ASYLUM FROM PURSUIT.

Lord Salisbury to Mr. White.

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 8, 1898.

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SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 1st instant, in which you invite my good offices with a view of obtaining the consent of Her Majesty's Government to the departure from Falmouth, where she has been stored since the outbreak of the war, of the United States torpedo boat Somers. You add that you are instructed by the United States Government to give an assurance that in the event of hostilities being resumed with Spain, which would now appear to be highly improbable, the Somers will not be made use of.

In view of this assurance I have the honor to state that Her Majesty's Government are glad to comply with your request, and that the necessary instructions will at once be sent to the proper authorities in order to facilitate the departure of the vessel.

I have, etc.,

(For the Marquis of Salisbury.)

(United States Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 1006.)

F. H. VILLIERS,

Asylum to vessels pursued by enemy.-Galiani (Dei doveri dei principi neutrali, I, cap. X, §4) maintains that asylum can be afforded to a ship pursued into neutral waters by an enemy only on condition that it practically be interned for the remainder of the war.

Gessner opposes this position of Galiani (Le Droit des neutres, p. 78). Perels follows Gessner, maintaining that even in a case where entrance to neutral waters is forbidden to a belligerent ship the position of Galiani is not justifiable, because the prohibition ought to hold only against voluntary and not against forced entrance. (Seerecht, section 39, II, a.)

Fiore (Droit International, III, p. 476) maintains that it seems that there should be a difference made between ships of war of the belligerents which are forced by the elements to make an entrance and those which seek the port as a refuge to escape pursuit by a victorious enemy about to capture or to sink them. In the first case, according to the usages of international law, the neutral state ought not to disarm the ship nor to prevent it from again taking part in the hostilities; but the second case is altogether exceptional, since the victor may be deprived of his prey through the protection afforded. This is without question an act of humanity, but if the belligerent can not continue his attack upon his opponent

in territorial waters, he should not be allowed to obtain safety and after making repairs to return to the combat. The refugee would thus obtain the protection of the neutral not only to escape the superior victorious force, but also to put himself again in condition for battle. Following this line of reasoning, Fiore concludes that the duties of humanity should be reconciled with the exigencies of war by preventing the belligerent ship from taking further part in the war, by retaining it in port, after disarming, or by allowing it to depart only after obtaining the word of the commander not to take any part during the remainder of the war.

The question of asylum to belligerent vessels in time of war in neutral ports was fully considered by the Institute of International Law in 1898. The report of the Institute recognized the difference between forces upon the sea and those upon land, due to natural conditions, which made it impossible to obtain supplies, fuel, repairs, etc., with the same facility as upon land, and also recognized the special dangers from the natural elements, as from stress of weather. The Institute in its discussions recognized the propriety of admitting belligerent vessels to neutral ports in time of war upon such grounds as might be regarded broadly as grounds of humanity. An admission to neutral ports under such conditions, for such specific purposes, limiting supplies, etc., to those absolutely necessary, and the duration of sojourn to period likewise absolutely necessary, would be no violation of neutrality, nor would it make the neutral port a base of military operations. It was held that such action of the neutral was not military in its nature and did not necessarily affect the issue of the conflict or modify the relations of the belligerent.

On the other hand, the admission to a neutral port of a belligerent ship pursued by its opponent and unable or even unwilling to meet its pursuer is to put the pursued ship beyond the reach of the other belligerent even more effectively than might have been the case had she entered one of her home ports. Such action may directly influ

OPINION OF INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 91

ence the issue of the war. Yet, in the first place it is admittedly impossible for the neutral in every instance to prevent the entrance of a vessel thus pursued, and in the second place the neutral may not allow any combat within neutral jurisdiction.

If the neutral allows the belligerent vessel fleeing from its opponent to find refuge in its neutral port for a time and then to go forth to meet the enemy, the neutral in effect makes the port a base of operations. The fleeing belligerent may in many instances within the twenty-four hour period summon and receive such reenforcement that when she again goes forth she may join with other of the forces of State X sufficient to secure her own safety or to threaten the force of the United States. In many other ways the twenty-four hour sojourn may be a decided or even a decisive military advantage. It is evident in this situation that the vessel of State X entered the port of Y from overwhelming military reasons. The vessel entered to escape capture or destruction by the enemy. To afford shelter under such circumstances and to allow the vessel to again set forth from the neutral port upon a military expedition is to act as an ally of State X.

