(1) The expressed intent of the potential enemy, coupled with the awesome destructive capability provided by modern technology, forces the free world to try to provide a complete deterrence to all

out war.

I noticed Mr. Fisher, last year before Congress, pointed out that the potential enemy might well risk intercontinental destruction in a gamble for world domination.

(2) Maximum military deterrence to all-out war requires that we (a) convince the enemy of our determination to insure and provide certain retaliation if attacked; (b) back it up with an inventory of weapons capable of certain retaliation; and (c) insure that the inventory includes the capability of ferreting out and destroying every remaining vestige of enemy nuclear offensive potential.

In any exchange of intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, terrible and widespread damage will be inflicted. But by the nature of such devices, being purely mechanical and therefore imperfect, some substantial residual atomic warmaking capability is a mathematical certainty. First, the technical and operational probabilities possible for such missiles in the foreseeable future make it economically infeasible to launch sufficient missiles at all known targets to insure the probability of absolute military destruction.

Second, we do not have the assurance that we can provide the threedimensional target information of the required accuracy to guarantee the destruction by missiles of all enemy nuclear delivery capability. In this regard, a potential enemy finds it much less difficult to identify accurately the targets in our system.

Third, the regimentation characteristic of the potential enemy enables them to take much more effective passive defense measures in the dispersal and underground protection of personnel and facilities. Fourth, missile systems are incapable of informing us of missed or new targets where remaining enemy strike capability may exist. Under such circumstances, there exists a calculated probability of substantial residual enemy capability. If the calculation looked favorable to the enemy, they might well start the conflict with the mathematical certainty of ending with a favorable balance of power, and being subsequently free to impose their will over the entire world. As producers of computers and guidance systems, we at North American Aviation are only to well aware that the only way to recognize missed, new, or mobile targets and to ferret out the last elements of enemy power is to put men in the immediate enemy area with the best extension of their faculties that we can technically provide.

These men can use the advanced equipment provided to identify new or poorly located targets or targets not yet completely destroyed; take action and simultaneously feed back the information to allow us to direct or divert remaining weapons so as to be most effective. The high accuracy yield combinations provided in our manned systems insures the capacity to destroy hardened targets which might remain. It appears to us that these factors indicate the indefinite continuation of the mixed-force concept for the USAF weapons inventory. It has never been, nor likely to be, prudent or practical to depend entirely on one type of system in a weapon inventory. The advent of the atomic bomb and the missile potentials demonstrated by the German V-1's and V-2's, motivated the USAF to start, in 1946, the programs for SNARK, NAVAHO, and ATLAS. These systems were

to complement the manned bomber force and raise its potential in the face of improving defense potential.

In operating from the present version of the mixed-force concept, the intercontinental ballistic missiles will be programed to strike known targets and enable us to apply our manned weapons for destruction of the missed and other critical targets that will spell final victory, if it can so be called. The missiles will undoubtedly disrupt large portions of the enemy defense structure and thus raise the effectiveness of our manned weapons. Our possession of a manned air weapon of the most advanced technical capability will assure the potential enemy of our ability to complete the total destruction of their strategic capability if they attack us, thus completing our deterrence to all-out war.

Assuming that enemy planners similarly assess the situation, we must have a manned interceptor of long range and high rate of sweep, in order to counter the enemy manned threat in the event that our own fixed air defense structure is partially disrupted by initial missile attacks. We can be assured that the enemy will provide a similar capability to attempt to stop our manned systems that can provide. the conclusive destruction of all their strategic power.

This is strong, inhumane talk; yet if we are to preserve our security, we must face the possibility of attack, must work out a deterrent strategy, and must provide ourselves with the visible force to carry out that strategy. In the interest of humanity, we must talk out these awful possibilities, and come to sound conclusions.

