tion), ratified by the United States in 1902, provides for the internment of the belligerent troops as follows:

Article LVII. A neutral state which receives in its territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies shall intern them, as far as possible, at a distance from the theater of war.

It can keep them in camps, and even confine them in fortresses or locations assigned for this purpose.

It shall decide whether officers may be left at liberty on giving their parole that they will not leave the neutral territory without authorization. Article LVIII. Failing a special Convention, the neutral State shall supply the interned with the food, clothing, and relief required by humanity.

At the conclusion of peace, the expenses caused by the internment shall be made good.

Article LIX. A neutral State may authorize the passage through its territory of wounded or sick belonging to the belligerent armies, on condition that the trains bringing them shall carry neither combatants nor war material. In such case, the neutral State is bound to adopt such measures of safety and control as may be necessary for the purpose.

Wounded and sick brought under these conditions into neutral territory by one of the belligerents, and belonging to the hostile party, must be guarded by the neutral State, so as to insure their not taking part again in the military operations. The same duty shall devolve on the neutral State with regard to wounded or sick of the other army who may be committed to its care.

Article LX. The Geneva Convention applies to sick and wounded interned in neutral territory.

If the crews of the abandoned war vessels of State X had gone to the shore of State Y as a portion of the military force of State X they would have been interned during the remainder of the war, according to the provisions of the Hague Convention, to which most of the States of the world are parties; or, even if not a party to the convention, State Y would intern them, in accord with the general international practice.

Effect of going on board public vessels.-In going on board of the war vessels of States A, B, and C, the crews of the vessels of State X practically enter the jurisdiction of States A, B, and C. Upon these war vessels of States A, B, and C no other State would claim any jurisdiction unless the peace of the port or the safety of the State was threatened, and even then action would ordinarily extend only to expelling the vessel from the port. Hence neither Y nor the United States would interfere.

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As the crews of the abandoned vessels have, by entering the war vessels of States, A, B, and C, entered within the jurisdiction of those States, it may be presumed that they will observe their international obligations. It would not be incumbent upon the commander of the United States war vessel to inform the other commanders as to their obligations or to make claims. He might with propriety confer with them in regard to the disposition of the crews in question and indicate the line of conduct that he thought to be proper.

Chino-Japanese war of 1894-95.-During the ChinoJapanese war of 1894-95, certain neutral war ships rescued Chinese soldiers in Korean waters. Of these acts Takahashi says:

As already mentioned, the French war ship Lion brought 45 Chinese soldiers to Chemulpo, and a German war ship sent back 120 Chinese soldiers from the islands in the Korean waters to Tientsin. The action of the French man-of-war was very humane in rescuing the Chinese, who were clinging to the masts of the sunken ship, but the act of the German vessel was not admissible from a legal point of view. The Chinese who were on the islands in the Korean waters were not in danger of their lives; on the other hand, it was said that they were displaying their usual lawlessness in plundering the villages of the island. They belonged to the crack regiment of the Chinese army, and it might be expected that they would serve again as soldiers. To send back these soldiers to China was nothing but giving assistance to one of the belligerents. By the law of nations, any belligerent can release prisoners on exacting an oath that they will not take arms again. But there is no precedent for a neutral restoring soldiers to one belligerent without taking the trouble to exact such an oath from them. (International Law during the Chino-Japanese war, p. 51.)

Takahashi admits that the soldiers might have been paroled, but denies the right of a neutral war vessel to restore them.

Chemulpo affair, 1904.-The case of the rescue of the officers and crews of the Russian ships Variag and Korietz in the harbor of Chemulpo, in the Russo-Japanese war affords a valuable precedent. The accounts of the circumstances vary somewhat (Lawrence 67, War and Neutrality in the Far East), but the following seems to be the course of events:

Japan severed her diplomatic relations with Russia on February 6, 1904.

On February 8th Admiral Uriu, of the Japanese navy, demanded of the senior Russian naval officer that he leave with the forces under his command the harbor of Chemulpo before noon of the 9th of February. In case of failure to comply with the demand, Admiral Uriu threatened attack upon the Russians. Admiral Uriu cautioned neutral vessels to keep clear of the field of possible action.

Earlier in the day the Russian gunboat, Korietz, had started for Port Arthur from Chemulpo, but seeing the Japanese vessels approaching, had returned to Chemulpo. It appears that by midnight of February 8th the Japanese forces, which had been landed, were in effective possession of Chemulpo. Early in the morning of the 9th the Japanese war vessels steamed out beyond the harbor. Before noon the Russian vessels, Variag and Korietz, started out. Before 1 o'clock these vessels, after a brief engagement, returned to the harbor of Chemulpo. The Variag was abandoned and sank during the afternoon. Boats from neutral war vessels in port received the personnel of the Variag and put them on board the British war vessel Talbot and the Italian war vessel Elba. The crew from the Russian war vessel Korietz, which seems not to have been injured in the engagement, later left that vessel in their own boats and went on board the French war vessel Pascal. Shortly afterwards, the Korietz blew up. The crew of a merchant vessel under the Russian flag, after setting fire to their vessel, also sought refuge in the Pascal.

