They are the cases before the court at the present time and in which it appears to me that every phase of the questions, so far as the use of the space at the Union Station, and so far as the use of the space at the hotel is concerned, has been covered, so that we will finally get a decision on these cases that have been presented to the court, and on every angle of it; because I have no doubt that these cases, if decided adversely to the defendants, will go to the court of appeals, and the judge who tried the cases has intimated that there is only one case in which he is going to hold not guilty; so that out of the seven cases that were taken into court-there were eight, but one involving another question-every phase has been covered, and I was successful, so far as the police court was concerned, in having the court rule that that space in front of the Union Station was dedicated to the public, although the fee was in the Washington Terminal Co. Mr. ZIHLMAN. And your idea is that the cases will go to the court of appeals, and then you will get a ruling for the future guidance of the police department?

Mr. HART. That is my idea. In other words, this was my idea: We had the Willard Hotel case, which decided these taxicabs could stand in front of the hotel; then an act of Congress which prohibited loitering of any public vehicles at such places, and I wanted to know whether this act of Congress or the decision in the Willard Hotel case prevailed.

Mr. ZIHLMAN. The court in its decision referred to existing ordinances or regulations?

Mr. HART. It did. That is the only theory on which I could get into the police court; otherwise. I would have been bound by the decision of the court of appeals, because the minute I presented such a case to the police court the judge would have said, "Mr. Hart, are you not familiar with the decision in the Willard Hotel case?" I was, of course; but the question in my mind was whether or not the act of Congress of date subsequent to the Willard Hotel decision would not call for a different ruling.

Mr. ZIHLMAN. Are you familiar with the provisions of section 18 of this bill?

Mr. HART. I did not have it at all until last night, when Capt. Headley handed it to me. If I had had it earlier, I would have been very glad to have looked it over very carefully.

Mr. ZIHLMAN. As one who is thoroughly familiar with these cases, Mr. Hart, what is your idea as to the suggestions of Commissioner Brownlow as to the placing of taximeters in all cabs and putting them all on an equal basis? Do you think that would bring about an improvement of the existing conditions?

Mr. HART. I do. I think it was the Kutz case which decided that the Public Utilities Commission had control over the Terminal taxicabs-decided that they were common carriers; in that same case there were some intimations that the public hackmen were not doing such a volume of business that would call upon the Public Utilities Commission to take notice of them as a public utility. Under those circumstances I believe that if taximeters were placed on the public vehicles it would place them in a position where the Public Utilities Commission could have a greater control over them than they now have; the commissioners control their rates now by police regula

tions; but I think the taximeter would benefit both the public and the driver, and I think they should be placed on those vehicles by all means.

Now, you asked me to read section 18, and I have read, section 18. I think that it is a very good provision, and it is a thing that has been in my mind for a long time, and I have given voice to my views. I have always thought that I would like to see placed at the various hotels a space for a certain number of taxicabs and a space for an equal number of public vehicles, but I have serious doubts as to whether or not any such arrangements could be lawfully made, or whether the courts would not rule that the various hotels would have just cause for complaint if the street adjacent to their property was used for that purpose. I do not believe that the hotels have the exclusive control over the streets by any means, but I think they would have a grievance, and could maintain their posititon in court if there was an attempt to maintain such a space adjacent to the hotel, even though that street is owned by the United States Government. That is a question that will have to be decided. In equity, I think it should be done.

Mr. BURDICK. Wouldn't they have a right to establish public hack stands at any place?

Mr. HART. I believe they would have a right to establish public hack stands, but I have my serious doubts, as I have said, as to whether or not public hack stands could be established on a street immediately adjacent to a hotel.

Mr. BURDICK. What is the difference between a hotel and a business block?

Mr. HART. On the theory of the adjacent ownership that would arise. When a man erects a hotel he has a right to believe that he is going to have free access to that hotel, as well as the use of the interior of the hotel, and as times have developed we have grown out of the old idea of the inkeeper, and you are bound to have cabs there for the accommodation of the guests of that hotel; and I have my serious doubts-I do not say as a set proposition that it can not be done, but I seriously question whether a hotel would not have a lawful grievance if a public hack stand was established at that hotel, and I do not believe you are going to remedy it much by so doing, and for this reason: If you put them close to the door and the public hack stand 20 or 30 feet up the street, there is dissatisfaction there; and if you put the private hackers here at the door and the Terminal Taxicab Co. up there there will be dissatisfaction.

