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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 7, 1968 Mr. ('Lark (for himself, Mr. BREWSTER, Mr. Byrd of West Virginia, Mr. Can
xox, Mr. COOPER, Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. GRUENING, Mr. Harris, Mr. HART, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. Javits, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. KENNEDY of New York, Mr. LAUSCHE, Mr. Long of Missouri, Mr. McCarthy, Mr. McGee, Mr. McGovern, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. Mondale, Mr. Montoya, Mr. MORSE, Mr. Moss, Mr. NELSON, Mr. Pell, Mr. PROUTY, Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. RIBICOFF, Mr. Scott, Mr. Tydings, Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey, Mr. Y ARBOROUGH, and Mr. Young of Ohio) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
To extend certain expiring provisions under the Manpower
Development and Training Act of 1962, as amended.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 3 That the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962
4 is amended as follows:
(1) Section 104 (a) of the Act (LABOR MOBILITY
DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS) is amended by striking п
out “1968" in the first sentence of such section, and
(2) Section 105 of the Set (TRAINEE PLACEMENT
ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS) is amended
by striking out “1968” in the first sentence of such section, and inserting in lieu thereof "1970";
(3) Section 251 of the Act (PART D-CORREC
TIONAL INSTITUTIONS) is amended by striking out "1969" in the first sentence of such section, and insert
ing in lieu thereof “1970";
(4) Section 304(a) of the Act is amended by striking ont “1968” and “1969”, and inserting respectively in lieu thereof “1969" and "1970";
(5) Sections 310 (a) and 310 (b) of the Act are
amended by striking out."1969” wherever it appears,
EVALUATING FEDERAL MANPOWER PROGRAMS (Paper delivered by Garth L. Mangum* to Industrial Relations Research
Association December 28, 1967) Summarizing two years of effort in 3500 words indicates either low output or high discipline. The task can best be accomplished in summary form with a few generalizations about the state of manpower policy and a brief evaluation of specific programs. References are given for data and details.
A. NATURE OF FEDERAL MANPOWER POLICY 1. There is no federal manpower policy in the dictionary sense: "a definite course of action selected from among alternatives, and in light of given conditions, to guide and determine present and future decisions.” However, there are programs and practices which can be analyzed in aggregate and from which policy emphases can be extracted.
2. Legislation in the 1950's such as the National Defense Education Act and practices of agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission emphasized manpower as an economic resource, with particular concern for the development of scientific and technical manpower. Spending for such purposes increased during the 1960's and now totals over $5 billion annually. However, the focus of public manpower efforts during the 1960's shifted in another direction.
3. The thrust of the manpower programs of the past five years has been to aid those who face various disadvantages in competing for jobs. This emphasis is attested to more by legislative and administrative efforts and public discussion than by expenditures of less than $2 billion per year.
B. OVERALL CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL MANPOWER POLICY 1. The relevant manpower programs which emphasize in varying degrees services for the competitively disadvantaged are the Manpower Development and Training Act, the Vocational Education Act of 1963, the Vocational Rehabilitation program and the several manpower components of the Economic Opportunity Act. The EOA programs are not evaluated in this paper since they are considered in Sar Levitan's contribution. However, they do figure in these generalizations about the state of manpower policy. In addition, the United States Emlopyment Service is included, not as a program but as a major deliverer of services.
2. This array of programs did not emerge as part of any systematic effort to identify and provide each of the services needed by various disadvantaged groups or by all the disadvantaged. Instead individual acts were written, considered, and amended in rapid succession to meet current crises, real or imagined, with little attention to their interrelations. Though overall objectives are reasonably clear, the objectives of some of the individual programs are not."
3. The resources and enrollments in all of these programs are too small relative to the size of the labor force and the magnitude of needs to have had an appreciable impact on the problems they were intended to "solve.” Remedial programs for the disadvantaged currently enroll an average of only 300,000 people at any point in time—this in an economy where in prosperous 1966, 2.5 million persons were unemployed 15 weeks or more, 850,000 were unemployed over half the year, 1.3 million looked for but did not find any work, 1.3 million males 25 to 64 years of age did not seek work and more than five million persons worked for less than the federal minimum wage.
