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fantry, but he hastened personally, tillery from the islands, under the and with apparent hazard, to immediate conduct of M. Du. chastise and restrain the blind and chemin, (being the first division cruel fury of the cavalry; five of of that great force, under the whoin are faid to have fallen by Marquis de Busty, which was inhis own hand in that generous ex- tended for the subversion of the ertion. The flaughter was, howe English power in 1 dia) were, in ever, great in the first insa ce ; the courie of the month of March, but as soon as it was effectually disembarked by Suffrein at Pon. Teltrained, Lally, as if it were en- dicherry. These being received tirely to perted what he had so or joined by a body of Hyder's happily begun, prevailed upon forces, the combined enemy marchTip oo Saib to commit the pri- ed in full confidence and security fonens to his own charge; and to beliege Cuddalore ; a place of the kindness and tenderness which suficient strength and of great they continued to experience from importance; but not expecting a bin), particularly the officers and fege, and being, through that, wounded, fully equalled his ge- and the unfavourable circumftannerosity and humanity in the field. ces of the times, unprovided for Many gallant Britith officers fell any length of defence, Captain in this untortunate affair ; avd of Huglies, the commandant, was the whole number who were in obliged to surrender it by capituthe field, only one escaped being lation on the 8th of -pril
. Thus wounded. They lost every thing allured by succefs, and encoubut their honour; and were fill raged by having no enemy to op: doomed to fuffer the miseries of a pole them in the field, long and cruel imprisonment at as by the weak and unprovided Seringapatam, Hyder's capital in state of the garrisons, they adthe Mylore kingdoin.
vanced to the nor hward, where This unfortunate stroke on the they besieged and took Permacoil; Coleroon, could not but totally and then, in concert with Hyder, disconcert Sir Eyre Coote's plan were directing their views to a for the conduct of the campaign. joint attack up n Vandiwath. All the countries to the southward
These unexpected losses, and were now laid entirely open to this new danger, were not necesthe designs of the enemy; whilft fary to quicken Sir Eyre Coote in Hyder, with his grand army, bis endeavours to put the army in closely watched the motions, and motion. Vandiwath was indeed was powerfully prepared to oh..of such great importance, that fruct the delijns of the English a less active and vigilant com. general, on the vorthern fide, who mander, could have left no means was already moft unfortunately unfought, nor resource untried cramped in his operations through for its prefervation. He accorthole circumttances which we have dingly advanced with the army before itated. In this state of im- towards that place, in full contibecility or contiraint on the one dence that Hyder, being now fide, and of active power on the strengthened by so powerful an other, the French forces and ar- aid of Europeans, would te vo
as well ways arerie to
a general action, he pushed on two days march dio inde d that he would rather be rectly to yder's camp. But that pleaf-d with to early an opportu- wary prince was not to be overnity of trying, and 'f benefiting ruled or guided in his conduct, by by their energy : at all events, any regard to appearances, or to he coorloded ibat be would sooner the opinions of others. He subfight, than relinquith an ob- mited without hesitation to the jeu, wbich he had to much at fuppoled disgrace, and took care hejt, aad w'ich was of so much to fall back in good time, without real cinlequence as the taking f at all waiting for so an Vanawath e found himself, approach of the Britith army as bowever, mistakes in ail his con- could by any means enable ihem ciutions, well tollided, as they to disturb his retreat ; and dicetinly were ; and it foon ap- recting his courie to the Red peared, that the prelence even of Hills, be there took a pohtion of his European allies, was not fuffi- fuch strength, a he well knew cient to reliore Hider's contidance would deter an able and expein the itľue of a field battle with rienced general, from all attempt the Erg:th
upou an army of such magnitude The protection of Vandi wash as he commanded. was not, how: ver fufficient
It is perhapi among the distinsatisfy the British general; and guithing features of great talents, as his position there was too ad- and is undoubtedly highly necefvantageous to encourage Hyder's fary in military affairs, not to approach, he determined to feek vrat so much to them, as to venhim upon
ture upon mea ures of great imconcluding, that the disgrace of p rtance, and capable of much setiring from to inferior a force danger in their consequences, under the eyes of ttrangers, who without full consultation and adwere themselves his allies, emi- vice. This was at least a leading nent for their own military abi- part of Sir Eyre Coote's chalities, and already prepotierted, racter. He held a council of war, through the greatness of his and having communicated all the name, in an opinion of his fuc intelligence he poffeffed to his ofperior prowess in war, together ficers, he then laid before them with a
fenfe of the imprefiion his own ideas, and the plan he which so shameful a retreat would had thereupon framed, in order make upon all the other Itates of to draw the enemy from his pre
and even upon his own sent tirong post, and thereby to fabjects and forces, would inevi. obtain an opportunity of bringtably induce Hyder to stand the ing him to action. Hyder's great hazard of a battle ; and that even magazines were deposited in the though the measure thould be con- Itrong fortress of Armee, and the
his own opinion, be general suggested, that a movewould notwithstanding be forced ivent towards that place, would to give way to the united opera- not only be a means of effectually tion, of so many powerful con- checking his supplies, but would current motives. In this opinion, alarm him so much for its safety
that on both accounts, he pro- dered it almost imposi' lc to ob. bably would be led to descend tain any precise information of from his present position on the the motions or fituation of his hills.
