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CHAP, XVI-The chief Kinds or Divisions of Being, and first of Substance and Mode.

AFTER we have gone through the various affections of being, we come now to consider what several kinds of being there are And it is certain they may be distinguished by the mind of man in very various ways, and cast into several kinds or species: But those which are most common in this science, and indeed not universal, are these three divisions of them. Beings are either substances or modes, finite, or infinite, and natural, artificial or moral.

The first and most general division of being is into substance and mode.

Every being is considered either as subsisting of itself, without the support of any creature, and then it is called substance, as an egg, a tree, air, water, a man, an angel; or it is considered as subsisting by virtue of some other being in which it is, or to which it belongs; and then it is called a mode, as length, motion, shape, colour, softness, wisdom, knowledge.

Note, When we speak of beings, we do more usually understand substances, because they seem to have a more considerable sort of nature and existence; but since many modes, properties and qualities have also a real existence in nature, and sometimes have other modes and affections belonging to them, besides vast powers and influences in the universe, I think they cannot well be excluded from the comprehensive idea of being.

Those philosophers who are of this opinion, are called the realists; whereas the writers who allow only substances to have a real existence and deny qualities, properties, relations, or any sort of modes really to exist, because they do not subsist by themselves, these are called nominalists or nominals.

It is granted indeed that mere relative modes or relations of things one to another, such as likeness, order, place, &c. seem still to partake less of the nature of beings than such real modes, as motion, figure and quantity do; yet many of these relations have a real foundation in nature, and a sort of reality in things as well as in our conceptions. Query, Must we take them out of all the ranks of being, when the word is taken in its very largest sense?

Though there have been fierce contentions on this subject between the nominals and realists, yet the controversy is not worthy of any warin debate: For while it may be allowed ou both sides, that being does not in so full and strong a sense belong to modes, as it does to substances, the disputants may agree by saying, that self-subsisting beings have a substantial essence and existence, whereas the essence or existence of modes is but

modul. Why should names provoke disputes, where our ideas agree?

All substances that we know are either material or intelligent, i. e. bodies ar spirits. Man indeed is compounded of both of them; but as for space, which is neither body nor spirit, I take it to be a nonentity or nothing real, but a mere idea of the mind, which we are wont to consider, under the form of something long, broad and deep, without solidity. Perhaps these positive conceptions arise by our abstracting some properties of matter from the rest, or only from a prejudice of sense and imagination, as we conceive just of darkness or a shadow to have the dimensions of length and breadth, and fancy it to have shape and motion too, though we know it is properly not-being, or a mere absence of light.

After substances, we come to consider modes of being, and these have also their various kinds into which they are distributed, viz. essential and accidental, primary and secondary, inherent and adherent, i. e. Qualities and adjuncts, and many others. But in Logic they are treated of largely; and therefore I dismiss the reader to Logic, part 1. chap. 2. sect. 3 and 4.

CHAP. XVII.-Of Finite and Infinite.

THE ideas of finite and infinite come next to be considered by us.

Finite beings are those which are limited or bounded in their natures, their parts, their quantity, their qualities, their powers and operations, or their duration. Infinite is that which is unlimited, and hath no bounds.

When substances are called finite or infinite, it is chiefly in respect of their quantity, or in respect of their powers. All substances are in this sense finite or infinite: But as there are some qualities or modes of being which are called infinite or finite, so there are some to which neither finite nor infinite can properly agree: We speak of knowledge, goodness, patience, length, breadth, &c. as finite or infinite: But there is no such thing as a finite or infinite blue, red or green; no finite or infinite likeness between two drops of rain: There is no finite or infinite truth in a proposition, nor finite or infinite crookedness in a stick.

The universe of bodies is finite in its dimensions or quantity, as well as every single body. I have elsewhere shewn, that the supposed space beyond the world is probably nothing at all, and therefore not properly infinite or finite; though we often speak of the infinite void; i. e. emptiness or absence of being every where beyond the creation, unbounded by any real being: For as nihility may be called the limit of being, so being may be said to limit nihility.

The idea of finite belongs to created spirits as well as bodies; not in regard of quantity, if they have no dimensions; but in regard of their qualities, their knowledge, and power, and goodness, and all their operations, for all these are confined to certain limits, yet they are allowed to have an everlasting or unlimited duration, i. e. with regard to the future, or a parte post, though not with regard to the past, or a parte unte, as the schools speak; that is, though they may have no end, yet they had a beginning.

