indicate no finall want of determination. Having thus taken full time for deliberation, five fail, which compofed their van, ftretched along to engage that of the English, while the admiral, with the other feven thips of the line, bore down directly in a body upon Sir Edward Hughes, who, in the Superbe, was in the centre of his line, and upon his two feconds, the Monmouth, Capt. Alms, a-head, and the Monarca, Gell, a-ftern. The engagement began about half paft one in the van, and within a few minutes after, M. de Suffrein, in the Heros, and his fecond a ftern, the L'Orient, both of 74 guns, bore down within pistol fhot of the Superbe, and pouring in a torrent of fire, continued to engage her fo close, and with fuch extraordinary fierceness, that it was the general opinion their intention was to board, and endeavour to carry her by a coup de main. The French admiral held this adventurous pofition, giving and receiving a moft dreadful fire, for about ten minutes; but he found the encounter fo exceedingly rough, and his fhip had fuffered fo much apparent damage in that fhort time, that making room for the fhips that were coming up to fupply his place. he fuddenly fhot away, and foed on to the attack of the Monmouth, which was already clofely and equally engaged. The battle continued to rage with great violence, particularly in the centre, where the odds, as to number and force, were conftantly and greatly against Sir Edward Hughes and his two brave feconds. At three o'clock, the Monmouth, after long sustaining, with unparalleled fortitude, the joint attack of two great fhips, one of equal, the other of fuperior force, befides frequently receiving the paffing fire of a third, had her mizen-mait thot away, and, in a few minutes after, her main-maft meeting the fame fate, the underwent the neceffity of falling out of the line to leeward. The enemy ufed every effort to profit of her condition, and, from their number, made fure of carrying her off. Indeed the was in the greateft danger; but the admiral bearing down inftantly to her relief, and being speedily followed by the Monarca and the Sultan, they covered her with fuch a fire, that the enemy were glad to relinquish their expected prize. The difadvantage which the English had hitherto experienced, of being obliged to fight close in with a rocky and dangerous leefhore, they hoped would have been remedied by the customary change of the wind in the afternoon; but this continuing ftill unexpectedly to the northward, the admiral found himself under a neceffity, at forty minutes paft three, in order to prevent his (hips from being too nearly entangled with the fhore, to make a fignal for the fquadron to wear, and haul their wind in a line of battle a-head, ftill fighting the enemy through the whole evolution. At length, towards the ap proach of night, finding himself in only fifteen fathom water, and being apprehenfive that the Monmouth, in her difabled condition, might drift too near the fhore, he made a fignal for the fquadron to prepare prepare to anchor; and the French fquadron about the fame time having drawn off in great disorder to the eastward, the action entirely ceafed. M. de Suffrein's fhip, Le Heros, had been so torn, early in the action, that he had been obliged to thift his flag to the French Hannibal, which was of the fame force; and foon after dufk, the frigate La Fine, of 40 guns, being either under orders to tow off and affift the difabled Heros, or else to discover the ftate and fituation of the British fquadron, fell fo clofely on board the Ifis, that the was obliged to ftrike her colours to Captain Lumley; but foon perceiving the weak and difordered ftate of the Ifis, which, befides her lofs in the action, had been originally fo badly manned, that the defect was now vifible in the manner of repairing her damages, the French frigate feized the advantage afforded by this circumstance, and, by the darknefs of the night, fuddenly to get clear of the Ifis, and totally to escape. The condition of both fquadrons was fo nearly alike, and they had fuffered fo extremely in the action, that fimilar apprehenfions were entertained by each through the night, of being attacked by the other in the morning; Sir Edward Hughes, how ever, only founding that opinion on the difabled ftate of the Monmouth, which he thought might poffibly ftimulate the enemy to a bold and hazardous attempt in the hope of carrying her off. The morning light removed the deception. The enemy were perceived at anchor about five miles VOL. XXVI. without the English fquadron; but they were in fuch apparent difor. der, and evident diftrefs, as fufficiently told that they were in no condition or temper for prefent enterprize. They had, however, the fortune of not lofing any of their lower mafts; a circumftance of great importance; as their damages, however great in other respects, were ftill capable of fuch a repair at sea, as would render the hips manageable, and capable of undergoing a certain degree of fervice; while, on the other fide, the Monmouth could only be