I.

reason; for if there are more Gods, that is, more beings ART. infinitely perfect, they will always think the same thing, and be knit together with an entire love. It is true, in things of a moral nature this must so happen: for beings infinitely perfect must ever agree. But in physical things, capable of no morality, as in creating the world sooner or later, and the different systems of beings, with a thousand other things that have no moral goodness in them, different beings infinitely perfect might have different thoughts. So this argument seems still of great force to prove the unity of the Deity. The other argument from reason to prove the unity of God, is from the notion of a Being infinitely perfect. For a superiority over all other beings comes so naturally into the idea of infinite perfection, that we cannot separate it from it. A Being therefore, that has not all other beings inferior and subordinate to it, cannot be infinitely perfect; whence it is evident, that there is but one God. But besides all this, the unity of God seems to be so frequently and so plainly asserted in the Scripture, that we see it was the chief design of the whole Old Testament, both of Moses and the prophets, to establish it, in opposition to the false opinions of the heathen, concerning a diversity of Gods. This is often repeated in the most solemn words, as, Hear, O Israel; the Deut. vi. 4. Lord our God is one God. It is the first of the Ten Commandments, Thou shalt have no other Gods but me.

And

Mat. iv. 10.

all things in heaven and earth are often said to be made by this one God. Negative words are also often used, There Isa. xliv. 6. is none other God but one: besides me there is none else, 8. and I know no other: the going after other Gods is reckoned the highest and the most unpardonable act of idolatry. The New Testament goes on in the same strain. Christ speaks of the only true God, and that he alone John xvii.3. ought to be worshipped and served; all the Apostles do 1 Cor. viii. frequently affirm the same thing: they make the believing 5, 6. of one God, in opposition to the many Gods of the heathens, the chief article of the Christian religion; and they lay down this as the chief ground of our obligation to mutual love and union among ourselves, That there is one Eph. iv. 4, God, one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism. Now since we 5, 6. are sure that there is but one Messias, and one doctrine delivered by him, it will clearly follow, that there must be but one God.

So the unity of the divine Essence is clearly proved both from the order and government of the world, from the idea of infinite perfection, and from those express declarations that are made concerning it in the Scriptures;

ART. which last is a full proof to all such as own and submit to

The third head in this Article is that which is negatively expressed, that God is without Body, Parts, or Passions. In general, all these are so plainly contrary to the ideas of infinite perfection, and they appear so evidently to be imperfections, that this part of the Article will need little explanation. We do plainly perceive that our bodies are clogs to our minds; and all the use, that even the purest sort of body, in an estate conceived to be glorified, can be of to a mind, is to be an instrument of local motion, or to be a repository of ideas for memory and imagination: but God, who is every where, and is one pure and simple act, can have no such use for a body. A mind dwelling in a body is in many respects superior to it; yet in some respects is under it. We who feel how an act of our mind can so direct the motions of our body, that a thought sets our limbs and joints a going, can from thence conceive, how that the whole extent of matter should receive such motions as the acts of the Supreme Mind give it; but yet not as a body united to it, or that the Deity either needs such a body, or can receive any trouble from it. Thus far the apprehension of the thing is very plainly made out to us. Our thoughts put some parts of our body in a present motion, when the organization is regular, and all the parts are exact, and when there is no obstruction in those vessels or passages, through which that heat and those spirits do pass, that cause the motion. We do in this perceive, that a thought does command matter; but our minds are limited to our bodies, and these do not obey them, but as they are in an exact disposition and a fitness to be so moved. Now these are plain imperfections; but removing them from God, we can from thence apprehend that all the matter in the universe may be so entirely subject to the divine Mind, that it shall move and be whatsoever and wheresoever he will have it to be. This is that which all men do agree in.

But many of the philosophers thought that matter, though it was moved and moulded by God at his pleasure, yet was not made by him, but was self-existent, and was a passive principle, but coexistent to the Deity, which they thought was the active principle: from whence some have thought, that the belief of two Gods, one good and another bad, did spring: though others imagine that the belief of a bad God did arise from the corruption of that tradition concerning fallen angels, as was before

:

I.

