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to put less emphasis on increasing its personal staff and much more effort into increasing the strength and investigatory power of its own institutional tools for these purposes, particularly the General Accounting Office, Congressional Research Service, and Congressional Budget Office.

6. Information, Disclosure and Executive Privilege. The Research Committee did not conduct any explicit review of these topics.

7. Campaign Financing. Passage of the Campaign Financing Act of 1974 created the one direct reform to flow from the Watergate fiasco. Similar laws have been enacted at the state level. As yet it is too early to be sure how these changes will affect the conduct of American politics, but a few indications of emerging trends seem apparent. The conditions for reimbursing campaign expenses appear of most help to those candidates already well-known and with a grassroots organization developed well in advance to draw out the many small contributions that earn matching Federal dollars. The building of a bandwagon effect through a succession of primary victories in a few states appears to be less important than basic organization-building efforts throughout a great many states. One of the most important and least foreseen results may be a tendency to make the personal campaign organizations of individual candidates a more enduring feature of the political landscape. Since Federal reimbursement for expenses occurs only later in the election year, the funds may be a way, not only of paying expenses after the election, but also of providing seed

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money to maintain a semblance of the candidate's organization for future competition.

There may also be good reason to raise significant constitutional questions about the possibility of infringing rights of individual free speech and expression in the recent campaign financing legislation. These issues are now being tested in the courts, as they must. Experience with the new Federal Election Commission itself is too brief to warrant any immediate conclusions about its effectiveness. What does seem clear is that the Commission has generally interpreted the scope for its rule-making powers somewhat broader than most legislators intended or, in an election year, may care to condone.

Summary. Writing in 1974 during the continuing crisis atmosphere of Watergate, the National Academy's Panel both over-and underestimated the possibilities of reform. It overstated the need to constrain executive power through detailed prescriptions concerning the framework and processes of Presidential leadership. Thus, the Panel urged too many new Congressional enactments intended to constrain executive action while stressing too little the need for Congress itself to make better use of the powers it already has. But the Panel also understated the need for institutional improvements of a more fundamental kind, particularly in the system of law enforcement and in the career civil service system. Ultimately, the Panel did not

65-728 - 76-26

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suggest a strategy whereby the momentum provided by Watergate would

result in continuing, broad public support behind a focused agenda for reform. Nor could the Panel have foreseen the back-to-normalcy letdown following the Nixon resignation and Ford succession.

Yet the fact is that most of the same institutional weaknesses are

as present today as they were before the first Watergate break-in, deficiencies with the same explosive potential for further weakening Americans' confidence in their political system. Protection should depend, not on straight-jacketing political executives as the Panel seems to suggest, but rather on a strategy of creating more countervailing tripwires to prevent individual misdeeds from escalating into major crises. More effective means for taking appropriate, speedy steps in response to early-warning signals would go far in preventing particular abuses of executive power from mushrooming into major disturbances that can be resolved only by constitutional processes of last resort. At present there is little sign of any effort to make government reform proposals a part of the 1976 campaign debate. Regretfully, Watergate's opportunity for creating the appropriate reforms may already have been dissipated.

Drafting Committee: Hugh Heclo, Chairman

Fred R. Brown
Conley Dillon

The following Research Committee members wish to have their names included as endorsing this report:

Elizabeth C. Cox

Willard Fazar

Ezra Glaser

Frank M. Graves
David Hartley
Eileen Siedman

Frank J. Heller

Robert T. Murphy
Philip Reeves

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APPENDIX

The Committee on Research in Public Administration

is associated with the National Capital Area Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration, with membership by invitation of

the Committee. Monthly luncheon meetings are held to discuss research topics of current interest in public affairs. During 1974-1975 the chairman of the Committee was Ezra Glaser. Guest speakers during discussion of the National Academy Panel's Report included Roy Crawley, Bertrand Harding, James M. Mitchell, Herbert Roback, Mitchell Rogovin, and Jules Witcover. None of these speakers is responsible for the contents

of this report, for which the Drafting Committee accepts full responsibility.