There is, essentially, no such thing as an unmanned weapon system. Man designs, programs, maintains, and makes the decisions to use all weapon systems. It is rational to use inanimate vehicles wherever they can fully satisfy the mission requirement. But the vagaries of warfare, including the much-used element of surprise and the improbability of ever being able to determine accurately in advance all possible targets and other factors involved, has brought us to the conclusion that the judgment of man will always be required in some fashion in the immediate battle area.

The fact that missile systems are not recallable, once well launched, presents us with the necessity of making an irrevocable decision at the time of launching the first missiles. The difficulty of making such a decision lengthens the system reaction time of the missile. A man located in the air vehicle provides positive control in flight; thus a manned system can be launched on less than certain information, with corresponding gain in system reaction time. In the air defense role, a manned vehicle is needed to verify early information by providing positive identification, as well as for ultimate defense.

Moreover, manned air vehicles incorporating the most advanced technology provide a physically demonstrable presence, with its undoubted strengthening of our allies and its corresponding deterrent effect on the enemy. From the viewpoint of the enemy, the present USAF capability with manned systems is already proven to a high degree.

Certainly our missile force must be powerful and reliable. But when we complement it with highly advanced, flexible, manned air weapons with their high accuracy-yield potential-we will have assured the enemy of conclusive action and provided a maximum deterrent to all-out war.

It has required some of the finest technical talent in the country to bring us into the missile era. It will continue to require talent and effort to improve reliability of these complex systems and to meet the inevitable counter weapons.

The more flexible manned vehicles require equally fine talents and involve as many technical fields. The sciences involved in extending man's faculties and environment to enable him to successfully accomplish his most necessary role in our weapon inventory are of a very high degree of advancement.

Furthermore, the manned air vehicle's capability of self-defense has been enhanced by technical developments of great importance. The crew will be surveying a battle situation, making decisions, and taking action while traveling faster than a shell from a 16-inch gun, and with better information and more time than you have in making many quick decisions on the highway. Small wonder that it takes such a broad segment of our best industrial talent. I believe you can appreciate our feeling of responsibility as the weapon system

contractor.

The technology upon which this system is based will also make possible a 70 percent reduction in the transportation time of the great jet transports now entering service. What this can mean to commerce, industry, and many other aspects of human affairs is a matter in which you may find it interesting to let your experience and imagination make some projections. I believe that a transport moving at three times the speed of sound will revolutionize the long distance movement of passengers and cargo. Because of its many implications, I very much doubt that our Nation can afford to be second in such a development.

I hope that in the past three mornings I have been able to add some helpful information to the vast and vital subject of modern weapon systems. I hope that in explaining the workings of weapon system contracting, I have not given the impression that I feel it is perfect or foolproof. Like any other procedure, it must be administered by capable and conscientious minds. I do believe that within the exacting requirements forced upon us by today's fast-advancing technology, it is a system that is narrowing the latitude for human weakness to the minimum.

It is, I feel, the logical answer to a pressing technical and administrative need. It is certainly the best technique we know of at this time to accomplish, within the framework of American capabilities and principles, the tremendous developmental undertakings necessary to national security. I sincerely believe that it will provide better weapon systems at less time than any other approach.

The vast and costly developments for defense and space will continue to require integrated application of the Nation's best technical resources. We believe that we are accomplishing such application today on the F-108 and B-70 programs, and that at the same time, we are refining and improving the techniques (technical and administrative) that may be the key to survival in the space age.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HÉBERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Atwood.

I will forgo any questioning, but on behalf of the committee, I do want to thank you for your full and complete cooperation during these three mornings with us.

We recognize the tedious effort, and we recognize the preparation and study that you have given to the presentation.

I particularly want to commend you for the conclusion which you read yourself just now, as bringing into sharp focus the problem of manned aircraft in the missile field. I think it is a great contribution and a very understandable presentation.

You have contributed much. Of course, there are many questions that are to be asked and many problems to be resolved.

The thought that ran through my mind when you were reading was the fact that perhaps the Air Force or the Defense Department, which has the same objectives as we all have, could well have put into successful operation the plan that you have outlined, which is certainly basically proper.

