to fantry, but he haftened perfonally, and with apparent hazard, chaftife and restrain the blind and cruel fury of the cavalry; five of whom are faid to have fallen by his own haud in that generous exertion. The flaughter was, however, great in the first infta ce; but as foon as it was effectually reftrained, Lally, as if it were entirely to perfect what he had fo happily begun, prevailed upon Tip, oo Saib to commit the prifoner to his own charge; and the kindness and tendernefs which they continued to experience from him, particularly the officers and wounded, fully equalled his generosity and humanity in the field. Many gallant British officers fell in this unfortunate affair; and of the whole number who were in the field, only one efcaped being wounded. They loft every thing but their honour; and were fill doomed to fuffer the miferies of a long and cruel imprisonment at Seringapatam, Hyder's capital in the Myfore kingdom. This unfortunate ftroke on the Coleroon, could not but totally difconcert Sir Eyre Coote's plan for the conduct of the campaign. All the countries to the fouthward were now laid entirely open to the defigns of the enemy; whilft Hyder, with his grand army, clofely watched the motions, and was powerfully prepared to obfruct the defigns of the Engl fh general, on the northern fide, who was already moft unfortunately cramped in his operations through thofe circumftances which we have before ftated. In this ftate of imbecility or contraint on the one fide, and of active power on the other, the French forces and ar tillery from the islands, under the immediate conduct of M. Duchemin, (being the first divifion of that great force, under the Marquis de Buffy, which was intended for the fubverfion of the English power in India) were, in the courie of the month of March, difembarked by Suffrein at Pondicherry. Thefe being received or joined by a body of Hyder's forces, the combined enemy marched in full confidence and fecurity to befiege Cuddalore; a place of fufficient ftrength and of great importance; but not expecting a fiege, and being, through that, and the unfavourable circumftances of the times, unprovided for any length of defence, Captain Hughes, the commandant, obliged to furrender it by capitulation on the 8th of pril. Thus aflured by fuccefs, and encouraged by having no enemy to op pole them in the field, as well as by the weak and unprovided ftate of the garrifons, they advanced to the nor hward, where they befieged and took Permacoil; and then, in concert with Hyder, were directing their views to a joint attack up n Vandiwath. was Thefe unexpected loffes, and this new danger, were not neceffary to quicken Sir Eyre Coote in his endeavours to put the army in motion. Vandiwah was indeed of fuch great importance, that a lefs active and vigilant commander, could have left no means unfought, nor refource untried for its prefervation. He accordingly advanced with the army towards that place, in full confidence that Hyder, being now ftrengthened by fo powerful an aid of Europeans, would he no ways ways averse to a general action, or indeed that he would rather be pleafed with fo early an opportunity of trying, and of benefiting by their energy: at all events, he concluded that he would fooner fight, than relinquith an object, which he had to mach at heat and which was of fo much real confequence as the taking of Vanuwath e ound himself, however, mistaken in ad his conclufions, well founded, as they certainly were; and it foon appeared, that the prefence even of his European allies, was not fufficient to refiore Hyder's confidence in the iffue of a field battle with the Ergh The protection of Vandiwafh was not, however fufficient to fatisfy the British general; and as his pofition there was too advantageous to encourage Hyder's approach, he determined to feek him upon his own ground; ftill concluding, that the difgrace of retiring from fo inferior a force under the eyes of ftrangers, who were themselves his allies, eminent for their own military abilities, and already prepoffeffed, through the greatnefs of his name, in an opinion of his fuperior prowess in war, together fense of the impreflion which fo fhameful a retreat would make upon all the other tates of India, and even upon his own fabjects and forces, would inevitably induce Hyder to ftand the hazard of a battle; and that even though the measure fhould be contrary to his own opinion, he would notwithstanding be forced to give way to the united operation, of fo many powerful concurrent motives. In this opinion, with a an he pushed on two days march directly to yder's camp. But that wary prince was not to be overruled or guided in his conduct, by any regard to appearances, or to the opinions of others. He fubmitted without hefitation to the fuppofed difgrace, and took care to fall back in good time, without at all waiting for fo near approach of the British army as could by any means enable them to difturb his retreat; and diresting his courie to the Red Hills, be there took a pofition of fuch