reftored, by length of time, new mafts, and a good harbour. Both parties continued in this fituation for feveral days, each bufily employed in repairing their damages, placing their fhips in the best fituation for withstanding a fudden attack, and eagerly watching every motion of the other. At length, on the morning of the 19th, the enemy got under fail, and ftood out to fea clofe hauled; but at noon they tacked with the fea breeze, and ftood in directly for the body of the English fquadron, with the apparent view of an immediate attack. This refolution was not lafting; for when they arrived within two miles of the British line, the countenance which they perceived, and the preparation made for their reception, were fo little inviting, that they fud. denly again tacked, and ftanding to the eastward by the wind, were entirely out of fight by the evening. The Monmouth being refitted with jury-mafts, in the bett manner which the prefent fituation would admit, the admiral [0] was was enabled on the fourth day after to proceed to Trincomale, where he ufed the utmoft diligence in repair ing the thips, and preparing the fquadron for further fpeedy fer. vice; the calls for their utmost exertion becoming now more frequent and urgent, than at any former time. Such was the result of this fierce and bloody naval conteft, in which the English fought under every difadvantage of wind and fituation.Captain Alms had the fortune to be peculiarly diftinguished; and it was remarkable, that his fituation in the Monmouth on this day, fhould fo nearly refemble that of Commodore King, and of the Exeter, in the last action. The flaughter of his men was equal to the havoc of his fhip. No less than 45 were killed, and 102 wounded, in the Monmouth only; which was probably a full third of her crew. The extraordinary fortitude with which he sustained fo long and fo desperate a conteft, against a fuperiority that feemed to render courage fruitlefs, would have afforded room for the highest praife, and even for national exultation, if it had been difplayed in circumftances wherein that virtue was lefs ge neral. It was much and generally regretted, that his recollection of fuch an action fhould have been embittered, as it was, by the lofs of his fon, a moft gallant youth, who having been juft made a lieutenant, in the admiral's fhip, fell, on that day, in a noble emulation of his father. The whole lofs fuftained in the fquadron, amounted to 137 killed, and to 430 wounded; the latter, in that climate, and at that distance from home, being little lefs a detraction from the common ftrength than the former. The French not only directed their principal att ck to the centre, but it was there only that, after the example of M. de Suffrein, and immediately under his eye, they ventured upon bold exertion, and came into close action. Our officers in the van complained that they generally kept at a guarded long-fhot diftance; a mode of action, which, from whatever cause it proceeds, generally proves very pernicious in its effect upon the mafts and rigging of Englifh fhips. The firong motives which induced Sir Edward Hughes rather to wish to avoid than to feek action, until he had landed the fupplies and troops, and got quit of the fick at Trincomale, proved extremely unfortunate in the event, having afforded the means for all thofe advantages which the enemy poffeffed in the engagement.Could he have forefeen or thought that they were really determined on fighting, he undoubtedly would have bore down upon them, and brought them to that point while the wind was in his favour; but more efpecially on the first day of their appearance, when they are faid to have been fo much scattered, that they could not easily have recovered their order. either of thefe cafes, but particularly the latter, it may well be prefumed, that the action would have borne a very different colour, and produced confequences far different from what it did.But it is to be obferved, that the admiral could only form a judg In ment ment of the enemy's prefent, by their general conduct, which at almoft all times goes rather to evade than to feek, clofe and general ac. tion with the English at fea; at lealt without a very decided fuperiority; which, as they were ignorant of the weak ftate of the Sultan and Magnanime, was not at this time of fuch apparent magnitude, as might encourage any extraordinary deviation from the ufua' practice. It feems then, confidering the effential objects which he had in view, that the admiral acted the part of a wife and able commander, in not abandoning them for a vain purfuit, or for the fake of fighting the enemy, when even that would have prefented no confideration of equal value in return. It seems indeed, that the intention of fighting on the other fide, only fprung up with the unexpected occafion of advantage that offered, when the English fquadron was fo lock ed in by the wind and the land, that they might direct their attacks against it, in whatever manner, and to whatever extent they pleafed. fituation of these three