The Diachronic Mind: An Essay on Personal Identity, Psychological Continuity and the Mind-Body Problemvii 1 ~OOUCTIONANOOVERVlliW 1 2 SEITING THE STAGE: PERSONAL IDENTITY ANO THE MErAPHYSICS OFMIND 1. Introduction 6 2. The Problem of Personal Identity over Time 7 3. The Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity over Time 12 4. The Neo-Lockean Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity 16 5. The Circularity Objection 19 6. Problems of Logical Form 21 7. The Lack of a Third-Person Criterion for Reidentification 23 8. The Unity of the Mental Bundle 25 9. The Individuation ofPersons 26 10. The Neo-Lockean Criterion and Physicalism: a 'Natural' Alliance 28 11. One 'Solution' to Five Problems 35 3 PARFIT'S REDUcrIO OF A SUBSTRATUM-ORIENTEO CONCEPfION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUlTY 43 1. Introduction 2. Relation R 45 51 3. Relation R and the Neo-Lockian Paradigm 4. Psychological Atomism 56 61 5. The Central Place of Q-Memory in the Neo-Lockean Paradigm 64 6. The Trouble with Q-memory 74 7. Contents and Contexts. The Other Four Problems 79 8. Conclusions 4 A CON1ENT-ORIENTEO CONCEPTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY 82 1. Introduction 83 2. Two Kinds of Psychological Continuity 91 3. Levels of N-Continuity 93 4. The Unity of N-Continuous Sequences. The Role of the Body 105 5. N-Continuity and Psychological Connectedness 109 6. Summary vi 5 A PSYCHOLOGICAL CRI1ERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY: THE AVE PROBLEMS REVISITED 1. Introduction 111 2. Circularity, Q-Memory, and N-Continuity 112 119 3. Narrativity and Logical Form 127 4. Third-Person Criteria of Reidentification: The Role of the Body 5. |
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allows anomalous monism argue ascribe basic narrative behaviour bodily continuity body body swap brain bundle theory causal connections causal efficacy causal relations cause characterisation claim coherence conceived conception of psychological constitute content-oriented conception criteria criterion of personal crucial Davidson Dennett diachronic holism distinct Eifel Tower eliminativism epiphenomenalism explain explananda explanatory function fact fission folk-psychology four features Hence idiosyncratic reasoning individual intelligible interpretation kind of psychological mental contents mental description mental events mentalistic multiple realisability N-continuity neo-Lockean paradigm nomological nonreductivism Noonan objective Parfit Parfitian perceptual contents person-stages personal identity philosophy of mind physical realisation physicalist possible practical reasoning predict presupposes problem psychological atomism psychological connectedness psychological context psychological continuity psychological criterion Q-memory qualitative similarity qualitatively identical recollection reidentification relevant role Section sense simply specific stage substrata substratum-oriented conception supervenience synchronic t₁ teletransportation temporally thesis third-person thought experiments token transitive relation unity of mind veridical memory