Mr. LOURIE. Yes. It is the statement which reads: "The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Treasury as appropriate, shall review plans and policies relative to military and economic-assistance programs, foreign-information programs and legislative proposals of the Foreign Operations Administration and the United States Information Agency to assure that in their conceptions and execution, such plans, policies, and proposals are consistent with and further the attainment of foreign policy, military policy, and financial and monetary policy objectives." Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Where is that? Mr. LOURIE. That is in the letter to executive heads. Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Where is it in the plan itself? Mr. LOURIE. I will find it for you, sir. Mr. JUDD. Maybe it got dropped out again. Mr. LOURIE. No. General SMITH. No, sir; it is not out. If it were out, I would not be here. Mr. LOURIE. It is in the letter Mr. BROWN of Ohio. I am talking about the plan now. Mr. BROWN of Ohio. The letter is not law. General SMITH. It gives us all we need. It is the President's letter to the heads of executive departments and agencies and to us, to me, certainly, it seems to provide those safeguards in these proposals which will assure that in carrying out their programs these operating agencies will in fact take their direction in matters of foreign policy from the Secretary of State and will at all times execute their programs in such a way Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, may I ask this question? I have had a lot of letters in my time, and I am sure the gentleman has, even from Presidents, and they can change position on letters much easier than they can on a plan that becomes law. I wonder if it wouldn't be a greater safeguard if that particular provision or paragraph was written into the reorganization plan. General SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I think that is adequate, knowing the Chief Executive as I do. Mr. BROWN of Ohio. We have different Chief Executives, Mr. Smith. General SMITH. Well, fortunately I do not look too far into the future for these things because this is coming up again in a very short time, a relatively short time, as you have just been told. My recommendation would be that this is adequate, and I think I would give it a chance to work because, as Mr. Hughes has said, while this is in effect a trial operation, although as I have told you it is based on a good deal of experience during the last few years, in any event as at present provided in that executive letter to these members of the executive departments who take their orders from the Chief Executive, it does give the Secretary of State the authority and insures that these programs will be executed in such a way under his general direction as to further our foreign policy objectives. Mr. McCORMACK. That letter then is something in addition to what we have before us. General SMITH. Yes, sir; and you will get that in a more detailed presentation of organization given by Mr. Lourie, and in addition to that, a very important link in this chain, the functions and the responsibilities of the ambassadors. Mr. McCORMACK. So that for us to consider this, we should have that letter, a copy of that letter, is that right? General SMITH. Yes, sir, and Mr. Lourie will follow immediately after me and go into the details of organization which I think will bring these things out. I want to emphasize it. Possibly I have been premature. Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to belabor the point, but I wonder if the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. McCormack, who has had a great deal of experience in legislative matters, does not agree with the viewpoint that I have expressed, that if that particular paragraph is a part of a reorganization plan, it becomes law and cannot be changed except by the adoption of a new reorganization plan which must be submitted to Congress or by the passage of a law by the Congress, is that not correct? Mr. McCORMACK. Well, if it was a part of the plan, of course it would be law, but that would require a new plan being submitted. Mr. BROWN of Ohio. I understand that. Mr. McCORMACK. On the other hand, if the plan is adopted and the letter does not conflict with it, then of course it is the instructions of the President which he gives in accordance with his plan. I assume the letter comes within the purview of the plan. Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Smith spoke, as this paragraph being a safeguard, which of course could be changed by a President, either the present President or a new President, whereby if it was a part of the plan, then it would have to meet the Congress one way or the other to be changed. Mr. McCORMACK. A part of the plan, yes, I think so. General SMITH. Mr. Chairman, all I can say is that as far as I can see from where I sit now, it would not make any difference to us whether it was written in now. Mr. BROWN of Ohio. It is too late now. General SMITH. But I can assure you from the viewpoint of the State Department that we believe that this provides us with whatever authority for coordination is needed and does preserve the position of the Secretary of State. I may say also that we have watched this with great care because that to me was a very important and vital part of the reorganization proposal. Mr. McCORMACK. Well, if it was in and out four times, you had to watch it. General SMITH. You know how these things work. They go through the mill, and when they get down to the bottom and start grinding again, you would be surprised sometimes what the draft Looks like when it emerges. Under these proposals, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of State should be able to do more effectively what the Hoover Commission described as the State Department's main task, which is to "concentrate on obtaining definition of proposed objectives for the United States in foreign affairs, on formulating proposed policies in conjunction with other departments and agencies to achieve those objectives, and on recommending the choice and timing of the use of various instru ments to carry out foreign policies so formulated," and those instruments, as you, yourself, Mr. Chairman, well know, go far beyond the field of what might fall within the scope of the State Department. I do not want to go into detail there. Since the end of the war it has been increasingly difficult for the Secretary of State to deal with the steadily mounting responsibilities placed upon him and still have enough time so that he and his principal assistants could concentrate on basic foreign policy functions. It is rather amazing to me how he gets through his day of appointments, I must say, but as an indication of the steady expansion of the work of the Secretary of the Department generally since the end of World War II, there have been put in force approximately 100 laws and Executive orders, each one of which has added to the State Department's responsibility. I want to digress here for just a minute. I saw some reference made the other day by a writer-I believe he was quoting a Member of Congress, about the responsibilities and the size of the State Department in time of war and saying that the personnel were not being reduced below that which existed in war. In war the State Department practically goes into a sort of state of coma. The Army takes over. It is in the time of peace and in trying to prevent war that the functions of the State Department are enormously enlarged, as you, yourself, sir, well know. Those statistics that I have just given you are rather impressive when they are considered in relation to the increased complexity of the general conduct of foreign relations today, and I wonder how many of you have ever totaled up the number of additional new independent countries that we have with which we have to conduct separate foreign relations. It is rather a large order. During the first 153 days Mr. Dulles served as Secretary of State he had to be out of the country for 33 days, and those were man-killing trips; and during the 120 remaining days when he was in the country he has met with congressional committees on 29 occasions and with one or more Members of the Congress on 33 separate occasions, involving part of 45 different days. Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Do you think he will favor the adjournment of Congress? General SMITH. No; as a matter of fact, as the chairman of this committee well knows, some of those meetings have been of vital importance to the State Department. You cannot get along without them. Mr. McCORMACK. In other words, General, you have had experience in both administrations when our Republican friends used to-well, I will withdraw the question. General SMITH. Mr. McCormack, if I may reply to that, I assure you, there is no difference. Mr. McCORMACK. That is what I thought. General SMITH. I know how highly the Secretary values these opportunities because you cannot conduct foreign policy-we have said many times-without the knowledge and support of the Congress. Mr. McCORMACK. General, on that a bipartisan policy calls for consultation, does it not? General SMITH. Yes, sir. Mr. McCORMACK. I won't raise the question now, but a lot of us on the Democratic side do not think that consultation is taking place. General SMITH. Well, I refer you to the chairman of the committee, Mr. McCormack. These Saturday mornings we have been in consultation with the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and there has been great statesmanship shown by members of both parties. Mr. JUDD. In the meeting last Saturday was Senator George and Senator Sparkman and Senator Lyndon Johnson; and from the House, Congressman Richards, the former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Congressman Lanham of the Subcommittee on the Far East. They were dealing with this crisis in Korea. We were down there 2 hours, or thereabouts, and that has been happening regularly, and there has been no preponderance at all of Republicans over Democrats. Mr. McCORMACK. I am glad to hear it because consultation means beforehand, not afterward. I have been at one meeting where I was told what was going to happen. I did not consider that consultation. Mr. BROWNSON. That is a point we Republicans have