(c) The Chairman as principal executive officer and the Executive Director for Operations shall be governed by the general policies of the Commission and by such regulatory decisions, findings, and determinations, including those for reorganization proposals, budget revisions and distribution of appropriated funds, as the Commission may by law, including this Plan, be authorized to make. The Chairman and the Executive Director for Operations, through the Chairman, shall be responsible for insuring that the Commission is fully and currently informed about matters within its functions.

:

Section 3. (a) Notwithstanding sections 1 and 2 of this Reorganization Plan, there are hereby transferred to the Chairman all the functions vested in the Commission pertaining to an emergency concerning a particular facility or materials licensed or regulated by the Commission, including the functions of declaring, responding, issuing orders, determining specific policies, advising the civil authorities and the public, directing, and coordinating actions relative to such emergency incident.

(b) The Chairman may delegate the authority to perform such emergency functions, in whole or in part, to any of the other members of the Commission. Such authority may also be delegated or redelegated, in whole or in part, to the staff of the Commission.

(c) In acting under this section, the Chairman, or other member of the Commission delegated authority under subsection (b), shall conform to the policy guidelines of the Commission. To the maximum extent possible under the emergency conditions, the Chairman or other member of the Commission delegated authority under subsection (b), shall inform the Commission of actions taken relative to the emergency.

(d) Following the conclusion of the emergency, the Chairman, or the member of the Commission delegated the emergency functions under subsection (b), shall render a complete and timely report to the Commission on the actions taken during the emergency.

Section 4. (a) The Chairman may make such delegations and provide for such reporting as the Chairman deems necessary, subject tó provisions of law and this Reorganization Plan. Any officer or employee under the Commission may communicate directly to the Commission, or to any member of the Commission, whenever in the view of such officer or employee a critical problem of public health and safety or common defense and security is not being properly addressed.

(b) The Executive Director for Operations shall report for all matters to the Chairman.

(c) The function of the Directors of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, and Nuclear Regulatory Research of reporting directly to the Commission is hereby transferred so that such officers report to the Executive Director for Operations. The function of receiving such reports: is hereby transferred from the Commission to the Executive Director for Operations.

(d) The heads of the Commission level offices or successor offices, of General Counsel, Secretary to the Commission, Office of Policy Evaluation, Office of Inspector and Auditor, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel and Appeal Panel, and Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards shall continue to report directly to the Commission and the Commission shall continue to receive such reports.

Section 5. The provisions of this Reorganization Plan shall take effect October 1, 1980, or at such earlier time or times as the President shall specify, but no sooner than the earliest time allowable under Section 906 of Title 5 of the United States Code.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Horton, do you wish to make an opening statement?

Mr. HORTON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, following the accident at Three Mile Island, two commissions began investigations. One was the President's own Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, more popularly called the Kemeny Commission after its Chairman; and the other was a Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigation on the accident, usually referred to as the Rogovin report after its director. Also, by coincidence, the General Accounting Office was finishing up a 5-year evaluation of the NRC.

There are a lot of differences in these reports, but there is one theme that does run through all three. That theme is the lack of management and accountability in the current NRC. Indeed, the GAO report was even entitled, "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission: More Aggressive Leadership Needed."

The real question before us, then, is not, should NRC be reorganized to improve management and accountability, but, how should it be reorganized?

One school of thought wants to eliminate the Commission completely and replace it with a single administrator. This does, of course, have great appeal from an economic and efficiency viewpoint. On the other hand, since the primary purposes of the NRC are safety, policy, and rulemaking, it might be best to have many viewpoints with a diversity of opinion. Therefore, there are those that wish to retain the collegiality of the present Commission, but unfortunately that has proven to be inadequate for management and accountability by three different studies. Obviously, it appears that we need a combination of the management and efficiency of a single manager combined with the diversity of opinion inherent in a collegiality body.

While I intend to keep an open mind and listen to all witnesses, at first glance it does appear that this plan now before us does combine those features. For the first time, the Chairman of the Commission is placed in charge. He will be more than just the chief spokesman. Some very legitimate concerns have been raised that, indeed, the Chairman might be too powerful. This is something that must be considered and should be watched by the appropriate oversight committees, but I think there are adequate safeguards in the plan, and the collegiality of the Commission will still be retained for the very important duties of policy and rulemaking.

