Memory: A Self-Referential AccountJordi Fern?ndez here offers a philosophical investigation of memory, one which engages with memory's philosophically puzzling characteristics in order to clarify what memory is. Memories interact with mental states of other types in a particular way, and they also have associated feelings that these other mental states lack. They are special in terms of their representational capacity too, since one can have memories of objective events as well as memories of one's own past experiences. Finally, memories are epistemically unique, in that beliefs formed on the basis of memories are protected from certain errors of misidentification, and are justified in a way which does not rely on any cognitive capacity other than memory. To explain these unique features, Fern?ndez proposes that memories have a particular functional role which involves past perceptual experiences and beliefs about the past. He suggests that memories have a particular content as well, namely that they represent themselves as having a certain causal origin. Fern?ndez then explains the feelings associated with our memories as the experience of some of the things that our memories represent, things such as our own past experiences, or the fact that memories originate in those experiences. He also accounts for the special justification for belief afforded by our memories in terms of the content that memories have. The resulting picture is a unified account of several philosophically interesting aspects of memory, one that will appeal to philosophers of mind, metaphysicians, and epistemologists alike. |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
apple in front aspects of memory aware Bernecker C-fibers causal origin causal self-reference approach chapter claim conjunctive view content of memories discussion disowned memory driver’s seat episode of remembering episodic memory episodically remembered epistemic justification epistemology of memory error through misidentification example extrinsic view facie justification false features of memories feeling of pastness forming a belief forming the belief functionalist immunity to error intentionality of memory intuition involves Jim’s judgments are IEM justification for forming justified in forming memory beliefs memory judgments memory represents mental image mental time travel mnemonic content notion observer memory one’s past perceptual experience perceived phenomenal features phenomenology of memory possible situation possible worlds preservativism proposition proprioception q-memory qualify question reason red apple reflexive view relevant remembered facts rience seems semantic semantic memory sense of mineness subject’s subjective view Tasmanian devil theater tion view of mnemonic virtue visualize