Mr. ZIHLMAN. Do you think there will be an improvement, and that it will remedy the condition, to follow out the suggestion of Mr. Brownlow that there be a requirement of placing all traffic on an equality by requiring all to take out a license?

Mr. HART. I do. I believe also that the Fickling case in the Court of Appeals has decided that the Terminal taxicabs are public vehicles, and I am satisfied under that decision they are subject to a publicvehicle license. I can give you a citation to that case if you would like to have it.

Mr. ZIHLMAN. Yes; I would like to have it.

Mr. HART. District of Columbia v. Fickling (33d Appeals, 371). I think you will find that case decided that the cabs of the Terminal Taxicab Co. were public vehicles.

Mr. ZIHLMAN. But they are not required under existing conditions to take out a hacker's license?

Mr. HART. They never have been.

Mr. ZIHLMAN. In your prosecutions in the police court, Mr. Hart, do you believe that it is necessary to establish a separate court for the handling of the traffic cases, with a judge who will sit exclusively in cases of that kind?

Mr. HART. I think that one of the greatest individual problems at the present time is traffic, and I am a firm believer that a traffic court should be created. I know that you want my opinion in these matters.

Mr. ZIHLMAN. That is correct.

Mr. HART. I do not believe that task should be put upon a judge of the police court-one of the two judges now sitting because I do not believe that you are remedying conditions. The reason, among others, for a traffic court is the great volume of business; and if you still send these traffic cases into a police court, or, as you will term it, a traffic court, you will still have that police judge trying these cases, although he is going to be called a traffic judge. Now, does it not result in this: He is going to have the same number of cases, and it is only a matter of deciding which cases he is going to hear first-the miscellaneous cases at one hour and traffic cases at another. That does not relieve the situation, and my opinion is that there should be established a court separate and distinct from the police court to hear traffic cases.

I had no idea what questions were going to be propounded to me, but I brought with me copies of my annual reports showing the number of informations filed in the District of Columbia branch of the police court for a good many years back. That will give you an idea of the work in the district branch. If you desire that data, I would be glad to give it to you.

Mr. ZIHLMAN. Yes; we would like very much to have it, because that is one of the questions we are going to have to decide-whether we shall establish this court, or whether it is to be put under the existing police judge, or whether a new office is to be created.

Mr. HART. This is a memorandum of the revenue from the D. S. United States branch. [Referring to paper.] Now, here are the number of cases filed in the police court in the District branch and the United States branch from January 1, 1908, to December 31, 1918. You are only concerned with the District of Columbia cases, as I understand, the branch which the traffic cases come into. Mr. ZIHLMAN. Yes.

Mr. HART. 1908, 15,515; 1909, 17,358; 1910, 17,061; 1911, 18,563; 1912, 18,685; 1913, 23,144; 1914, 23,363; 1915, 24,916; 1916, 20,086; 1917, 29,855; 1918, 29,654.

Mr. BURDICK. What are those; all classes of cases?

Mr. HART. They are all classes of cases; informations that were filed.

Mr. ZIHLMAN. Traffic cases?

Mr. HART. No; informations that were filed in the District branch of the police court; all informations that were filed. Mr. BURDICK. Have you the traffic cases?

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Mr. HART. Now, the traffic, I could only give you for the yearyou could get them from the police department. When I forwarded my annual report for the fiscal year 1918, and the fiscal year 1917, I listed the various informations filed; that was my first two years Then I discovered that the police department did the identical same thing, and I saw no reason for a duplication, so I simply gave the total number of informations in my last report.

Now, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, I can differentiate between the total number and the traffic cases. The total number for that year was 29,021. Now, violations of the speed regulations that year were 5,838; and the police regulations, the majority of which were traffic regulations, 10,545.

Mr. ZIHLMAN. That includes all cases where they simply appeared at the precinct police station, where they appeared and deposited collateral?

Mr. HART. As a result of information filed in the police court. Mr. ZIHLMAN. All informations?

Mr. HART. Yes; you see the policeman will make his arrest to-day; he will notify the party arrested to go to the police precinct and leave collateral or meet him in court. In any event, the policeman appears the following morning before the prosecuting officer, and files an information, and if the party arrested has placed collateral at one of the various police precincts and fails to appear in court such collateral as he has deposited is forfeited; if he does appear he is entitled to his trial by the court, and that is something I will speak about later.

Mr. BURDICK. You say if he failed to appear?

Mr. HART. If he failed to appear the information is turned into a warrant, unless collateral had been deposited.

Mr. BURDICK. Well, I understood——

Mr. HART (interposing). Just the contrary.

Mr. BURDICK (continuing). That if he failed to appear and forfeited his collateral, nothing further would be done.

Mr. HART. Unless in the opinion of the prosecuting attorney there is some peculiar reason why that individual should be brought into

court.

Mr. BURDICK. Is the warrant issued?

Mr. HART. Is a warrant issued?

Mr. BURDICK. If he fails to appear?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURDICK. What is done with it then; is it pigeonholed?
Mr. HART. I should say not.

Mr. BURDICK. What I want to get at is the statement here made that the man puts up his collateral and forfeits it if he does not appear and nothing further is done. Is that the situation?

Mr. HART. That is not true. The procedure is this: Up to the point that I have described the man has not appeared in court. The policeman swears to the information. He goes into court. His name is called. He fails to respond in court. It is then turned into a warrant based on the information. That warrant goes to police headquarters, where it is recorded, and from police headquarters it goes to the precinct in which the individual policeman who swore to the charge is on duty. That warrant is turned over to the officer for service. He is supposed to serve the warrant.

Mr. BURDICK. Well, does he?

Mr. HART. I should say that in a vast majority of cases he does; but there are some cases where I presume he would not be able to locate the defendant.

Mr. BURDICK. Then what did the commissioner mean by the statement that in the vast majority of cases they forfeit the collateral and the charge is dropped and they do not have to appear in court to answer?

Mr. HART. I am going to explain that in this way: I do not believe that there should be any ironclad ruling that there should be no forfeiture of collateral in all classes of cases.

Mr. BURDICK. No; I do not mean that, but it should not be in the vast majority of cases.

Mr. HART. Yes. In other words, I would say that where you have a more serious charge involving a traffic offense and where a conviction for the second offense calls for an increased penalty, then do not permit the forfeiture of collateral, because it has been held by the court that a forfeiture of collateral is not a conviction, and wherever your law is drawn it always speaks of a second "conviction." Therefore, you want to cover that particular phase. Mr. BURDICK. Yes.

Mr. HART. I do not believe that in each and every case it is necessary to hale a party into court. I have referred to the question of parking for 40 minutes when you are only allowed 30 minutes. I do not believe it is necessary to hale that party into court.

Mr. ZIHLMAN. But you do believe it should be passed upon by the traffic judge, if one is established; that he should be allowed to say what class of cases should forfeit collateral?

Mr. HART. Yes; either that or the prosecuting attorney, who is an officer of the court; and if he is a man of discretion and judgment, I think that he should be able to determine when a forfeiture should be permitted and when it should not be permitted.

Mr. BURDICK. Do you not believe that every time an information or warrant is issued it should be put through to final determination? Mr. HART. I do.

Mr. BURDICK. And passed upon by the judge?

Mr. HART. I do, with the exception that I have just given, that the prosecuting attorney, I believe, should be permitted to settle a great many of these cases. I do not believe it is necessary to take every one of these cases before the judge.

Mr. BURDICK. Of course, the prosecuting attorney can hear a complaint and if he believes it is trivial he would have a right to quash or dismiss it.

Mr. HART. In my experience I have had a great many cases where it was only just that I listen carefully to the defendant himself, and if I believed that he was guilty to a slight degree he should have a small penalty imposed. That is, I think, the proper procedure. I do not believe that that man, who has been guilty of some minor violation, should be kept away from his place of business and haled in before the judge on a trivial matter. Now, I did not completely answer your question, I believe.

Mr. BURDICK. No.

Mr. HART. About the question of forfeitures. With the congestion that there was in the police court for the two years that I was