main body. ; nor could the evoluThe general's proposal being tions or approach of the former, upanimously approved of in the which they were endless in the recouncil of war, he directed his petition of, be considered as the course towards Arnee, and en- smallest indication either of his camped within five miles of that distance or designs. The van of place. . This judicious movement, the army bad already reached immediately produced the intend- Arnee, and were marking out a ed effect, by drawing Hyder camp in sight of the place, when down from the hills, who march- a diltant cannonade on the rear, ed with the utmoft expedition to announced to the general Hyder's the rescue of a place which con- sudden approach, who was till tained the means of carrying on then supposed to be at several the war. This movement, how- miles distance. erer, continued unknown to the This surprize, however, progeneral, until a little before day, duced no manner of disorder, al. at the very moment that the army though their arrival at that criwas commencing its five mile tical juncture afforded great admarch to Arnee ; and this intelli- vantages to the enemy in their gence rendered it then a matter attack; for the arnıy was in a of deliberation, whether he should low fituation surrounded by comftill proceed to that place, or ad- manding grounds, which Hyder's vance to meet Hyder, and tight forces instantly took poffeffion of; him on the way? Re determined so that their maneuvres were per. on the former, as the most cer. formed under every pollible dif. tain means of bringirg the enemy advantage in that respect, and to action ; for it Hyder found they were exposed to a heavy that he could save the place, by though distant cannonade during drawing the English army away the time they were forming from its position, he then would These difficulties and disadvanbave been under no neceflity of tages by no means disconcerted risquing a battle, which was the general, who used the utmott decision that he evidently had no dispatch, and displayed all bis difpofition to appeal to, while it usual ability, in making fách dircould be avoided without some positions, and adopting fuch meafignal loss.
sures, as would the most speedily It was not the least of the many remove or remedy them, and great difficulties which the Bri- might, in their effect, tend to tish general had to encounter in bring the enemy to close and dethis war, that the vast crowds of cisive action. Hyder's cavalry, which contiantly
It was notwithstanding June 2d, , atiended and watched all the near mid-day, before he finallett movements of the army, could reduce the enemy's
1782. covering as it were the whole face various attacks to one settled of the adjoining country, ren- point of action ; but as soon as
that was accomplished, the Bri- and service, and speedily fit for tih troops advanced upon them fresh action. It is not less rewith such relfless impetuolity, markable, nor worthy of obser. that Hyder's aimy gave way on vation, that, although before Hy
A total rout ensued, der's time, the surprize of Indian and the enemy were pursued till camps at night by Europeans, and late in the evening.
