been available to all concerned to the best of my knowledge. I came here, and the request which Commander Byrne speaks of for the information was made yesterday, which was the first knowledge we had that the Navy didn't have that information or was not getting that information. As a member of the group evaluating this test, we also have a Navy member, a Commander Abernathy, and that information has been available to him at all times. So, I feel sure, perhaps there is a misunderstanding in a rather general way.

Mr. BONNER. Is there any further presentation to make? What observation would you care to make, Major Dull, for the Air Force?

STATEMENT OF MAJ. J. E. DULL, MEDICAL SUPPLY DEPOT, AIR FORCE LIAISON

AIR FORCE 100 PERCENT IN FAVOR OF TEST

Major DULL. So far as the Air Force stations out here, from the depot on down, I know personally that they are 100 percent in favor of this test. They have received excellent service from this depot and they are more than happy with it. So far as the cooperation for any information which we have requested is concerned, Colonel Asbill has furnished it to me without any delay. That is about all I have.

OPINIONS SOUGHT FROM HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS

Mr. BROWNSON. I would like to have an expression from the highranking members present as to what their investigation of this experiment to date has indicated to the best of their knowledge that has been developed up to the present time. I think it would be an excellent thing to include a statement at this time such as any representative of the three services would care to make on the basis of their knowledge of the experiment to date as transmitted to them through their own command channels from the participating unit.

ARMY POSITION

Major General TANSEY. I would like to make a statement in answer to several questions that were not probably fully answered. One was the question which was brought up about the delay in getting the test started. That delay, of course, was not due to the depot commander here. As soon as the decision was made to start this test, I think my office telephoned him very shortly thereafter-probably the same dayso he was alerted and it was confirmed as fast as the mail would get it to him. The Surgeon General's Office was also informed.

I think the delay was due entirely to the Army's position that if this was to be a test, it should be a real test and not some test of the depot in Atlanta or two or three others that were suggested. Those matters on a high level cause considerable discussion and agreement upon the Munitions Board level and among the Secretaries. The Army proposed that we try the west coast because that would be a test to support in time of war-support the Korean operation, the Navy fleet in the Pacific and a large area of the Air Force and that was the reason that we suggested this particular place. Another point I would like to make is the point which I think is well taken and disturbed me a little bit and that is the point Mr. Ward brought up about

the questionnaires. It is a very general thing and I think it can be improved. I think I will initiate action with the Munitions Board to make it more positive and definitive-pin-point it. I do not think everyone in the field had the same yardstick, as Mr. Ward expressed; they were not thinking in terms of the same service or a monthly basis or a percentage basis of logistic support. I think that can be improved upon and I will initiate action when I get back to see if that can be done.

The Army at this time is not prepared to make a statement as to the evaluation. That will be at the Munitions Board level anyhow, based upon reports from the various services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board staff, and the Comptroller, who are looking into the economy that a test like this might prove to be in the future. So, we do not feel that we can at this time give you an evaluation. However, I would like to emphasize the point brought out so clearly in the last sentence or two of Colonel Strnad's presentation and that is, that we are interested in a system that will not fall down in time of war. You could have tests, perhaps, in smaller areas in peacetime, but the Army wants to be sure that it will have a logistic support in time of war.

We are very much interested in and behind 100 percent the saving of money and pushing the objectives of this subcommittee. We, however, do not want to move into any field, regardless if we can save a few dollars or spending a few dollars, and reduce the combat effectiveness of our troops along that line.

There is one other point, even though you went into a full service depot for all three services in this area, at this level there comes a point when the depot commander's hands would be tied and I refer to the supply of equipment or supplies which are critical in nature and need to be allocated. Decisions of a nature like that in time of war would have to be made at a joint level and the only agency I know to make those decisions at the present time with the authority they have is the Joint Munitions Board Allocations Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So, if you are in short supply, you still have problems in setting up an agency, whether it was one service or joint service, you still require allocations at a higher level, where the agency would be in close touch with the priorities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, covering the combat operations at the time.

Mr. CURTIS. You are talking now about over-all supply and not a shortage that might be in the distributive system which this level would reflect?

