that technical question, and the supreme court have said that upon that class of questions, if there is a scintilla of evidence upon that technical question, they will not reverse the case. But I do not believe there is a judge upon the circuit bench of the state of Indiana that would sit up and under his oath affirm a case in which the verdict rendered was clearly and plainly against the evidence in the case. So that I say, for the credit of the bar of Indiana, for the reputation of the circuit judges of this state, and in the interests of justice, the right of trial by jury, which has been regarded as a mainstay in our liberties, may not be stricken down and that the lawyers of this state may not bring upon themselves the odium of any such result. I hope that this resolution will not pass. In fact, I am opposed to and I voted against the other resolution. I have reasons that I might suggest, but will refrain from doing so, why that resolution ought not to have passed, but I certainly feel in the interest of the reputation of this association and for the honor of the circuit judges of this state, and in the interest of the common people of this state, that this resolution ought not to be passed.

THE SECRETARY: Mr. President, I move to insert the word "civil" after the word "other," making the language read and "in other civil cases."

MR. E. P. HAMMOND: I second the motion.

THE PRESIDENT: The first vote will be upon the amendment as suggested by Mr. Moores.

MR. SMITH: I move to lay the whole proposition on the table.

The motion was duly seconded, and upon the vote the chair announced that the motion was carried. A division was called for, resulting in the section under consideration being laid upon the table by a vote of 24 ayes and 14 noes.

THE SECRETARY: Does not the laying of this part of the report on the table dispose of the whole report?

THE PRESIDENT: No, take up the next proposition, if there is any.

A MEMBER: Do I understand that we were voting on the proposition to lay the entire report on the table?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I held that that one proposition under consideration was laid on the table.

THE SECRETARY: Let me ask the question again. Can we either approve or reject the report while part of the report is on the table? THE PRESIDENT: The association decided to act upon the report of the committee in sections and it has the power to approve parts of it and reject parts of it. The laying of the section on the table. applies to that part of the report alone. What is the next proposition?

MR. MARSH: "We are of the opinion that our judges in all of our courts are inadequately compensated for their services, and believe that the salary of the supreme judges should not be less than $6,000 a year; of each of the appellate judges, not less than $5,000 a year, and of each circuit and superior judge, not less than $3,500 a year."

MR. TAYLOR: I move that that part of the report be adopted.
The motion was duly seconded.

MR. WILLIAM R. HOUGH: I am fully aware of the generous disposition of the members of the bar of Indiana, and how liberal they are with other people's money; but before we adopt the part of the committee's report now under consideration, I believe we ought to think for a moment upon the matter, and unless there appears to be a necessity for an increase in the salaries of our judges, in order to secure the services of suitable talent in the judicial branch of the state government, such increase ought not, in my opinion, to be recommended by this association. In view of the compensation which has been awarded to our judges in the past, and their present salaries, and the character, ability and efficiency of those who have been,

and of those who still are, willing to serve for the salaries fixed by the statute, I do not think that this part of the report should be adopted. The interests of the taxpayers should not be disregarded. And as has already been suggested by another, during the discussion on another part of the report, there ought not to go out from this meeting any ground for the suggestion that the interests of the common people, the masses of the taxpayers, are not of sufficient importance to be recognized by this body, or that we are seeking the enactment of legislative measures which will promote especially the interests of our profession.

In dealing with this matter I do not deem it improper, but entirely in order, to mention the fact that with the present salaries we have the leading members of the profession anxiously seeking these offices; and when such of them as have been successful in their aspirations, have served a term, they are, at the expiration of the same, almost without exception, early in the race working in season. and out for the nomination for another term. Our judiciary is composed of men who are competent for the places they fill. We would not for a moment entertain a suggestion that they are not; and yet, we know, that as a rule, candidates for judgeships are so anxious to obtain their nominations, in the first instance, that they will engage rooms in the best hotels in the cities in which the nominating conventions are held, and have their friends come up in force, days in advance of the time fixed for the interesting event, and labor early and late in order to secure the coveted prize. And we further know how these same patriots, having learned how sweet and glorious it is to serve, if not to die for, one's country, on a satisfactory salary, as the end of their terms of office approach, do cheerfully and unselfishly employ the same methods as in the first instance to have themselves again placed upon the sacrificial altar.

Now, I submit that when new legislation is asked on a given subject, those who ask for the same ought to be able to point out some

evil to be remedied thereby, or some needed benefit that can not otherwise be supplied. And can it be truthfully said that there exists an evil that would be remedied, or a benefit to the people that would be provided for by the proposed legislation? As long as there are well qualified men in these offices, and many others of equal fitness who are anxiously seeking to be honored with the same whenever vacancies occur, or are likely to occur therein, at the present salaries, how can there be any necessity for an increase in order to secure to the public the services it ought to have? Remember that taxes are high; that everything is tending to the upper story; that the men who work for their daily bread and who are already wearied by the burden of overtaxation, are restive on account of extravagance in the use of the public moneys. Whether they are always right or not, we know that the feeling exists.

By way of reminiscence, I may say that I can remember when there were seven counties in the circuit of which the county in which I reside was a part. Judge Buckles was then upon the bench. He served for a salary of $1,500 per annum, and we never questioned his ability or his honor. He filled the place with credit. This was before the court of common pleas was abolished, and the common pleas district, of which my county was a part, comprised five counties, and the salary of the judge of this court was $1,000 a year. At the present time my county, which is about an average county of the state, in wealth and population, constitutes a circuit. of itself; and our judge, like other circuit judges in the state, receives a salary of $2,500 a year, which equals in amount the salaries of both the circuit and common pleas judges at the time I have first mentioned. He receives for doing the business in one county what the former two judges received for doing the business in not less than five counties. And this case is similar to those in other circuits in the major portion of the state. And I am of the opinion that you will all agree with me that it is no disparagement to the

present occupants of the bench to say that our former judges, with their lower salaries, were in every respect the equals of their successors. So, too, in regard to the supreme court. Without naming all of the many eminent and honorable men who, with distinguished ability and efficiency, performed the duties of that court in former years, can it be said that the increase of salary of the judges which has been made from time to time has secured the services of a class of jurists superior to Judges Worden, Frazer, the two Elliotts, Howk, Mitchell, Woods, etc., who served for salaries of $4,000, or less? And we should not forget that during the greater part of the time, these former judges performed all of the work of our, then, only court of last resort. We have since increased the salaries of our supreme judges to $4,500 a year, and have given them, in addition, the aid of the appellate court, which is supposed to do about one-half the work which otherwise would have to be performed by the supreme court. The members of this new court receive a salary of $3,500 each. And we now have two courts of appellate jurisdiction, at an annual expense of $40,000 for salaries, to transact the business which was formerly done by one court at an annual expense, for salaries, of only $20,000. Under all these circumstances it does seem to me that there is no necessity for such legislation as is recommended by that part of the committee's report, now being considered.

As before intimated, there has never been a dearth of candidates for the judicial nominations at any of the conventions of either of the leading parties of the state. On the other hand, there has always been a crowd and a hot fight for the favor of being named. I believe that we have as good talent now on the bench, in all our courts, as we would have in the future in case the salaries of the judges should be increased, as recommended by the committee's report, and, therefore, I fail to see any necessity for such an increase. There is no reason for it, and unless there be a good reason