Now It Can Be Told: The Story Of The Manhattan ProjectGeneral Leslie Groves and J. Robert Oppenheimer were the two men chiefly responsible for the building of the first atomic bomb at Los Alamos, code name "The Manhattan Project." As the ranking military officer in charge of marshalling men and material for what was to be the most ambitious, expensive engineering feat in history, it was General Groves who hired Oppenheimer (with knowledge of his left-wing past), planned facilities that would extract the necessary enriched uranium, and saw to it that nothing interfered with the accelerated research and swift assembly of the weapon.This is his story of the political, logistical, and personal problems of this enormous undertaking which involved foreign governments, sensitive issues of press censorship, the construction of huge plants at Hanford and Oak Ridge, and a race to build the bomb before the Nazis got wind of it. The role of groves in the Manhattan Project has always been controversial. In his new introduction the noted physicist Edward Teller, who was there at Los Alamos, candidly assesses the general's contributions-and Oppenheimer's-while reflecting on the awesome legacy of their work. |
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Results 1-5 of 74
Page vi
... soon excused them . After that it was necessary for me to make my own weather predictions — a field in which I had nothing more than very general knowledge . " As in other complicated issues , General Groves made the right decision . My ...
... soon excused them . After that it was necessary for me to make my own weather predictions — a field in which I had nothing more than very general knowledge . " As in other complicated issues , General Groves made the right decision . My ...
Page xvi
... soon became evident to Dr. Bush and to me that if serious delays to our work were to be avoided the MED should expand its research activities , and take over control of all the atomic research projects then under the management of the ...
... soon became evident to Dr. Bush and to me that if serious delays to our work were to be avoided the MED should expand its research activities , and take over control of all the atomic research projects then under the management of the ...
Page 8
... soon became apparent that unless unprecedented quantities of this material could be produced in a much purer state , a U - 235 chain reaction would be impossible . The basic problem was to arrive at an industrial process that would ...
... soon became apparent that unless unprecedented quantities of this material could be produced in a much purer state , a U - 235 chain reaction would be impossible . The basic problem was to arrive at an industrial process that would ...
Page 13
... soon come to a standstill . Then the question of a name for the project came up . Toward the end of June , Reybold called Robins , Marshall , Nichols and me to his office and told us that he had conferred with Somervell and Styer , and ...
... soon come to a standstill . Then the question of a name for the project came up . Toward the end of June , Reybold called Robins , Marshall , Nichols and me to his office and told us that he had conferred with Somervell and Styer , and ...
Page 14
... soon concluded that the best lo- cation would be somewhere near Knoxville , Tennessee . That area seemed to meet all the requirements , and beyond that , it gave promise of being a pleasant place for the permanent operating force to ...
... soon concluded that the best lo- cation would be somewhere near Knoxville , Tennessee . That area seemed to meet all the requirements , and beyond that , it gave promise of being a pleasant place for the permanent operating force to ...
Contents
3 | |
19 | |
33 | |
THE PLUTONIUM PROJECT | 38 |
I | 60 |
I | 68 |
II | 78 |
OAK RIDGE | 94 |
CHOOSING THE TARGET | 263 |
TINIAN | 277 |
ALAMOGORDO | 288 |
OPERATIONAL PLANS | 305 |
HIROSHIMA | 315 |
THE GERMANS HEAR THE NEWS | 333 |
NAGASAKI | 341 |
PART III | 357 |
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BRITISH | 125 |
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND PRESS CENSORSHIP | 138 |
II | 149 |
THE COMBINED DEVELOPMENT TRUST | 170 |
ALSOS IITALY | 185 |
A SERIOUS MILITARY PROBLEM | 199 |
ALSOS IIFRANCE | 207 |
ALSOS IIIGERMANY | 230 |
PART II | 251 |
TRAINING THE AIR UNIT | 253 |
THE MED AND CONGRESS | 359 |
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JAPANESE CYCLOTRONS | 367 |
TRANSITION PERIOD | 373 |
THE AEC | 389 |
POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS | 401 |
A FINAL WORD | 413 |
APPENDIXES | 417 |
INDEX | 445 |
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Now It Can Be Told: The Story Of The Manhattan Project General Leslie R. Groves Limited preview - 2009 |
Now It Can Be Told: The Story Of The Manhattan Project General Leslie R. Groves Limited preview - 2009 |
Common terms and phrases
agreement Air Force Alamogordo Alamos American Army asked assistance atomic bomb atomic energy Belgian Belgian Congo British Bush carried Chicago Chief of Staff civilian Colonel Commanding complete Compton Conant construction cyclotrons decision diffusion discussion du Pont effort engineering equipment explosion Farrell felt field finally gaseous diffusion German Groves Hanford heavy water Hechingen Heisenberg Hiroshima immediately important intelligence Japan Joliot knew laboratory later Los Alamos major Manhattan Project Marshall material matter miles mission Nagasaki Navy necessary needed Nichols nuclear Oak Ridge operation Operation Harborage Oppenheimer organization OSRD particularly Pash personnel pile plane plans plant plutonium Pont possible President problem production radioactive reactor reason responsibility scientific scientists Secretary of War Secretary Stimson Sengier Stimson Styer target technical thought Tinian tion told Tube Alloys United uranium V-J Day wanted Washington weapon
Popular passages
Page vi - Since it was obvious that they were completely upset by the failure of the long-range predictions, I soon excused them," he explains. "After that it was necessary for me to make my own weather predictions — a field in which I had no special competence." Luckily for Amarillo and Albuquerque, Oppenheimer continued to rely on the chief meteorologist, Jack Hubbard. He, Oppenheimer and Farrell had long planned to constitute themselves a triumvirate to decide whether to keep to schedule. None of them...
Page ix - Yet the gulf between the military establishment and the scientific community is as great as ever. General Groves was one of the pioneers who, with difficulty but ultimate success, managed to throw a bridge across the abyss. I do not see much hope for the survival of our democratic form of government if we cannot rebuild that bridge made by General Groves and J. Robert Oppenheimer.
Page xv - Wallace and as a result what was known as the "top policy group" was formed to direct the project. It consisted of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of War, Dr. Bush, and Dr. James B. Conant, chairman of the National Defense Research Committee.
Page v - Throughout the war years, Oppie knew in detail what was going on in every part of the Laboratory. He was incredibly quick and perceptive in analyzing human as well as technical problems. Of the more than ten thousand people who eventually came to work at Los Alamos, Oppie knew several hundred intimately, by which I mean that he knew what their relationships with one another were and what made them tick. He knew how to organize, cajole, humor, soothe feelings — how to lead powerfully without seeming...
Page iv - I have known many directors intimately. For a short time, I was even a director myself. I know of no one whose work begins to compare in excellence with that of Oppenheimer's.
Page xvi - At first, the responsibilities were only for the engineering, construction and operation of the plants to produce bomb materials.
Page xvii - This assignment included selecting the target cities, subject to the approval of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War...
Page xv - We made certain that each member of the project thoroughly understood his part in our total effort — that, and nothing more.
Page xvii - The bulk of the project moved ahead by dint of the hard work and the feeling of urgency of everyone concerned and without requiring any personal supervision on my part.
Page xvi - I gradually came to be more and more responsible for the initial formulation of general policy and for the translation of policy into action.