Mr. Chairman, the plan before us is not perfect, and we should not be fooled that any organization plan will prevent another Three Mile Island. The plan does, however, appear to be a good step in the right direction of more accountability and better management techniques to make the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a better orga

nization.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Horton.

Our witnesses today are Harrison Wellford of the Office of Management and Budget and the Chairman and Commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Our first witness is Harrison Wellford, the Executive Associate Director for Reorganization and Management at OMB, a position he has held for some 4 years.

He has appeared before the committee on many occasions and has always provided us with helpful information on reorganization

matters.

You have been candid and forthright in your statements and helpful to us in our deliberations. We are delighted to have you with us again, Mr. Wellford.

You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HARRISON WELLFORD, EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR REORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT, OFFICE ON MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET; ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM S. DINSMORE, SENIOR STAFF MEMBER; AND SUSAN CONNOR, LEGAL COUNSEL, PRESIDENT'S REORGANIZATION PROJECT

Mr. WELLFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have with me Bill Dinsmore from OMB, who has been coordinating the task force on the NRC reorganization, and also 'Susan Connor, the legal counsel for the reorganization project at OMB.

Mr. Chairman, I have a fairly lengthy prepared statement I would like to summarize and submit for the record.

Mr. BROOKS. Without objection, it will be included in the record at this point.

[Mr. Wellford's prepared statement follows:]

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY

EXPECTED AT 10: 00 a.m.

TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1980

STATEMENT OF HARRISON WELLFORD

EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

BEFORE THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to present the President's proposal for strengthening the performance of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This reorganization is part of a series of actions taken by the President to improve nuclear safety management following the accident at Three Mile Island. The President is convinced that NRC's management structure impedes its Commissioners and staff in addressing safety issues and vigorously pursuing corrective actions.

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NRC's Organizational Difficulties Evidence of organizational problems within NRC is compelling, documented by broad-ranging investigations initiated after the Three Mile Island accident. Let me summarize those findings:

O

Following the accident, the President appointed a Commission,
headed by Dr. John Kemeny, to determine the causes and to
report to him and to the American people on measures needed to
strengthen nuclear safety. Among the Commission's conclusions
was the serious charge that lack of unified management in NRC
has contributed to safety issues not being raised, analyzed and
resolved. The Commission and the Chairman have not understood
their respective authority and responsibility. Lacking clear
leadership, program offices too often have proceeded on their own,
rather than together, in pursuing common safety objectives.

These findings have been corroborated and supplemented by a
comprehensive management study initiated by the NRC itself and
carried out by the firm of Mitchell Rogovin. This study bluntly
charged that the Commission "is not so much badly managed as
it is not managed at all." It stated that five Commissioners have
been dealing individually with the various office directors,
without coordination and even often in competition. A phrase
often heard in the agency is that each Commissioner feels he
"owns 20 percent of the agency." Lacking coherent direction,
NRC has not focused on priority objectives in advancing
nuclear safety.

A third study, by the General Accounting Office, highlighted
the Commission's failure to establish policy objectives and control
regulatory actions. Because authority of the Chairman and the
Executive Director for Operations is undefined, the staff has
lacked guidance and firm direction in meeting regulatory objectives.
The GAO study urged that the NRC Chairman be made the Chief
Executive Officer in fact as well as name.

In developing this Plan, we have consulted extensively with the NRC Chairman, other Commissioners and key officials. We have also obtained views from Members of Congress and from a range of knowledgeable persons within and outside the government.

A common theme emerges from these contacts and the studies: no one is accountable for managing the agency. This is most obviously true for emergencies where trying to respond by Commission action has confused the public and embarrassed the agency. The Three Mile Island accident showed that you cannot manage an emergency by committee. But, it is also clear that no one is now in charge of carrying out NRC's regular or non-emergency responsibilities. No one assures feedback of operating experience to institute corrective actions. Individual Commissioners have acted on their own in giving staff assignments. The Commission has neglected its collegial tasks, in part because each Commissioner has been immersed in management and administrative details. In response to such criticisms, NRC has taken some steps to clarify management responsibilities and to address its collegial tasks. But existing law remains an impediment to forceful and unified direction of the agency's regulatory activities. While improvement actions are welcome, they should still be confirmed and made permanent through enactment of the Plan.