been trying to develop over the past 8 years in regard to bipartisan foreign policy. Mr. BROWN of Ohio. I was going to add that Mr. McCormack has not been suffering from a new complaint. There have been quite a number of people suffering from that complaint several years previously. General SMITH. I can say we were trying to do that on a consultation basis and trying to avoid in every possible way confronting committees or, indeed, individual Members of this Congress on whose advice we depend with any Mr. McCORMACK. We Democrats are pretty well united on foreign affairs, you know. Mr. JUDD. I should have added that Speaker Rayburn was invited, former Speaker Rayburn. Speaker Martin was there, but Speaker Rayburn could not come. There was no attempt whatsoever to make it a partisan matter. Mr. BENDER. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) General SMITH. At the meeting over which I presided about 3 weeks ago, as you will recall, I came in and threw a problem on the table in front of a subcommittee of the Congress and we proceeded to a solution by parliamentary methods. We took a vote and we accepted that solution. Mr. BROWN of Ohio. You will have to learn a new procedure before this committee. We do not follow parliamentary procedure. Mr. JUDD. I am no longer chairman. Mr. BROWNSON (presiding). May I say at this point that I appreciate very much the opportunity of presiding at these hearings and regret that an appointment at the White House made it necessary for me to leave the committee session for a few minutes and miss part of Secretary Smith's testimony. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary. General SMITH. The real reason we are asking for the transfer of some of the Secretary's responsibility as we propose, without losing control, is that we hope he will have a little more time for his major responsibility. In brief, the proposals move within the framework of existing legislation in a direction which should enable the executive branch to perform far more effectively as a team for conducting foreign affairs. The responsibility for foreign policy is clearly and specifically assigned by the President to the Secretary of State, and that will, of course, require certain supervisory functions which cannot be separated from that major function of foreign policy responsibility. As I said a few minutes ago, you will see when Mr. Lourie and Mr. Sargeant complete their presentation how we expect to implement that. The proper coordination and the execution of major overseas operating programs is assured by first providing a single agency, the Foreign Operations Administration (in which foreign assistance and related economic operations are consolidated. In other words, that is the tactical as distinguished from the strategic concept, and a single agency, the United States Information Agency), in which the administration of the foreign information programs of this Government are also brought together. The specific effect on the State Department of these first steps toward a more effective organization of the executive branch for the conduct of foreign policy affairs can best be described to you by Mr. Lourie, but I do want to say this, that we have worked it out, although there are some details which still need to be provided. A certain amount of willing subordination is expected, and of course can only be provided by the orders of the President. Mr. McCORMACK. Willing subordination to whom? General SMITH. To the gentleman who is responsible for the formulation and supervision of foreign policy, the Secretary of State. That concludes my presentation, sir, and Mr. Lourie is now prepared to follow with more detail. May I defer to him, sir? Mr. BROWNSON. I wonder, Mr. Secretary, since it is 12: 15 now, if we could check with the committee as to whether they would rather proceed with such questions as they might have to direct to Secretary Smith or whether they would rather adjourn now for the lunch hour and question Secretary Smith at the close of that period? Do any of the committee members have questions to ask Secretary Smith? General SMITH. Might I make a suggestion, sir? I do not presume however, it seems to me that after the second part of this presentation is made, it may be that a number of things which will occur to members of the committee will be answered during that presentation, and it might save your time if Mr. Lourie were permitted to finish up what is really chapter 2 and a more extensive chapter, and then you have the whole picture as we see it, both policy and execution. Mr. McCORMACK. I would like to hear Secretary Lourie, but I have to go over to the floor. Mr. JUDD. Will you be back, General Smith? General SMITH. I will if you like. Mr. JUDD. I want to ask one question, and that is the only one I have to ask. Maybe he would not have to come back. Mr. BROWNSON. There will probably be some things develop as Secretary Smith indicated as a result of Mr. Lourie's testimony about which we would like to question both Secretary Smith and Secretary Lourie. General SMITH. In that case, if anything is asked which I know Lourie is going to answer, if I might say to wait until he is finished, |