Major General TANSEY. This particular depot would be supporting a very critical one

Mr. CURTIS (interposing). Yes, but I mean in its distribution, not necessarily an over-all supply. If they were found to have a shortage of over-all supply that would be inquired into?

Major General TANSEY. Well, the supply control point would come into the picture and if it were not nationally available.

STRENGTHENING MUNITIONS BOARD

Mr. BONNER. General, along the line you were addressing yourself to this subcommittee, this subcommittee has repeatedly stated that it did not want to do anything to injure the striking effectiveness of the armed services, and repeatedly this subcommittee has made observa

tions on the activities of the Munitions Board. If you will remember, back some time ago we asked several times if the Munitions Board didn't need strengthening. At an appearance of the Secretary before the subcommittee, the following occurred:

Mr. BONNER. Mr. Secretary, this statement at the bottom of page 9 strikes me very forcefully and I think it will strike the Nation most forcefully, your statement: "I agree that there is room for improvement."

LOVETT'S STATEMENT ON MUNITIONS BOARD INADEQUACY

And the Secretary, speaking of the functions of the Munitions Board, goes on further and I quote:

I believe that the present concept of the Board would prove inadequate under full mobilization.

SUBCOMMITTEE WORKING ON MEDICAL SUPPLY SINCE MAY 1951

So, therefore, this subcommittee initiated and introduced legislation to improve the Munitions Board, and the Senate became interested and picked it up, and as a result of that there is legislation on the books that has greatly strengthened the functions of the Munitions Board. I would like to call the attention of the subcommittee and you gentlemen here to the fact that Congressman Shelley, of San Francisco, who held the initial hearings on medical supply in Brooklyn on May 1, 1951, is now with us. A great deal of credit is due Congressman Shelley for the progress which has been made in this field. Congressman Shelley has been absent due to some conditions beyond his control, but the subcommittee is happy that he has now joined us.

Mr. BROWNSON. I wonder if any of the other general officers or admirals have a statement they would like to make?

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. DAN C. OGLE, DEPUTY SURGEON GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE

TEST WORKING WELL FOR AIR FORCE

Major General OGLE. As this subcommittee knows, this test has not altered the medical supply system of the Air Force. Speaking for the Office of the Surgeon General, the Medical Supply Services have been entirely in favor of it and they have taken the opportunity of sending people here for preliminary evaluation of the test. They have no objection to it and it is certainly working admirably as far as they are concerned and our supply service has been quite satisfactory since the supply stock record accounts have been placed in the Army depots. I have no further comment.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. T. EARLE HIPP, SUPPLY CORPS, COMMANDING OFFICER, NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER, OAKLAND, CALIF.

NAVY INTEGRATED MEDICAL SUPPLY WITH OTHER COMMON SUPPLIES

Rear Admiral HIPP. I am Rear Adm. T. E. Hipp, Commanding Officer, Naval Supply Center at Oakland, of which this medical and dental supply depot became a component on the first day of July of this year. I would like to say here, as a component of the naval supply

center at Oakland, we are and have been supporting this test to the utmost. I would like to also reassure the committee that the change in the officers in charge of the depot-and we all recognize that Commander Owen was a very able officer and did a wonderful job there as officer in charge of that depot-however, I can assure you that the service and the operation of that depot will not suffer since it has become a part of the Navy supply center. They have been very close neighbors of ours all the time. There has been a utilization of common services and it isn't like two strangers getting together. Our personnel-they know us and we know them. The Naval Supply Center is so designed it can undertake this job and do it. I assure you, Mr. Bonner, and the other members of the committee, that we will support this test to the utmost.

Mr. KENNEDY. I would like to ask Admiral Royar if there is any plan at this level with regard to the return of the stocks at the conclusion of the test on August 31 that would give an indication of what the Navy's attitude was during, we will say, the last 3 months, as to what would be the disposition of those stocks at the end of the test.

Rear Admiral ROYAR. Well, you may know the directive is out that there will be no movement of the stocks until the test has been evaluated. Therefore, we will continue to support this depot, and it will operate as it has been until——

Mr. KENNEDY (interposing). Not until the final operation is over. Do they have the directive at this level at this time?

