Mr. Tallamy, let me ask you a few questions, if I may, for the purpose of information.

Let me direct your attention first to the situation that exists in fiscal year 1960. The appropriation for highway purposes was contained in the bill that went to the President recently, H.R. 7349, making appropriations for the Department of Commerce and related agencies. That is true; is it not?

Mr. TALLAMY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. While that matter was before the Senate an amendment was added on page 12 of the bill respecting the appropriation for Federal-aid highways.

Mr. TALLAMY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your understanding that the language of this appropriation confines expenditures for highway trust purposes in fiscal 1960 to that amount of money which is available for highwayconstruction purposes from the trust fund?

Mr. TALLAMY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The appropriation bill does not, in your opinion, make appropriation of any deficiencies that may exist between the actual obligation for expenditure and the trust fund out of the general fund?

Mr. TALLAMY. It makes no provision, in my judgment, for that. The CHAIRMAN. Is that the opinion of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and other governmental agencies that would be involved with you in the payment of these amounts in fiscal 1960?

Mr. TALLAMY. Yes; I would judge that is true because every conversation that I have had so far indicates clearly that we all agree that the funds must come from the trust fund.

The CHAIRMAN. As I read the record of what transpired in the Senate, that clearly is not what was intended, apparently.

I discussed this matter with certain members of the Appropriations Committee representing the House in the conference between the House and the Senate, and it was not what they intended apparently, from what they told me.

But if the language of the statute says something, that is what you have to do, of course.

Mr. TALLAMY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the thought then of the executive departments involved that you will only be able to incur expenditures in fiscal 1960 for highway-construction purposes, regardless of what we may owe the States, to the extent of the amount that will be available in fiscal 1960 in the trust fund?

Mr. TALLAMY. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You say, according to your best estimates, that amount of money in the trust fund will be some $500 million short of the claims that will be presented to the Federal Government by the States representing the States' portion of the highway-construction cost actually incurred and paid during fiscal 1960?

Mr. TALLAMY. That is right; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to interrogate the Director of the Bureau of the Budget when he comes to the committee on that point. The other day I talked to him about this hearing and suggested that he prepare himself to discuss it with us, because you had given us, as I recall, this

same information when you were before this committee in executive session a week ago last Friday.

Mr. TALLAMY. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Since then I have had these conversations again with members, and there does seem to be some difference as between the language as you interpret it and what was actually intended.

I have a number of questions, Mr. Tallamy, about the overall situation that I want to go into with both you and Mr. Allen. But before I do that I think it would be fair for the Chair to yield to other members of the committee who may have some questions at this particular point.

Mr. Boggs?

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Tallamy, you refer to the additional approximately 1,400 miles that you discovered after you had measured these connecting routes. Was that approximately 1,400 miles?

Mr. TALLAMY. I did not get the latter part of your question.

Mr. Boggs. We authorized 40,000 miles to connect certain areas of the United States, and you discovered that you could connect them with less than 40,000 miles. Is that correct?

Mr. TALLAMY. It did not take 40,000 miles to connect the points of origin and destination of traffic in the metropolitan areas which were included in the 1955 estimate.

Mr. BOGGS. Well, it took what; 38,000?

Mr. TALLAMY. It took 38,548.

Mr. BOGGS. So that you had approximately 1,400 miles left over, so to speak.

Mr. TALLAMY. Yes, sir; left over from connecting those particular cities that were connected in the 1955 estimate.

Mr. BOGGS. Then, without any further action on the part of Congress, you proceeded to allocate those 1,400 miles; did you not? Mr. TALLAMY. Yes,sir.

Mr. BOGGS. At the time that you made the allocation did you anticipate these difficulties with the trust fund?

Mr. TALLAMY. I guess we knew that the trust fund was not going to be able to meet the 1958 estimate of costs, yes, sir. But we did know also that the 1956 legislation stipulated that the Interstate Sysem should connect all of the principal metropolitan areas and industrial centers of the United States in the most direct manner and, at the same time, take care of local needs to the maximum extent possible with a system not to exceed 40,000 miles.

The States themselves had indicated to us that it would take an additional 13,000 miles to accomplish, in their judgment, the intent of connecting all of the principal metropolitan areas. So we did actually apportion 1,102 miles of the surplus to accomplish, to the maximum extent that we could, the joining of those metropolitan

areas.

Mr. BoGGs. Following through on that for a moment, in allocating this extra 1,400 miles did you consult with the States before you allocated it?

Mr. TALLAMY. Yes, sir. All of the States requested those designations before they were made.

Actually, the way it worked out was that there were a few of the routes which the States had not at the particular time requested desig

nation for. But in the analysis of the 13,000 miles which they had requested, it became very apparent that there were certain deficiencies in the system so far as integration of the system and other matters were concerned. We brought those to the attention of the States. After that the States then did request that they be designated. After the States designated them, we did designate them.

