Senator MARTIN. May I add a word?

Senator HUMPHREY. Oh yes, Senator.

Mr. HOEGH. We are going to have a reunion here.

Senator MARTIN. Governor Hoegh is a man of proven executive ability, and I am very proud to have him in the position he now holds. Senator HUMPHREY. Governor Hoegh, will you proceed?

Mr. HOEGH. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to come before this committee and discuss the organization of the Federal Government to carry out its nonmilitary defense functions.

Your committee is aware of the extensive investigation of this subject by the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee. Those studies, which were made under the leadership of Mr. Holifield, have materially assisted in the development of the President's Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. The activities of the House committee, which culminated in the issuance of an interim report in 1956 and the introduction last year of Chairman Holifield's bill, H. R. 2125, and companion measures, are important parts of the history of the President's proposal.

The findings and recommendations of the Civil Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee also provided substantial assistance in the formulation of this reorganization plan.

There is a close relationship to the findings and recommendations contained in the Kefauver committee report and the provisions of the President's reorganization plan.

For example, the plan is predicated upon the essentiality of integrating many nonmilitary defense activities into the normal day-today functions of the Federal departments and agencies.

The plan also recognizes the inseparability of civil defense and the related nonmilitary defense activities presently being conducted by the Office of Defense Mobilization, and therefore provides that all of the nonmilitary defense responsibilities of the Federal Government will be under the supervision of a single office.

It will establish central guidance and supervision essential to insure that the departments and agencies are adequately prepared to carry out their assigned emergency functions. In addition, the consolidation will materially facilitate the successful development of overall nonmilitary defense plans which the committee found to be essential.

Consistent with the findings of the Senate committee, the reorganization plan is founded upon the principle that modern weapons and the means for their rapid delivery require that the total nonmilitary defense activities of the Federal Government be given a priority commensurate to that established for our military preparedness

measures.

In this connection, the basic concept of the reorganization plan goes even further than many nonmilitary defense organizational proposals made during recent years. In accord with the specific recommendation of Senator Kefauver's committee

* * * that the President assume, as an addition to the heavy burdens of office, the personal responsibility for providing the leadership which will cause the people to support a proper civil defense effort

the plan will vest the total nonmilitary defense responsibility in the President and will establish, in the Executive Office of the President,

the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization to assist him in the discharge of these responsibilities.

Consistent with this basic concept, the reorganization plan transfers to the President the functions vested in me under the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. This committee is familiar with the Civil Defense Act, but it might be helpful if I reviewed its major provisions.

Briefly, the act authorizes me as Federal Civil Defense Administrator, to prepare national plans and conduct programs designed to protect life and property in the United States from enemy attack. More specifically, title II of that act provides authority for particular activities to be undertaken.

This involves establishment of adequate civil-defense communications, the development and maintenance of a national attack warning system, the conduct of civil-defense studies and research, the training and instruction of civil-defense personnel, the acquisition and maintenance of reserve stocks of equipment and materials for use during an emergency, the furnishing of financial assistance to the States and their political subdivisions for civil-defense purposes, and the education of the population relative to civil-defense measures for survival. Those are examples of the preattack activities engaged in by the Federal Civil Defense Administration to develop the capability of the Nation to absorb the effects of modern war and to survive.

As this committee is aware, the act, in title III, also contains many extraordinary emergency powers designed to permit the Administrator to carry out his responsibilities under attack and postattack conditions. These powers, which by the terms of the statute are exercised only during a civil defense emergency, and then subject to the direction and control of the President, would be transferred by the reorganization plan, directly to the President.

Since my appointment as Federal Civil Defense Administrator, I have become aware of the interrelationship of responsibilities discharged, on behalf of the President, by the Office of Defense Mobilization and many of the programs conducted by the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

I have discussed this subject with Mr. Gray and our staffs have engaged in a continuing effort to delineate the appropriate areas of activity of the respective agencies.

To date, in my opinion, these efforts have met with some degree of success, but as a result of extensive review of the problems, I have reached the conclusion that single direction of the total nonmilitary defense activities of the Federal Government is essential to the adequate development of the Nation's capability to protect life and property from attack.

As a former governor, I am aware of the practical problems facing civil defense officials at the State and local levels. Since becoming Administrator, I have been even more convinced of the importance of the role that the States and the cities must perform if our Ñation is to survive a nuclear attack.

I say without hesitation that the success or failure of the Nation's nonmilitary defense effort and I mean defense mobilization, including economic stabilization, resources management and other related activities as well as civil defense-will be determined by the way that our State and local governments operate under emergency conditions.

Further, the way that they react will be determined by the extent to which they have, during the preattack period, developed their сараbility to operate under such conditions.

Therefore, our total nonmilitary defense effort, including our Federal planning, must be predicated upon the development of the capability of governments, at all levels, to effectively continue to carry out their essential functions under emergency conditions.

This is why I have placed such a high priority upon the program that we call continuity of Government. This program is designed to assist State and local governments to increase their capability to operate effectively under attack and postattack conditions.

This program has the complete support of the governors of this Nation and is well underway.

In order that the States and their political subdivisions can effectively plan and organize their efforts to develop this capability to continue operating, it is essential that they know what is expected of them. It is equally essential that they be advised what they may expect, in the way of assistance, from the Federal Government.

Therefore, one of my first tasks upon becoming Administrator was to attempt to clarify the respective civil defense roles of the Federal, State, and local governments, and the individual citizen. I determined that the best manner in which to accomplish this was the development of a new national civil defense plan.

To this end, and as a matter of urgent priority, my agency is completing a plan which establishes national nonmilitary courses of action and sets forth step by step how the mission is to be accomplished, and above all, by whom.