ftrength, a he well knew would deter an able and expetienced general, from all attempt upon an army of fuch magnitude as he commanded. It is perhaps among the diftinguithing features of great talents, and is undoubtedly highly neceffary in military affairs, not to truft fo much to them, as to venture upon mea ures of great imp rtance, and capable of much danger in their confequences, without full confultation and advice. This was at least a leading part of Sir Eyre Coote's character. He held a council of war, and having communicated all the intelligence he poffeffed to his officers, he then laid before them his own ideas, and the plan he had thereupon framed, in order to draw the enemy from his prefent ftrong poft, and thereby to obtain an opportunity of bringing him to action. Hyder's great magazines were depofited in the ftrong fortress of Arnee, and the general fuggefted, that a movedent towards that place, would not only be a means of effectually checking his fupplies, but would alarm him fo much for its fafety tha' that on both accounts, he probably would be led to defcend from his prefent pofition on the hills. The general's propofal being unanimously approved of in the council of war, he directed his courfe towards Arnee, and encamped within five miles of that place. This judicious movement, immediately produced the intended effect, by drawing Hyder down from the hills, who marched with the utmost expedition to the rescue of a place which contained the means of carrying on the war. This movement, however, continued unknown to the general, until a little before day, at the very moment that the army was commencing its five mile march to Arnee; and this intelligence rendered it then a matter of deliberation, whether he should fill proceed to that place, or advance to meet Hyder, and fight him on the way? Hle determined on the former, as the moft certain means of bringing the enemy to action; for it Hyder found that he could fave the place, by drawing the English army away from its pofition, he then would have been under no neceffity of rifquing a battle, which was decision that he evidently had no difpofition to appeal to, while it could be avoided without fome fignal lofs. a It was not the leaft of the many great difficulties which the Britifh general had to encounter in this war, that the vaft crowds of Hyder's cavalry, which confiantly attended and watched all the fmallett movements of the army, covering as it were the whole face of the adjoining country, ren dered it almoft impofi'le to ob tain any precife information of the motions or fituation of his main body; nor could the evolutions or approach of the former, which they were endless in the repetition of, be confidered as the fmalleft indication either of his distance or defigns. The van of the army had already reached Arnee, and were marking out a camp in fight of the place, when a diftant cannonade on the rear, announced to the general Hyder's fudden approach, who was till then fuppofed to be at feveral miles diftance. This furprize, however, produced no manner of diforder, although their arrival at that critical juncture afforded great advantages to the enemy in their attack; for the army was in a low fituation furrounded by commanding grounds, which Hyder's forces inftantly took poffeffion of ; fo that their manoeuvres were performed under every poffible difadvantage in that refpect, and they were expofed to a heavy though diftant cannonade during the time they were forming. Thefe difficulties and disadvantages by no means difconcerted the general, who ufed the utmost difpatch, and difplayed all his ufual ability, in making fách dif pofitions, and adopting fuch meafures, as would the moft fpeedily remove or remedy them, and might, in their effect, tend to bring the enemy to close and decifive action. It was notwithstanding June 2d, near mid-day, before he 1782. could reduce the enemy's various attacks to one fettled point of action; but as foon as that tish troops advanced upon them with fuch refiftlefs impetuofity, that Hyder's army gave way on every fide. A total rout enfued, and the enemy were purfued till late in the evening. that was accomplished, the Bri- and fervice, and fpeedily fit for fresh action. It is not lefs remarkable, nor worthy of obfer. vation, that, although before Hyder's time, the furprize of Indian camps at night by Europeans. and the ever confequent deftruction of their armies, were among the common incidents of warfare: yet, that fo wonderful was the change which he introduced in the government of armies, and fo ad. mirable the measures with respect to guards and the establishment of pofts, that in all the courfe of his wars with the English, though op: pofed by fome of the moft enterprizing officers in the world, and by commanders of firft rate abilities, no camp of his was ever furprized by night or by day. Nor will this appear the lefs extraordinary when we recollect, that fome of the greatest generals and beft armies, even in Europe, have not at all times been exempt