sit in as a guest. Then I'll be chairman of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, which will have representatives of the leading agencies on it and meeting with me. Mr. LANTAFF. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BROWNSON. Is that a successor to that psychological board? Didn't Dr. Gordon Gray head one for some time? Mr. LANTAFF. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. BROWNSON. I think he did; and, as I recall, during the time they had it they didn't hold very many meetings and it was rather inactive. I wonder if this replaced that or that board is still in existence. Dr. JOHNSON. I don't know. They have a group that meets twice a week with me, a policy group, representing the State, Defense, Joint Chiefs, MSA, and CIA relationships. Mr. LANTAFF. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BROWNSON. Mr. Lantaff. Mr. LANTAFF. What will be your relationship with the PSB? Dr. JOHNSON. What is the PSB? Mr. LANTAFF. Psychology Strategy Board. Dr. JOHNSON. Well, I think it would be very close. Mr. LANTAFF. The committee you mention you are chairman of, if I understand the organization correctly, is under the Psychological Strategy Board. It is the working level. Mr. MERSON. The working level. Dr. JOHNSON. Working level. Mr. LANTAFF. And that is under the PSB? Dr. JOHNSON. That's right. Mr. LANTAFF. And as a member of that Board Dr. JOHNSON. Well, I won't be a member of the Psychological Strategy Board. Mr. LANTAFF. Well, State will be a member of that Board? Dr. JOHNSON. Yes; that is correct. Probably Mr. Bedell Smith will represent State on that Board. I think probably Mr. Allen Dulles will be on that Board. Mr. LANTAFF. Do you think that will work satisfactorily? There again we have this question of policy separate from operating responsibilities, with you Dr. JOHNSON. Yes. Mr. LANTAFF. In your operating capacity taking your policy directives, I presume, from the PSB? Dr. JOHNSON. Yes. I would imagine that Board will come to tentative decision and it will be discussed with the Secretary of State and I'll get my orders from the Secretary of State. Dr. JOHNSON. Yes. I would imagine that Board will come to operate when you are the actual operating agency for all information in the Government and, yet, you will be the only one, under this reorganization plan, that does not participate in the formation of policy at the PSB level. If I recall the organization of PSB, isn't that a representative from Defense, State, and Dr. JOHNSON. I think that's right. Well, of course, I think the reason I haven't been invited on it is that they want me to be purely an operator. I am not supposed to originate policy. 35202-53--12 Now, policy decision having to do with the distribution of news, and so forth, will be up to me, as I understand the Secretary of State, to use my ingenuity and imagination to implement what I get. Mr. LANTAFF. Of course, the thing I am fearful of and the point you mentioned a moment ago—the purpose of this was to decentralize and get people down in the field actually carrying out this business of dissemination of information, and that they would be the people who would actually know what was going on and feel the pulse of the people, so to speak, and, yet, under this organization we are actually separating the policymaker, the one who has to determine policy, from those in the field that you have mentioned that would be so expert at it because they would feel the pulse-and I thoroughly agree with you in that respect-but I am just a little concerned as to whether or not, with these levels of organization we have, maybe we are going to separate people that are going to have the job and put up here in a castle somewhere the people that are going to have to dream up policy and we will be worse off than we were before. Dr. JOHNSON. I would think, sir, policy guidance will go out every day from our office, and maybe 2 or 3 times a day under certain conditions, to the public-affairs offices and the Ambassadors. If there was any question of interpretation of that policy, from a diplomatic point of view, I would imagine they would immediately get in touch with the Ambassador, and the Ambassador would get in touch with the Secretary of State. Mr. BROWNSON. That is the point that disturbs me. I can see in your business very little except policy. I mean almost everything that you originate, except your most routine of all programs, demands a policy decision on that particular matter. Dr. JOHNSON. Well, as soon as I get a policy decision, sir, which might be any one of a number of things-we might decide under certain conditions our Government would take such-and-such an attitude. We would suggest