4. The 1961-67 period is most appropriately viewed as an experimental one during which many things were tried with varying degrees of success and failure. A positve contribution of these efforts was the identification of a number of services which have proven useful in lowering the obstacles to employment and retention of the disadvantaged. A few of these are:
(a) Outreach to seek the discouraged and undermotivated and encourage them to partake of available services;
•Garth L. Mangum is Co-Director of the Center for Manpower Policy Studies at The George Washington University where he is evaluating federal manpower programs and policies under a grant from the Ford Foundation.
Sar A. Levitan and Garth L. Mangum, Making Sense of Federal Manpower Policy, Polics Papers In Human Resources and Industrial Relations, No. 2, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, the University of Michigan, Wayne State University, 1967.
(6) Adult basic education, to remedy the lack of obsolescence of earlier schooling and prevocational orientation to expose those with limited experience to alternative occupational choices;
(c) Training for entry level skills, for those unprepared to profit from the normally more advanced training which assumes mastery of rudimentary education;
(d) Training allowances, to provide support and an incentive for those undergoing training and residential facilities for youth whose home environment precludes successful rehabilitation;
(e) Work experience, for those accustomed to the discipline of the work place;
(f) Job development, efforts to solicit job opportunities suited to the abilities of the disadvantaged job seeker;
(9) Relocation and transportation assistance to bring the workers to where the jobs are;
(h) Subsidization of private employment of the disadvantaged;
(i) Job coaching to work out supervisor-worker adjustments after a job is found;
(j) Creation of public service jobs tailored to the needs of job seekers not absorbed in the competitive market. 5. Essential as these services are, they are available through no one program, agency or labor market institution. The various programs are limited in the services they can offer. The budgetary committments for the various services are not rationally related to need. For instance, there are currently more slots for work relief than for training when training should probably stand above work relief in the hierarchy of remedial services.
6. The administrative capability to deliver these services has yet to be developed. At the local level, there is no single agency or combination of easily accessible institutions where those seeking help can find it. Neither has any community the resources to provide some type of service to all who need it. A multiplicity of federal funding sources encourages interagency competition at the federal level and a proliferation at the local level placing a premium on "grantsmanship." Coordination has been tried with little success and consolidation of programs has been limited. Existing agencies have changed their orientation and biases but slowly and only under considerable outside pressure. New agencies have yet to learn effective practices. Surprisingly little has been done, considering the number of programs and the level of expenditures, to develop or train capable staffs at any level of government.
The currently approved model for delivering comprehensive manpower services is the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP). It attempts to concentrate and integrate the efforts of existing programs on behalf of target populations. It appears to have two premises : (1) the complex of programs and agencies can be integrated and focused through a single local institution; (2) while sufficient resources can not be marshalled for a measurable national impact, concentration of both financial resources and administrative capability on narrowly defined targets may make an appreciable difference in a limited number of big city slums and rural depressed areas. The brief CEP experience argues for both technical assistance for planning and management capability and augmented resources to avoid becoming one more link in a chain of unfulfilled promises.
7. Administration officials and Members of Congress have been too impatient to await the results of new and existing programs and to allow for restructuring, removal of negative elements, and finally their expansion into effective programs. As a result, there has been an excessive resort to gimmicks and to attempts to devise "instant policies for instant success.” The procedure has become a familiar one. New approaches are designed intuitively rather than empirically. They are launched with public relations fanfare, complete with numerical goals and early target dates. Manipulation of numbers to "prove" success then becomes a major staff function until a quiet burial of the goals and targets can be devised. The favored gimmicks of the moment are the CEP approach and private enterprise involvement. Both have promise as part of the manpower policy arsenal of weapons but the experiences of neither to date has earned the warmth with which they are being embraced.