the ever consequent destruction of The want of cavalry on the their armies, were among the comBritish fide, and the superabun. mon incidents of warfare : pet, dance of it the other, pre- that so wonderful was the change vented vi&ory from producing any which he introduced in the goof its grand effects in this war, vernment of armies, and so ad. whether with respect to the de. mirable the measures with respect ftru&ion of men, the taking of to guards and the establishment of prisoners and artillery, or the to- posts, that in all the course of his tal difperfion and ruin of the wars with the English, though op: enemy's army. It is however a posed by some of the most entermatter peculiarly worthy of ob. prizing officers in the world, and servation, and although Hyder's by commanders of first rate abitried and veteran sepoys and gre- lities, no camp of his was nadiers, who once would not have surprized by night or by day. dreaded the encounter of any Nor will this appear the less exenemy whatever, had long fince traordinary when we recollect, that been worn out and consumed in some of the greatest generals and this war, yet that such were the best armies, even in Europe, have effects of his own great military not at all times been exempt from talents, and of the remains of such misfortunes. that admirable order and difci. On the day after the battle, Sir pline which he bad been so many Eyre Coote having obtained in. years establishing, that even the telligence, that Hyder was sort of troops which he now com camped upon such strong ground, manded, though incapable of long as might encourage him to stand ftanding the brunt of close and another action, and seemed to be severe action with the English se- chosen for that purpose, he again poys, yet they were, in all cir- advanced upon him. cumstances, ftill obedient to com- his coming up, he found the mand, and soon recovered their enemy retreating with great preorder ; never once being guilty of cipitation, although the approaches that thameful' dereli&ion of their to his encampment were so difficommanders, and irretrievable dis- cult that they might be disputed perfion, which, before his time, with much advantage. The purhad been the constant concomi- suit was continued on the follow. tants of defeat in Indian armies. ing day, until it was found that When Hyder's army was beat, the enemy had quitted the road, whatever the loss, or however and crossed the country towards great the defeat, it was still beaten Arnee. But however Hyder might like an European army; and, like be defeated, and obliged to Ay, that, was easily recalled to order he still remained unconquered;
and was ever formidable and dan- more unfavourable, and affairg gerous In less than a week after seemed now rapidly tending to a the battle, a body of his chosen crisis, which could not, to a mind cavalry found means to draw the lo conprehensive as his, but be British grand guard into an an- seriously alarming He had been buscade, and cut them entirely able to bring desolation and ruin off before they could be sup- upon the Carnatic; but with all ported by the army. The troops bis power and all his exertions, and catile during this time, have he had failed in the great pur. ing suffered greatly by heat, tick- poses of the war ; and he was ness and fatigne, and the stock too clear fighted not fully to perof provision they had brought ceive, that the season for their with them being nearly exhautied, attainment was now elapred. lle the general found it necesary to had long cousidered the English fall back, within reach of the as the only effective obstacles to sources of his fupply.
the vast designs which he had The batile of the 2d of June formed in India. His ambition was the latt, in which these two not only svared to the restoration great commanders were ever des- of the Mogul empire, and its dved to face each other ; nor was establiihment in his own family, either of them afterwards preient but he confided in bis own abiat any action of importance. They lity, for Jaying it out upon a did not survive many months; more extensive scale, and fixing it and though they equally escaped upon much fironger and more per the dangers of the field, it seems nianent foundations, than those probable that they were both vic- upon which it had been originally iims to this contention.
raised. The present weak and The British general could not but degenerate race of Mabome an complete the ruin of a conftitution,' priuces, who had sprung up upon already much impaired and broken, ihe ruins of the fallen empire, he by the fatigues which he under held in such contempt, as men went, and the unparalleled diffi- unworthy of the filuations in culties which he bad to encounter, which fortune had placed them, in every part of this most arduous and incapable of all the purposes and dangerous war.
whether of war or of govern. On the other hand, though his ment; that so far from confidergreat rival and antagonist, wasing them as at all interfering with much a younger man, and pos- his views, he, on the contrary, fetred an monly vigorous held their wealth and their power and robust conftitution, he had as fure resources, to be applied, for some time encountered, and as the occasion might require, to was now particularly experiencing, their completion The Mahratsuch a series of unexpected dit- tas were the only native power ficulties, disappointments, and which he had to apprehend; but dangers, as were sutiicient to put he had been so long in the practhe firmelt mind and the firongett tice of playing upon and managing constitution to the test. His prof. those intestine divisions, to which pects were every day becoming the nature of their government so