suggested. The philosophers could not apprehend that ART. things could be made out of nothing, and therefore they believed that matter was coeternal with God. But it is as hard to apprehend how a mind by its thought should give motion to matter, as how it should give it being. A being not made by God is not so easily conceivable to be under the acts of his mind, as that which is made by him. This conceit plainly destroys infinite perfection, which cannot be in God, if all beings are not from him, and under his authority; besides that successive duration has been already proved inconsistent with eternity. This opinion of the world's being a body to God, as the mind that dwells in it, and actuates it, is the foundation of atheism for if it be once thought that God can do nothing without such a body, then as this destroys the idea of infinite perfection, so it makes way to this conceit, that since matter is visible, and God invisible, there is no other God, but the vast extent of the universe. It is true, God has often shewed himself in visible appearances; but that was only his putting a special quantity of matter into such motions, as should give a great and astonishing idea of his nature, from that appearance: which was both the effect of his power, and the symbol of his presence. And thus what glorious representations soever were made either on mount Sinai, or in the pillar of the cloud, and cloud of glory, those were no indications of God's having a body; but were only manifestations, suited to beget such thoughts in the minds of men, that dwelt in bodies, as might lay the principles and foundations of religion deep in them. The language of the Scriptures speaks to the capacities of men, and even of rude men in dark times, in which most of the Scriptures were writ: but though God is spoke of as having a face, eyes, ears, a smelling, hands and feet, and as coming down to view things on earth, all this is expressed after the manner of men, and is to be understood in a way suitable to a pure Spirit. For the great care that was used, even under the most imperfect state of Revelation, to keep men from framing any image or similitude of the Deity, shewed that it was far from the meaning of those expressions, that God had an organized body. These do therefore signify only the several varieties of Providence. When God was pleased with a nation, his face was said to shine upon it; for so a man looks towards those whom he loves. The particular care he takes of them, and the answering their prayers, is expressed by figures borrowed from eyes and ears: the peculiar dispensations of rewards and punishments are ex

D

ART. pressed by his hands; and the exactness of his justice and I. wisdom is expressed by coming down to view the state of human affairs. Thus it is clear that God has no body: nor has he parts, for we can apprehend no parts but of a body so since it is certain that God has no body, he can have no parts: something like parts does indeed belong to spirits, which are their thoughts distinct from their being, and they have a succession of them, and do oft change them. But infinite perfection excludes this from the idea of God; successive thoughts, as well as successive duration, seem inconsistent both with eternity, and with infinite perfection. Therefore the essence of God is one perfect thought, in which he both views and wills all things and though his transient acts that pass out of the divine essence, such as creation, providence, and miracles, are done in a succession of time; yet his immanent acts, his knowledge and his decrees, are one with his essence. Distinct thoughts are plainly an imperfection, and argue a progress in knowledge, and a deliberation in council, which carry defect and infirmity in them. To conceive how this is in God, is far above our capacity: who, though we feel our imperfection in successive acts, yet cannot apprehend how all things can be both seen and determined by one single thought. But the Divine Essence being so infinitely above us, it is no wonder if we can frame no distinct act concerning its knowledge or will.

:

There is indeed a vast difficulty that arises here; for those acts of God are supposed free; so that they might have been otherwise than we see they are: and then it is not easy to imagine how they should be one with the Divine Essence; to which necessary existence does certainly belong. It cannot be said that those acts are necessary, and could not be otherwise: for since all God's transient acts are the certain effects of his immanent ones, if the immanent ones are necessary, then the transient must be so likewise, and so every thing must be necessary: a chain of necessary fate must run through the whole order of things; and God himself then is no free being, but acts by a necessity of nature. This some have thought was no absurdity: God is necessarily just, true, and good, not by any extrinsic necessity, for that would import an outward limitation, which destroys the idea of God; but by an intrinsic necessity, that arises from his own infinite perfection. Some have from hence thought that, since God acts by infinite wisdom and goodness, things could not have been otherwise than they are: for what is infinitely

wise or good cannot be altered, or made either better or worse. But this seems on the other hand very hard to conceive: for it would follow from thence, that God could neither have made the world sooner nor later, nor any other way than now it is: nor could he have done any one thing otherwise than as it is done. This seems to establish fate, and to destroy industry and all prayers and endeavours. Thus there are such great difficulties on all hands in this matter, that it is much the wisest and safest course to adore what is above our apprehensions, rather than to inquire too curiously, or determine too boldly in it. It is certain that God acts both freely and perfectly: nor is he a Being subject to change, or to new acts; but he is what he is, both infinite and incomprehensible: we can neither apprehend how he made, nor how he executes his decrees. So we must leave this difficulty, without pretending that we can explain it, or answer the objections that arise against all the several ways by which divines have endeavoured to resolve it.

The third thing under the head I now consider, is, God's being without passions. That will be soon explained. Passion is an agitation that supposes a succession of thoughts, together with a trouble for what is past, and a fear of missing what is aimed at. It arises out of a heat of mind, and produces a vehemence of action. Now all these are such manifest imperfections, that it does plainly appear they cannot consist with infinite perfection. Yet after all this, there are several passions, such as anger, fury, jealousy and revenge, bowels of mercy, compassion and pity, joy and sorrow, that are ascribed to God in the common forms of speech, that occur often in Scripture, as was formerly observed, with relation to those figures that are taken from the parts of a human body. Passion produces a vehemence of action: so when there is in the providences of God such a vehemence as according to the manner of men would import a passion, then that passion is ascribed to God: when he punishes men for sin, he is said to be angry: when he does that by severe and redoubled strokes, he is said to be full of fury and revenge: when he punishes for idolatry, or any dishonour done himself, he is said to be jealous: when he changes the course of his proceedings, he is said to repent: when his dispensations of providence are very gentle, and his judgments come slowly from him, he is said to have bowels. And thus all the varieties of Providence come to be expressed by all that variety of passions, which among men might give occasion to such a variety of proceeding.

ART.

I.