8. For no program are there adequate valid data for evaluation of strengths and weaknesses and no program currently has a reporting system capable of producing such data. Data on the characteristics of enrollees are adequate in some but not all programs. Data on services provided are weak and follow-up
data on program results are grossly inadequate and undependable. Ad hoc internal evaluations have been made of several programs, either in-house or by contract, but for the most part, their coverage is limited, their data weak and their investigations not probing.
9. Nevertheless, one concludes from observation, available data and piecing together other fragmentary evidence that some programs are at least moderately successful and merit expansion. None is a clearly proven failure, though in several cases the funds could have been better spent elsewhere. Through this necessary experimental process many lessons have been learned, needs probed and useful services identified. Congress has demonstrated a willingness to change and adapt programs in light of administrative experience. Expansion of programs has been slower than anticipated but less because of Congressional reluctance than absence of aggressive Administration requests.
C. PROGRAM EVALUATION 1. MDTA:
MDTA's original objective was to retrain experienced adult family heads displaced by economic and technological change. As labor markets have tightened, its emphasis has shifted to the disadvantaged. MDTA consists of two distinct components-institutional and on-the-job training (OJT)—which are best evaluated separately.
a. The institutional training program has built-in "creaming" tendencies since its enrollees are primarily those who have sought help from an Employment Service office. Nevertheless, MDTA institutional training is increasing its proportionate enrollment of the non-white, the young, the public assistance recipient, the handicapped and those with 9 to 11 years of education. It has yet to make significant progress in serving those with 8 years of schooling or less and persons over 44 years of age. Over half the institutional enrollees are apparently drawn from families with annual incomes of less than $3000 per year. The institutional training program probably "creams" within each disadvantaged category. However, the 70 to 80 MDTA skill centers clearly reach a more disadvantaged clientele than other MDTA projects and are probably reaching as deeply as any program except perhaps the Job Corps.
b. The OJT program has never served appreciable numbers of disadvantaged and its record has been worsening in all categories. This may in part be due to recent pressures to expand it to one-half of the total MDTA enrollment, primarily to get more enrollees within the same fixed budget. Enrollment means employment and employers are quality conscious. The federal administrators of the program in the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training are experienced at promoting apprenticeship but accustomed to leaving recruitment and selection to employers and unions. To augment the limited BAT staff, OJT slots have been contracted to trade associations who subcontract the training to their members or to community action agencies, unions and civil rights organizations who subcontract, usually with smaller employers. The trade associations have a quality bias and the community contractors, while they have the right prejudices, lack experience and competence.
c. Overall, the MDT program has a favorable cost-benefit experience. The completers have more stable employment and higher earnings after training when compared with their own pre-training experience and with control groups. Disadvantaged institutional completers still have a more difficult time finding jobs than other completers but have better experience than in the absence of training. The disadvantaged have a difficult time getting into OJT but once in have retention rates not significantly different from those of the non-disadvantaged.
In addition to its contributions to its enrollees, MDTA has had a positive influence on the Employment Service on Vocational Education and, to a small degree, on apprenticeship. There are continuing issues of priority between serv
* For detailed evaluation of the Manpower Development and Training program see Garth L. Mangum, Contributions and Costs of Manpower Derelopment and Training, Policy Papers in Human Resources and Industrial Relations, No. 5, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, The University of Michigan, Wayne State University, 1967. The MDTA reporting wystem is set up to produce adequate data on trainee characteristics, training occupations, completions and employment experiences of the first post-training year. However, serious under-reporting makes the latter of doubtful validity and makes 'state-by-state analyses staky. The OJT reporting is particularly bad. The reporting system is especially poor on costs and the nature of the training given. A mass of data is poured into the computers but there have not been the staff resources and top level interest to see that it was retrieved and analyzed for managerial and evaluative purposes. Nevertheless, more information is available than for other programs.