fhips occafioned his putting an end to the action, and making the fignal to caft anchor. It is farther acknowledged, and ferves to thew more than any thing elfe, the disorder and confufion which then prevailed on the French fide, that the Heros had caft anchor in the middle of the English fquadron, while the rain and darknefs prevented their perceiving her fituation; until her captain at length difcovering his danger, feized a favourable moment to cut his cable, and efcape. They likewife acknowledge, that the La Fine had been under orders to tow her off, when fhe fell on board the Ifis; but the fact of her ftriking is overlooked; and it is only coldly obferved, that the feparated from that ship without fighting. The lofs of.men on the French fide, as ftated in their published account, by no means accords with former experience, any more than with the nature and circumftances of the action, the acknowledged damage fuftained by their fhips, and the number of officers (whofe names could not well be concealed) which appear in both lifts of the killed and wounded. In this account, the flain are rated at 139, and the wounded at 364 The French fleet proceeded after the action to Batacalo, a Datch port on the island of CeyJon, about 20 leagues to the fouthward of Trincomale, where they were detained until the month of Though thefe actions neither June, in endeavouring to repair were nor could be decifive in faand equip their fhattered fhips.-vour of the English, yet they were, It is acknowledged in their own particularly the firft, of no fmall account, that the admiral's fhip importance in their confequences. the Heros, with her feconds, the Every body knew the great force L'Orient and the Brilliant, had which France, at an immenfe exfuffered extremely; that M. de pence, had been long collecting in Suffrein had been obliged to thift her African iflands; and all India his flag from the former to the was in expectation of the mighty Ajax; that the condition and blow which he was now to give, [D] 2 and and which it was fuppofed would have proved fatal to the British interefts in that quarter of the globe. It was in this idea that Hyder Ally first ventured to invade the Carnatic; and it was upon the fame principle, that notwithstanding his repeated defeats, he still rejected every overture tending to an accommodation that could be made. A fufficient naval force to crush that of the English, was, excepting fome artillery and engineers, probably all the aid which he wished for from France; for he was little difpofed to place any great confidence in the fervices of a French, or indeed of any European army in India; their military knowledge and kill, as officers and engineers, was all that he valued; nor did he wish that France, or any other foreign nation, fhould retain any inland footing whatever in the country. He only wifhed the English refources by fea to be cut off, and he knew that every thing must then be at his own difpofal. Exhaufted then as his patience was, through the failure of France in fo long delaying to fulfil her engagements, whilft he was alone expofed to all the rigours of a moft dangerous war, how great mutt have been his difappointment, and how highly muft it have excited the aftonifhment of all India, when it was feen, that with fo confiderable a real, and fo vaft an apparent fuperiority of force, the French fleet would not venture to attack the English in the open road of Madras; but that on the contrary, thefe inflantly pursue the fuperior enemy, take or difperfe the con voy under his protection, and in a hard fought battle, wherein they had other difadvantages befides a fuperiority of force to encounter, leave the claim to victory undetermined? Nothing could have impreffed the princes and ftates of India more ftrongly with an opi nion of the great fuperiority of the English in all naval affairs, than these circumftances; nor could any thing afford a more grievous mortification to Hyder; who now faw his hopes of taking Madras, of depofing the Nabob of Arcot, and of placing his fon Tippoo in poffeffion of the Carnatic, to be as remote and uncertain as ever. We have heretofore feen, that Tellicherry, on the Malabar coast, had been conftantly invested, and more or lefs clofely preffed, by Hyder's forces, from the very beginning of the war; and, that under the preffure of thofe loffes and misfortunes, which were about that time fo general, and of that depreffion and hopeleffnefs, bordering on defpair, which prevailed, it had even been in contemplation to abandon that fettlement. We have likewife fhewn, that Sir Edward Hughes had relieved and preferved the place.The blockade, however, fill continued, and the ftrength and number of the enemy increased; but they were of a kind, at that dif tance from the feat of Hyder's power and difcipline, unequal to the carrying on of a regular fiege, and were contented with closely fhutting up the place, and barring the principal paffages with forts; waiting for famine, or other diftrefs, to fupply the defects of military fkill. The works |