy must have located and dispersed its own supply and shipping installations so as to afford maximum protection. Therefore, if Marine supply and shipping functions are coordinated with comparable functions of the Navy at or near Naval Supply and transshipping depots, they will of course receive like protections.

The statements and testimony of the Marine Corps representatives conclusively prove that the activities of the Islais Creek Depot have fallen off considerably and it is respectively submitted that the volume of activity now taking place at the Islais Creek property when considered separately from the Harrison Street property would be below the activity which could be expected if the property were turned over to private industry. We certainly cannot afford to maintain depots on a standby basis for reserve or dead storage, nor can we afford to maintain on a standby basis the shops which are presently located there, particularly when the Marines themselves admit they can be moved elsewhere to land already owned by the government, at considerable savings and benefit to all concerned both in time of peace and in time of war.

Representatives of the Navy stated that they had given up a number of temporary installations which were needed during wartime expansion of their facilities. Those representatives stated that they have thereby relocated and concentrated installations and activities at Treasure Island and at other locations in the Bay Area, and that in the event of future emergencies they could again acquire necessary temporary warehouses and other installations by commandeering the same in a moment's notice. The same thing would of course be true in the case of the Marine Corps. In the event it was necessary for them to have increased storage, supply and other facilities in a future emergency or war, the same would of course be commandeered overnight in San Francisco and other locations in the Bay Area the same as during the last war. In the interim there is no reason why the Marine Corps cannot follow the example of the Navy and the Army and why all of the services cannot do considerably more in the way of coordination by joint action in some of their supply, shipping, and other functions.

The testimony with respect to Port Hueneme is, I believe, a case in point. There it appears that the Navy is endeavoring to retain piers on a stand-by basis even though they are not needed at the present time. Certainly it could permit the use of those piers by private commercial interests or municipalities, as they could be commandeered immediately in the event they were again needed by the armed services in time of emergency or war.

The Marines indicated that the main obstacle to moving the Marine Corps Islais Creek Depot to Alameda is the expense of making that move. It should be noted that the figures presented by the Marines with respect to time and cost of moving included moving from both Harrison Street and Islais Creek properties. The move from the Islais Creek property alone would be considerably less, particularly as the Marine Corps representatives had previously stated that the supplies kept at the supply depot were fluid and that there was rapid turn-over of them. If that be true, insofar as the supplies are concerned, there is no reason