from fuch misfortunes. The want of cavalry on the British fide, and the fuperabundance of it on the other, prevented victory from producing any of its grand effects in this war, whether with respect to the deftruction of men, the taking of prifoners and artillery, or the total difperfion and ruin of the enemy's army. It is however a matter peculiarly worthy of obfervation, and although Hyder's tried and veteran fepoys and grenadiers, who once would not have dreaded the encounter of any enemy whatever, had long fince been worn out and confumed in this war, yet that fuch were the effects of his own great military talents, and of the remains of that admirable order and difcipline which he had been fo many years eftablishing, that even the fort of troops which he now commanded, though incapable of long ftanding the brunt of clofe and fevere action with the English fepoys, yet they were, in all circumftances, ftill obedient to command, and foon recovered their order; never once being guilty of that thameful dereliction of their commanders, and irretrievable difperfion, which, before his time, had been the conftant concomitants of defeat in Indian armies. When Hyder's army was beat, whatever the lofs, or however great the defeat, it was ftill beaten like an European army; and, like that, was easily recalled to order en On the day after the battle, Sir Eyre Coote having obtained intelligence, that Hyder was camped upon fuch ftrong ground, as might encourage him to ftand another action, and feemed to be chofen for that purpose, he again advanced upon him. But, upon his coming up, he found the enemy retreating with great precipitation, although the approaches to his encampment were fo difficult that they might be difputed with much advantage. The purfuit was continued on the following day, until it was found that the enemy had quitted the road, and croffed the country towards Arnee. But however Hyder might be defeated, and obliged to fly, he ftill remained unconquered; and and was ever formidable and dangerous. In less than a week after the battle, a body of his chofen cavalry found means to draw the British grand guard into an ambufcade, and cut them entirely off before they could be fupported by the army. The troops and cattle during this time, hav. ing fuffered greatly by heat, ficknels and fatigue, and the ftock of provifion they had brought with them being nearly exhaufted, the general found it neceñary to fall back, within reach of the fources of his fupply. The battle of the 2d of June was the latt, in which thefe two great commanders were ever deftined to face each other; nor was either of them afterwards prefent at any action of importance. They did not furvive many months; and though they equally efcaped the dangers of the field, it feems probable that they were both victims to this contention. The British general could not but complete the ruin of a conftitution, already much impaired and broken, by the fatigues which he underwent, and the unparalleled difficulties which he bad to encounter, in every part of this moft arduous and dangerous war. On the other hand, though his great rival and antagonist, was much a younger man, and poffelled an uncommonly vigorous and robuft conftitution, he had for fome time encountered, and was now particularly experiencing, fuch a series of unexpected difficulties, difappointments, and dangers, as were fufficient to put the firmeft mind and the ftrongeft conftitution to the teft. His profpects were every day becoming more unfavourable, and affairs feemed now rapidly tending to a crisis, which could not, to a mind fo comprehenfive as his, but be feriously alarming. He had been able to bring defolation and ruin upon the Carnatic; but with all his power and all his exertions, he had failed in the great purpofes of the war; and he was too clear fighted not fully to perceive, that the feafon for their attainment was now elapsed. He had long coufidered the English as the only effective obftacles to the vaft defigns which he had formed in India. His ambition not only foared to the restoration of the Mogul empire, and its establishment in his own family, but he confided in his own ability, for laying it out upon a more extenfive fcale, and fixing it upon much fironger and more permanent foundations, than thofe upon which it had been originally raifed. The prefent weak and degenerate race of Mahome an princes, who had fprung up upon the ruins of the fallen empire, he held in fuch contempt, as men unworthy of the fituations in which fortune had placed them, and incapable of all the purposes whether of war or of government; that fo far from confidering them as at all interfering with his views, he, on the contrary, held their wealth and their power as fure refources, to be applied, as the occafion might require, to their completion. The Mahrattas were the only native power which he had to apprehend; but he had been fo long in the practice of playing upon and managing thofe inteftine divifions, to which the nature of their government fo pecu |