Mr. BOGGS. Where did you allocate this additional 1,400 miles? Mr. TALLAMY. I have a map, Mr. Boggs and Mr. Chairman, which I would like to show the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be glad to have you show it to us. (The above-mentioned map is as follows:)

Mr. TALLAMY. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, this map shows where he designations were made. One of the principal designations was from Erie, Pa., down to Pittsburgh. There is no through State highway, no proper way at all of getting all of this traffic from the Great Lakes area, the St. Lawrence area on down to the metropolitan complex and the industrial complex of Pittsburgh and Wheeling.

Mr. CURTIS. Are you talking about new, additional allocations now?

The CHAIRMAN. The question was with respect to the 1,452 miles that he allocated in addition to the original contemplation.

Mr. TALLAMY. These were a part of the 1,452 miles which had been mentioned.

I would like to point out again, though, for the benefit of the committee that the full 1,452 miles were not designated. Only 1,102 were. The other 350 are still held in reserve. But as a part of the 1,102 miles this route was added from Erie to Pittsburgh and Wheeling.

Another route added was from Canton, Ohio, on down through West Virginia and North Carolina to the vicinity of Charlotte, N.C. There is no principal way for this industrial area of the Great Lakes to get down to the southeastern seaports.

One of the principal points of the whole Interstate Highway System, of course, is to serve the national defense, and one of the vital points of national defense is to have all your national seaports so they can be used in time of emergency, and used effectively and quickly.

If the seaports in the northeast area should be blown out, what we want to do is to be able to get the interior complex of the southeastern seaports connected by rapid transportation. One of the primary ways of accomplishing that is through the Interstate System.

In that national defense aspect a system integration of this route stood very high. Also, of course, it is industrially important.

Another one that was added was from the vicinity of Cairo down to Nashville, Tenn. This is particularly important from a system integration point of view.

You will notice that the central and northwestern portion of the United States desiring to go to the southeastern portion of the United States by way of the Interstate System has to go down this way and come back up to get over to these ports of Savannah, Jacksonville, and Charleston, in through here. Or they would have to go out of the region in this fashion down and across [indicating]. So a crosscut route there was extremely important from the point of view of system integration, and that one was established.

Another one of vital importance was from San Antonio to Corpus Christi. We try to serve all communities of over 100,000, particularly seaports, and Corpus Christi had no important connection to the Interstate System. Because of that fact and our wanting to provide service to that type and size of community, the analysis showed that was acceptable.

Another important one was from Echo Junction to Ogden, bypassing Salt Lake City, another important defense point, because of the aspects of Salt Lake City, if anything happened there, we had a big bypass around it.

Here are city routes in Salt Lake City, Duluth, Chicago, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Syracuse, Scranton. Í give you a list of the cities.

There are a certain number of city routes that were added in order to complete the belt lines in or around those metropolitan areas. Those are the ones that have been designated out of the 1,102 miles. These that are shown in green and which I will now point to are those out of the extra 1,000 miles for which no estimate of cost may be included.

Up to Winnipeg, in that new industrial complex of Canada, it is an important thing to connect border points from the point of view of system integration, and this one began to stand up very well as leading to Mexico and leading to the southern ports, because otherwise you would be detouring out of the way to get to this major point of Canada. But it is a part of the 1,000-mile addition.

Another part of the 1,000 additional miles is from Denver to Cove Fort, Utah. There was a proposal to go up toward Salt Lake City. The States analyzed that and recommended that it proceed down to the Southwest.

You will notice there is no place in the United States where they only have four routes across the country. And from a system of integration, so as to permit traffic to go directly across the United States and from the northeastern part of the United States to the southwestern part of the United States, that route proved to be a desirable one to undertake although it is not part of the 1,000 miles. Another part of the 1,000 miles was from Pendleton, Oreg., to Ellensburg in the State of Washington. One of the primary reasonsfor that is to connect the military and industrial complex in the Rocky Mountain area with the northwestern ports in Washington by way of those ports to Alaska.

You will notice that unless there was a direct connection there we would be depending entirely upon the coastal road in Oregon and Washington which, from a military point of view, was not good. This stacked up as very important from the point of view of system integration.

Those were the routes that were added.

Another one was down around here, around New Orleans, from Baton Rouge over to east of New Orleans, in order to tie in with Mobile. The reason for that bypass is that the existing highway system is close to the coast, and it was felt desirable to put a route back in the country away from the exposed area of the gulf.

Mr. BOGGS. Because of military reasons?

Mr. TALLAMY. Yes, sir; that was one of the primary reasons.