In order that the neutral may not violate neutrality and in order that the pursuing belligerent may not be deprived of some of the rewards of his effort to place his enemy beyond the power of further contest, there seems to be a single line of approved conduct, viz, to intern the belligerent vessel coming within neutral jurisdiction in order to escape capture by a pursuing enemy.

Kleen, in La Neutralité, 1898, Volume I, on page 533, says:

Donc, un naivre de guerre fuyant devant l'ennemi et réfugié dans un port neutre, y est traité à l'instar des fuyards de la guerre continentale, c'est-àdire désarmé et interné après avoir joui des soins humanitaires; tandis qu'au contraire, le naivre entré en disette ou détresse proprement dite peut et doit quitter le port et mettre au large aussitôt qu'il est hors de danger.

Opinion of the Institute of International Law.-Kleen was also instrumental in drawing up the rules adopted by the

Institute of International Law in 1898. These were unanimously adopted, as follows:

(Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International, XVII, 1898, Session de la Haye, page 285.)

Art. 42 La concession d'asile aux belligérants dans les ports neutres, tout en dépendant de la décision de l'État souverain du port et ne pouvant être exigée, est presumée, à moins de notification contraire préalablement communiquée.

Toutefois, quant aux navires de guerre, elle doit être limitée aux cas de véritable détresse, par suite de: (1o) Défaite, maladie ou équipage insuffisant, (2o) péril de mer, (3o) manque des moyens d'existence ou de locomotion (eau, charbon, vivres), (4o) besoin de réparation.

Un navire bélligérant se réfugiant dans un port neutre devant la poursuite de l'énnemi, ou après avoir été défait par lui, ou faute d'équipage pour tenir la mer, doit y rester jusqu'à la fin de la guerre. Il en est de même s'il y transporte des malades ou des blessés, et qu'après les avoir débarqués, il soit en état de combattre. Les malades et les blésses, tout en étant reçus et secourus, sont, après guérison, internés également, à moins d'être reconnus impropres au service militaire.

Un refuge contre un péril de mer n'est donné aux navires de guerre des belligérants que pour la durée du danger. On ne leur fournit de l'eau, du charbon, des vivres et autres approvisionnements analogues qu'en la quantité nécessaire pour atteindre le port national le plus proche. Les réparations ne sont permis que dans la mesure nécessaire pour que le bâtiment puisse tenir la mer. Immédiatement après, le navire doit quitter le port et les eaux neutres.

Si deux navires ennemis sont prêts à sortir d'un port neutre simultanément, l'autorité locale établit, entre leurs appareillage, un intervalle suffisant de vingt-quatre heures au moins. Le droit de sortir le premier appartient au navire le premier entré, ou, s'il ne veut pas en user, à l'autre, a la charge d'en réclamer l'éxercice à l'autorité locale, qui lui délivre l'autorisation si l'adversaire, dûment avisé, persiste à rester. Si, à la sortie du navire d'un belligérant, un ou plusieurs navires ennemis sont signalés, le navire sortant doit être averti et peut être réadmis dans le port pour y attendre l'entrée ou la disparition des autres. Il est défendu d'aller à la rencontre d'un navire ennemi dans le port ou les eaux neutres.

Les navires des billigerants doivent, en port neutre, se conduire pacifiquement, obéir aux ordres des autorités, s'abstenir de toutes hostilités, de toute prise de renfort et de tout recrutement militaire, de tout espionnage et de tout emploi du port comme base d'opération.

Les autorités neutres font respecter, au besoin par la force, les prescriptions de cet article.

L'État neutre peut exiger une indemnité de l'État belligérant dont il a entretenu soit des forces légalement internées, soit des malades et blessés, ou dont les navires ont, pas mégarde ou par infraction à l'ordre du port, occasionné des frais ou dommage.

INTERNMENT IN RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

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Internment in Russo-Japanese War.-On August 10, 1904, the Czarevitch, a Russian battle ship, accompanied by destroyers, pursued by a Japanese fleet, sought shelter in the port of Tsingtau, and the German authorities interned the vessels. Certain other Russian vessels were interned at British ports in which they sought shelter. The Russian transport Lena received like treatment by the United States at San Francisco.

Conclusion.-(a) From the point of view of both theory and practice it would seem that the United States commander, under the circumstances as stated in the situation, would be justified in claiming that belligerent vessels entering and remaining in the neutral port in order to escape capture by his vessels, should be interned for the remaining period of the war.

(b) The authorities of State Y would also be under obligations to intern the vessels of State X thus seeking neutral protection.