While it has been claimed that the Japanese admiral demanded the Russian refugees as prisoners of war, the following is, upon good authority, asserted to be the fact:

The admiral in command of the Imperial Japanese fleet at Chemulpo did not make any demand for surrender to him of the Russian officers and men rescued from the sunken ships Variag and Korietz.

The survivors of the above-mentioned ships were temporarily taken on board the French man-of-war Pascal, British man-of-war Talbot, and Italian man-of-war Elba, but the representatives of France, Great Britain, and Italy at Seoul, having asked the views of the Japanese representative there in regard to the mode of sending back the said Russians, the Imperial Government instructed their representative to consent to the proposition on the following conditions:

(1) That the survivors of the Russian ships would be sent to Shanghai.

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(2) That the Russian Government would give assurance that the said survivors would not be allowed to go to any place north of Shanghai.

The French representative addressed an official note to the Japanese representative, transmitting therewith a list of the names of the Russian survivors, signed by the captain of the Pascal, and giving assurance that the captain of the said vessel would not hand over the Russians to the authorities of other countries unless he obtained a guarantee from the said authorities to the effect that they would never be allowed to again take part in any act of hostilities. Thereupon the Pascal was permitted to sail for Shanghai with 8 officers and 39 petty officers and men from the Variag and 9 officers and 160 petty officers and men from the Korietz on board.

The British representative also addressed an official note, transmitting therewith a list of the names of the Russian survivors, signed by the captain of the Talbot, declaring that until the cessation of hostilities they would be detained within the British dominions. Thereupon the British ship Amphitrite was permitted to sail for Hongkong with the chief executive officer and other officers and men from the Variag on board, altogether numbering 275.

The Italian representative addressed an official note to the Japanese representative, transmitting therewith a list of the Russian survivors, stating that they would be taken to Shanghai and there instructions from the Italian Government as to the disposition of these men would be asked. Thereupon the Italian man-of-war Elba was permitted to leave for Shanghai with 7 officers and 174 petty officers and men from the Variag.

This recent example is in accord with the general principles governing in analogous cases.

Kleen's opinion.--Kleen gives a conclusion also which would support the action of the neutral war vessels. He says:

Particulièrement difficle est la question de savoir comment traiter des fuyards trouvés par des navires neutres sur mer (sur des îles, des débris, etc.). Une distinction essentielle semble devoir être faite selon qu'il y a, ou non, danger de mort. Dans le premier cas, et quand même les fuyards ne seraient ni blessés ni malades, ils se trouvent dans une situation analogue à de tels, plutôt qu'à celle de simples fuyards sur les territoires et dans les ports, puisqu'ils sont entre la vie et la mort et exposés à la perte à moins d'être secourus. A défaut de stipulation positive, il semble done juste de les traiter d'apres les dispositions de la Convention de La Haye du 29 juillet 1899 (art. 6, 8 et 10), assurant la protection des naivres transportants, et des naufragés, blessés et malades, à condition de garanties contre leur rentrée dans la même guerre comme combattants. Si au contraire les fuyards recontr ́s sur mer sont hors de danger de mort, la question de savoir si l'humanité exige de donner suite à leurs réclamations de secours, peut dépendre du degré de détresse où ils se trouvent. S'ils sont ramassés par un naivre de guerre neutre ou en haute mer, ils sont placés dans la même situation juridique que des fuyards entrés sur un terri

toire neutre, sujets à l'internement. Que si celui-ci était impossible à cause de l'éloignement de l'État du naivre, ils peuvent être remis à l'État convenable le plus proche avec des garanties contre leur rentrée au service belligérant. Si c'est dans des eaux territoriales et par un naivre neutre marchand qu'ils sont reçus, ce naivre doit les remettre à l'État territorial, à moins que cela n'implique un service de transport interdit pour le compte d'un belligérant, et cet État agira comme envers des fuyards entrés sur son territoire. (Kleen. La Neutralite. Vol. II, p. 32.)

Conclusions. As these crews enter upon the vessels of States A, B, and C, those states become officially responsible for their treatment. The practice is such that had they gone ashore in the harbor by putting themselves under the jurisdiction of State Y, they would have been interned. By going on board of the war vessels of States A, B, and C, they put themselves under the jurisdiction of those states and should be interned or otherwise disposed in such manner that they would not again participate in hostilities during the remainder of the war.

It may be said, therefore, that

(a) The claim of the United States commander was not justifiable, as he had not captured the vessels of State X and could exercise no jurisdiction within the port of neutral State X or upon the neutral war vessels belonging to States A, B, and C.

(b) The proper adjustment of the case under consideration would be the internment of the rescued seamen or other disposition by which they should not again take part in the war.

It may be noted that this case particularly shows the need for further agreement upon the rules of maritime warfare.