of laborers, there will be a rise in the wages, until it reaches the point where men can afford to learn the trade.

129. Exceptions to the law.

To this law there are two exceptions.

(a) When any particular calling is disagreeable, or in disrepute among men, the amount demanded and which must be paid as wages, will be somewhat above what it would be by the above rule, to overcome the reluctance to perform it arising from this

cause.

(b) When the occupation is particularly pleasant and honorable, many will undertake it for the pleasure and honor, and thus will serve for less than the mere commercial value of their services. Of this kind are the services of professional men, the devotees to art and science generally.

130. Effect of constancy of occupation.

The above statements apply to cases in which wages are computed by the year. When, however, we have occasion to compute by a shorter period, as by the day, hour, etc., there is often another element, that comes in to modify the result, which is sometimes called the constancy or steadiness of the occupation.

Thus masons can seldom get work all through the winter, their wages will, therefore, be higher in proportion during the summer, and the weather when they can work. Physicians, and men of that kind, are liable to very great irregularity and inconstancy in the occupation of their time. They charge more per hour than if their occupation was constant.

Or again, when any kind of business is positively unhealthy, men will charge for their time, a sum in proportion to the time they are likely to lose by sickness.

131.

Second law determining the rate of wages.

The second law arises from the limitation of supply for the demand. This law applies to men of extraordinary gifts only, the great men in any department, are few and never in excess of the demand. Hence they can demand for their services what they please, and they usually get it.

In an ordinary lawsuit, for example, a lawyer of ordinary capacities will answer all purposes. And he cannot charge exorbitant fees, for there are so many that can do the work as well as he that their competition will deprive him of work altogether, unless he will work as cheaply as they. But in one

of those cases where large amounts are at stake, and the cause one that requires the greatest skill, the

men who have that skill are so few that they can demand almost anything they please, and the prices such persons can command have no constant ratio to the expenses of educating them. The only limit to price in such cases is intrinsic value; it cannot rise above that.

132. Average cost of reproduction will not explain them.

Writers on Political Economy have usually attempted to account for the exceptionally large fees or salaries that such persons get, on the same principle-the average cost of reproduction—as they apply to ordinary cases. But I think they fail, for two reasons:

(1) It often happens that such extraordinary persons have expended no very great amount on their education; they rise to their eminence by virtue of some natural gift, and with no more than the ordinary means of education and no more than the ordinary amount of labor and study in preparation.

(2) But generally no amount of labor, tuition, or expenditure of any kind can make such men "to order." A state may be in never so great need of great statesmen or a great general, and it may have all the appliances and means for educating and “making" them. But they will not come at its call.

It may be in "perishing" need, but its calamities and its clamors alike pass unheeded, unless there be some one God-made man adequate to the emergency, and then he is invaluable, worth more than all other men without him.

133. In what sense wages equal in all departments.

Leaving now this last class out of the account, and taking note only of the great mass of laborers, the common run of men, such as exist or can be produced by education to any extent that may be wanted, and we have the law that

"Taking the cost of education into account, the wages of labor in all departments will be equal."

If there is no outside influence, no misgovernment, no unjust legislation, the thing will take care of itself and come to this result; the law of supply and demand is good for that.

134. This just as well as necessary.

I have been aiming in this discussion to point out and discuss the laws that regulate the different rates of wages that are paid to men in the different callings and occupations of life, rather than to show the justice of what they will get, to show what will be, rather than what ought to be. It may be

worth while, however, to pause for a moment to show that what will thus occur, is just and right on the fundamental principles of justice.

It is not an uncommon notion among the laborers of the lower order, that they do all the work and get but a small share of the wealth. But work to be effective, requires brains as well as muscle, good calculation as well as diligent toil. And we often see that a company of ten men, for example, with one man to plan and guide them in their work, will accomplish a good deal more than one-tenth more than they would with no such guidance. They are more likely to accomplish twice as much with him as they could without, thus showing that he is really the most effective laborer of them all, perhaps, more effective than them all.

135. Different rates of rent.

The same laws, in general, will regulate the rent that will be paid for capital, as compared with the wages of labor, and for one kind of capital when compared with another.

There may be objects that, like Niagara Falls, are unique and cannot be reproduced, which will fix their own price, irrespective of the cost of reproduction, since reproduction in such cases is impossible, and the only limit to the price they command is,