This unlimited duration of spirits has been called usually immortality or eviternity. And indeed this property doth really belong also to matter considered in general as well as to mind; for however variable and mortal the particular forms and conipositions of bodies may be, yet as for body or matter itself nothing can destroy or annihilate it but the God that created it.

We have little to do with the ideas of infinite, but in our conceptions of the everlasting duration of our natures, in our contemplations of God, or of mathematical quantities.

How far the duration of our souls is infinite, has been exprest.

The infinity of God has been usually distinguished into the infinity of his essence, or his duration, or his attributes.

1. The infinity of his essence or presence is his immensity or omnipresence: How this to be understood concerning his consciousness and power or influence rather than extension. See the the chapter of time and place.

2. The infinity of his duration is his externity, without beginning and without end, a parte antè as well as a parte post. See the chapter of duration.

3. The infinity of his attributes implies that his knowledge and his power have no bounds; or that his power, knowledge, holiness, wisdom, goodness, are infinite, &c. i. e. every way perfect in the most absolute sense.

When we consider an infinite under this idea of actual absolute perfection, it may be counted a positive idea; but if we consider it as without limit, it is negative: Yet some refine further, and make the word limit a negative term, because it denies progress or increase, and thus infinite becomes a sort of positive idea again.

Mr. Locke teaches us that our idea of infinite is not a complete idea, but rather an idea ever growing and receiving additions; and for the most part this is a just idea of it, for it is certain, that this is the way we come by this idea at first. Yet the idea of an actual positive infinite directly contradicts this growing idea, for it supposes all addition impossible. We are finite creatures, and we soon lose ourselves among infinites.

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Indefinite is not a medium between finite and infinite, for they are two contradictory ideas; indefinite therefore, only denotes our ignorance of the limits of a thing.

No actual infinite can consist of finite parts, for there is some proportion between the parts and a whole, but between finite and infinite, there is no proportion dig

Yet mathematicians oftentimes deal in infinites, both with regard to magnitude and number and though there be not in nature any actual infinite quantity of either kind, for there is no magnitude, there is no number, which cannot receive addition, yet they form a sort of abstracted notion of infinite length, breadth depth, of infinite extension and divisibility, and reason upon them.

There is also infinite disproportion when they treat of quan tities and their infinitesimals, 2. e. such as bear no finite proportion to the quantities whose infinitesimals they are.

Their infinite approximations may be justly ranked among the ever-growing ideas.

CHAP. XVIII-Of natural, moral and artificial Beings and Ideas.

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THE last distribution of beings which I shall take notice of is into natural, moral and artificial.

Natural beings are all those things that have a real and proper existence in the universe, and are considered as formed and ordained by God the Creator; such are bodies, spirits, men, beasts, trees, fruit, strengh, countenance, sense, reason, fire, air, light, &c.

Though some of these are produced by others, as eggs by a hen, and fruit from a tree, yet God is generally considered as the author of all natural beings; and indeed he is so either immediately by himself, or by the laws of nature, which he has ordained.

Artificial beings are made by the contrivance or operations of men, whether they are of a mere corporeal nature, such as houses, windows, pictures, statutes, arms, garments, writing, music, and the various utensils of life; or whether they relate more to intellectual matters, as words, sciences, rules, arguments, propositions, verse, prose, &c.

Note, Though in some natural beings man is said to be the more immediate author or cause of them, such as a father of his son, &c. and in all artificial beings whatsoever, yet the power of man reaches only to what is modal in them; it is God alone can make substances, for that is most properly a creation.

Moral beings are those which belong to behaviour, conduct and government of intelligent creatures, or creatures endued with freedom of will, considered as lying under obligations to par

ticular actions or abstinences: But these considered as moral are only modal; such are law, duty, virtue, vice, sin, righteousness, judgment, condemnation, pardon, reward, punishment.

As beings have been thus divided into natural, artificial and moral, I think we might almost in the same manner run through all the sciences. and give new names to different beings, by calling them logical, mathematical, political, &c. applying these names to the subjects which these sciences treat of.

I confess I should chuse rather to call them different ideas, than different beings, and under this consideration we may say logical ideas are such as genus and species, definition and syllogism: Mathematical ideas are length, breadth, a cube, a circle, multiplication, proportion, &c. Our ideas are called medicinal, when we discourse of sudorifics and boluses: And when we speak of kings, subjects, laws, rebellion, allegiance, treason, &c. these are political ideas; but God, holiness, christianity, repentance, gospel and salvation are theological, and of highest importance above all other kinds of ideas.

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