Mr. BORKIN. I am listing the judges Judges Chase, Swan, and the two Hands, four other judges-testified.

Senator TYDINGS. You said it was incomprehensible to you that the judges of the court, of this court of appeals, could not have known that he was engaged in questionable activities or improprieties. What did you mean by that?

Mr. BORKIN. In other words, his conduct was so open and notorious, the curious people who kept running in and out of his office, the discussions in the circuit, in the area around the courthouse, were such that you would have to be blind not to know that a malignant influence was at work.

Senator TYDINGS. You mean it was widely known in the courthouse that Judge Manton was on the take?

Mr. BORKIN. When you say among those who were in a position to know by being in the courthouse every day, that includes the press, that includes the clerks, that includes the assistants and, I suppose, the cleaning women.

Senator TYDINGS. Probably. Did they have law clerks in those days? Mr. BORKIN. I believe they did. Yes, I know they did, because some of this information I got was from one of the law clerks of the other four judges. In other words, he reported to me that one of them, at least, went to see President Hoover to be certain that Manton would not be appointed in Justice Butler's place should Butler retire. Senator TYDINGS. To the Supreme Court?

Mr. BORKIN. Yes.

Senator TYDINGS. You mean one judge?

Mr. BORKIN. One of the judges; at least, one of his law clerks told me that.

Senator TYDINGS. And yet that same judge went in and testified for him at the trial?

Mr. BORKIN. Right; had to; right.

Now, I have no proof, but I have awfully good testimony of a very prominent lawyer today and a very honorable man, who told me that, and I think it has appeared in other publications. I think another book referred to it, that such a visit was made or request was made of President Hoover.

So this would speak really for a national commission.

Senator TYDINGS. Mr. Borkin, although you prefer a more complete disclosure, would it be adequate, in your opinion, to secure the reliability of the judiciary, if section 391(a) remained as drafted and was used to reveal apparent conflicts of interest, while a title I commission, with subpena powers, could investigate those problems of bribery and/or other charges of corruption?

Mr. BORKIN. First, let me say this, because this is a peculiar area of inquiry, unique, this is one part of the social scene which is as delicate as walking on eggs. I do not know whether you have experienced it, but I have, in the writing of my book, where people think that because I have exposed judicial corruption and written on it that maybe I will be in trouble, which is a very odd point of view when you stop to think of it for a moment. In other words, that the judges and others will visit their wrath on me. Of course, that is not the case at all.

Also, I cannot understand why a private foundation, let alone the Government, does not make a study to find out the prevalence, in a

general way, not by name, of psychotic, drunk, difficult, improperjudges who act improperly. I do not think we have anywhere a study

of this.

Here we have a judiciary, not contemplated by the Founding Fathers, of 500 judges. The only way you can remove them is by impeachment, an utterly absurd task physically. Now, out of 500 judges the ordinary statistics would indicate you are going to find that some are drunks, you are going to find some are senile, you are going to find others with other disabling maladies, let alone conflict of interest and let alone outright corruption.

But why is it that nobody wants to make a study of this? There seems to be an utter reluctance just to look at the facts.

I would urge you, as a committee, why not have an overall survey? Maybe we are talking about a problem that does not exist or maybe we are talking about a real problem, but we really do not know. I do not know. Maybe you can urge a foundation to make a study. I think this would be very helpful.

I would hate to see it hold up the passage of this Judiciary Reform Act and, by the way, this Judiciary Reform Act in its present form is great.

My recommendations are relatively minor within the context of the whole act. I would like to see them enacted. But the filing of assets alone would have a great effect, because the judges still would have to write them down.

Senator TYDINGS. All right. I certainly appreciate your being with us this morning, Mr. Borkin. Your book and the facts that you have illuminated and exposed have been of great assistance to us in this area and, if we are successful in passing legislation in this field, you will have made a much-needed contribution in that direction.

Mr. BORKIN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, and more power to you.

Senator TYDINGS. Thank you. The Subcommittee will recess subject to the call of the Chair.

THE JUDICIAL REFORM ACT

WEDNESDAY, MAY 1, 1968

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENTS IN JUDICIAL

MACHINERY OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room 6226, New Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph D. Tydings (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Tydings.

Also present: M. Albert Figinski, chief counsel; Thomas G. Gherardi, deputy counsel; and Richard Nelson, minority counsel. Senator TYDINGS. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate now resumes its consideration of S. 3055, the Judicial Reform Act, and S. 3060, S. 3061, and S. 3062, measures to improve the administration of justice in the courts of the United States. In earlier hearings on these bills, we have heard from two distinguished senior judges of the United States, and from a distinguished attorney. Today we are to hear from a preeminent scholar in the area of judicial administration and from two administrators of programs that the bills we study would amend or modify.

The first part of our inquiry today relates to the establishment of a Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure, to retirement programs for our Federal judges, and to other administrative details of our bills.

There is, perhaps, no greater repository of information about the administration of courts than the American Judicature Society. The Society has time and again rendered invaluable assistance to this subcommittee, even as it has to scholars, court administrators, judges, and bar associations across the country. The executive director of the Society, and the editor of its fine journal, Judicature, is Glenn R. Winters, no stranger to this subcommittee. He is recognized by all concerned about judicial administration as a distinguished innovator and supporter of programs to improve the administration of justice. Mr. Winters, we are delighted to welcome you. We are pleased to see that you are accompanied by your daughter, and we are delighted to welcome her as well to this hearing.