other, it is a mere rudimentary sensation manifesting itself in the twofold antithetic form of continued actual sensations, or sensations proper, and continued possibilities of sensation converted by the natural laws of expectation and association into permanency and objectivity. The systems are identical in the assertion of a single or unitarian root of knowledge-and further, in the assertion that this root is subjective or idealistic; but they are essentially opposed in so far as, in the one case, the single factor out of which all knowledge springs is spiritual-the apprehensive ego: according to the Sensationalists, it seems to be nothing more than a modification of matter, different, it may be, from all lower modifications, but not substantially different or distinct.1

III. The final stage of Professor Ferrier's philosophical development is exhibited in the Lectures on Greek Philosophy.' These lectures do not add anything, or at least add very little, to the distinctive results of his system of thought. They are valuable as models of lucid exposition, of calm, vigorous, persistent thinking, tracking a few ideas with an undeviating interest and freshness, and a reiterated force and clearness of meaning, which at times almost startles by its brilliancy, yet they labour under special disadvantages. With the exception of the earlier ones, they are scarcely in a state in which he himself would have published them. They suffer, moreover, from intrinsic defects, arising partly from his subject, and partly from his mode of treating it.

1 Bain On the Emotions and Will, pp. 641-646; Mill's Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, c. xi.

The earlier or pre-Socratic phases of Greek philosophy are only known to us from fragmentary writings, in some places impenetrably obscure, and offering a field for plausible conjecture rather than for clear and satisfactory explanation. This was a tempting field for Professor Ferrier. Possessed of not a few of the qualities of a historian of Philosophy,—a rare insight into the heart of systems, and the vitally organising skill which can reproduce their process of connection and growth, and trace their most hidden relations,—he was yet so intent upon his own views as to see other systems mainly in their light. His faculty of interpretation, while keen and largely appreciative, was also arbitrary and over confident. Where he did not find meanings he did not hesitate to substitute them -to eke out the meagre and halting sense from his own fertile and eager thoughtfulness. Above all things, he professed the necessity of rendering past doctrines intelligible - of "reanimating them from within while engaged in receiving and deciphering them from without."1 But it is evident how nearly interpretation may in such a case verge upon dogmatism, and the function of the historical critic be lost in the zeal of the metaphysician. The 'Lectures on Greek Philosophy' bear a good many traces of this dogmatism -of the process of first putting in a meaning and then drawing it out again. The process is pleasant, and a vivid light is shed over the page, but it is a light to which the materials before him sometimes very slightly contribute.

After the publication of the Institutes of Metaphysic,' or at least of the pamphlet in their defence, Fer

1 Remains, vol. i. p. 3.

rier's interest in the polemical side of his philosophy, which had hitherto been so strong, seemed to languish. He dwelt mainly on certain positive aspects of philosophical belief, and especially upon the great idea that philosophical Truth must, by its character, be universal-in other words, a Truth for all intelligence, and not merely for some intelligence; and further, that philosophy in its successive developments is to be regarded, and can only be understood, as a search after this Universal or Absolute. This is the twofold idea which inspires his lectures. It constantly reappears, and the various systems which come under review are made tributary to its illustration. It is remarkable to what extent it sheds a real illumination upon the course of Greek speculation.

In conclusion, we feel warranted in saying of Professor Ferrier-whatever estimate may be formed of his philosophical system—that he is one of those thinkers who are likely to leave their mark upon the course of metaphysical opinion. There is life in all that came from his pen,-the life which springs out of intense conviction and of a rare, brilliant, and penetrating faculty of thought. He was possessed of a lofty faith in the divine dignity of human reason and the reality of a Truth transcending that of the senses. far removed as any man could be from superstition, he yet held, with an unhesitating decision, that man cannot live by bread alone; and in a time when the vague compromises of the old Scottish school seem no longer able to resist the advancing tide of Sensationalism, he will be remembered as having vindicated a spiritual principle in man on grounds of the highest and most confident argument.

As

BACK TO KANT; OR, IMMANUEL KANT AND

THE KANTIAN REVIVAL

AUTHORITIES.

1. Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason. In Commemoration of the Centenary of its First Publication. Translated into English by F. Max Müller, with a Historical Introduction by Ludwig Noiré. London :

1881.

2. The Philosophy of Kant, with a Historical Introduction. By Edward Caird, M.A., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Glasgow: 1877.

3. On the Philosophy of Kant: Shaw Fellowship Lectures. By Robert Adamson, M.A., Professor of Logic, Owens College, Manchester. Edinburgh 1879.

4 Kant and his English Critics: a Comparison of Critical and Empirical Philosophy. By John Watson, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's University, Canada. Glasgow: 1881.

5. Text-Book to Kant: The Critique of Pure Reason-Esthetic, Categories, Schematism. Translation, Reproduction, &c., with Biographical Sketch. By J. Hutchison Stirling, LL.D. Edinburgh: 1881.

6. Kant. By William Wallace, M.A., LL.D., Fellow and Tutor of Merton College. (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics.) 1882.

7. The Life of Immanuel Kant. By J. H. Stuckenberg, D.D., late Professor in Wittenberg College, Ohio. London: 1882.

8. Studies in Philosophy: Back to Kant, &c. By W. L. Courtney, M.A., Fellow of New College, Oxford. London: 1882.