Commander BYRNE. Yes, sir.

Mr. KENNEDY. If you keep the stocks here in this area, what plans do you have for the naval depot, which is on a stand-by basis?

Rear Admiral ROYAR. We cannot make any permanent plans until the test is finally evaluated and we know what final arrangements will be made; whether this will be made a permanent operation or whether we will go back to the other operation.

Mr. KENNEDY. There has been some mention in Washington of a problem area in the test with regard to the Navy on the number of requisitions coming back "not in stock"-NIS, I believe they call it. I was wondering if the Navy feels that it is getting adequate support under the test at the present time?

Commander BYRNE. Any stocks available for issue to the naval activities have come from the Oakland depot. If an item is NIS, it is the Navy's responsibility. Now, I know the matter to which you are referring. It happened that the Navy's NIS position was perhaps larger than it should have been, but there were reasons why it was that high. One was that there are what we call newly established items, which come into the system every month; new items, such as drugs or medical stores of one kind or another, which are added to the catalog. In the past-until recently-it has been the policy for naval activities to requisition those new items immediately when they appeared in the catalog, yet the item would not be available at a depot maybe until 6 or 9 months later due to procurement problems. So, all of these items that are requisitioned by naval activities, the depot has an obligation even though there has never been any of that item in stock. Another reason why the Navy NIS figure was high is that we had a system of rationing. If we got to a low level of supply and, let us say, an activity requisitioned 12 of an item, we might send them

3 and keep the other 9 for issue to other activities. When we did that, it established an obligation even though some of the items had been provided through the requisition activity. Actually the NIS position of the Navy, we will say of July 1, I know it was excellent. I think there were only about 10 items which were NIS throughout the medical supply system.

Mr. KENNEDY. Do you have a few examples of the type that you have mentioned?

Commander BYRNE. A newly established item

Mr. KENNEDY (interposing). NIS.

Mr. SHELLEY. What were the type of items that you have just mentioned of the 10 that were NIS as of July 1 that you can recall? Commander BYRNE. I am sorry, I can't tell you what they are. Maybe Captain Jordan would know.

STATEMENT OF CAPT. L. G. JORDAN, UNITED STATES NAVY

Captain JORDAN. I cannot tell you the identical items, but no procurement is authorized until an item is standardized. The catalog usually comes into the hands of the customer and reflects the additional new items in advance of delivery of the items under contract. The field activity seeing the item in the catalog, may ask for it and it is then back-ordered and will be furnished to that activity when it becomes available for delivery under a contract.

Mr. KENNEDY. Do you feel that the organization as set up here at Alameda for the institution of this test is unified enough in character to lend itself to stabilized integration if the test were to be successful? For instance, it would appear from the chart that you have, the Army organization and the liaison of the Navy and Air Force is merely two tails added to the kite. A question by the Congressman earlier was answered by stating that the executive officer was an Air Force man. It would seem that some organization of that type would be a help in monitoring the activities of the agencies. Do you have any comment on that?

Lieutenant Colonel ASBILL. I have my personal comment on this. I believe back as far as 1947 we recommended something along this line be jointly staffed. I think it would lend to a much better operation if it were jointly staffed with the Navy as well as it is now with the Army and Air Force. For example, we have about 15 Army officers and about 6 Air Force officers in various and sundry positions in the depot and there are, more or less, 3 you might say, attached in this Navy liaison. I really believe that you could have an executive officer who could wear any uniform as far as I am concerned or an adjutant or stock-control officer. Certainly it would not make a bit of difference to me. I believe it would certainly lend to perhaps a little closer cooperation.

Mr. KENNEDY. Commander Byrne, in your experience here, do you have any comment? Do you feel you would have been placed in a more participating role had it been integrated, rather than as it was set up?

Commander BYRNE. I think the set-up that exists was satisfactory, and while I think that the three services could provide a staff through unified operation, the fact that it is essential, I would say that under a unified operation, all services provide personnel. Yet, I do not