PUBLICATIONS Printed by Order of THE SOCIETY FOR PRESERVING LIBERTY AND PROPERTY AGAINST REPUBLICANS AND LEVELLERS. NUMBER VIII. CONTAINING, The Advantages peculiar to a Monarchy, and the English Conftitution. By M. De Lolme-Judge Buller's Charge to the Grand Jury of the County of York, at the Lent Affizes 1793. Printed and Sold by J. DOWNES, No. 240, Strand, near Temple-Bar; where the Bookfellers in Town andCountry may be ferved with any quantity. PRICE ONE PENNY. THE ADVANTAGES PECULIAR TO A MONARCHY, AND THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. BY M. DE LOL ME. THE firft peculiarity of the English Government, as a free Government, is its having a King,-its having thrown into one place the whole mafs, if I may use the expreffion, A of of the Executive Power, and having invariably and for ever fixed it there. By this very circumftance, alfo, has the depofitum of it been rendered facred and inexpugnable; by making one great, very great, Man in the State, has an effectual check been put to the pretenfions of those who otherwife would ftrive to become fuch; and diforders have been prevented, which, in all Republics, ever brought on the ruin of liberty; and before it was loft, obstructed the enjoyment of it. If we caft our eyes on all the States that ever were free, we shall see that the People in them, ever turning their jealoufy, as it was natural, against the Executive Power, but never thinking of the means of limiting it that have fo happily taken place in England, have never employed any other expedient befides that obvious one, of trufting that power to Magiftrates whom they appointed annually; which was in a great meafure to keep to themfelves the management of it, et In a State which is fmall and poor, an arrangement of this kind is not attended with any great inconveniences, as every individual is taken up with the care of providing for his own fubfiftence; as great objects of ambition are wanting, and as evils cannot, in fuch a State, ever become much complicated. In a State that ftrives for aggrandifement, the difficulties and danger attending the purfuit of fuch plan, infpire a general spirit of caution, and every individual makes a fober use of his rights as a Citizen. But when, at laft, thofe exterior motives come to cease, and the paffions, and even the virtues, which they excited, thus become reduced to a ftate of inaction, the People turn their eyes back toward the interior of the Republic; and every individual, in feeking then to concern himfelf in all affairs, feeks for new objects that may restore him to that ftate of exertion, which-habit, he finds, has rendered neceffary to him, and to exercise a power which, fmall as it is, yet flatters his vanity. As the preceding events cannot have given an influence to a certain number of Citizens, they avail themselves of the general difpofition of the People, to promote their The rendering that power dependent on the People for its fupplies. private private views; the legislative power is thenceforth continually in motion; and as it is ill informed and falfely directed, almoft every exertion of it is attended with some injury either to the laws, or the State. This is not all; as those who compofe the General Affemblies cannot, in confequence of their numbers, entertain any hopes of gratifying their private ambition, or, in general, their private paffions, they at least feek to gratify their political caprices, and they accumulate the honours and dignities of the State on fome favourite, whom the public voice happens to raise at that time. But as in fuch a State there can be, from the irregularity of the determinations of the People, no fuch thing as a fettled courfe of measures, it happens that Men never can exactly tell the prefent state of public affairs. The power thus given away is already grown very great, before thofe by whom it was given fo much as fufpect it; and he himself who enjoys that power, does not know its full extent: but then, on the firft opportunity that offers, he fuddenly pierces through the cloud which hid the fummit from him, and at once feats himself upon it. The People, on the other hand, no fooner recover fight of him than they fee their favourite become their Mafter; and discover the evil only to find that it is past remedy. As this power, thus furreptitiously acquired, is deftitute of the fupport both of the law, and of the antient course of things, and is even but indifferently refpected by those who have fubjected themselves to it, it cannot be maintained but by abufing it. The People at last fucceed in forming fomewhere a centre of union; they agree in the choice of a Leader; this Leader in his turn rifes; in his turn alfo he betrays his engagements; power produces its wonted effects, and the Protector becomes a Tyrant. This is not all; the fame caufes which have given a Mafter to the State, give it two, give it three. All thofe rival powers endeavour to fwallow up each other; the State becomes a fcene of quarrels and endlefs broils, and is in a continual convulfion. If amidst fuch diforders the People retained their freedom, the evil muft indeed be very great, to take away all the advantages of it; but they are flaves, and yet have not what in other countries makes amends for political fervitude, I mean tranquillity. In order to prove all these things, if proofs were deemed neceffary, I would only refer the reader to what every one knows of Pififtratus and Megacles, of Marius and Sylla, Cæfar and Pompey. However, I cannot avoid tranflating a part of the fpeech which a Citizen of Florence addreffed once to the Senate: the reader will find in it a kind of abridged story of all Republics; at least of those which, by the fhare allowed to the People in the Government, deferved that name; and which befides, have attained a certain degree of extent and power. "And that nothing human may be perpetual and stable, "it is the will of Heaven, that in all States whatsoever, "there should arife certain deftructive families, who are the "bane and ruin of them. Of this our Republic can afford "as many and more deplorable examples than any other, "as it owes its misfortunes not only to one, but to se"veral of fuch families. We had at firft the Buondelmonti " and the Hube ti. We had afterwards the Donati and "the Cerchi; and at present (fhameful and ridiculous "conduct) we are waging war among ourselves for the Ricci and the Albizzi." "When in former times the Ghibelins were fuppreffed, "every one expected that the Guelfs, being then fatis"fied, would have chofen to live in tranquillity; yet, but "a little time had elapfed, when they again divided "themselves into the factions of the Whites and the Blacks. "When the Whites were fuppreffed, new parties arose and new troubles followed. Sometimes battles were fought "in favour of the Exiles; and at other times, quarrels broke out between the Nobility and the People. And, ་་ as if refolved to give away to others what we ourselves "neither knew, nor would peaceably enjoy, we com"mitted the care of our liberty, at fome times to King Robert, and at others to his brother, and at length to "the Duke of Athens; never fettling nor refting in any kind of Government, as not knowing either how to enjoy liberty or fupport fervitude ." The English Conftitution has prevented the poffibility of misfortunes of this kind. Not only, by diminishing the power, or rather the actual exercife of the power, of the People, and making them fhare in the Legislature See the Hiftory of Florence, by Machiavel, L. III. only 4 |