It is, of course, essential that such a plan be completely coordinated within the executive branch of the Federal Government. It is equally essential that the States and cities review it, comment on it, and make such suggestions as are necessary to insure that it is a simple, practical and workable plan.

This task is nearing completion, I am happy to report. The plan has been accepted and approved by various representatives of State and local governments, as well as the national associations of State and local civil defense officials.

During recent weeks, I have personally supervised the coordination of the plan within the Federal Government. I am happy to report that there is general agreement on its major aspects. Likewise, the governors, during their 1958 conference, in Miami, generally endorsed the plan.

The preparation and coordination of the new national civil defense plan confirmed my earlier conclusion that all of the nonmilitary defense activities of the Federal Government should be placed under single direction.

I am convinced that the consolidation of these two agencies, and the elimination of artificial delineations of responsibilities, will result in a substantial increase in the effectiveness of the total nonmilitary defense activities of the Federal Government.

It will certainly eliminate much of the confusion that exists in the minds of State and local officials as to which Federal agency is in charge.

These results alone would be adequate justification for the acceptance of the proposal to consolidate the two agencies.

I would like to comment on one additional aspect of the report of Senator Kefauver's committee. This involved the question of the ability of the Federal Civil Defense Administration to effectively conduct its activities from its location in Battle Creek, Mich.

The committee hearings indicated that in some respects it appeared difficult for the agency to carry out its responsibilities while located in Battle Creek. The subcommittee recommended that the Administrator give serious consideration to the possibility of relocating at least a portion of his staff to the Washington area while at the same time considering the desirability of the dispersal aspect of the present physical location, Extensive consideration has been given to this recommendation.

As a matter of fact, certain top staff members are located in Washington although we refer to Battle Creek as the headquarters of FCDA. This includes myself and my deputy.

In effect, while the greater majority of FCDA staff are located in Battle Creek the Washington Office is the policy office.

I do not want to conclude my remarks without mentioning one other thing.

There are, in addition to organization other problems facing the Nation's nonmilitary defense program.

I do not want to be interpreted as representing that the acceptance of this organizational proposal would, by itself, overnight, result in adequate nonmilitary defense preparedness. At the same time I want to make it emphatically clear that I strongly believe that the organizational problem must be solved before any really effective nonmilitary defense planning and readiness can be achieved. It is the essential next step. However, it is certainly not the only step. In this connection, it is also essential that the Congress approve another measure which, from the State and local civil defense standpoint, is of equal importance.

I refer to the enactment of Mr. Durham's bill, H. R. 7576, which is currently pending before the Senate Armed Services Committee. This bill was unanimously passed by the House last summer.

Consistent with the Kefauver committee finding of a necessity for greater Federal responsibility, the bill establishes civil defense as a joint responsibility of Federal, State, and local governments, with the Federal Government providing overall direction and coordination, and sharing the cost of civil-defense functions at State and local levels. I cannot overemphasize the importance of the passage of this legislation.

Civil-defense officials, mayors, and governors, from every part of the Nation, advise me that the enactment of this bill is essential to their development of an adequate civil-defense program.

I urge the members of this committee to give their strong support to this measure when it is considered by the Senate.

In summary, I believe the President's reorganization plan will accomplish the following:

1. Strengthen the Nation's nonmilitary defense organization; 2. Increase the stature of civil defense and mobilization;

3. Provide the best overall coordination and supervision of the nonmilitary defense activities within the Federal Government;

• See p. 62.

4. Provide unified guidance and assistance to State and local governments;

5. Establish a solid foundation upon which accomplishment of the assigned mission can be accelerated; and

6. Provide more efficient and economical administration.

The close relationship between military preparedness and nonmilitary defense readiness activities, and the vital importance of both, demand, because these functions transcend the responsibilities of any single department or agency, that the nonmilitary defense functions be vested in no one short of the President.

In conclusion, I want to assure you that the Federal Civil Defense Administration wholeheartedly supports Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 and strongly urges that the Congress permit the plan to take effect.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you very much, Governor Hoegh. Is the support that you emphasize for Reorganization Plan No. 1, based upon any knowledge of the proposed administrative structure of this new agency?

Have you seen any blueprint as to what may happen?

Mr. HOEGH. I have that which the McKinsey Co. has recommended. I have seen their proposals A and B; yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. What do you think of those proposals? Mr. HOEGH. I have given them some consideration, despite the fact that I do not know who the Director will be, and I have had my staff give them great consideration.

Now as to my final conclusions, I think probably it would be better that I did not express them here, in that it is not my prerogative at this time.

Senator HUMPHREY. Whose prerogative do you think it is Governor, to express some point of view about it?

Mr. HOEGH. I thought you had the right man here.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Finan?

Mr. HOEGH. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am going to call him back again and get a little more definitive expression from him.

I agree with the philosophy which is enunciated here about the importance of joining together the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

I think that this point has been well established. I have no argument even to the point of placing this in the Executive Office, with the redelegation of authority to the Administrator. I am, however, interested in finding out what this thing is going to look like. It is something like saying, "I believe everybody ought to have a good house," but before you buy that house it is kind of a good idea to take a look at the plans and the blueprints. It is better even if you study them meticulously.

Mr. HOEGH. I might mention this Senator: This organization should be streamlined. It should be capable of performing the functions of Civil Defense and ODM.

Senator HUMPHREY. Right.

Mr. HOEGH. And there can be therefore some consolidation of our various departments in our respective agencies that now exist. Another point I would like to make clear: I think that it is important for the Director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobili