police department. I even extend that view to other matters which are not now before the committee, where there is already divided authority, which I think does not work to the best advantage. Any other questions on that line, Mr. Zihlman? Mr. ZIHLMAN. No; I think that is all, Mr. Brownlow. Mr. BROWNLOW. Now, I believe and I am going to take up some of the less important things first, before coming to what I believe is the keystone of the structure. I think that traffic regulations as a whole would be greatly advantaged in the District of Columbia if in writing this legislation you gentlemen would make it a misdemeanor to violate an order displayed on a traffic signal properly mounted by the police department. As it is now, the commissioners when they make a traffic regulation have to give notice of it by publication for 30 days. Now, as a matter of fact, if we decide that there should be no left-hand turn, for instance, at the corner of Fourteenth Street and New York Avenue, we publish a regulation to that effect, and it is printed in the newspapers in the advertising pages, and nobody sees it, and nobody reads it. If a traffic signal is displayed at a place where three or four thousand drivers pass by it, everybody sees it; a large traffic sign or signal is put up at Fourteenth Street and New York Avenue, and every motorist who goes by sees that, and it is not necessary for him to see it every morning for 30 days until it sinks into his consciousness one morning is sufficient. Now, traffic is a liquid thing. An efficiently organized and competently administered branch of the police department ought to have the authority to regulate the traffic by the display of signs of the character I have just indicated, and the violation of an order so made, or ignoring of the advice on that traffic signal. should be made a misdemeanor punishable by a small fine. As a matter of fact, in most instances the signs are obeyed without question. Now, we should have the authority, when we make one-way streets, to do that without publication, because it may be desirable, because of a particular emergency that may arise, to make a street a one-way street for 10 days or two weeks, and then restore it to normal traffic; it may be desirable on account of building operations in progress or for some other reason; the presence of a large convention, and a large number of people attending a convention at some place requires special traffic regulations for the time that convention is in session that will not be necessary when it adjourns; and I believe a very simple provision giving a legal status to trafficsignals would enable us to accomplish a much more beneficial and elastic treatment of the traffic problem in the city as a whole. Now, one other question that I would like to suggest in this connection is with respect to public vehicles. I think the law should require all public vehicles to be equipped with a taximeter. That has been the law for many years in many European cities; in Paris and Berlin for many years even before the introduction of motor vehicles, and in London from the very beginning with respect to all motorized public vehicles, and I believe it should be the law here. I don't know anything that involves more difficulty and has puzzled legislators more than the regulation of the rates and fares of public carriages and public vehicles. The acts of the British Parliament show struggles with that problem from the very earliest time, and I believe the third act the Congress ever passed affecting the District of Columbia was one regulating the hire of public hacks. It has been a problem that has been variously affected by various acts of Congress and by various decisions of courts until the matter has got into a puzzling condition, which I confess I am unable to fathom or solve. I think sometimes I have found out what is the law about this and that, and then somebody else in the corporation counsel's office tells me about some other case which holds differently and it upsets my former ideas. I have not been able to find mental terra firma for my feet on that question. But I certainly think there ought to be a law that would eliminate any question whatever as between various classes of vehicles, for hire; and I believe that can be accomplished best by equipping all public vehicles with taximeters, and having the rate for those vehicles fixed by the Public Utilities Commission, as the Public Utilities Commission now does fix the rate for taxicab companies. That is a suggestion that I throw out as a radical cure for a great many evils of which you have heard great complaints, and of which we receive constant complaints. Mr. ZIHLMAN. Would you also provide that drivers of public hacks be provided with hackers' licenses? Mr. BROWNLOW. Unquestionably. Mr. ZIHLMAN. Put them all on the same basis? Mr. BROWNLOW. Put them all on the same basis. And then I think one of the things-while it has been explained to me I have never been able to understand it-I think that when a man on the street wants a taxicab and sees one empty he ought to be able to hale it, and the taxicab should be required to stop for him, and he should be able to engage it unless it is otherwise engaged. Mr. ZIHLMAN. If he has a license we could do that? Mr. BROWNLOW. Yes; I believe he ought to have a hacker's license, and a taximeter, and I believe there should be a uniform rate. Mr. ZIHLMAN. Haven't the commissioners power to make a regulation of that kind now? Mr. BROWNLOW. No, sir; I am advised we have not now. Now, the other question, which is in my opinion the chief question, the establishment of a traffic court. Traffic courts have been established in a great many cities of the country, and the necessity for their establishment is monthly and weekly and daily increasing. I believe that there should be established in the District of Columbia a traffic court presided over by a judge who has no other duties. I do not believe it will be sufficient, or that it will meet the situation to establish a branch of the police court to be known as a traffic court to be presided over by one of the police judges. I believe that a traffic judge who gives his special attention to the consideration of cases that are brought before him involving the traffic laws and regulations is essential. And for this reason: It is perfectly true, gentlemen, that the time of the court is greatly relieved because 75 per cent or 80 per cent of the traffic violators who are arrested and put up collateral for their appearance forfeit the collateral. That is what I want to stop. I want the traffic court, and then I would not permit any person to evade appearance before the traffic court by reason of the forfeiture of collateral. It is perfectly all right to accept collateral to guarantee the appearance of a man or woman in court if he or she is arrested. The objection is made that you would not have a lady, a refined woman in your family, who has parked her car at the wrong angle, placed in the position of going before the police judge. No; I would not; but I would have her go before the traffic judge. I have heard of persons who say when they are arrested about twice a month for parking their cars where it should not be parked, and where he puts up $2 collateral for his appearance and forfeits it, that it is worth $4 a month to him. There is no respect for law among people who habitually forfeit collateral. We have had a law on the statute books making it mandatory on the judge to impose a jail sentence for third conviction for violating the speed regulation. And yet there has been none-there has been no jail sentences imposed, because nobody is ever convicted of speeding they simply forfeit collateral, and the person who habitually forfeits his collateral is a person who does not care a whoop about the $10 or even a $50 forfeiture. But in every case of traffic violation, if that person is taken before a judge who understands the theory and purpose of a traffic regulation, the fine may be no more-it may cost the person no more than the forfeiture of collateral; maybe in some instances it will be less, but there is the psychological effect which will go a long way toward reestablishing that respect for law and order which, apparently, becomes atrophied the minute a man gets into a gasolinepropelled machine. Our best citizen, who will make the finest speech for the necessity of law and order in this country, will go out and beat the traffic cop, if he can, and then go out and joke about it and about the forfeiture of his collateral, and think it is smart to get away with it; where it would not be a joke and would not be a joking matter if in every case he had to go before the judge and his guilt and his innocence be determined, and if he knew that a repetition of that offense would result certainly in the revocation of his permit to drive and possibly a term in jail. Mr. BURDICK. This forfeiture of collateral is habitual? Mr. BURDICK. You mean under the law, or the judge Mr. BROWNLOW (interposing). Oh, you can send a bench warrant for the man, but, as a matter of fact, it is not done. It is a practice that has grown up in the District of Columbia, and the people of the District of Columbia are of the opinion that it is a universal practice and regard it as an established institution. Mr. BURDICK. Does that apply in every case; for instance, if I commit an assault? Mr. BROWNLOW. Not in the case of a serious offense. But it does in number of cases. Now, in theory he deposits so much money to insure his appearance in court, but he does not appear and that amount is forfeited. Of course, a bench warrant could be sent for him, but in practice, with the crowded conditions of the court, that has not been true, and 75 per cent-isn't that true, Mr. Hart? Mr. HART. Yes, sir. Mr. BROWNLOW. Seventy-five per cent of the cases have been ended with the forfeiture of the collateral. And it does not always mean that the man is guilty; he goes down and sees the corporation counsel, and the gravity of the offense will be determined in a measure by the prosecutor, who says, "We will permit you in this case to forfeit your collateral and end the case." Mr. BURDICK. You could stop that by special law if the law officers would enforce it? Mr. BROWNLOW. Yes; but without a judge devoting his entire time to this question you simply could not begin to do it with the two judges we have now, and only one of them sitting at a time in the District of Columbia police court. Now, another thing, we are killing too many people and maiming too many people; people are being run over by motorists who simply drive on; the respect for pedestrians is non est among a great many of them, and the fact that it is entirely unnecessary and the result of a recklessness and irresponsibility and a disregard of the rights of others, and is because a majority of them have never been haled into court. Of course, anybody is liable to have an accident. But reckless driving is reckless. For instance, here is a regulation about shooting by a street car which is standing still loading or discharging passengers. A violation of that regulation is never accidental. A man can have his mind off the main subject long enough to speed without intent. But a man does not shoot by a street car that is discharging or taking on passengers unless he knows that he is taking a chance, and a person that does that certainly ought to be fined very heavily in the first instance, and in the second instance ought to have his license revoked for one or two years, and in the third instance he ought to be sent to jail. Another reason why I think there should be a traffic court and why every case should be brought before the judge and no forfeiture of collateral accepted, if there is anything in the whole world I despise it is the man who, because of his wealth or prominence in business or official position, seeks to escape his responsibility in such a matter as traffic ordinances. And under the system of a forfeiture of collateral it allows that man to escape, and a poorer person without friends may receive a much greater punishment. Now, I believe that a man who stands behind his wealth, or his prominent position in business or in official life in order to get by with traffic violations is a man who is unworthy of any consideration whatsoever from any good citizen. And I furthermore believe that if there is a menace to our public institutions in this country it is the belief among great masses of the population that the laws do not reach the powerful and the wealthy as they do the weak and the poor. And if we have a traffic court, one of the very great things that will be eliminated is the belief among a certain class of prominent and wealthy people that they can get by with it. I feel very strongly on that subject, because efforts of using influence of that kind are repeatedly made, and I have never known of a man—no man ever successfully made an appeal of that kind to me and my views are so well known that very few are made now-but I have never heard of a man who does make that appeal because of his wealth or standing that I do not have a contempt for him. Mr. ZIHLMAN. Some of the evils you have just pointed out are covered in the bill, page 18, section 15, which requires a person operating a motor vehicle striking another person or any vehicle containing a person, to stop and render assistance and give his name if requested. Some criticism is made of the request having to be made. These violations are covered by a fine of not less than $100, nor more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, and in addition, the court shall, in the case of an operator, revoke the privileges granted by his operator's license card, and in case of any person having authority to control the operation of the motor vehicle, such motor vehicle shall be declared forfeited. No privilege revoked under the provision of this section shall be subsequently restored. Mr. BROWNLOW. Without definitely, Mr. Zihlman, having criticized the phraseology, I heartily approve of the provisions of section 15, under subsections 1, 2, and 3. I doubt, however, the wisdom of saying that no privileges revoked under this section shall be subsequently restored, because that is so hard and so fast that it will operate against the exercise of the salutary powers conferred in the the balance of the paragraph. Now, I believe this: That perhaps there should be a time limit fixed in the statute during which it shall not be restored. Mr. ZIHLMAN. Not for these crimes, striking a car containing another when under the influence of liquor or drugs. Mr. BROWNLOW (interposing). No; not when driving under the influence of liquor and not speeding, that should not be restored. The Commissioners of the District of Columbia have for the last 18 months, in every instance where a person has been charged with operating an automobile while under the influence of liquor, and that has subsequently been convicted or has forfeited the collateralthe commissioners have revoked each permit-we have restored the permits after they have been revoked-we have restored those permits in cases, the commissioners themselves going into the matter on the advice of the police department; we have gone into that matter, and ordinarily we have never restored a license until after 90 days; in some cases it has been a matter of two years, and we have refused some altogether. But there are cases where men have been arrested for driving an automobile while intoxicated, where the discovery of the fact that he was intoxicated was not due to any accident. I have a case in mind where a man got a little too much at a late party and started home, and he got within a half block of his garage, after having driven 3 miles, and he got that far without any untoward instance, and the policeman stopped him because he did not have his lights lit, and his breath was evidence of another condition, and we revoked his license, and in 90 days we restored it to him. So with respect to driving while under the influence of liquor I think the court should have the discretion to restore it once after a time limit. And I say that because of the experience I have had in the revocation of such permits during the past 18 months, where our practice has been invariably to revoke the permit. I am still embarrassed by the fact that I have not made a detailed study of the bill, Mr. Chairman. |