ways of implementing that to the field, but the field would have to decide, or the Ambassador, if our suggestions met with his approval in terms of the cultural background and the educational background of the people. Mr. BROWNSON. I at least am asking these questions because I believe in a strong information service and I want to make sure that the information service is going to be a strong one under this plan. Dr. JOHNSON. Here is a little Mr. BROWNSON. This separation of policy and operations is a little disturbing. You see, we were asked last week-in fact, we voted on it this morning-to approve a Defense Department plan, the chief merit of the Defense Department plan, of which I approve highly, is that this plan brings policy and operations closer together. Dr. JOHNSON. Yes. Mr. BROWNSON. Then the next week and the next two plans in sequence, 7 and 8, we are asked to approve on the basis of their chief virtue, which is that we separate policy and operations. That is why we are probing this. Dr. JOHNSON. I think, sir, I can help clarify that a little. Of course, the Defense Department has been traditionally an operating agency. The State Department has been traditionally a policymaking agency. Now, I have a little memorandum that one of my staff prepared for me apropos of this. We talked about this the other night. Broadly speaking, policy embraces decisions as to basic purposes and objectives. Mr. LANTAFF. Well, Defense does that, too. Dr. JOHNSON. Policy embraces decisions as to basic purposes and objectives. Well, of course, they do get into some policy. We all get into some policy. Mr. LANTAFF. What do the Joint Chiefs of Staff do except recommend policy? Dr. JOHNSON. Military policy; yes. Operations have to do with the ways and means of carrying out the purposes and achieving the objectives of policy. Under the above definitions, foreign policy is made up of the purposes and objectives of the United States in international affairs. Foreign operations are the ways and means of implementation of such policy. Instruments of implementation are found in four broad categories— political, economic, military, information (psychological). To apply the above definitions to a concrete example, the decision to develop defensive strength in Western Europe is a foreign policy decision. Efforts to achieve this objective are the ways and means of foreign operations implementation. In this example, all four elements of implementation are being employed, each according to its individual capacity. Mr. LANTAFF. Mr. Johnson, don't you think that is just so many words? Dr. JOHNSON. Well, to me, it is pretty clear, sir, frankly. Mr. LANTAFF. It is clear, but don't you think it is just so many words? I mean, here we have the military. The Rockefeller report says one thing we have got to preserve in the military-is that we have to have the Joint Chiefs of Staff up here making policy; but, yet, the members of that Joint Chiefs of Staff that determine that policy have to wear another hat and be the Chief of Staff of their own services. So, they will not only develop, but be responsible for carrying out those policies. In other words, we are going to make those people carry out the policy they dream up. Dr. JOHNSON. That's right. Mr. LANTAFF. So, then that is the secret of success of our military operation and how we were able to win the wars that we have won, because of the fact that we know that they can support these military decisions because the policymakers at the top have to carry them out. Dr. JOHNSON. I wonder if this would give you any comfort. It seems to me that an information organization, if its doing a topflight job, ought to have special talents and special abilities, other than the kind of abilities that are needed in the State Department. Now, to develop that kind of organization and to assemble and attract specialists in the motion picture, radio, press, and so forth Mr. LANTAFF. What is the difference between the type of specialists we would have to attract to the International Information Administration and the type of specialists we have to attract to work for the State Department? Dr. JOHNSON. I am talking in terms of information now. Mr. LANTAFF. What is the difference between the type? You certainly would have to have qualifications for key positions. in the State Department. You don't mean to say—— Dr. JOHNSON. Well, the history of it shows pretty well that it's been rather difficult to get the kind of talent you want. Mr. LANTAFF. Well, that is a question of salary, then, isn't it? Mr. LANTAFF. And the question of abuse to keep down the Voice of America? Dr. JOHNSON. You have had so many changes. Mr. LANTAFF. That is not an organizational fault, though? Dr. JOHNSON. No. Mr. LANTAFF. It is a personnel fault? Dr. JOHNSON. Well, it is partly organizational, but it hasn't had the dignity, the importance, and the stature that I think it will have as a separate organization. Mr. LANTAFF. Well, the same argument would apply for taking the Department of Army out from under the Department of Defense? Dr. JOHNSON. I wouldn't think it was quite comparable. Mr. LANTAFF. I am not talking in terms of personalities, but on the organization principles here. Mr. MEADER. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield to me on that point? Mr. LANTAFF. Yes. Mr. BROWNSON. Mr. Meader. Mr. MEADER. I would like to quote a brief passage from page 173 of the hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953. I asked this question of Mr. Rockefeller: You do not believe in the separation of policymaking from the execution of the policy decided? Mr. ROCKEFELLER. No, sir; but we felt there should not be the separation. But we are filled with respect and admiration for the ingenuity of the Congress in setting up a system which kept the civilians in that structure, which prevented the military from getting control, as has been our tradition. The Rockfeller Commission apparently is on record as not favoring this principle of separating policy from operations. Dr. JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Dulles favors it. Apparently every man I've talked to-General Greunther, Mr. Draper, Mr. McCloy-I could mention Mr. LANTAFF. That is what Dr. JOHNSON. Tracy Voorhees Mr. LANTAFF. That is what I can't get through my head-why these same people do not favor it for the Department of Defense and yet favor it for the Department of State. Dr. JOHNSON. Well, I can't speak for them. Mr. LANTAFF. I realize they are entirely different agencies; they have entirely different missions and functions, but no one, as yet, has explained to me the reason for the different type of approach here. Mr. MERSON. Mr. Lantaff, may I make a comment on that? I think the confusion here arises from the fact that what we seek to do is really to separate the foreign policy from the foreign operations. The State Department traditionally is a small-or should be a fairly small, compact, policymaking body. The Secretary of State, by the very nature of his responsibility in Government, the responsibility which he has in the Cabinet and decisions Mr. LANTAFF. May I ask you what you mean by "fairly small"? Mr. MERSON. Well, it's all relative. I realize Mr. LANTAFF. What is your idea of "fairly small"? Mr. MERSON. Well Mr. LANTAFF. After this reorganization should be approved, what would be your idea of a fairly small policymaking State Department? Mr. MERSON. Well, taking the International Information Administration and the TCA out of the State Department reduces it by at least nine-thousand-odd people in the information program. I don't know how many there are in MSA. Mr. LANTAFF. What you have in mind is a fairly small policymaking State Department-that is what I am talking about. Mr. MERSON. Well, the size Mr. LANTAFF. What do you mean by the use of the term? Mr. MERSON. The size it would have, relieved of the operational agencies it now has. Mr. LANTAFF. Well, that is not Mr. MERSON. I don't know how many people that would leave, Mr. Lantaff. Mr. LANTAFF. I—what I am talking about. You said it could be a fairly small department. Mr. MERSON. Yes. Mr. LANTAFF. I agree with you. Mr. MERSON. Well, in a relative sense. Mr. LANTAFF. What I am trying to get at is your idea of small. Mr. LANTAFF. Well, that is obvious. Dr. JOHNSON. There are about 22,000 now, aren't there, in the State Department, with all the various groups in there? Mr. LANTAFF. I think it is about twice that size. Dr. JOHNSON. I don't know. We are 9,000, I think, and I was told we are about 40 percent of the State Department. Mr. BENDER. Compared to the Defense Department, it is very small. Mr. LANTAFF. Oh, that is true, and the Department of Labor is very small compared to the Department of State. Mr. MERSON. Of course, I am out of my role, Mr. Lantaff, speaking about the size. Mr. LANTAFF. You realize if this organization goes through the State Department will have more people in it by some 200 bodies than it does today? Dr. JOHNSON. I don't see how that could be. Mr. LANTAFF. Isn't that the testimony? Mr. BROWNSON. That is correct, because they are taking over the educational group in information from the department which has been operating under the Fulbright scholarships. Dr. JOHNSON. But they are in the State Department now, sir. Mr. BENDER. Excuse we. Is there anyone in the room who can answer the question? Mr. STOKES. I think I can. |