Again on behalf of the committee, I want to thank you. Just by way of parting, though, I want to ask you one thing. In your first chart that you brought here, Mr. Courtney has pointed out the fact that God is definitely on the side of North American and all the trust is in little business. That was not purposeful, was it?

In the division of the dollar, I want you to know that God is definitely on the side of North American and then small business has the trust.

Mr. Gavin, have you any questions?

Mr. GAVIN. No. I just want to take this opportunity to commend Mr. Atwood on a very fine statement and his patience over the last three days before the Committee.

After listening for several years to presentations before this committee, it is gratifying to me to see that at last a weapons system has been developed, coordinated and presented here, that eliminates the confusion, complication, duplication and overlapping that we had on previous presentations before the committee, particularly on the aircraft.

This technique that they have developed here-coordinated under one head and cooperating with all interested parties in all phases of our economic and industrial life-I want to say, is certainly an indication that we are now progressing to a point where we actually know what they are doing; where we are going; what objectives we have to reach and the manner in which we are reaching them.

So I want to heartily commend Mr. Atwood for a very fine statement of the technique developed by his corporation, and on the many problems that we have in this weapon production.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Price?

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I, too, want to compliment Mr. Atwood and his associates on the manner of their presentation. I think it is one of the finest jobs done before any congressional committee on which I have served, in my many years here on the Hill.

I think what is involved here is a thorough understanding of other weapons system and its place in the new order of things. We all recognize the fact that we are in a new era; that the equipment and the facilities needed in the interest of national defense are far and away beyond that which we needed in the years gone by and matters. of procurement to fulfill these needs are certainly changing. What we want to get at here is to see whether or not they have hit upon an idea that fills these needs and if any improvement can be made

upon the idea. The chairman, Mr. Hébert, several times expressed some concerns that also enter into the picture. I think as we go through these hearings, some of these matters will be resolved.

I want to compliment Mr. Atwood particularly upon the conclusions in his statement. I think I could have ghost-written that section of your statement, because I have felt this way for a long time. I have made many public statements to this effect.

I agree with you. I think one of the points that you made here, that is, the chief deterrent that we have in war is our residual capacity after the first blow-I thought you brought that out very well there. I think it is a good point and one which I hope will attract the attention of the general public of this country.

It is residual capability that is the main deterrent to war today.
Mr. ATWOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. PRICE. Those are some of the things that the committee and the Congress must keep in mind as they examine these matters.

I want to compliment you upon these conclusions that you have drawn here.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Fisher?

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I, of course, completely share the gratitude of the committee for the contribution that Mr. Atwood has made.

To complete the record a little more, I am wondering, Mr. Atwood, if you would tell us just briefly about your background. Mr. HÉBERT. That is in the record, Mr. Fisher.

Mr. FISHER. Is it already in the record?

Mr. ATWOOD. Yes.

Mr. FISHER. Did you tell them about being from Texas?

Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Fisher, I am very proud of being a graduate of the University of Texas.

Mr. FISHER. I don't think I have any questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HÉBERT. All right. Mr. Atwood, I just want to close on thismaybe a little sour note now.

Don't float out on the cloud because of the great compliments you have heard here today. When the report comes out, you may not recognize

Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Chairman, before you do that and while I am on a cloud, may I say in all sincerity on behalf of myself, Mr. Taylor, and all our associates at North American Aviation, we have considered it a privilege.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HÉBERT. The reason I serve warning is because we are in much the same situation as the doctor after examining you, who tells you you are as sound as a dollar and in good health, but when you put your coat on and are ready to go, he warns you you can probably drop dead as soon as you leave the office.

But you recognize in your presentation which you have made that this is not a perfect system. We all do. There are many, many bugs in it. There are many questions that remain unanswered, and many problems to be solved before these hearings are over.

Mr. ATWOOD. Yes, sir.